LIBYA: WHAT IF QADHAFI IS OUSTED?

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP91B00874R000200080013-9
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 8
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: September 12, 2011
• Sequence Number: 13
• Publication Date: September 25, 1985
• Content Type: MEMO

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entry me igence gency
DIRECTORATE OF INTELLIGENCE
25 September 1985
LIBYA: What if Qadhafi is Ousted?
Summary
Qadhafi's removal would result in ar. intense--ard
possibly bloody--power struggle among several competing
factions. The most likely outcome would be a regime
that curtailed Libya's worldwide support for
revolutionary causes but remained opposed to many US
policies in the Middle Fast and Africa. Its
receptivity to developing a more constructive
relationship with Washington would be tempered at least
initially by the need to dispel the inevitable
suspicions at home and abroad that the US put it ir.
power. A less likely scenario involves an extremist-
dominated government that could become an even greater
threat to US interests than the Qadhafi regime. Such
extremists ~vould be more willing thar. Qadhafi to target
US personnel and facilities directly ir, terrorist
operations. Although the extremists are opposed to
Soviet ideology, they might feel compelled to try to
obtain Moscow's protection if they perceived themselves
under strong US pressure. In return, Moscow might
demand increased access to Libyan air and naval
facilities and push Tripoli to adopt policies ir. ,
support of Soviet objectives in the Middle East and
elsewhere.
We judge that Oadhafi's prospects for survival are poorer
r.ow thar, at ar.y time since he came to power 16 years ago.
This memorandum was prepared by the Maghreb Branch, Arab-
Israeli Division, Office of Near Eastern and South Asian Analysis, with a
contributior, fran the Near East/North Africa Branch of the Office of Central
Reference. Information as of 2.5 September 1985 was used in its preparation.
. ; n and ernmPnts should be directed to Chief, .Arab-Israeli Division
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economic policies, economic constraints imposed by the soft oil
market, and wasteful spending in support of radical causes
worldwide are seriously eroding the relatively high standard of
living that once was regarded by most Libyans as among the
principal fruits of Qadhafi's revolution. These developments, in
our view, combined with widely resented abuses of power by
padhafi's extremist supporters, are creating the political
climate that encourages plotting by Qadhafi's many opponents and
network.
The Key Players
In our judgment, four key groups have the capability of
deposing Qadhafi. These groups include:
--Oadhafi's relatives and fellow tribesmen, assigned to
Libya's most important military and security posts, who are
concerned that his declining political fortunes threater.
their redominant osition ir. Libya. 25X1
Oadhafi's fe ow ri esmen ave een 25X1
advising him over the past two years to curtail his
revolutionary programs as a means of rebuilding his popular
support and preserving their position.
--Libyan nationalists in the armed forces, who would be
motivated by their loss of political influence to the
revolutionary committees and their resentment at Qadhafi's
establishment of a Peoples Militia as a counterweight.
the nationalists also oppose 25X1
many of Qadhafi's aggressive foreign policies which, in
their view, are unrelated to Libyan interests.
--Exiled Libyan dissidents, who oppose Qadhafi because his
revolution has deprived them of their wealth, status, and
political influence ir. Libya. Their first attempt ir. May
1984 to establish a network inside Libya capable of
attacking Qadhafi demonstrated their growing determination
to try to exploit .his domestic difficulties.
--Fanatics in the revolutionary committees, who might depose
Qadhafi in oppositior. to one of his periodic tactical shifts
toward moderation or to prevent him from curbing their
influence.
Qadhafi alrea y as gore out
ideologues his appearance of
radical objectives.
Instability Ahead
None of these groups appears to us, to have the strength to
quickly consolidate its position on its own, even in the event of
a pre-emptive move by or.e of them. The Oadhaafa tribe is
relatively small and would need to coopt i.ts rivals or to expand
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its base of support to maintain control. There are also
indications of personal rivalries over assuming Qadhafi's mantle,
which would seriously weaker, the nadhaafa's ability to carry the
day. Oadhafi's extensive security precautions militate against a
coup by nationalist military officers that would immediately
eliminate Qadhafi's tribesmen or the revolutionary committees as
political actors. Libyan exiles have been unable to build an
extensive reliable support network inside the country because of
long absence from Libya. The revolutionary committees would
likely encounter deep-rooted popular resentment over their role
in orchestrating Qadhafi's brutal efforts over the oast 1(1 years
to suppress dissent.
In our view, these weaknesses portend instability in the
immediate post-Qadhafi period. Available evidence does not
indicate anyone of adhafi's stature able and 'n
take control.
Even some form of
c~i~le involving elements from all four factions would
only serve as a facade for intense behind the scenes
maneuvering.
The radicals and the exiles would be in the worst position
to survive such infighting, in our view. Available evidence
indicates that the revolutionary committees have insufficient
arms, equipment, and training to maintain power by oppression.
Even lining up behind their titular chief, Oadhafi's deputy Abd
al-Salam Jallud, is unlikely to generate much popular support
because his longstanding reputation for corruption, and debauchery
would make him a political liability.
exiles' popular support wit ir, Libya is limited,
and we believe that only a successful attack on Oadhafi would.
provide the exiles the leverage needed to have a sigr.ificar.t role
in a post Qadhafi regime.
Implications for the T1S
The most dangerous outcome from the standpoint of TIS
interests would be the emergence of a regime dominated by
revolutionary committee extremists, Such a government probably
would be an even greater threat to [1S interests than Oadhafi.
these fanatics are encouraging
Oadhafi's use of terrorism ar.d subversion and focus or.
undermining US interests. They almost certainly would exploit
their positions in the government to support terrorism, and
subversion as foreign policy instruments. This would heighten.
the threat of direct Libyan ir.volvemer.t ir. terrorist operations
against US personnel and facilities, particularly in the Middle
East. Any US attempt to counter Libyan aggression, however,
could push the regime into Soviet hands. This might open up
additional opportunities for Moscow to obtain increased access to
Libya r. air and naval facilities and to promote a Libya r. foreign
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policy that uses moderate tactics to undermine US interests.
In our judgment, any other regime--even one dominated by the
Qadhafi clan--probably would want a more constructive
relationship with Washington. We believe that such a new
regime's focus on building popular support would require bringing
order to Oadhafi's chaotic system of government, curtailing
costly foreign adventures, and redressing popular socio-economic
grievances. The need to promote and revise economic priorities
would require the new government to improve its international
image--particularly by reducing Libyan involvement in _
revolutionary causes worldwide--to facilitate access to Western
consumer goods, technology, and managerial expertise. This
almost certainly would involve approaches to the US.
At the same time such a regime probably would proceed
cautiously to allay inevitable suspicions at home and abroad that
the US "installed" it in power. Qadhafi's vitriolic 16-year
attack on Western values and frequent references to the brutal
Italian occupation of Libya during the early 1900s, ensures that
no r.ew leadership could survive without demonstrating its
independence from Western influence. In addition, existing
Islamic currents in Libya probably would reinforce the regime's
determination to pursue a nonaligned foreigr. policy, particularly
during a time of domestic political turmoil. Any emphasis by the
regime on traditional Islamic values would be ir.terded to build
support among Libyans who inevitably would look to Islam to
provide a sense of personal security in their daily lives.
In our view, the nonaligned and Islamic affinities of the
r.ew regime would result in continuing opposition to US-sponsored
peace initiatives. Such a regime also probably would remair.
involved in areas where traditional Libyan political and economic
interests are ergaged, such as in Tunisia, Niger, Sudar., and'
Chad.
What Car. the Soviets Do?
we doubt that Moscow could install a Marxist-oriented pro-
Soviet regime without a greatly expanded Soviet military
presence. Soviet advisers are too few and scattered to take
control of the Libyan military and swing it into action.
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Moreover, widespread dissatisfaction in Libya r. military circles
with the quality of Soviet assistance is accompanied by general
cultural alienation and ill-will resulting from a condescerdirg
attitude b Soviet advisers toward their Libyan students,
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a t oug some East Germans have 25X1
trained Libyan intelligence officers, Oadhafi's distrust of
Moscow has prompted him to limit the involvement of Soviets and
their East European allies with the intelligence services.
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Moscow's capability to influence a Libyan succession would
depend on which groups came to the fore. Ir. any case, judgments
about Moscow's influence are perforce speculative giver. the
limited information on Soviet assets and inroads among the
various Libyan groupings. Moscow's extensive and lorgstarding
training of Libyan military personnel and their 1,500-2,000 man
military advisory contingent in Libya point to greater Soviet
influence with nationalist officers and Qadhaafa tribesmen in the
armed forces and security services than with ideologues or
exiles. This assessment is su orted 'r. t by
the extremists dislike
tie ovie s an regar Marxism as an impediment to broader
acceptance of padhafi's own "Green Rook" revolutionary
philosophy.
The Soviets at a minimum probably have used their extensive
contacts in military circles to identify Libyan officers most
likely to assume key political positions in a post-Oadhafi
regime. Moscow thereby probably also has acquired potentially
valuable information or, these officers' views, leadership skills,
and lifestyles to use in its efforts to develop a pro-Soviet
faction within the armed forces. Such ir.formatior,, in
conjunction with intelligence obtained from established agents
the Soviets almost certainly have in place, could help them
exploit political uncertainties resulting from Qadhafi's
removal. Moscow could use its access to Libya r, military
personnel and facilities to warn the Libya r. regime of a coup if
the Soviets deemed a change in goverrmer.t against their
interests.
Moscow's willingness to use whatever assets it has in Libya
to influence the succession is another key unknown. The Soviets
might adopt a wait-and-see approach, believing their interests
would be preserved in ary case by cor.tir.ued Libyan deper.der.ce on
Soviet military assistance. To strergther. Moscow's hold or. this
dependency, the Soviets initially might offer additional weaponry
to the new regime at corcessior.al rates. The payoff of such ar.
approach could be lessened, however, if, as we expect, West
European governments--particularly the French--were willing to
help reduce Libyan dependence on Moscow by sunnlvina advanced
arms.
nn balance, we regard Soviet leverage as insufficient to
deter any regime not comprising revolutionary committee fanatics
from seeking improved relations with Washington. Instead, the
new regime probably would try to play off Moscow and Washington
in an attempt to maximize the militarv and economic benefits it
needs to survive in power.
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Profiles of Key Political Actors
Qadhafi's Relatives and Tribesmen
--Maj. Khalifa Hunaysh...commar.der Oadhafi's personal
security force...a relative of Oadhafi's...has been active
in Libyan campaigns to assassinate dissidents
abroad...approves of Libya's present relations with the
Soviet Clnion...adversary of 'Abd 'al-Salam Jallud...about
50.
--Ahmad Oadhafi al-Dam...a cousir, of Oadhafi's...serves as
Qadhafi's chief envoy abroad...involved in activities of
Revolutionary Committees...extremely ambitious...desires to
become more influential in domestic politics...sees Khalifa
Hunaysh as an obstacle to his rise...about 33.
--Col. Hasan Muftab Ashkal...Committee in Sirte...a cousir.
of Qadhafi's...or.e of his closest and most trusted
advisors...a troubleshooter, used by Qadhafi for a variety
of tasks...one-time head of nadhafi's personal security
force disliked by career military officers...in his early
40's.
--Col. Masud' Abd al-Hafiz...a cousir. and possibly a
brother-ir,-law of nadhafi's...one of Qafhafi's most trusted
military aid es...ger.erally assigned to key command
positions...currently commander of Sebha Military District
from which Libya r. forces in Chad are directed...ir. his late
30's.
--Lt. 'Ali Kilar,i...materr.al cousir. of ar.d personally close
to Qadhafi...has trained youths in sabotage and
assassination...led a hit team into Rome in July 1984; two
months before ar. exile there helped coordinate forcible
repatriation. of exiles from Morocco during Tripoli's 14
month rapprochmer,t with Rabat...a member of the of the
Military Revolutionary Committee...about 29.
Nationalists in the Military
--Maj. Khuwaylidi al-Humaydi...Deputy Chief of Staff of the
Armed Forces and head of Military Intelligence...
revolutionary colleague of Oafhafi's...close to Mustafa
Kharubi...dislikes 'Abd al-Salam Jallud...about 33.
--Brig. Gen. Mustafa Kharubi...Ir.spector General of the
Armed Forces...revolutionary colleague of Oadhafi's...a
critic of Oadhafi's foreign and campaign to murder
dissidents in exile...dislikes 'Abd al-Salam Jallud...about
42.
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Radicals and Ideologues
--Staff Maj. 'Abd al-Salam Jallud...defacto number-two mar.
in regime...revolutionary colleague and ideological
supporter of Oadhafi's...titular head of Revolutionary
Committees Bureau, but extent of influence ur.clear...has
many enemies within regime, but his administrative,
diplomatic negotiating talents useful to Oadhafi...favors
interference in US domestic policies and terrorism against
US interests abroad...age 41.
--Lt. Col. Abdallah Hijazi...key member of the Military
Revolutionary Committee, which monitors military for anti-
Oadhafi activity...active in aiding foreign dissident groups
and in 1984 assassination campaign against Libyan dissidents
abroad...in his late 30's.
--Musa Kusa...~Jadhafi's most committed supporter and devotee
of his "Green Book" political theories...as Director of
International Center for Revolution, coordinates Libya r.
propaganda efforts and liaison with leftist groups
worldwide...favors violent elimination of opponents of the
regime at home and abroad...responsible for supplyiry arms
to foreign revolutionary movements, but opposes Marxist
causes...age 37.
--Maj. Abdallah Sanussi...personally close to padhafi and a
relative by marrige...involved in terrorism against exiles
since 1980...has played a particularly active role in Libya r.
efforts to undermine the regime of former Sudanese President
and to kill Chadian President Hadre...about 33.
--Maj Muhammad Majdub...fellow tribesman of Qadhafi's...
defacto head of the Revolutionary Committees Bureau under
Jallud...is a member of the People's Court that proposes
death sentences for Libyan dissider.ts...probably respor.'sible
for several murders of exiles during 1979-80.
--Sa' id Rashid...civilian ergir.eer...trained dissident
Sudanese plotting to overthrow regime of former President
Nimeiri...responsible for assassinations in Europe, and
Africa...heavily involved in supervising training camps for
foreign dissidents...also is chief security at Tripoli
airport and a member of the People's Court that rules or.
death sentences for dissider.ts...age 36.
--'Izz al-Din Hinshari...civilian er.gineer...a principal
revolutionary committee officer. ..heads the Central
Operations Department of the Secretariat for External
Security... also chief of immigration...about 33.
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5 ~c:xF r
Libyan Exiles
--Muhammah al-Mugaryaf...founder, secretary-general and
spokesman for the oppositionist National Fror.t for the
Salvation of Libya...ordered operations that led to
shootouts with security forces in two locations in Libya ir..
May 1984...publicly seen as closely aligned with the
West...supported by a variety of Arab states...an economist
who served as Ambassador to India until his defection ir.
mid-1980...in.his mid-40's.
--'Abd al-Mun'im al-Huni... oppositionist in self-imposed
exile in Cairo since August 1975...intelligent, shrewd, low
keyed...respected by other oppositionist leaders...
reportedly also enjoys support within and outside of the
Armed Forces...former career military man...was ore of the
12-member Revolutionary Command Council that overthrew the
monarchy in 1969...about 42.
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