LIBYA: WHAT IF QADHAFI IS OUSTED?

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CIA-RDP91B00874R000200080013-9
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RIPPUB
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S
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8
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December 22, 2016
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September 12, 2011
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13
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Publication Date: 
September 25, 1985
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MEMO
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Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/09/12 :CIA-RDP91 B00874R000200080013-9 entry me igence gency DIRECTORATE OF INTELLIGENCE 25 September 1985 LIBYA: What if Qadhafi is Ousted? Summary Qadhafi's removal would result in ar. intense--ard possibly bloody--power struggle among several competing factions. The most likely outcome would be a regime that curtailed Libya's worldwide support for revolutionary causes but remained opposed to many US policies in the Middle Fast and Africa. Its receptivity to developing a more constructive relationship with Washington would be tempered at least initially by the need to dispel the inevitable suspicions at home and abroad that the US put it ir. power. A less likely scenario involves an extremist- dominated government that could become an even greater threat to US interests than the Qadhafi regime. Such extremists ~vould be more willing thar. Qadhafi to target US personnel and facilities directly ir, terrorist operations. Although the extremists are opposed to Soviet ideology, they might feel compelled to try to obtain Moscow's protection if they perceived themselves under strong US pressure. In return, Moscow might demand increased access to Libyan air and naval facilities and push Tripoli to adopt policies ir. , support of Soviet objectives in the Middle East and elsewhere. We judge that Oadhafi's prospects for survival are poorer r.ow thar, at ar.y time since he came to power 16 years ago. This memorandum was prepared by the Maghreb Branch, Arab- Israeli Division, Office of Near Eastern and South Asian Analysis, with a contributior, fran the Near East/North Africa Branch of the Office of Central Reference. Information as of 2.5 September 1985 was used in its preparation. . ; n and ernmPnts should be directed to Chief, .Arab-Israeli Division Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/09/12 :CIA-RDP91 B00874R000200080013-9 25X1 L~~ I Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/09/12 :CIA-RDP91 B00874R000200080013-9 economic policies, economic constraints imposed by the soft oil market, and wasteful spending in support of radical causes worldwide are seriously eroding the relatively high standard of living that once was regarded by most Libyans as among the principal fruits of Qadhafi's revolution. These developments, in our view, combined with widely resented abuses of power by padhafi's extremist supporters, are creating the political climate that encourages plotting by Qadhafi's many opponents and network. The Key Players In our judgment, four key groups have the capability of deposing Qadhafi. These groups include: --Oadhafi's relatives and fellow tribesmen, assigned to Libya's most important military and security posts, who are concerned that his declining political fortunes threater. their redominant osition ir. Libya. 25X1 Oadhafi's fe ow ri esmen ave een 25X1 advising him over the past two years to curtail his revolutionary programs as a means of rebuilding his popular support and preserving their position. --Libyan nationalists in the armed forces, who would be motivated by their loss of political influence to the revolutionary committees and their resentment at Qadhafi's establishment of a Peoples Militia as a counterweight. the nationalists also oppose 25X1 many of Qadhafi's aggressive foreign policies which, in their view, are unrelated to Libyan interests. --Exiled Libyan dissidents, who oppose Qadhafi because his revolution has deprived them of their wealth, status, and political influence ir. Libya. Their first attempt ir. May 1984 to establish a network inside Libya capable of attacking Qadhafi demonstrated their growing determination to try to exploit .his domestic difficulties. --Fanatics in the revolutionary committees, who might depose Qadhafi in oppositior. to one of his periodic tactical shifts toward moderation or to prevent him from curbing their influence. Qadhafi alrea y as gore out ideologues his appearance of radical objectives. Instability Ahead None of these groups appears to us, to have the strength to quickly consolidate its position on its own, even in the event of a pre-emptive move by or.e of them. The Oadhaafa tribe is relatively small and would need to coopt i.ts rivals or to expand -2- SECRET Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/09/12 :CIA-RDP91 B00874R000200080013-9 o is way to i. n justify to the the nursui t of Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/09/12 :CIA-RDP91 B00874R000200080013-9 its base of support to maintain control. There are also indications of personal rivalries over assuming Qadhafi's mantle, which would seriously weaker, the nadhaafa's ability to carry the day. Oadhafi's extensive security precautions militate against a coup by nationalist military officers that would immediately eliminate Qadhafi's tribesmen or the revolutionary committees as political actors. Libyan exiles have been unable to build an extensive reliable support network inside the country because of long absence from Libya. The revolutionary committees would likely encounter deep-rooted popular resentment over their role in orchestrating Qadhafi's brutal efforts over the oast 1(1 years to suppress dissent. In our view, these weaknesses portend instability in the immediate post-Qadhafi period. Available evidence does not indicate anyone of adhafi's stature able and 'n take control. Even some form of c~i~le involving elements from all four factions would only serve as a facade for intense behind the scenes maneuvering. The radicals and the exiles would be in the worst position to survive such infighting, in our view. Available evidence indicates that the revolutionary committees have insufficient arms, equipment, and training to maintain power by oppression. Even lining up behind their titular chief, Oadhafi's deputy Abd al-Salam Jallud, is unlikely to generate much popular support because his longstanding reputation for corruption, and debauchery would make him a political liability. exiles' popular support wit ir, Libya is limited, and we believe that only a successful attack on Oadhafi would. provide the exiles the leverage needed to have a sigr.ificar.t role in a post Qadhafi regime. Implications for the T1S The most dangerous outcome from the standpoint of TIS interests would be the emergence of a regime dominated by revolutionary committee extremists, Such a government probably would be an even greater threat to [1S interests than Oadhafi. these fanatics are encouraging Oadhafi's use of terrorism ar.d subversion and focus or. undermining US interests. They almost certainly would exploit their positions in the government to support terrorism, and subversion as foreign policy instruments. This would heighten. the threat of direct Libyan ir.volvemer.t ir. terrorist operations against US personnel and facilities, particularly in the Middle East. Any US attempt to counter Libyan aggression, however, could push the regime into Soviet hands. This might open up additional opportunities for Moscow to obtain increased access to Libya r. air and naval facilities and to promote a Libya r. foreign -3- SECRET 25X1 25X1 25X1 1bX1 -;, -- Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/09/12 :CIA-RDP91 B00874R000200080013-9 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/09/12 :CIA-RDP91 B00874R000200080013-9 policy that uses moderate tactics to undermine US interests. In our judgment, any other regime--even one dominated by the Qadhafi clan--probably would want a more constructive relationship with Washington. We believe that such a new regime's focus on building popular support would require bringing order to Oadhafi's chaotic system of government, curtailing costly foreign adventures, and redressing popular socio-economic grievances. The need to promote and revise economic priorities would require the new government to improve its international image--particularly by reducing Libyan involvement in _ revolutionary causes worldwide--to facilitate access to Western consumer goods, technology, and managerial expertise. This almost certainly would involve approaches to the US. At the same time such a regime probably would proceed cautiously to allay inevitable suspicions at home and abroad that the US "installed" it in power. Qadhafi's vitriolic 16-year attack on Western values and frequent references to the brutal Italian occupation of Libya during the early 1900s, ensures that no r.ew leadership could survive without demonstrating its independence from Western influence. In addition, existing Islamic currents in Libya probably would reinforce the regime's determination to pursue a nonaligned foreigr. policy, particularly during a time of domestic political turmoil. Any emphasis by the regime on traditional Islamic values would be ir.terded to build support among Libyans who inevitably would look to Islam to provide a sense of personal security in their daily lives. In our view, the nonaligned and Islamic affinities of the r.ew regime would result in continuing opposition to US-sponsored peace initiatives. Such a regime also probably would remair. involved in areas where traditional Libyan political and economic interests are ergaged, such as in Tunisia, Niger, Sudar., and' Chad. What Car. the Soviets Do? we doubt that Moscow could install a Marxist-oriented pro- Soviet regime without a greatly expanded Soviet military presence. Soviet advisers are too few and scattered to take control of the Libyan military and swing it into action. 25X1 25X1 25X1 1bX1 Moreover, widespread dissatisfaction in Libya r. military circles with the quality of Soviet assistance is accompanied by general cultural alienation and ill-will resulting from a condescerdirg attitude b Soviet advisers toward their Libyan students, ~tix~ a t oug some East Germans have 25X1 trained Libyan intelligence officers, Oadhafi's distrust of Moscow has prompted him to limit the involvement of Soviets and their East European allies with the intelligence services. 25X1 25X1 -4- SECRET - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/09/12 :CIA-RDP91 B00874R000200080013-9 .. .._ _ .... _~... 1 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/09/12 :CIA-RDP91 B00874R000200080013-9 Moscow's capability to influence a Libyan succession would depend on which groups came to the fore. Ir. any case, judgments about Moscow's influence are perforce speculative giver. the limited information on Soviet assets and inroads among the various Libyan groupings. Moscow's extensive and lorgstarding training of Libyan military personnel and their 1,500-2,000 man military advisory contingent in Libya point to greater Soviet influence with nationalist officers and Qadhaafa tribesmen in the armed forces and security services than with ideologues or exiles. This assessment is su orted 'r. t by the extremists dislike tie ovie s an regar Marxism as an impediment to broader acceptance of padhafi's own "Green Rook" revolutionary philosophy. The Soviets at a minimum probably have used their extensive contacts in military circles to identify Libyan officers most likely to assume key political positions in a post-Oadhafi regime. Moscow thereby probably also has acquired potentially valuable information or, these officers' views, leadership skills, and lifestyles to use in its efforts to develop a pro-Soviet faction within the armed forces. Such ir.formatior,, in conjunction with intelligence obtained from established agents the Soviets almost certainly have in place, could help them exploit political uncertainties resulting from Qadhafi's removal. Moscow could use its access to Libya r, military personnel and facilities to warn the Libya r. regime of a coup if the Soviets deemed a change in goverrmer.t against their interests. Moscow's willingness to use whatever assets it has in Libya to influence the succession is another key unknown. The Soviets might adopt a wait-and-see approach, believing their interests would be preserved in ary case by cor.tir.ued Libyan deper.der.ce on Soviet military assistance. To strergther. Moscow's hold or. this dependency, the Soviets initially might offer additional weaponry to the new regime at corcessior.al rates. The payoff of such ar. approach could be lessened, however, if, as we expect, West European governments--particularly the French--were willing to help reduce Libyan dependence on Moscow by sunnlvina advanced arms. nn balance, we regard Soviet leverage as insufficient to deter any regime not comprising revolutionary committee fanatics from seeking improved relations with Washington. Instead, the new regime probably would try to play off Moscow and Washington in an attempt to maximize the militarv and economic benefits it needs to survive in power. -5- SECRET 25X1 1bX1 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/09/12 :CIA-RDP91 B00874R000200080013-9 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/09/12 :CIA-RDP91 B00874R000200080013-9 Profiles of Key Political Actors Qadhafi's Relatives and Tribesmen --Maj. Khalifa Hunaysh...commar.der Oadhafi's personal security force...a relative of Oadhafi's...has been active in Libyan campaigns to assassinate dissidents abroad...approves of Libya's present relations with the Soviet Clnion...adversary of 'Abd 'al-Salam Jallud...about 50. --Ahmad Oadhafi al-Dam...a cousir, of Oadhafi's...serves as Qadhafi's chief envoy abroad...involved in activities of Revolutionary Committees...extremely ambitious...desires to become more influential in domestic politics...sees Khalifa Hunaysh as an obstacle to his rise...about 33. --Col. Hasan Muftab Ashkal...Committee in Sirte...a cousir. of Qadhafi's...or.e of his closest and most trusted advisors...a troubleshooter, used by Qadhafi for a variety of tasks...one-time head of nadhafi's personal security force disliked by career military officers...in his early 40's. --Col. Masud' Abd al-Hafiz...a cousir. and possibly a brother-ir,-law of nadhafi's...one of Qafhafi's most trusted military aid es...ger.erally assigned to key command positions...currently commander of Sebha Military District from which Libya r. forces in Chad are directed...ir. his late 30's. --Lt. 'Ali Kilar,i...materr.al cousir. of ar.d personally close to Qadhafi...has trained youths in sabotage and assassination...led a hit team into Rome in July 1984; two months before ar. exile there helped coordinate forcible repatriation. of exiles from Morocco during Tripoli's 14 month rapprochmer,t with Rabat...a member of the of the Military Revolutionary Committee...about 29. Nationalists in the Military --Maj. Khuwaylidi al-Humaydi...Deputy Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces and head of Military Intelligence... revolutionary colleague of Oafhafi's...close to Mustafa Kharubi...dislikes 'Abd al-Salam Jallud...about 33. --Brig. Gen. Mustafa Kharubi...Ir.spector General of the Armed Forces...revolutionary colleague of Oadhafi's...a critic of Oadhafi's foreign and campaign to murder dissidents in exile...dislikes 'Abd al-Salam Jallud...about 42. -6- SECRET Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/09/12 :CIA-RDP91 B00874R000200080013-9 _.. __ __ 1 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/09/12 :CIA-RDP91 B00874R000200080013-9 Radicals and Ideologues --Staff Maj. 'Abd al-Salam Jallud...defacto number-two mar. in regime...revolutionary colleague and ideological supporter of Oadhafi's...titular head of Revolutionary Committees Bureau, but extent of influence ur.clear...has many enemies within regime, but his administrative, diplomatic negotiating talents useful to Oadhafi...favors interference in US domestic policies and terrorism against US interests abroad...age 41. --Lt. Col. Abdallah Hijazi...key member of the Military Revolutionary Committee, which monitors military for anti- Oadhafi activity...active in aiding foreign dissident groups and in 1984 assassination campaign against Libyan dissidents abroad...in his late 30's. --Musa Kusa...~Jadhafi's most committed supporter and devotee of his "Green Book" political theories...as Director of International Center for Revolution, coordinates Libya r. propaganda efforts and liaison with leftist groups worldwide...favors violent elimination of opponents of the regime at home and abroad...responsible for supplyiry arms to foreign revolutionary movements, but opposes Marxist causes...age 37. --Maj. Abdallah Sanussi...personally close to padhafi and a relative by marrige...involved in terrorism against exiles since 1980...has played a particularly active role in Libya r. efforts to undermine the regime of former Sudanese President and to kill Chadian President Hadre...about 33. --Maj Muhammad Majdub...fellow tribesman of Qadhafi's... defacto head of the Revolutionary Committees Bureau under Jallud...is a member of the People's Court that proposes death sentences for Libyan dissider.ts...probably respor.'sible for several murders of exiles during 1979-80. --Sa' id Rashid...civilian ergir.eer...trained dissident Sudanese plotting to overthrow regime of former President Nimeiri...responsible for assassinations in Europe, and Africa...heavily involved in supervising training camps for foreign dissidents...also is chief security at Tripoli airport and a member of the People's Court that rules or. death sentences for dissider.ts...age 36. --'Izz al-Din Hinshari...civilian er.gineer...a principal revolutionary committee officer. ..heads the Central Operations Department of the Secretariat for External Security... also chief of immigration...about 33. -7- SECRET 25X1 25X1 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/09/12 :CIA-RDP91 B00874R000200080013-9 _. i Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/09/12 :CIA-RDP91 B00874R000200080013-9 5 ~c:xF r Libyan Exiles --Muhammah al-Mugaryaf...founder, secretary-general and spokesman for the oppositionist National Fror.t for the Salvation of Libya...ordered operations that led to shootouts with security forces in two locations in Libya ir.. May 1984...publicly seen as closely aligned with the West...supported by a variety of Arab states...an economist who served as Ambassador to India until his defection ir. mid-1980...in.his mid-40's. --'Abd al-Mun'im al-Huni... oppositionist in self-imposed exile in Cairo since August 1975...intelligent, shrewd, low keyed...respected by other oppositionist leaders... reportedly also enjoys support within and outside of the Armed Forces...former career military man...was ore of the 12-member Revolutionary Command Council that overthrew the monarchy in 1969...about 42. -8- SECRET Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/09/12 :CIA-RDP91 B00874R000200080013-9