ILLUSTRATIVE MEASURES ON SOUTH AFRICA

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP91B00874R000300090005-6
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 18
• Document Creation Date: December 27, 2016
• Document Release Date: June 28, 2012
• Sequence Number: 5
• Publication Date: July 9, 1986
• Content Type: MEMO

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9 July 1986
MEMORANDUM FOR: Deputy Director for Intelligence
Deputy Chief, Africa Division, ALA
SUBJECT: Illustrative Measures on South Africa
1. Attached for your review is the package of impact analyses for
State's list of illustrative measures. In some cases, we have briefly
raised alternative options that could be taken. I do not know your plans
for distributing these, but I will be attending the State-hosted
interagency meeting this afternoon and could deliver them.
2. State's illustrative measures, which vary significantly in their
scope, are all intended to send political messages to South
Africa--telling whites that the United States is committed to ending
apartheid and convincing blacks that the United States is genuinely
seeking the end to white rule. To a great extent, the impact these
"signals" have on South Africans--both black and white--will determine how
domestic and international audiences will react to them. The United
States, of course, could send political messages directly, that is, by
political gestures rather than economic-oriented actions. For your
background, we have listed a few, but have not provided impact sheets on
them since they are so squarely in State's sphere. All are pretty
controversial with lots of pros and cons.
-- Appoint a black American as Ambassador to South Africa; such
an appointment would be an unequivocal statement to Pretoria
of US rejection of apartheid; furthermore, this official
probably would have an entree into black South Africa
unavailable to any other Western official; it is a gesture
that the United States is in a unique position to make.
-- High-level, high-visibility visit to Frontline States; a
high-ranking US official would meet with regional heads of
state to discuss the US role in the region and how the US and
the FLS together can handle South Africa.
-- Announce expanded financial assistance for black labor unions,
including the funding of strike funds; a strike by the
5EeR E--~
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National Union of Mineworkers is widely expected this summer
and US assistance to the union probably would be an unexpected
gesture.
Indicate official US support for antigovernment groups
including the African National Congress; announce plans for
regular, high-level meetings.
Attachment:
As stated
2
S E C R E T
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J L L K t I
UNILATERAL U.S. ACTIONS
SECRET
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Proposed Action: Expelling all South African Defense Attaches
Impact on South Africa: Would reinforce South Africa's already strong
sense of.diplomatic isolation. South Africa traditionally has tried
to maximize its overseas presence and recently fought to maintain some
form of attache representation following Argentina's expulsion of the
Since the recent expulsion of
the senior South African attache, Pretoria's attache office in the US
has an air attache, a naval attache, a sergeant, and two secretaries
accredited to the US.
Impact on Region: Probably none. Many of its security liaisons have
been suspended following South Africa's recent raids against ANC
facilities in Botswana, Zimbabwe, and Zambia.
Impact on US and Allies: Pretoria probably would respond in kind,
expelling the US attache contingent consisting of an army attache, a
naval attache, an assistant air attache, four enlisted men, and one
secretary.
Moreover,
the attache office in Pretoria operates a C-12 passenger plane in
support of US Embassies throughout southern Africa.
Alternative Options: Expel commercial attache, science attache or
nonessential Embassy personnel. In each case, the principal impact is
diplomatic, signaling South African isolation, but the US would be
hurt somewhat more than South AFrica since our representation is
usually larger and performs more valuable services--e.g. contacts that
our commercial attache is making with black businessmen.
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Proposed Action: Reducing South African official scientific personnel in
Impact on South Africa: Little overall impact on South African access to
technology as most transfers occur through commercial ties, especially
direct foreign investment. Probably would increase cost of obtaining
technology and restrict access to export licensing. Official scientific
presence consists of a science and technology attache, who also serves as
the official liasion for the government-supported Council for Scientific
and Industrial Research (CSIR), and at least one CSIR representative at the
South African Consulate in Beverley Hills. CSIR conducts fundamental
scientific research from agricultural development to space research and has
also applied for numerous U.S. export licensing requests, particularly in
the semiconducter industry. South African scientists frequently attend
academic seminars, training and research programs. South Africa probably
would try to expand scientific ties with other countries, such as Israel
where CSIR already has a bilateral exchange program.
Impact on on region: Probably none as Pretoria likely to retaliate
directly. Minor economic sanctions against neighbors possible, however,
including withdrawal of technological advisory programs, and abandoning
joint scientific reserach projects particularly in the area of vaccine and
disease research.
Impact on the U.S. and Allies: Minimal. South Africa would undoubtedly
expel the U.S. scientific attache, who gains little significant scientific
Pretoria may close the door on movement toward
signing IAEA nuclear safeguard agreements on its semi-commercial uranium
enrichment plant, but these negotiations already rife with problems.
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MULTILATERAL ACTIONS WITH ALLIES
(but Possible U.S. Unilateral Actions)
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Proposed Action: Revoke South Africa's Most Favored Nation Status
Impact on South Africa: Most South African goods would not be affected by its
loss of Most Favored Nation status which would have effects similar to a
selected boycott of South African products. Our analysis. of past trade
boycotts against South Africa and other countries suggests that such actions
are most likely to be effective when the goods involved are easily traceable
to country of origin and substitutes are readily available at similar prices
from other sources of-supply. This would affect South African exports such as
coal, steel, agricultural products,and gold coins, but these goods account for
less than 20 percent of total South African export earnings. By contrast,
boycotting or, if Most Favored Nation status is revoked, imposing a higher
price on South African gold bullion, diamonds, and platinum--which account for
more than half of export earnings--would be difficult to enforce as they are
readily marketable, easily transshipped, and difficult to trace. An Embassy
contact reports that in an effort to circumvent possible trade sanctions, some
exporters of mineral commodities already are laundering forwarding documents
to disguise South African origin.
Impact on Region: Pretoria might respond with minor economic sanctions
against neighbors, including expulsion of some foreign workers, rail
slowdowns, and the like. South African companies probably would try to use
neighboring states to disguise country of origin with some minor benefits for
Impact on US and Allies: Pretoria probably would tighten foreign currency
controls on the repatriation of dividends and profits by foreign companies,
which would affect the book value of foreign assets in South Africa. Pretoria
might threaten to impose limited embargoes on strategic mineral sales to the
West, but may be deterred from taking action by fear of prompting tougher
sanctions.
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Proposed Action: Terminate South African Airlines Landing Rights
Impact on South Africa: Would reinforce South Africa's already strong
sense of diplomatic isolation. Pretoria clearly anticipates further
sanctions on its civil aviation. The state-run South African Airlines
(SAA) already is experiencing financial difficulties due to the
recession, the falling rand, inflation, and increased costs, and
sanctions would further cripple its sinking revenues. SAA already is
developing elaborate schemes to counter the effects of lost landing
rights in the West by developing alternatives in Zambia, Swaziland,
and Mauritius. Obtaining agreement to a total ban on SAA landing
rights in Europe will be difficult since negotiations reportedly are
underway with Olympic Airways (Greece), Alitalia (Italy), Sabena
(Belgium), KLM (The Netherlands), and Uta (France) to increase the
weekly number of flights to South Africa from 2 to 3, with the
provision that they pay a special surcharge to SAA. Termination of
landing rights by only a few countries would have only limited impact.
Impact on Region: Some countries in the region would stand to gain
additional revenues due to increased international traffic through
their facilities. However, South Africa is likely to retaliate for
lost landing rights by restricting some rail transit in the region.
Impact on US and Allies: Pretoria would likely retaliate by denying
foreign carrier landing rights in South Africa at a substantial loss
of revenues to individual Western air carriers. For example, Prime
Minister Thatcher recently stated that stopping direct flights to
South Africa could cost British Airways about $100 million in lost
revenues. Loss of South African landing rights also would require
significant re-routing of Western air traffic to the region. In
addition, South Africa could retaliate by restricting access of some
Western ships to ports and refueling facilities. More than 12,000
ships of numerous registries call annually in Durban, Cape Town, Port
Elizabeth, and other South African ports annually.
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Proposed Action: Visa restrictions on employees of South African Government
and certain private citizens.
Impact on South Africa: Would reinforce South Africa's already strong sense
of diplomatic isolation by limiting highly valued diplomatic contact. Also
restricts reporting capabilities of its diplomatic presence. Could sharpen
divisions among white South Africans by cutting access to potential haven
for whites, especially professionals and English-speakers, seeking to
emigrate.
Impact on region: Probably little as Pretoria likely to respond directly.
Pretoria could tighten border controls or introduce new regulations on visa
requirements for individuals transiting through South Africa to neighboring
Impact on U.S. and Allies: Almost certain retaliation in kind limiting U.S.
and European official travel to South Africa. Pretoria is not a signatory
to the Vienna Consular Covention, which provides guidance on diplomatic
relations, and it already has bent rules by demanding that new U.S.
Embassy positions be approved and the names of newly assigned personnel
submitted before a diplomatic identity card is issued. This action could
portend, according to the Embassy, limitations on the number of diplomatic
personnel recognized by Pretoria, particularly the five new personnel
assigned to the new USAID group. Loss of US and Allied diplomatic presence
probably exceeds that of South Africa because of West's relatively limited
access to events and people inside South Africa, particuarly in the wake of
nationwide declaration of emergency. Pretoria probably also would refuse
again to grant travel visas for government opposition leaders, such as
Bishop Tutu.
Alternative action: The U.S. and its Allies could demand descriptions of
the duties of South African diplomatic personnel, as we do with Cuba and
the Soviet Union, or limit renewals of visas for diplomatic personnel.
Could be labelled as retaliation for South African moves and probably would
lead to significantly reduced diplomatic presences, both in South Africa
and in the West.
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Proposed Action: No New Investment For Non-Sullivan (non-EC Code) Signatories
Impact on South Africa: Would have little economic impact since we expect little
new foreign investment in South Africa until the domestic unrest subsides, which
is unlikely in the near term.. The recent debt crisis--triggered by a loss of
foreign confidence in South Africa--clearly indicates investor concern over
domestic political and economic uncertainties. During 1985, foreign investment
in South Africa fell-by nearly $4 billion as the result of disinvestment, loan
repayment, and capital flight.
Estimated Foreign Investments in South Africa*
Country
United Kingdom
United States
West Germany
France
Other
Total
Total
$15 billion
$13 billion
$3 billion
$2 billion
$8 billion
$42 billion
(1985)
Direct
$4.5+ billion
$2.1 billion
$1+ billion
$1.6 billion
$19 billion
* Includes direct investment, foreign-owned shares on the Johannesburg Stock
Exchange, other types of equity investment and overseas debt.
Impact on Region: Pretoria probably would respond with minor-economic sanctions
against neighbors, including expulsion of some foreign workers, rail slowdowns,
and the like. If part of comprehensive package, more severe punitive actions
likely.
Impact on US and Allies: Pretoria probably would retaliate by tightening
foreign currency controls on the repatriation of dividends and profits by
foreign companies, which would affect the book value of foreign assets in South
Africa. Pretoria might threaten to impose limited embargoes on strategic
mineral sales to the West, but may be deterred from taking stiffer action by
fear of prompting tougher sanctions.
Alternative Option: Ban All New Foreign Investment and Loans: We believe that
many studies overstate South African economic vulnerability to foreign
restrictions on new.investment and loans, although widespread investmentand loan
restrictions would reduce long-run growth potential. South African investment
has not depended heavily on foreign funds: net capital inflows accountedfor only
9 percent of domestic fixed investment between 1963 and 1980, according to South
African Government data. Since 1980, capital outflows have exceeded capital
inflows by an average of $400 million per year, and investment has been funded
from internal corporate savings. A portion of these internally-generated funds
have come from subsidiaries of foreign companies, but, to date, bans on new
investment have not applied to reinvested profits.
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Proposed Action: No computer sales to South African Government
Impact on South Africa: Relatively minor and short-lived for a US only cut-off
of computer sales. Some government agencies and government-owned companies
undoubtedly would be caught short
but other government-owned companies already
switching to an IBM architecture as their common standard, which allows them to
use a wide variety of of IBM-compatible computers. Stopping sales only to
government offices is probably unenforcable since South Africans undoubtedly
Impact on region: Pretoria probably would respond with minor economic sanctions
against neighboring states, including expulsion of some foreign workers, rail
slowdowns, and the like. If part of a comprehensive package, more severe,
punitive actions likely
Impact on US and Allies: Since a ban on sales only to government offices is.
probably unenforcable, acquisition by South African business firms probably
would compensate for reduction in government demand, thus negating impact on US
Alternative Option: Total Ban on all Computer Sales. A total ban would have a
significant short-term impact, but could prove difficult to enforce. Producing
computers and other sophisticated electronic devices is probably beyond existing
South African technological capabilities, but most of the vital components not
produced domestically are small enough to be carried in by suitcase, making an
effective embargo difficult. Moreover, South Africa has made significant
progress in semiconductor fabrication and we have little doubt that as in oil
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and arms procurement, Pretoria would employ clande
stine means to a
cquire
computer and electronic equipment.
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Computers and co
mputer
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related equipment were the single largest category of goods exported by the US
to South Africa in 1985. A total ban on sales- to South Africa would cost US
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Proposed Action: Extending arms embargo against military and police
Impact on South Africa: Minimal. South Africa has been operating
under a voluntary UN arms embargo since 1963, made mandatory in 1977.
The result has been a resilient, thriving arms industry, which already
meets most domestic defense and security requirements, with such
exceptions as advanced aircraft, large naval vessels, and certain high
technology electronics,
Impact on Region: Probably none.
Impact on US and Allies: We believe some US allies already turn a
blind eye to covert trade with South Africa. Enforcement would be
difficult as country of origin labels on weapons and shipping
manifests are easily altered. Moreover, dealing with dual use
commodities has always been difficult.
Alternative Options: Further discourage purchase of South
African-produced arms by third countries, such as Iraq, Taiwan, Chile,
and Argentina. The UN General Assembly in 1984 passed a nonbinding
resolution, requesting UN member nations not to buy military equipment
produced in South Africa. Despite South Africa's aggressive efforts
to market its arms, actual sales are still fairly limited and the loss
of these markets would have only a limited impact in South Africa.
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Proposed Action: Stockpile strategic minerals
Impact on South Africa: Would reinforce South Africa's diplomatic isolation by
signaling West's determination to reduce longstanding dependence on Pretoria.
Any significant Western stockpiling effort, however, undoubtedly would boost the
price of South African minerals--chromium, manganese, platinum-group metals, and
vanadium--and add to foreign currency earnings, about 9 percent of which come
from these minerals. Over the long haul, however, higher prices would trigger
accelerated recycling and substitution efforts, and encourage competing
producers to gear up production. As the main alternative supplier of these
s
ra
t
t
eg
i
i
c m
nerals, the Soviet Union
b
Strategic Minerals: Estimated World Production, 1985
South Africa
USSR
Share of Western
Share of World
Share of World
Production
Production
Production
Chromium
53
31
31
Manganese
29
15
43
Platinum group
86
43
50
Vanadium
58
42
31
pro
ably would profit.
me
a
e economic impact hl
,owever, woud be negligible..
Impact on US and Allies: Aside from the cost of stockpiling and higher price of
minerals for current use, would have little impact except in unlikely case
Pretoria imposed preemptive embargo on strategic mineral sales. Pretoria would
fear that an embargo would lower export earnings and could trigger reprissals
against South Africa's export-dependent economy. The US has substantial
stockpiles or reserves of all four minerals, West Europe has limited stockpiles,
but Japan is the most dependent, receivin ercent or more of each of the
four minerals from South Africa.
Alternative Option: Promote Substitution: An announcement that the US and its
allies will push the development of alternative materials and sources of supply
could have an important pyschological effect on Pretoria since it would signal
the West's determination to reduce a longstanding dependence on South Africa.
The im
di
t
wor
chromium supplies, with negligible impact elsewhere.
Impact on Region: Would benefit Zimbabwe as producer of about 5 percent of
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Proposed Action: Ban all exports to the South African Government except
medicine.
Impact on South Africa: A ban on all sales to government offices could have a
significant impact but is probably unenforcable. South African firms have
developed considerable skill in evading end-use certification and probably could
divert needed items to the government and government-owned companies. Moreover,
.we estimate that between 1960 and 1979 Pretoria spent over $2 billion building
and maintaining nonmilitary strategic stockpiles and can weather even
comprehensive import embargoes for several years. In addition, Pretoria has
engaged in subtrefuge trade that has enabled it to circumvent all previous
---
o
c
embarg
econ
m
Impact on the region: Pretoria probably would respond with minor economic
sanctions against neighboring states, including expulsion of some foreign
workers, rail slowdowns, and the like. If part of a comprehensive package, more
severe, punitive actions likely.
Impact on the US and Allies: Since a ban on sales only to the government is
probably unenforcable, acquisition by South African business firms would
compensate for a reduction in government demand, thus negating impact on US and
A I 1 S -
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POSITIVE ACTIONS WITH OR WITHOUT ALLIES
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Proposed Action: Expand US AID programs
Impact on South Africa: Would beef up existing programs and
increase US ties to affected individuals but, in our view,
would be unlikely to win many points for the United States
among blacks in general. Growing anti-American sentiment
among South African blacks reflects the perception that the
United States supports Pretoria's "neo-apartheid" policies
that change the image but not the reality of racial
oppression. Increased US assistance to blacks
under thettcurrent system reinforces the radical view that
the US government is tacitly aiding SAG efforts to coopt
blacks. Moreover, a rapid infusion of US aid targeted at
blacks could overwhelm the already extended managerial
capacity of many black business and community groups.
Pretoria's recent crackdown on antigovernment activity also
raises problems for possible US ventures since many
community, groups are affiliated with the United Democratic
Front, whose local level leaders have been a specific target
for detentions. Finally, the SAG's toleration of specific
programs targetted at blacks already has been strained;
increasing them will be viewed as more "foreign meddling" in
internal affairs and could well be rejected by Pretoria,
especially if these measures are announced in conjunction
with an economic sanctions package.
Impact on Region: None, unless aid programs of neighboring
countries are reduced to accommodate increased funding for
Impact on the United States and Its Allies: In addition to
normal budget problems, increased US or Allied assistance
targetted at blacks under the current system always risks
the perception, both domestically and internationally, that
efforts to help blacks, without ending apartheid, amounts to
little more than helping blacks adjust to continued white
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Proposed Action: Increase aid to rebuild townships damaged in
antiapartheid unrest, particularly in the areas of housing, education,
health, and business development
Impact on South Africa. Unrest-related destruction in the townships
stems largely from attacks by radicals which probably would continue
despite US efforts to rebuild schools and other government buildings.
Rapid urban growth is straining the already inadequate health,
housing, and educational facilites and probably can be alleviated only
by longterm development programs, themselves possible only if unrest
subsides, which is unlikely. US assistance in such areas as housing
undoubtedly would be seen by many blacks as American collaboration
with Pretoria to make apartheid more acceptable. Pretoria,
increasingly about "outside meddling," is unlikely to permit any
crash program that is not carefully meshed into its own program for
blacks--which obviously undercuts the potential impact on South
African blacks.
Impact on Region: Probably some resentment from neighboring states
where living conditions often fall short of those for urban blacks in
Imapct on the US and Allies: Would require dramatic increases in
funding to achieve even marginal results in the short-term. A
coordinated effort by the US and its Allies, however, would likely
allow greater funding and possibly defuse opposition from past critics
of US projects.
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Proposed Action: Marshall-type Plan for Southern Africa
Impact on South Africa: Strong demonstrations of Western support for
neighboring black-ruled states would have significant psychological impacts on
Pretoria, which also counts on its neighbors' dependency on South Africa to
stave off sanctions. In the short term, however, significant progress toward
reducing dependence on South Africa is unlikely. Moreover, any improvement in
neighboring economies probably would raise their demand for South African
imports. We estimate that South Africa earns about $1.2 billion from all of
its regional economic ties.
Impact on Region: Depends on nature and extent of assistance. Major
infrastructural projects, such as upgrades of rail lines or port facilities,
could take years to have any significant impact and could be derailed by
continued regional turmoil. The Southern African Development Coordination
Conference--formed in 1980 by nine southern and eastern African nations with
the goal of reducing economic dependence on South Africa--has received donor
contributions or commitments exceeding $1 billion, but is further than ever
from achieving its goals, in our view. Poor economic policy choices, drought,
and low world prices for the region's major commodity exports have combined to
boost economic dependence on South Africa, Western donors, and policy advice
from organizations such as the IMF.
Impact on US and Allies: An effective Marshall-type plan would involve a
massive multi-year effort. For example, in the extreme case of a South
African blockade against its neighbors, balance of payments assistance to
compensate for the loss of all exports currently funneled through South
African ports would total nearly $2 billion per year.
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