TALKING POINTS FOR THE ADDI QADHAFI'S POSITION AFTER THE AIRSTRIKE

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP91B00874R000100170010-3
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 2
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: August 31, 2011
• Sequence Number: 10
• Publication Date: June 9, 1986
• Content Type: MISC

Talking Points for the ADDI
9 June 1986
Qadhafi's Position After the Airstrike
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/08/31: CIA-RDP91 B00874R000100170010-3
Regime Vulnerabilities
Domestic reactions to the US airstrike last April confirm
Qadhafi's unprecedented political problems.
-- Press reports indicate that the funeral procession in
Tripoli for those killed in the attack attracted only
several thousand marchers out of a local population of
about 900,000.
popular
criticism ot a a i has become more open since the US
_a a i graffitti recently appeared in Tripoli and
Washington's humiliation of the Libyan military--Libyan
forces proved unable to defend Qadhafi even at his best protected
residence--strengthens the political climate in Libyan that was
already conducive to plotting.
Banghazi for the first time this year.
Qadhafi's failure to attract significant foreign support for
his anti-US posture adds to his domestic vulnerabilities.
-- Recent expulsions of Libyans involved in terrorist
activities by West European governments and limits on
the official Libyan presence contradict Qadhafi's claims
of widespread international support and US isolation, as
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/08/31: CIA-RDP91 B00874R000100170010-3
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/08/31: CIA-RDP91 B00874R000100170010-3
well as his denials of terrorist involvement.
In our view, Qadhafi's failure to convene an
extraordinary Arab League Summit has further undermined
Qadhafi's attempts to persuade T.ihvans of US blame for
Regime Countermeasures
Although the US airstrike has weakened Qadhafi's grip on
power, his extensive security precautions and the continuing
loyalty of his security services protect him from all but the
best-organized and skillfully implemented plots.
We have no indication that the US attack has weakened
the morale of either the Jamahiriya Guard--his principal
coup protection force--or other domestic security
In addition, Qadhafi apparently has been given a
lift by a recent Soviet commitment to strengthen
Libyan military capabilities against potential US attacks.
-- In our view, Qadhafi's renewed approaches to the
Soviets--highlighted by Libyan number two man Jallud's
visit to Moscow two weeks ago--probably are intended in
part to help shore up his domestic position.
-- The Libyan leader may regard increased Soviet military
assistance as a prerequisite for undercutting dissent in
the officer corps and rebuilding his international
prestige.
Qadhafi might also perceive a major arms purchase, as a
means to revive traditional West European concerns over
closer ties between Tripoli and Moscow and undermine the
current Allied effort to isolate the Libyan regime.
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/08/31 : CIA-RDP91 B00874R000100170010-3