CHERNOBYL SUMMARY

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP91B00874R000100170009-5
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 7
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: August 30, 2011
• Sequence Number: 9
• Content Type: MISC

Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/08/31 :CIA-RDP91 B00874R000100170009-5
Chernot~ Summary
WHAT HAPPENED
The accident occurred during low power testing when
the reactor power surged from 200 megawatts to about 1600 megawatts (At full
power the reactor produces 3200 megawatts.) We believe that either faulty
control rod manipulation or loss of cooling water initiated the accident.
-- Within seconds the fuel overheated and chemical reactions began
producing hydrogen.
-- A hydrogen explosion occurred -- apparently within minutes --
damaging the reactor and starting fires in the
reactor building.
-- Damage to the reactor was so severe that it was impossible to
remove heat and the 1700 tons of graphite in the reactor core
were heated to the ignition point.
-- The explosion blew radioactive debris into the environment.
The fire continued to expel radioactive materials from the
core.
Reactor Status
The damaged reactor continued to burn for about 2 weeks.
-- The high temperatures -- thousands of degrees -- threatened
to destroy critical safety systems in the adjacent reactor.
Heroic efforts were required to save this reactor from
destruction.
-- A combination of improvisation -- using helicopters to drop thousands
of tons of materials into the burning reactor -- and heroism by
technicians who were able to enter the building while the reactor
blazed, finally stabilized the situation.
RECOVERY OPERATIONS
High radiation levels at the site have made recovery operations
difficult.
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/08/31 :CIA-RDP91 B00874R000100170009-5
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/08/31 :CIA-RDP91 B00874R000100170009-5
-- In areas near the reactor the levels are so high that only
remotely operated equipment could be used. A shielded above
ground concrete tunnel is now being constructed to allow people
access around the reactor building.
-- At greater distances access is possible, but workers are
receiving the maximum allowable dose of 25 rem in 15 to 20 working
hours. (Under similar circumstances the US would allow only 3 rem.)
-- Operations are greatly hindered by blowing radioactive dust.
Materials are being sprayed from helicopters to cover the ground
and immobilize airborne contaminants.
-- A tunnel has been dug under unit 4 and preparations are underway
to construct a concrete structure under the building.
,,, Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/08/31 :CIA-RDP91 B00874R000100170009-5
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/08/31 :CIA-RDP91 B00874R000100170009-5
RADIOLOGICAL EPPECTS
Acute Radiation Sickness
--About 299 people have been hospitalized for acute radiation sickness
of the first to fourth degree, 18 of these victims were described as
being of the fourth degree.This indicates that at least 18 persons
received '.:ighly lethal radiation doses.
a received more than 800-900 rads.(About 450 rads will be lethal to
50 percent of those exposed,assuming no medical intervention. One rad
is equivalent to the radiation dose of 50 chest X-rays.)
overall.
about 85 of the victims are in serious condition,
--Thus far, 2~ of the radiation victims have died; 12 of these had received
bone marrow transplants. Two persons dieid in the initial fire/explosions.
--Most exposure victims are now passing the critical period. The principal
risk for all radiation sickness vic ims is due to infection because the
bone marrow is suppressed and does^~ ke white blood cells. (There is also
the problem of bleeding due to the loss of platlets to clot the blood.)
Nature of Radiation Injuries
--The distribution of radiation injuries is to guards, firemen, physicians,
and reactor physicists. The physicians may have been heavilyt exposed when
they treated highly contaminated victims.
--The Soviets may still be able to ascertain exposures to workers and the
general population even for tholle who did not manifest symptoms. The
have been collecting blood cells for examination from certain :persons.
These will be examined for abnormalities in the chromosomes; human
exposures down to 15 rads can be detected by this method. (The Soviets
have already contacted us for assistance on this technique.)
Thus, the Soviets could eventually assess their population dose.
Long-Term Consequences
--Research on atomic bomb survivors and other exposed population groups
has shown that radiation induces cancers. Models :which predict cancer
potential show that the probability increases as a function of the amount
of radiation and total number of persons exposed.
--If we use the Soviet figure for the population at risk, then about 300 excess
cancers can be expected...depdnding on the total dose to them.
--We are currently conducting computer modelling to refine these estimates.
Potential thyroid cancers will be much higher due to the larger quantities
of radi~ctive iodine released, which concentrates in the thyroid gland.
. ~~ Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/08/31 :CIA-RDP91 B00874R000100170009-5
 .__ _1___
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/08/31 :CIA-RDP91 B00874R000100170009-5
,.
USSR: Economic Impact of
the Chernobyl' Accident
Preliminary analysis of the Chernobyl' nuclear
accident indicates that direct damage to the Soviet
economy will be relatively minor. Although the cost
of the evacuation, decontamination, cleamtp, im-
ports of technical equipment and medical supplies,
and some permanent resettlement will be large-
perhaps as much as 25 billion rubles
a 30-km zone amend the plant. We estimate the
population of this aria to be 150,000 to 180,000,
including the two towns of Pripyat' and Chernobyl'
asd the surrounding rural population. It is likely
that many Bad on foot-some with their live-
stock-before vehicles arrived. In addition to the
offu:ial evacu~xs, thousands of persons, mostly
women and children, have left Kiev and other cities
agriculture, industrial facilities, and the environ-
ment will be limited to a fairly small area. None-
theless, the potential loss of electric power this year
could put a crimp in General Secretary Gorba-
chev's hopes to get the new five-year plan off to a
The Haman Costs
Preliminary calculations suggest workers and fire-
men at the reactor site and local residents who were
drawn to the area by the fire-perhaps as many as
200 to 300 persons---received potentially lethal
doses of radiation. As of 21 May, the death toll was
15-13 from radiation and two from the explosion.
Additional deaths among the heavily irradiated
victims are expected in the next several weeks.
Onlookers near the site would have inhaled consid-
erable airborne radioactivity and may be among
the hospitalized victims, who, according to Gorba-
chev, numbered 299 on 14 May. People within S
kilometers (]cm) of the site who were exposed to the
initial radioactive plump could have received sub-
stantial doses of radiation. An additiona125,000 to
30,000 persons who were exposed may have re-
ceived enough radiation to show mild symptoms
such as nausea, and these people will be at risk for
future cancers.
The accident also forced alarge-scale relocation of
many in the area. As of 13 May, Moscow acknowl-
edged that 92,000 persons had been evacuated from
outside the 30-lon area.
It is dill cult to estimate the cost of the evacuation,
but assuming military units were involved, little
inertmseatal cost would accrue to the Soviets. Vol-
zmteeis are housing many of the evacuees; and, if
esnting bottsiag is properly decontaminated, resi-
de~ could begin returning within months. The
Soviets reportedly are applying a polymer to the
immediate area that can later be removed, taking
contamiaaticn with it. The roofs of buildings are
also being coated to prevent rain from washing
radioactive debris into drainage systems. It is likely
that permanent relocation will be required for some
of the population. Indeed, in some areas, the evacu-
ees are already being put to work.
Impact as Agriculture
The initial plume of radioactivity appears to have
passed aver an area covered largely by forests and
swamps. Not more than 15 to 25 percent of the
crop sad pasture land in the Chernobyl' region
would have been seriously affected. Soviet data
show that the region accounts for a minuscule share
of total Ukrainian farm output. Damage to farming
regions beyond the immediate area of the accident
is likely to be minimal. Because harmful levels of
contanunation are Iocalized, we do not anticipate
substantial, long-term effects on international com-
modity supplies or trade.
Secret
D! /EEW 86-021
23 May l 986
,,, Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/08/31 :CIA-RDP91 B00874R000100170009-5
__ __...
25X1 i
25X1'
25X1
25X1
25X1
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/08/31 :CIA-RDP91 B00874R000100170009-5
What Happened in Cturnobyl7
Our best estimate c~1'the cause ct1'the accident is
that the reactor power suddenly surged, producing
superheated steam. A reaction between superheat-
ed steam and zirconium-alloy fuel cladding pro-
dueed hydrogen gas. The gas built up until it
exploded, damaging the reactor and leading to fuel
melting and afire in the graphite. The destruction
c?f the reactor hall allowed large quantities ct1'
radioactivity to escape. The explosion reportedly
knocked out the radiation alarm system, and
ct~icials at the site did not learn ct1'the high levels
QJ'radioaetivity until hours later. Two and possibly
three persons were killed by the explosion, and at
least 3S people at the site, including some ctf the
Firemen who responded, were exposed to lethal
doses crf radiation. Helicopters were used to drop
sand, lead beads, clay, dolomite, and boron into
the burning reactor. There wasfinally extin-
guished on 11-12 May.
The livestock sector may be more seriously disrupt-
ed in the area. Indeed, we have already seen reports
of livestock being slaughtered because of high
radiation levels. Soviet press reports
however, indicate many livestock were evacuated
along with the population. Livestock that ingested
contaminated feed before being evacuated should
survive if quickly switched to clean feed. Except for
milking cows, radioactive isotopes not excreted by
these animals would be localized in organs general-
ly not consumed by humans, such as the thyroid,
and in bones. Some pastureland beyond the evacu-
ated area may have to be taken out of use until
radiation drops to acceptable levels, putting pres-
sure on local supplies of stored feed.
The local dairy industry will be most seriously
aSected because cows consuming radioactive feed
concentrate radioiodine-the main contaminant-
in their milk. Cows fed contaminatal feed will
produce hazardous milk for several weeks after
switching to clean feed. Soviet dairy authorities will
have to not only monitor the milk but also assure
that condemned milk does not reach black-market
Local F.,Q'ects of Radiation on Agriculture
The e~"ects onfarming activities near the site are
likely to be varied. Although the 48eeted area
contains very small quantities cif grain and sugar-
beets, winter grains planted last fall and sugar-
beets that are just emerging have been exposed to
radioactive particles settling on leaves. Some ctf
this radiation will be incorporated into the plants.
Lightly contaminated grain may be mixed with
clean grain during milling to dilute any harntl'ul
e,8'ects, but any heavily contaminated grain will
have to be collected and disposed ctf. Sugarbeets
exposed to radiation would tend to concentrate
radioactivity in their roots and will likely have to
According to US experts, spring grains and vegeta-
bles can be planted in areas a1'light contamination
because most 4f these crops-with the exception 4f
su~owers-ado not absorb radiation through their
roots. Danger to humans, however, could result
from contaminated dust raised by machinery in
fields during planting, subsequent field operations,
and harvesting. Thorough monitoring and decon-
tamination of workers, equipment, and crops in the
areas adjacent to the evacuated zone will be
necessary, slowing field work. Even in those areas
where contamination is light, crops could sr~'er
some losses d'normal Springfield operations are
delayed. Workers may be kept from thefields as a
safety precaution or diverted to cleanup opera-
tions. Growing seasons in the USSR are short, and
harvests are frequently disrupted by the early
The Chernobyl' power plant is located just north of
the Kiev Reservoir, which supplies the bulk of the
drinking water for the Ukraine's capital. Some
radiation was undoubtedly carried to the reservoir
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/08/31 :CIA-RDP91 B00874R000100170009-5
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/08/31 :CIA-RDP91 B00874R000100170009-5
/~ Sprat
winds and by the two major rivers feeding it-
t>ye Pripyat' and the Dnepr. Fish, particularly
ft+a+hwater shellfish, taken from these waters will
also require monitorin? for some t~n,~~
ov~e
ronmenta aut orities, however, maintain that reg-
tlsr water samples are being taken from the Kiev
Reervoir and that they show levels ivity
below established norms.
Ln1 Ind~~stry
An inventory of industrial facilities within the 30-
]art zone around the reactor reveals only a small
__ mrmber of civilian plants, including two concrete
~- p~ucts plants, amachine-tool plant, perhaps 10
- food-processing sites, three textile mills a
~. _>~ salmad repair yard. several
~.._ of these facilities ha own-probably
as
l
a resu
t of the evacuaUOn order. How long they
wtZl be affected remains an open question, depend-
ing ~ the degree of contamination and how
i
kl
qu
c
y
tht Soviets want to resume their operation. Moscow
has already discussed bringing reactor units 1 and
2 at Chernobyl' back on line as quickly as possible,
bat local industr ma n ave such a high
priacity.
In aD Ii selfhood, the accident disrupted-at least
tea~orarilY-electricity supplies beyond the 30-km
area. All industries suffer problems in the event of
browvnouts or blackouts, but the largest users of
mom'-rnetals processing, cement, food process-
ing. and chemicals-would be hardest hit from
resulting damage to machinery and products in
process. We have no information to daft regarding
specific disruptions in electric power supplies to
local industry. In addition to electricity, industrial
facilities depend on water for cooling and process-
ing. if irradiated water is used in processing, some
end products could be affected, particular) in the
chemical and food sectors.
Electricity Supplies
The shutdown of the four 1,Otl~)?megawatt (MW)
reactors at Chernobyl' will pttlbably have a wide
range of effects. During the sUfttmer lull in electric-
ity demand, the Soviets will bts able to compensate
for most of the power losses as~ciated with Cher-
nobyl' by using other generatidR capacity more
intensively. Beginning in Septesmber, however, the
upsurge in demand for electricity probably will
eliminate most of the painless tldjustment mecha-
nisms. Moreover, two
reactors at Kursk identical to t ~ amaged one at
Chernobyl' may not now be opstational. We cannot
be certain whether these othet teactors are com-
pletely shut down or arc operating at reduced
power levels for safety reasons. Moreover, if they
are in fact shut down, it is unekar that the
Chernobyl' accident was the te~t+wn? Moscow, how-
ever, probably would not disrv{yt the economy
further by shutting down the Mining nine
graphite-moderated, boiling-wrier reactors
(RBMK) similar to those at C~rnobyl' unless the
cause of accident is judged to ]eve stemmed from
basic design faults.
The confirmed shutdowns at Chernobyl' and the
likely shutdowns at Kursk-assauming the latter
reactors remain out of service kvt the remainder of
the year and the power is not ode up from other
plants-world reduce Soviet ~tricity output in
1986 by about 25 billion kilowa~t~-hours (kWh),
roughly 1.5 percent of the annum.) total. The im-
pact, however, is concentrated ?s~ two power grids
that would experience losses of sa~out 10 pcrcxnt.
Power cuts of this magnitude, though unlikely,
could seriously affect key econost~c activity in the
Ukraine and Moscow regions: p'u~s believe the Sovi-
ets will attempt to ease the imps by drawing
electricity from adjoining grids, end possibly from
more distant grids in the Urals a~ Kazakhstan.
Moscow may also request that (,~zechoslovakia,.
Bulgaria, Romania, and Poland 'sduce imports of
electricity from the Ukraine-r~yhly 20 billion
~tiu
25X
25X1
25X1
,,, Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/08/31 :CIA-RDP91 B00874R000100170009-5
 ,~
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/08/31 :CIA-RDP91 B00874R000100170009-5
f
kWh was sent to these ooantries m 1985. Clotting
exports to Eastern Europe, however, may not be a
politically attractive way to ease the crunch.
The Soviets could ate for the loss of elec-
tricity over the next several months if they forgo
maintenance normally scheduled for the sum-
mer-at pcrwerplan~ ~~ fossil fuels and operate
than at full winter capacities. Moscow has already
reported that one generating unit at a thermal
power plant in Kiev, normally held in reserve at this
time of the year, is now operating at full capacity to
p~i~y coepeosate for the loss of Chernobyl'.
Saver other power plants in the Ukraine-four
hydroelectric and three thermal-arc also reported
to be working at fall capacity.
the Soviets to at least put construction of new
RBMK rcactars on hold temporarily. The Soviet
decision to allow placement of nuclear plants closer
to populated areas to supply cxntralized district
heating systems-including one in Kiev-could be
reexamined.
Increasing output at eom-entional Plants, however,
is only a swpgap . Maintenance must still
be performed, sad if it is not finished by winter the
Soviets will be bard pressed to meet the surge in
electricity demaad that will take place then. In a~
event, domestiic suP'p~ of fossil fuels will have to
be supplemented with increases in domestic fuel
production and passisibly with imports, such as
additional oral from Poland. The additional fuel
required to offset the loss of the Chernobyl' reac-
tors would aasount to perhaps 150,000 barrels per
day oil eq~civaleat and half again as much if the
other Lwo reactors remain shut down. If domestic
fuel oil supplies are used to generate replacement
electricity for these six reactors, at the expense of
exports of oil to the West, hard currency losses
would amount to 5100 million per month at current
prices.
The Chernobyl' disaster is likely to result in some
setback to the USSR's nuclear power program. The
Sovicts currently have 28,300 MW of nuclear
generating capacity, supplying some 11 percent of
their electricity. Moscow's Plans call for expansion
of nuclear capacity to 70,000 MW by 1990, boost-
ing the nuclear share of total electricity output to
more than 20 percent. The accident may prompt
25X1
25X1
e
25X1
~~ Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/08/31 :CIA-RDP91 B00874R000100170009-5