IRANIAN LEADERSHIP STRUGGLE

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP91B00874R000200040005-2
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 14
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: August 4, 2011
• Sequence Number: 5
• Publication Date: November 10, 1986
• Content Type: MISC

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Iranian Leadership Struggle
10 November 1986
1. Nature of Leadership Struggle in Iran
Why is the struggle going on now? Three main reasons:
-- First, economic deterioration has narrowed regime options, sharpened
factional divisions over course of the revolution.
-- Second, dramatic deterioration this year in Khomeini's health. We do
not believe he can any longer mediate and soften the factional
infighting, one of his key political roles. Preliminary round of
"post-Khomeini" struggle may have begun.
-- Third, question of how--or even, whether--to prosecute the war more
acute than ever. Tied to economic problems: Iran's resources to
fight diminishing; and increasingly encountering difficulties
providing subsistence for populace. Iraqi air attacks on economic
facilities have exploited this vulnerability.
-- At same time, regime has backed self in corner by making overthrow of
the Ba'thists in Baghdad a test of the success of the Iranian
revolution. Compromise over war has become compromise of revolution;
difficult for people acting according to Allah's pre-ordained
blueprint.
-- Regime raised stakes higher this year by touting "final offensive" and
undertaking mass mobilization. Backing out now risks humiliating
admission that leaders' judgment was seriously flawed. But to go
ahead with offensive and fail carries risk of popular backlash. These
dilemmas foster increased backbiting.
Who is involved? Three basic groups:
-- Radicals support aggressive export of the revolution, continuation of
the war, and greater government control of economy. They are most
vehemently opposed to the US. A moderate/conservative coalition
generally opposes violent export of the revolution, favors a
negotiated end to the war, and seeks to limit government's economic
role. This group is most anti-Soviet, but also suspicious of the
US. Pragmatists maneuver between the two other factions, for the most
part choosing policies they believe further Iran's national
interests--and their own political careers.
Until recently, relatively well-defined relationships among four key
leaders drove Iranian politics:
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-- Consultative Assembly Speaker Rafsanjani, regime's second most
powerful figure after Khomeini and best politician, since Khomeini is
no longer in his prime. Leading pragmatist, with allies in both
moderate and radical camps.
-- Ayatollah Montazeri, Khomeini's designated successor and
long-considered ally of Rafsanjani. Their most likely post-Khomeini
scenario: the politically less sophisticated Montazeri would serve as
titular leader while wily Rafsanjani wielded real power and put
together coalition ensuring his and Montazeri's supremacy.
-- President Khamenei, another pragmatist with moderate leanings and
Rafsanjani's chief rival.
-- Prime Minister Musavi, a leading radical and hardliner on the war. He
and Rafsanjani have seemed to draw closer this year.
Relationships among these four now becoming more ambiguous. Particularly
over two issues behind recent upsurge in infighting: the war and the arrest
of associates of Montazeri.
Khamenei and
Musavi separately asked Montazeri to intercede with Khomeini to
postpone planned offensive against Iraq. Musavi reportedly even wants
the war to end.
-- Rafsanjani's room for political maneuvering has narrowed this year
because he has assumed a more prominent role in directing the war.
Heavily involved in preparations for the offensive. His influence
would be enhanced if offensive succeeds, damaged if it is postponed
indefinitely or is launched but fails.
Montazeri clearly suffered setback after arrests of his associates, but
who won less certain.
-- Factional infighting is increasing, but we do not believe significant
shift in favor of any faction has yet occurred.
-- Fact that Rafsanjani felt compelled to appease radicals by strongly
condemming US after contacts became public demonstrates strength of
radical influence, especially regarding Iranian policies toward US.
-- Whether Iran carries out successful offensive against Iraq likely to
be single most decisive factor in next round of the struggle.
-- Prospects are receding for gradual evolution of Iranian policies
toward moderation. Serious internal conflict likely before one
faction emerges on top. Open conflict favors the radicals; they
control more men and guns.
Our knowledge of the events surrounding the arrest of Montazeri's
son-in-law, son, and their associates is limited. The only certainties:
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-- The arrests struck at a group of radicals in Montazeri's entourage
whose official function was to support radical Shia activities
abroad. The radicals' leader, Mehdi Hashemi, is also implicated in
the recent kidnapping of the Syrian Charge' in Tehran and the
smuggling of explosives into Saudi Arabia in the luggage of Hajj
pilgrims.
-- The arrests have seriously undermined Montazeri's prestige.
-- The incident almost certainly confirms Khomeini's weakening grasp.
Doubtful a strong Khomeini would have let matters get so out of hand,
or permit public humiliation of his protege. We doubt Khomeini wrote
or fully understood import of letter to Intelligence chief, carried in
media, directing investigation to continue.
In our judgment, undermining Montazeri is a gain for radicals, a setback
for moderates.
-- Montazeri over the past three years has supported more moderate
domestic and foreign policies. Particularly forceful on need to rein
in excesses of revolutionary organizations such as Revolutionary
Guards. Has encouraged debate on major economic and other issues. We
have no recent evidence of his involvement in use of violence or
terrorism to export revolution.
-- Hashemi not significant in export of revolution. His operation
relatively minor. Closing it down has almost no effect on Iranian
activities.
-- Montazeri probably has lost whatever slim chance he had to use his
prestige as Khomeini's handpicked successor to "bless" more moderate
policies. With Montazeri weakened, the leadership struggle is likely
to be even more unstable, a development that works to the advantage of
radicals, who probably control more guns and are more willing to use
them to gain political dominance.
Difficult to believe actions against Montazeri's associates could have
taken place without Rafsanjani's concurrence. We have no evidence of that,
nor a persuasive explanation of what Rafsanjani would have hoped to gain.
-- If he did concur, he might have sought to eliminate a nest of radical
influence on Montazeri, assuming Montazeri would recoup his prestige;
support.
Rafsanjani has reassured Montazeri of his 25X1
-- Montazeri may have turned against the war, or at least against a major
offensive, and Rafsanjani may have clipped Montazeri's wings to help
keep open his options.
-- Rafsanjani may be maneuvering to revoke Montazeri's designation as
successor and have him replaced by another Ayatollah, or by a council,
as the constitution permits. Both would be high-risk machinations.
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-- Intelligence Minster Reyshahri, who is in charge of the Hashemi
investigation, may be making a bid to gain more influence at the
expense of both Rafsanjani and Montazeri. He would have to have had
the support of other powerful leaders. If true, it would signify more
serious political fragmentation than ever.
-- Reyshahri is son-in-law of Ayatollah Meshkini, influential head of
Council of Experts which has institutional authority to pick
Khomeini's successor. Last year the Council selected Montazeri, but
Meshkini covets the post.
What are strengths and vulnerabilities of key players:
Rafsanjani
-- Strengths: Skillful politician, adept at coalition-building among
disparate groups. Support in Revolutionary Guard, regular armed
forces, Majles. Protege of Khomeini and has access. Solid record of
accomplishment.
-- Weaknesses: Reputation as opportunist. Low level cleric. Political
star tied to increasingly incapacitated Khomeini, politically weakened
Montazeri, and Iran's military fortunes. No firm independent power
base.
Montazeri
-- Strengths: Khomeini's handpicked and officially designated
successor. Support among moderates and radicals in Revolutionary
Guard, Komitehs, mosques.
-- Weaknesses: Less skillful politician, religious credentials weak,
little charisma. Prestige seriously undermined by recent arrest of
associates, failure of personal plea to Khomeini to rescind arrests.
No firm power base.
Khamenei
-- Strengths: Reelected President last year as Khomeini's obvious
choice. Support among Revolutionary Guards, bazaar, Majles.
-- Weaknesses: Eclipsed recently by Rafsanjani. Perceived as somewhat
ineffectual.
Musavi
-- Strengths: Reelected Prime Minister last year with Khomeini's
approval. Strong support among radicals, especially in Cabinet.
-- Weaknesses: Lacks support among moderates, conservatives. Reputation
as poor administrator, blamed for government's weak domestic
performance.
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2. US Leverage on Key Players
-- The US has almost no leverage on key players. Whatever their position
in the Iranian spectrum, they still view the US as an enemy and a
threat to the survival of the revolution.
-- Some pragmatists--Rafsanjani being the prime example--probably
recognize Iran could gain some benefits by a public rapprochement with
Washington, but they lack the authority or political support to
initiate such a public move or even to offer it as a serious
alternative for debate.
3. Implications of Leadership Struggle on the War
-- The main reason for delaying the long-planned offensive seems to be
doubts about military readiness. Differences among leaders on the
war, however, have added to the caution by raising the political risks
for pro-offensive advocates.
-- Those who want an offensive still seem on top. Their major advantage
being Khomeini's approval, reiterated just yesterday.
-- If the offensive is not launched over the next few months, growing
popular war-weariness fueled by economic problems will weigh more
heavily in the regime's calculations and will be increasingly likely
to force an indefinite postponement.
-- The war is likely to figure prominently in the leadership struggle,
but the debate probably will be over the management of the conflict,
not over whether to end it.
-- The pragmatists, if they gain predominance, will give more weight to
Iran's economic plight in determining what to do about the war, but
even they are unlikely to feel secure enough for some time to seek a
formal peace. Khomeini's legacy will not be easily abandoned.
4. Implications for the Soviets
-- We have no evidence that the Soviets have initiated any action as a
direct result of the Iranian leadership struggle.
-- We believe the USSR's ability to influence events in Iran is limited
and its willingness to intervene militarily is constrained by the
possibility of confrontation with the West. Moscow has a variety of
levers it might use to exert pressure on Iran, but any effort at
coercion risks being counterproductive and pushing Iran closer to the
West.
-- Moscow probably does not possess the assets to exert significant
influence on Iranian domestic developments.
-- Moscow believes its major objective in Iran is achieved as long as the
US remains excluded from Iran. A significant improvement in relations
is unlikely at least as long as Khomeini is alive. The best scenario
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for the Soviets would be a stable and united Iran led by an anti-US
leftist government willing to cooperate with the USSR.
-- A radical government controlled by left-leaning technocrats or
Revolutionary Guard leaders could, in fact, emerge; only likely after
severe factional strife.
6. Iranian Vulnerabilities
-- Economy. Conditions worsening almost weekly. Continued Iraqi attacks
on economic targets will further trend. Denial of foreign loans would
further limit options (Tehran has sought only limited credit because
regime has wanted to avoid being indebted to Western institutions).
Total trade, commercial embargo by West would be devastating.
-- Arms. Still lacks sophisticated weapons, armor, air defense
equipment. Iraqis improving, at least in use of air force. If
planned Iranian offensive launched, Tehran will be hard pressed to
carry out another for some time, if embargo maintained and economic
conditions remain critical.
-- Political infighting. Signs of disarray in regime likely to encourage
opposition become more active, take more risks. Probably welcome US
7. Recent Developments in the War With Iraq
Relative calm has characterized the level of fighting during the past
month. Both Tehran and Baghdad are probably assessing the results of their
recent strategies. Preparations continue for the next round.
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Iran's military options are narrowing and differences within the regime
over war strategy intensifying.
-- Tehran probably still believes it needs a decisive victory before
growing economic problems hinder its war-making ability. The current
delay suggests Tehran is having logistics problems and is being
careful to avoid a failure. We expect a ground offensive before the
end of the winter rainy season.
-- Small skirmishes and joint Kurdish-Iranian operations in northern Iraq
continue in efforts to pressure Iraqi forces.
-- Iran's Navy continues to stop and search ships bound for Iraq, looking
for war goods. Its last attack on Gulf Arab shipping was on 17
October.
Iraq's successful bombing of Iranian economic targets has tapered off
over the last four weeks.
-- Iraq attacks seriously weakened Iran's economy. A continued lull will
enable Tehran to make repairs and strengthen its air defenses, making
future attacks more risky.
-- Throughout the war Iraq has backed off after stepping up pressure. We
expect attacks to resume.
-- Press reports in the US that Iran has secured F-14 parts, however, may
make Baghdad more cautious about risking its top pilots and French
aircraft.
-- Baghdad has strengthened its ground defenses since the disaster at Al
Faw last February, and is confident if can withstand another
offensive. Nonetheless, Iraq could suffer a serious battlefield
defeat if Iran achieves suprise and if Iraq reacts slowly.
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ILLEGIB
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SECRET SYSTEM 11
90761
.CRISIS PRE-PLANNING GROUP MEETING
Monday, November 10, 1986
Room 208, Cordell Hull Conference Room
2:00-3:00 p.m.
THE SITUATION IN IRAN
Agenda
I. Introduction
II. Intelligence Update
A. Nature of the Leadership Struggle
-- Key personalities
-- U.S. factor
-- Relationship to Iran-Iraq War
-- Soviet role and activism
-- Limits of predictability
B. Major Vulnerabilities and Potential
Leverage Points
-- Can the situation be influenced
from the outside?
III. U.S. Interests Armacost
A. The Strategic Importance of Iran in
the East-West Balance
B. Iran's Regional Role
C. Moderating Iranian Behavior
IV. U.S. Objectives Keel
A. Build Leverage to Advance Interests as
Internal Situation Unfolds
B. Limit Prospects for Soviet Gains while
Avoiding Superpower Crisis
C. Limit Damage to U.S. Relations with
Arab States
V. U.S. Options All
A. Diplomatic
B. Economic
C. Military
D. Public Affairs
VI. Summary
SECRET
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Office of Near Eastern and South Asian Analysis
Directorate of Intelligence
10 November 1986
The attached is from May 1985 SNIE
Memo to Holders, Iran: Prospects for
Near-Term Instability.
It is generally still quite good with
a few exceptions:
1. Conservative Ayatollah
Shariat-Madari is dead.
2. Conservative Assembly Deputy
Rabani-Amlashi is dead and for balance was
replaced by a radical.
3. Intelligence Minister Reyshari is
not listed. It almost certainly is
significant that he is the son-in-law of
Ayatollah Meshkini (last name on Pragmatist
list).
Attachment:
As stated
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0tVRL. I
SECRET
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASMNGTON. D C 20506
SYSTEM II
90761
November 7, 1986
MEMORANDUM FOR MR. DONALD P. GREGG
Assistant to the Vice President
for National Security Affairs
MR. NICHOLAS PLATT
Executive Secretary
Department of State
COLONEL JAMES F. LEMON
Executive Secretary
Department of Defense
Executive Secretary
Central Intelligence Agency
CAPTAIN JOSEPH C. STRASSER
Executive Assistant to the Chairman
Joint Chiefs of Staff
SUBJECT: CPPG on Iran, Monday, November 10, 1986
from 2:00-3:00 PM, Room 208 (St
A CPPG on Iran will be convened on Monday, November 10, from
2:00-3:00 PM in Room 208, Old Executive Office Building. SSl
The agenda and list of participants are attached as Tabs A and B.
(C)
Rodney P. McDaniel
Executive Secretary
Attachments
Tab A - Agenda
Tab B - List of Participants
SECRET
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 L1 I I i . ! I i 11 Ll ~ lll~l -
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SECRET
.CRISIS PRE-PLANNING GROUP MEETING
Monday, November 10, 1986
Room 208, Cordell Hull Conference Room
2:00-3:00 p.m.
THE SITUATION IN IRAN
Agenda
I. Introduction
II. Intelligence Update
A. Nature of the Leadership Struggle
Key personalities
U.S. factor
Relationship to Iran-Iraq War
Soviet role and activism
Limits of predictability
B. Major Vulnerabilities and Potential
Leverage Points
-- Can the situation be influenced
from the outside?
A. The Strategic Importance of Iran in
the East-West Balance
B. Iran's Regional Role
C. Moderating Iranian Behavior
IV. U.S. Objectives
A..Build Leverage to Advance Interests as
Internal Situation Unfolds
B. Limit Prospects for Soviet Gains while
Avoiding Superpower Crisis
C. Limit Damage to U.S. Relations with
Arab States
V. U.S. Options
SYSTEM II
90761
A. Diplomatic
8. Economic
C. Military
D. Public Affairs
VT. Suanmary
SECRET
'41 I
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 ILL LJ_ ! ! . ! 1 1' 1 1 1 1 11 LL ' I I I I II 'I III
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SECRET
SYSTEM II
90761
CRISIS PRE-PLANNING GROUP MEETING
Monday, Novem er 10, 1986
Room 208, Cordell Hull Conference Room
2:00-3:00 p.m.
PARTICIPANTS
WHITE HOUSE
Donald Gregg
Rodney B. McDaniel
Dennis Ross .
Howard Teicher
Michael H. Armacost
Arnold L. Raphel
DEFENSE
Richard L. Armitage
Robert Pelletreau
John Helgerson
LTG John H. Moellering
SECRET
DEC i\ GT
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