TALKING POINTS FOR THE DCI

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP91B00874R000200080007-6
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 3
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: September 12, 2011
• Sequence Number: 7
• Publication Date: January 29, 1986
• Content Type: MISC

Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/09/12 : CIA-RDP91 B00874R000200080007-6
LIBYA WORKING GROUP
FILE
Talking Points for the DCI
29 January 1986
Libyan Military Reaction and Threat to US Operations
The Libyan military approach to the US operations in the Tripoli
Flight Information Region (FIR) has been increasingly cautious.
Tripoli clearly is attempting to avoid a clash with the US outside the
Gulf of Sidra.
-- Last week, several Mig-23 and Mig-25 interceptors were sent
to identify the US fighters in the FIR.
-- Over the weekend, Libyan aircraft increasingly concentrated
on reconnaissance of the Gulf of Sidra and defensive patrols,
with fewer approaches to US fighters.
-- This week, Libyan fighters have been ordered not to approach
US aircraft outside the Gulf of Sidra.
-- No Libyan Navy ships have approached our fleet--a notable
difference from the energetic Libyan Navy reaction to ships
that lingered in the central Mediterranean in years past.
Tripoli has used the general alert that has been in effect all
month to refine and tighten its command and control.
-- The national Air Defense Headquarters in Tripoli has, for
example, asserted more direct control of the coastal air
defense sectors than had been heretofore demonstrated.
This probably reflects Qadhafi's desire to avoid an
accidental clash sparked by a local commander. Lapses in
military professionalism continue to occur, however, and the
potential for an accidental clash remains.
The readiness of the Libyan air, naval, and air defense forces
remains high, largely because they have carefully paced themselves
over the last two weeks.
-- They probably can sustain this level of operations for at
least another week and can achieve a peak operations tempo
with no further preparation. At their peak, the Libyan Air
Force can scramble as many as 125 separate fighter aircraft a
-day, and sortie over 20 ships with about a dozen missile
boats and submarines operating near the Gulf.
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air-to-air missiles. Perhaps 10% are capable of holding
their own in encounters with US fighter pilots. We believe
the squadron of Syrian Mig-23 Pilots in Libya will take
orders and fight as if they were Libyans. They are better
than the average Libyan pilot, but not the best in the
country. The greatest air. threat is posed by Libya's 15 or
so Flogger-Gs, the new variant of the MiG-23 that became
operational in Libya last summer.
Probably only one quarter of Libya's 31 missile ships can
fire its missiles. Training, manning, and maintenance
shortfalls prevent a more effective rate. We have no
information as to which missile ships pose the greatest
threat.
Libya's new SA-5 complex at Surt has become operational and has
been assigned air dPfansa racnnncihilif_iac F_ I
It is probably capable of acquiring, designating, and firing
at a target, but probably cannot handle several targets in
rapid succession or reload quickly.
the Libyans have
operational control and are manning the complex; both they
and the Soviets believe they can fire a missile.
-- The Soviets have asked the Libyans not to operate the SA-5s
while US forces are in the area, but
Tripoli is ignoring the request.
-- Further SA-5 complexes are intended, and additional SA-5
equipment has been delivered to Libya
Tripoli's tactics for opposing a US air penetration of the Gulf
show a misperception of the capabilities of its SA-5s.
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Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/09/12 : CIA-RDP91 B00874R000200080007-6
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/09/12 : CIA-RDP91 B00874R000200080007-6
Copy 1 - DCI
Copy 2 - DDI
Copy 3 - NIO/NESA
Copy 4 - NIO/CT
Copy 5 - D/NESA
Copy 6 - NESA/AI
Copy 7-10 - NESA/AI/M
DDI/NESA/AI/M~
;; Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/09/12: CIA-RDP91 B00874R000200080007-6