TALKING POINTS FOR THE DDI 16 JUNE 1986 QADHAFI'S POSITION AFTER THE AIRSTRIKE

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP91B00874R000200130011-5
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 4
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: August 17, 2011
• Sequence Number: 11
• Publication Date: June 16, 1986
• Content Type: MISC

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DDI- b2SWX
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
DIRECTORATE OF INTELLIGENCE
16 June 1986
Qadhafi's Shaky Domestic Position
Summary
Libyan leader Qadhafi remains shaken by the US
airstrike last April. The US attack has aggravated his
unprecedented political problems by humiliating the
Libyan armed forces and indirectly stimulating closer
cooperation between Washington and West European
governments to isolate his regime. Qadhafi's security
forces, however, remain loyal and effective enough to
protect him from all but the best-organized and
skillfully implemented plots.
Impact of the US Attack
Domestic reactions to the US airstrike last April confirm
Qadhafi's unprecedented political problems.
Press reports indicate that the funeral procession in
Tripoli for those killed in the attack attracted only
several thousand marchers out of a local population of
about 900,000.
pro-Qadhafi
demonstrations--highly publicized by the Libyan media--
have been stage managed by his radical supporters.
popular 25X1
criticism of Qadhafi has become more open since the US
strike.
This memorandum was prepared by the Maghreb 25X1
Branch, Arab-Israeli Division, Office of Near Eastern and South
Asian Analysis. Information as of 16 June 1986 was used in its
preparati0 . Questions and comments should be addressed to
Chief, Ardb-Israeli Division 25X1
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a a i grattitti recently appeared in Tripoli and
Banghazi for the first time this year.
Washington's humiliation of the Libyan military--Libyan
forces proved unable to defend Qadhafi even at his best protected
residence--strengthens the political climate in Libyan that was
already conducive to plotting.
Qadhafi's failure to attract significant foreign support for
his anti-US posture adds to his domestic vulnerabilities.
N
-- Recent expulsions of Libyans involved in terrorist
activities by West European governments and limits on
the official Libyan presence contradict Qadhafi's claims
of widespread international support and US isolation, as
well as his denials of terrorist involvement.
relying on the VOA and BBC for accurate information
because they recognize that the regime is disinforming
them.
-- In our view, Qadhafi's failure to convene an
extraordinary Arab League Summit has further undermined
Qadhafi's attempts to persuade Li.byans of US blame for
the confrontation.
Regime Countermeasures
Although the US airstrike has weakened Qadhafi's grip on
power, his extensive, security precautions and the continuing
loyalty of his security services protect him from all but the
best-organized and skillfully implemented plots.
-- We have no indication that the US attack has weakened
the morale of either the Jamahiriya Guard--his principal
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coup protection force--or other domestic security
In addition, Qadhafi apparently has been given a limited
psychological lift by a recent Soviet commitment to strengthen
the Libyan military capabilities against potential US attacks.
-- In our view, Qadhafi's renewed approaches to the
Soviets--highlighted by Libyan number two man Jallud's
visit to Moscow last month--probably are intended in
part to help shore up his domestic position.
-- The Libyan leader may regard increased Soviet military
assistance as a prerequisite for undercutting dissent in
the officer corps and rebuilding his international
prestige.
-- Qadhafi might also perceive a major arms purchase as a
means to revive traditional West European concerns over
closer ties between Tripoli and Moscow and undermine the
current Allied effort to isolate the Libyan regime.
- The favorable Soviet response has increased Qadhafi's
confidence enough to reassert his control over day-to-
day developments, thereby discouraging at least some
potential plotters.
Nevertheless, the cancellation by Qadhafi of his public
appearance on 11 June--a national holiday commemorating the 1970
withdrawal of US forces from Libya--demonstrates the considerable
pressure he is under.
-- Qadhafi almost certainly decided on a televised
appearance because he fears assassination if he appears
publicly.
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