BREAKFAST WITH SENATORS STEVENS AND RUDMAN

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP91B01306R000500030005-9
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 23
• Document Creation Date: December 23, 2016
• Document Release Date: November 7, 2013
• Sequence Number: 5
• Publication Date: July 27, 1989
• Content Type: MEMO

Declassified in Part- Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/11/26: CIA-RDP91B01306R000500030005-9
R
Next 1 Page(s) In Document Denied
Declassified in Part- Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/11/26: CIA-RDP91B01306R000500030005-9
25X1
/ Declassified in Pad- Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/11/26: CIA-RDP91B01306R000500030005-9
TOP SECRET 25X1
27 July 1989
MEMORANDUM FOR: The Director of Central Intelligence
FROM:
Deputy Director of Congressional Affairs
SUBJECT: Breakfast with Senators Stevens and Rudman
1. After your Pentagon breakfast on Friday, 28 July,
you will join a breakfast for Senators Ted Stevens (R., AK)
and Warren Rudman (R., NH). Dick Kerr will host the
breakfast from 8:00 to 10:00 AM in your dining room. Both
Senators serve on the Senate Appropriations Defense
Subcommittee. Keith Kennedy, their Appropriations Committee
staffer, also will attend. , John Helgerson, 25X1
, Tom Elmore, Bob Blackwell, and I will join 25X1
25X1
25X1
you.
2. This breakfast is being held in response to the
Senators' request for a wide ranging intelligence briefing.
Each Senator has broad gauged interests in national security
issues, but their staffer indicates they are currently
interested in the following topics:
--Developments in China since the end of the student
uprising.
--Prospects for a Cambodian settlement
--Current situation and future prospects in Afghanistan.
--Key FY 90 intelligence budget issues. In that regard,
Bill Lackman suggests that we bring up:
O The implications of the SSCI NFIP personnel
freeze;
TOP SECRET
Declassified in Part- Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/11/26: CIA-RDP91B01306R000500030005-9
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
Declassified in Part- Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/11/26: CIA-RDP91B01306R000500030005-9
TOP SECRET 25X1
25X1
Because of Senator Stevens' interest in Federal employee
issues, you may wish to discuss in very general terms our
efforts to prepare a flexible benefits initiative.
25X1
9)(1
3. We have provided talking points to begin the
discussion of each of these topics, but we would not be a
all surprised if other issues
25X1
Breakfast participants will be prepared to discuss
25X1
the issues as appropriate.
25X1
Attachments
TOP SECRET
- Declassified in Part- Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/11/26: CIA-RDP91B01306R000500030005-9
STAT
STAT
25X1
25X1
Declassified in Part- Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/11/26: CIA-RDP91B01306R000500030005-9
Declassified in Part- Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/11/26: CIA-RDP91B01306R000500030005-9
25X1
Declassified in Part- Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/11/26: CIA-RDP91B01306R000500030005-9
Declassified in Part -Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/11/26: CIA-RDP91B01306R000500030005-9
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/11/26: CIA-RDP91B01306R000500030005-9 25X1
?
0EA/CH/PA
China After the Rebellion
Six weeks after the 3/4 June suppression of the prodemocracy movement, we
see several worrisome trends:
? The regime is continuing its crackdown on dissidents, some 10,000 have been
arrested to date, and several hundred may have been executed.
? At the same time a power struggle is going on among China's geriatric leaders
that is likely to continue until Deng's death.
? More orthodox party elders in particular seem determined to purge the reform
wing of the party.
The economy, meanwhile, continues to do poorly with inflation running at
over 20 percent and unemployment increasing:
? The crackdown has also worsened the longterm outlook, as foreign investors and
governments are very reluctant to make new commitments to development
projects.
So far the regime's fear campaign has cowed much of the urban population,
but the crackdown also is engendering increased anger and bitterness that could,
together with growing economic problems, trigger more serious unrest in the next
year or two:
? Many urban workers are already bitter over the impact of inflation and .are angry
over the government's new policy of issuing government bonds in lieu of part of
their wages.
? And if the government is forced to resort to issuing IOU's to farmers again this
year to purchase the fall grain harvest, it is likely to face increasing unrest
among China's 800 million peasants.
SECRET
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/11/26: CIA-RDP91B01306R000500030005-9
25X1
25X1
Declassified in Part- Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/11/26: CIA-RDP91B01306R000500030005-9
Declassified in Part- Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/11/26: CIA-RDP91B01306R000500030005-9
Declassified in Part- Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/11/26: CIA-RDP91B01306R000500030005-9 25X1
Status of Cambodia Peace Talks
0EA/SEA
We have been carefully watching the discussions taking place
in Paris this week between the Cambodian resistance groups
led by Prince Sihanouk and Cambodian Prime Minister Hun Sen,
who represents the Vietnamese-backed government in Phnom
Penh.
Sihanouk had a one-on-one meeting with Hun Sen, and the
two made no progress toward resolving their differences
over the terms of a settlement. The key issue was the
role of the Khmer Rouge. Sihanouk insists that the
Khmer Rouge must be included in a settlement equally
with the other factions, while Hun Sen maintains that
the Khmer Rouge must have no part.
All four of the Cambodian factions had a roundtable
discussion the next day, but could not even agree on
how the factions should be represented at the month-
long international peace talks that will begin on
Sunday.
It looks now as if the Cambodian factions have deferred to
the international conference to resolve their differences.
We are concerned that the international group will
focus on Vietnam's promise of withdrawal as the only
requirement for peace in Cambodia rather than the tough
job of hammering out an agreement that gives Sihanouk
real power.
The danger is that such a partial solution would
probably result in a bloody civil war among the four
factions and deny the Cambodian people the prospect of
a government of their choice.
Tom Elmore, the head of our Office of East Asian Analysis,
is intimately familiar with the complexities of the Cambodia
problem and can explain the situation in more detail for
you.
SECRET
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/11/26: CIA-RDP91B01306R000500030005-9
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
Declassified in Part- Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/11/26: CIA-RDP91B01306R000500030005-9
Declassified in Part -Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/11/26 : CIA-RDP91B01306R000500030005-9
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/11/26: CIA-RDP91B01306R000500030005-9
s
SECRET
Situation Report on Afghanistan
We and the Intelligence Community no longer consider it
likely that the Afghan mujahedin will defeat the Kabul
regime by the end of 1989. We believe, however, that the
insurgents can still achieve some significant gains before
winter if they make a concerted effort. Resistance
commanders continue to retain the strategic advantage, and
we believe they will be able to oust Najibullah, but
according to their own timetable.
Military Activity Increases
The focus of major fighting continues to be near
Jalalabad around the garrison at Samarkheyl. Forces from
both sides continue to occupy positions on ridges
overlooking the garrison. Meanwhile, the regime continues
to resupply Jalalabad overland despite insurgent efforts to
block the road.
--Samarkheyl has, in effect, become a "no man's land"
with neither side in control. The garrison probably
has been unoccupied or abandoned for at least two
weeks,'
Elsewhere in Afghanistan, fighting appears to have
picked up in Kabul and Qandahar, although regime positions
are not in danger of falling to the insurgents.
--Insurgent rocket attacks against Kabul have increased
Najibullah's Position Strengthened
Regime President Najibullah appears to be in greater
control now than when the Soviets left Afghanistan as a
result of the continuing massive Soviet resupply effort, the
relative success of regime troops to defend Jalalabad, and
the general lack of insurgent pressure on regime positions
.countrywide. Nonetheless, last week's reportedly failed
coup attempt by elements of the defense ministry highlights
Najibullah's tenuous hold on power.
--He still has not expanded his support base,
even among purported regime supporters.
the National Reconciliation
Program has been virtually ineffective and broadly
unpopular.
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
WARNING NOTICE
INTEL! ICENCE SOURCES SECRET
flf? mr-Tunnc infirm irrn
Declassified in Part- Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/11/26: CIA-RDP91B01306R000500030005-9
25X1
Declassified in Part- Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/11/26: CIA-RDP91B01306R000500030005-9
SECRET
--His recent reappointments of rivals to the
government, like the brother of former president
Babrak Karmal, will not satisfy the opposition's
desire to oust him and may actually reflect his
inability to isolate them.
Intra-resistance hostilities between Jamiat Islami and
Hizbi Islami (Gulbuddin) forces are likely to increase
following the massacre of 30 Jamiat insurgents by insurgents
associated with Gulbuddin despite efforts by both party
leaders to peacefully settle the dispute.
--Jamiat party leader Rabbani blames Gulbuddin directly
for the incident and appealed to the interim
government to arrest and punish the perpetrators.
--We expect Jamiat forces loyal to commander Ahmad Shah
Masood will take revenge against Hizbi Islami forces
in northeastern Afghanistan, despite Gulbuddin's
public condemnation of the incident.
Pakistan Remains Committed
? Benazir Bhutto is not likely to advocate a major change
in Pakistan's Afghan policy, but may consider concessions in
order to achieve a political settlement if the insurgency is
still bogged down at the end of this year's fighting season.
--Bhutto pledged continued support for the resistance
last month in meetings with President Bush.
Even though Pakistani diplomats will continue seeking
a "political solution" this summer, Islamabad is
not likely to change its bargaining position until
after the current fighting season. If the
resistance has made no headway by the end of this
year, we believe Pakistan would be more amenable
to a negotiated settlement that removes Najibullah
but leaves some regime figures in place.
SECRET
Declassified in Part- Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/11/26: CIA-RDP91B01306R000500030005-9
Declassified in Part- Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/11/26: CIA-RDP91B01306R000500030005-9
Declassified in Part- Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/11/26: CIA-RDP91B01306R000500030005-9
Declassified in Part- Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/11/26: CIA-RDP91B01306R000500030005-9
R
Next 2 Page(s) In Document Denied
Declassified in Part- Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/11/26: CIA-RDP91B01306R000500030005-9
25X1
Declassified in Part- Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/11/26: CIA-RDP91B01306R000500030005-9
(D
CD
H-)
?
rt-
V)
Declassified in Part- Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013L11/26: CIA-RDP91B01306R000500030005-9
Declassified in Part- Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/11/26: CIA-RDP91B01306R000500030005-9
SECRET
Proposed Flexible Benefits Program
---Pat Butler, a former member of Senator Stevens Staff and
currently the Minority Staff Director of the Subcommittee on
Federal Services, Post Office and Civil Service, Committee
on Governmental Affairs, raised the possibility of
Senator Stevens sponsoring a pilot project on flexible
benefits at a meeting with the DDA in April. In response to
Ms. Stevens' question, the DDA discussed the broad outline
of the proposed Agency Program.
---Any discussion of our proposed program should be caveated
with the comment that the Administration has not yet
reviewed the proposal and we must then brief the Oversight
Committees before we can proceed.
---In initial discussions with OPM, it indicated that the
Agency offered the right environment to conduct this type of
experiment.
---Our proposed plan resembles those in the private and
non-Federal public sector. The plan contains pre-tax
features as well as choices in the type and level of health
insurance benefits available to employees.
---Our primary reasons for designing such a plan are:
--to control the rising health insurance costs and to
--to develop a powerful recruitment and retention tool
to meet the challenge of staffing an intelligence agency
in the Year 2000.
SECRET
Declassified in Part- Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/11/26: CIA-RDP91B01306R000500030005-9
25X1
25X1
Declassified in Part- Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/11/26: CIA-RDP91B01306R000500030005-9
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/11/26 : CIA-RDP91B01306R000500030005-9
Declassified in Part- Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/11/26: CIA-RDP91B01306R000500030005-9
a
Alaska - Senior Senator
Ted Stevens (R)
Of Girdwood ? Elected 1970
Appointed to the Senate 1%8
Born: Nov. 18. 1923, Indianapolis. Ind.
Education: U.C.L.A., B.A. 1947; Harvard U. Law
? School, LL.B. 1950.
Military Career: Army Air Corps, 1943-46.
Occupation: Lawyer.
Family: Wife, Catherine Chandler; six children.
Religion: Episcopalian.
Political Career: Alaska House, 1965-68; Republican
nominee for U.S. Senate, 1962; sought Republican
nomination for U.S. Senate. 1968; appointed to U.S.
Senate. 1968.
Capitol Office: 522 Hart Bldg. 20510; 224-3004.
In Washington: Freed from the burdens
of party leadership by his narrow loss to Robert
Dole at the start of the 99th Congress, Stevens
has redirected his acerbic energy toward be-
coming a major force on defense policy.
Stevens has not given up on his hopes of
succeeding Dole as GOP leader some day, nor
abandoned the efforts on behalf of Senate
colleagues that long ago earned him the title of
"Mr. Petk." Legislative opponents still find
him as cranky and as tough a bargainer as ever.
But the intensity that Stevens displayed
over eight years as assistant Republican leader
has focused more often since 1985 on enhancing
the power of the Defense Appropriations Sub-
committee than on trying to enforce party
discipline or win increased congressional pay
and benefits.
As chairman of the subcommittee in the
99th Congress and as ranking Republican now,
Stevens has been determined to give the panel
a role as an independent source of judgments
about military funding. In doing so, he has
faced opposition both from its traditionally
more powerful House counterpart and from the
Senate Armed Services Committee.
During the four years when John G. Tower
chaired Armed Services. Stevens waged several
floor battles over his subcommittee's right to
determine military spending levels. That con-
flict escalated into an intense turf dispute in
1985, when the Armed Services chair went to
Barry Goldwater ? a change that brought two
of the Senate's more irascible members into
head-to-head opposition.
The core of the argument was the Appro-
priations Committee's approval of amounts for
various weapons systems that were above the
authorization limits set by Armed Services.
34
_
Stevens insisted that the excess funds, which
could not be spent until additional authorizing
legislation was passed, were an essential tool in
negotiating with the House. Without some flex-
ibility on spending, he said. the Senate con-
stantly would be forced to bargain down to the
normally lower House levels during conference
on the appropriations bill.
The dispute came to a head in 1986, when
Appropriations reported a supplemental
spending bill that was 85.6 billion over defense
authorization limits. Armed Services leaders
raised heated objections. and a major poor
fight loomed. Negotiating late into the night,
Stevens and Goldwater finally came up with a
compromise in which Stevens promised to stop
including unauthorized funds in his spending
bill. The two chairmen agreed that the panel
would work more closely in the future, and that
each would allow members of the other com-
mittee to attend markup sessions.
Stevens generally has supported President
Reagan's requests for a massive increase in'
military spending. In 1986. he backed the bud-
get's call for a 3 percent real growth in spend-
ing, and fought to defend high funding levels
for the strategic defense initiative.
Some of Stevens' most important work in
this field has been on the issue of requiring U.S.
allies to assume more of the burden of NATO
defense costs. He was incensed that Western
European countries were financing the Soviet
Union's construction of a pipeline to the natu-
ral gas fields in Siberia, and threatened to cut
U.S. troop levels on the continent. Sub-
sequently, Stevens included in the fiscal 1983
defense appropriations bill a provision reducing
the number of U.S. troops in Europe by 23,000.)
It was dropped in conference, but a freeze on
Declassified in Part- Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/11/26: CIA-RDP91B01306R0005oorrinnn_q
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/11/26 : CIA-RDP91B01306R000500030005-9
troop strength did become law.
The subject of Central America ? and
Reagan's efforts to curtail leftist movements
there ? has been another major concern of
Stevens. Convinced that Soviet-backed forces
in the region constitute a grave security threat
to the United States, Stevens has been a prime
Senate ally of the administration's campaign to
defeat guerrillas in El Salvador and undermine
the leftist government of Nicaragua.
believe in the Monroe Doctrine," Ste-
vens once said. "What goes on in our hemi-
sphere is our business." He worries in particu-
lar that a weakening of the U.S. stance in the
region would lead to a wave of illegal aliens. "If
we indicate a lessening of our resolve in Central
America, we've got to prepare ourselves for a
wave of 3 to 5 million immigrants."
Late in 1986. when fellow senators of both
parties were rushing to oreak with the adminis-
tration over its arms sales to Iran and diNiersion
of some of the.proceeds,to Nicaraguan contras,
Stevens was takirig a more -cautious approach,?
trying as long as he could to defend the admin-
istration's goals in the affair, if not its methods.
Stevens' near-miss at the majority leader-
ship in December of 1984 was one of the biggest
surprises in recent Senate politics. Despite his
long tenure as chief lieutenant to Majority
Leader Howard H. Baker Jr., Stevens was seen
by almost everyone as a sure loser in his bid to
move up after Baker's retirement. Yet Stevens
ended up eliminating three other contenders,
losing to Dole in the final round of balloting by
only three votes, 28-25.
That narrow defeat reflected the wide-
spread ambivalence about Stevens and his
leadership in the Senate. For all the widespread
dislike of his heated temper, confrontational
style and tendency to let legislative differences
become personal feuds, many Republicans
clearly felt that his militant approach might be
just what was needed to restore order out of the
near-chaos into which the Senate had fallen
under Baker's amiable stewardship.
Another important factor in Stevens'
strong showing was his reputation as a man
who fought for benefits other senators wanted
but were afraid to pursue openly.
Most members scurry for cover when the
subject of pay raises comes up, but Stevens
unabashedly proclaims his belief that Congress
is underpaid. "Service in the Senate," he has
said, "should not require a sacrifice."
Over the years. Stevens has pushed an
impressive variety of schemes to make congres-
sional life more rewarding. Not all his efforts
have been successful, and in some cases Con-
Ted Stevens, R-Alaska
gress eventually reversed itself and took away
the benefits. But the list of measures passed is
impressive: a 5.5 percent pay raise (1979); a tax
break for Washington. D.C.. living expenses
(1981); postponement of limits on senators'
outside -income (1979) and expansion of their
free mailing privileges (1981).
In 1982 Stevens engineered a compromise
with the House that removed limits on sena-
tors' outside income, while giving House mem-
bers a $9,138-a-year raise. He could not secure
a pay raise for senators, but Congress the next
year voted to equalize salary levels. In 1985 he
forced a reluctant House to accept a provision
increasing the permitted amount on honoraria
? a prime source of extra income for senators
? to $30,000 a year, from 822.500.
Although he served as chairman of the
Ethics Committee in the 98th Congress, Ste-
vens has never had much use for parts of the
tough ethics code the Senate adopted in 1977.
In 1979 he. joined-New 'York Democrat Daniel
Patrick -Moynihan. lightning-quick move.
made with just six senators on the floor, to
postpone for four years the code's limit on
outside earnings. The coup succeeded, and was
later confirmed by a roll-call vote.
Another asset. for Stevens as a potential
leader was his demonstrated ability to deliver
votes in a crunch. In 1979, during the fight over
President Carter's standby gas rationing plan,
he rounded up an estimated eight to 10 GOP
votes that proved critical for final approval.
Later that year, he took a 62-26 defeat on a pay
raise and turned it into a 44-42 victory within
two hours. A moderate by GOP standards, he
can deal effectively. with Democrats as well as
with fellow Republicans.
But in the end, Stevens' impressive leader-
ship campaign could not overcome the negative
aspects of his own reputation. His years of
service as assistant leader never gained him the
affection of his colleagues, nor banished the
impression that he can be a very difficult
person to work with.
Stevens often seems to be an angry man on
the Senate floor. More than almost any other
senator, he allows differences over legislation to
become heated personal arguments. From his
first week in the chamber in 1969, when he
tangled with veteran Democrats Edmund S.
Muskie and John 0. Pastore over an appoint-
ment to President Nixon's Cabinet, colleagues
have known that debate with Stevens can
quickly degenerate into a shouting match.
Stevens' penchant for personal dispute is
strongest when he comes into conflict with
another senator of similarly contentious per-
sonality ? such as Ohio Democrat Howard M.
35
npriassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/11/26 : CIA-RDP91B01306R000500030005-9
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/11/26 : CIA-RDP91B01306R000500030005-9
Alaska - Senior Senator
Metzenbaum. After years of battle, the bitter-
ness between the two came to a head in the fall
of 1982, over a bill to transfer a federal railroad
to the state of Alaska. During one particularly
nasty fight on the Senate floor, Stevens threat-
ened to go to Ohio to campaign against Metzen-
baum.
Later in the year. Stevens sought. to apolo-
gize to Metzenbaum for another argument over
the bill: But even his apology turned into
another shouting match.
Stevens' sharp tongue extends to Washing-
ton. D.C. During debate on tax breaks for
members of Congress. Stevens angered local
residents by saying that he knew of "no town
that has a worse crime standard, a worse set of
schools, a worse circumstance to live and work
in than the city of Washington."
Nevertheless. Stevens chose the city as the ,
place to-rebuild his personal life. His first wife' ?
was killed in a. 1978 plane crash, in which he '.
also was injured. Remarrying in 1980, he
bought a town house on the border of Capitol
Hill, in a transitional inner-city neighborhood,
rather than in one of the more fashionable D.C.
suburbs.
Stevens is one of the few Senate Republi-
cans to draw sizable campaign help from orga-
nized labor. He is popular with public employee
unions grateful for his unflagging support for
federal workers, an important constituency in
Alaska. As chairman of the Civil Service, Post
Office and General Services Subcommittee at
Governmental Affairs until 1987; he was ideally
positioned to look out for those workers.
Stevens was once a federal employee him-
self? he worked in the Interior Department?
and he fights regularly against the imposition
of "caps" on federal pay raises, saying it is
unfair to make government workers suffer from
inflation.
Stevens' relations with federal employee
unions were strained during 1982, however, by
his advocacy of a proposal to revamp the fed-
eral retirement system. Stevens pushed the
plan, which involved inclusion of federal work-
ers in the Social Security system, in an unsuc-
cessful effort to hold off attacks on cost-of-
living adjustments in the pension systems.
Early in 1983. Congress cleared compromise
legislation that would bring new federal work-
ers under Social Security.
In the next Congress. Stevens worked with
Governmental Affairs Committee Chairman
William V. Roth to pass legislation establishing
a new pension system for federal workers hired
after 1983. The bill, enacted into law in 1986
after months of conference negotiations, sought
to provide new ,benefits to retired workers while
still costing the federal government less money.
On the Commerce Committee, where he
has served throughout his Senate career. Ste-
vens was mostly involved in shipping issues
during recent years as chairman of the Mer-
chant Marine Subcommittee. He was a key
player in the 98th Congress' approval of the
first major changes in shipping law in 20 years.
The legislation, strongly opposed by consumer
groups, expanded the ocean-liner industry's
antitrust immunity for setting priCes and divid-
ing routes.
The emphasis on pay and defense during
recent years has been in marked contrast with
the late 1970s, when one issue ? Alaska lands
legislation ? dominated Stevens' agenda. He
focused most of his time and energy during
those years op the fight over apportionment of
his state's land for development and environ-
mental protection.
. During 'the. years of work on the-bill. Ste-
vens was thoroughly alienated from his fellow
Alaskan, Democratic Sen. Mike Gravel, The
Stevens-Gravel feud was largely a question of
style and tactics. Both wanted to keep the
government from barring development in much
of Alaska. but they disagreed vehemently on
how to do so. Stevens felt the legislation was
inevitable and wanted to make it as acceptable
to Alaska as he could; Gravel sought to block
legislation through filibusters and similar dila-
tory tactics, fighting with a showmanship Ste-
vens regarded as pure demagoguery.
? "It's hard to do anything about Alaska
with Mike Gravel in the Senate," Stevens once
complained. In 1980 he took the unusual step
of backing Gravel's Democratic primary oppo-
nent, who defeated him. The seat later went
Republican.
At Home: Stevens' careful defense of
Alaska interests has made him invulnerable at
the polls. Although he has not had his way on
every issue, he always seems to have the right
political approach ? stubborn but pragmatic.
Stevens. who had been majority leader in
the Alaska House, made it to Washington by
appointment when Democratic Sen, E. L. Bart-
lett died in 1968. He owed his promotion to
Walter J. Hickel, the state's GOP governor.
Only months before. Stevens had failed to win
the Senate Republican primary. Six years ear-
lier. he had been nominated and had drawn
only 41 percent Of the vote.
Once in Washington. however. Stevens be-
gan digging in politically. In the 1970 contest to
fill the final two years of Bartlett's term, he
won with almost 60 percent while the GOP was
losing the governorship. In that campaign,
against liberal Democrat Wendell P. Kay. Ste-
Declassified in Part- Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/11/26: CIA-RDP91B01306R000500030005-9
Declassified in Part- Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/11/26: CIA-RDP91B01306R000500030005-9
yens favored greater oil and mineral develop-
ment; Kay was a firm conservationist.
Running for a full term in 1972, Stevens
crushed Democrat Gene Guess, the Alaska
House Speaker, whom he linked to presidential
nominee George McGovern. Stevens also ap-
pealed to Alaska's hunters by labeling Guess as
pro-gun control.
By 1978 Stevens had been elected to the
Senate Republican leadership and no promi-
nent Democrat even considered a serious cam-
paign against him. An electrical contractor and
an economics professor fought for the Demo-
cratic nomination, and the contractor, who got
it, received less than a quarter of the vote.
Stevens' 1984 opponent did only .slightly
better. John E. Havelock, a lawyer who served
as the state's attorney general in the early
1970s, tried to convince voters that the incum-
bent was more interested in pursuing his own
Ted Stevens, R-Alosko
Senate ambitions than in Alaskan affairs. But
Stevens paid his challenger little heed. Armed
with a massive campaign chest, he spent much
of the campaign stumping for other GOP sena-
tors in pursuit of his party's Senate leader post.
He crushed Havelock with 71 percent of the
vote in the most expensive Senate race in
Alaska's history.
Stevens flirted briefly with the idea of
returning to state politics in 1985, announcing
that he would have been willing to step in if
then-Democratic Gov. Bill Sheffield failed to
survive impeachment proceedings brought
against him over allegations that he had steered
a state office lease to a political-supporter. But
Stevens discarded the, notion after it became.
clear that Sheffield would survive ? at least
long enough to stand for re-election in 1986 ?
and that a number of prominent Republicans
were interested in running for governor.
Committees
Rules and Administration (Ranking)
Appropriations (2nd of 13 Republicans)
Defense (ranking); Commerce, Justice, State, the Judiciary and
Related Agencies; Interior and Related Agencies; Labor, Health
and Human Services, Education and Related Agencies; Military
Construction.
Commerce, Science and Transportation (5th of 9 Republicans)
Merchant Marine (ranking); Aviation; Communications; National
Ocean Policy Study.
Governmental Affairs (2nd of 6 Republicans)
Federal Services, Post Office and Civil Service (ranking); Fed-
eral Spending, Budget and Accounting; Oversight of Govern-
ment Management; Permanent Subcommittee on Investiga-
tions.
Joint Library
Joint Printing
Elections
1984 General
Ted Stevens (R)
146,919
(71%)
John E. Havelock (D)
58.804
(29%)
Previous Winning Percentages:
1978
(76%) 1972
(77%)
1970 (60%)
? Special election. Stevens was appointed in 1968 to fill the va-
cancy caused by the death of Sen. E. L. Bartlett. The 1970 elec-
tion was to fill the remainder of Bartlett's term.
1984
Stevens (R)
Havelock (D)
Campaign Finance
Receipts
Receipts from PACs
$1,325,135
$92,982
$637,798 (48%)
$6,050 ( 7%)
Expend-
itures
$1,195,616
$92,001
Voting Studies
Year
Presidential
Support
S 0
Party
Unity
S 0
Conservative
Coalition
S 0
1986
83
11
83f
15t
88
9
1985
75
16
71
21
90
3
1984
84
12
85
8
94
4
1983
92
5
80
17
77
16
1982
74
18
85.
8
90
4
1981
76
14
81
10
79
13
S = Support .. 0 = Opposition
t Not eligible for all recorded votes.
Key Votes
Produce MX missiles (1985)
Weaken gun control laws (1985)
Reject school prayer (1985)
Limit textile imports (1985)
Amend Constitution to require balanced budget (1986)
Aid Nicaraguan contras (1986)
Block chemical weapons production (1986)
Impose sanctions on South Africa (1986)
Interest Group Ratings
Year
ADA
ACU
AFL-CIO
CCUS
1986
15
71
33
74
1985
10
64
25
78
1084
20
67
22
76
1983
15
44
13
74
1882
15
50
35
76
1981
15
53
17
100
37
Declassified in Part- Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/11/26: CIA-RDP91B01306R000500030005-9
Declassified in Part- Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/11/26: CIA-RDP91B01306R000500030005-9
Warren B. Rudman (R)
Of Nashua ? Elected 1980
Born: May 18, 1930, Boston, Mass.
Education: Syracuse U., B.S. 1952; Boston College,
LL.B. 1960.
Military Career: Army, 1952-54.
Occupation: Lawyer.
Family: Wife, Shirley Wahl; three children.
Religion: Jewish.
Political Career: N.H. attorney general, 1970-76 (ap-
pointed).
Capitol Office:.:530 Hart. Bldg:_2.05.10; 2R4.-3324.
In Washington: To-some of the capital's
more jaundiced observers. Rudman's perfor-
mance in 1985 had some of the characteristics
of a successful political hunger strike. Within
weeks of his public threat to abandon the
Senate out of disgust with the federal deficit,
Congress approved his radical new procedure
aimed at balancing the budget.
It would be a wild exaggeration, of course,
to say that fear of losing Rudman from their
ranks was a major reason that members of
Congress passed the Gramm-Rudman-Hollings
anti-deficit amendment in the fall of 1985. But
the ultimate result could not help but contrib-
ute to Rudman's already considerable estimate
of his own influence. He is a man of unusual
intelligence and ability; a man of modesty he is
not.
There can be no denying that Rudman was
genuinely disturbed by the failure of Congress
to halt the spiraling deficit. "I truly believed.
we could put some sense into the fiscal policy of
this country," he said. "So far I haven't seen it
and I'm disappointed."
Nor is it difficult to sympathize with
Rudman's frustration at the shallowness of life
at the center of power in Washington. "I
haven't had a very good time," he said of his
first Senate term. "Quite frankly, this is not a
town that cares for Warren Rudman as a per-
son, or anything I stand for or anything I
value."
Still, it was not easy to accept the idea that
a man who seemed so comfortable in the Sen-
ate, an admirer of Daniel Webster, George
Aiken and other influential small-state New
England senators, would abandon his whole
career simply because Congress kept spending
too much money. The idea of Rudman agoniz-
ing about retirement was only made to seem
more implausible by the fact that he had al-
ready hired a media consultant to produce his
New Hampshire - Junior Senator
. _
campaign commercials at the time he said he
was thinking of quitting.
In any case, Rudman's doubts about the
Senate were resolved when he read late in the
summer of 1985 that Texas Republican Phil
Gramm was planning to offer a balanced-bud-
get plan as an amendment to a bill raising the
ceiling on the federal debt. Since his thoughts
had rug along similar lines, Rudman quickly
joined with Gramm to develop a proposal call-
ing for a series of annually decreasing ceilings
on the deficit, reaching a balanced budget by
1991.
Gramm and Rudman, who were soon
joined by South Carolina Democrat Ernest F.
Hollings, formed an effective legislative alli-
ance. While Gramm provided much of the
oratorical firepower behind the proposal, the
more established Rudman gave it an aura of
respectability and helped arrange some of the
complex procedural compromises needed to
flesh out the idea. He also added a touch of
levity to the bombastic rhetoric used by both
sides of the issue: "This is a bad idea whose
time has come," he said on more than one
occasion.
The Gramm-Rudman law was quickly
challenged in the courts, however, and by mid-
1986 the Supreme Court ruled that part of its
enforcement language that mandated auto-
matic, across-the-board cuts, if needed to meet
deficit goals, was unconstitutional. Gramm and
Rudman responded with a "fix" of their plan,
which passed the Senate but died due to House
opposition. By early 1987, many budget experts
were predicting it would be impossible to meet
the law's fiscal 1988 deficit goal.
Although Rudman has not abandoned his
efforts to balance the budget, he displays a
certain skepticism about the public's real com-
mitment to reducing federal spending. "The
919
?
,__ Declassified in Part- Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/11/26: CIA-RDP91B01306R000500030005-9
Declassified in Part- Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/11/26 CIA-RDP91B01306R000500030005-9
^
Warren B. Rudman, R-N.H.
American people talk a great game against big
government," he says. "But anything they get,
of course, isn't big government." "
There is little doubt that Rudman is a
capable legislator. It took him only a short time
to win a reputation in the Senate for hard and
thoughtful work, particularly on the Appropri-
ations Committee. If he has irritated some with
his healthy sense of his own importance, he has
gained the trust of the GOP leadership: He was
named chairman of the Ethics Committee in
the 99th Congress, and vice chairman of the
special Iran-contra committee in the 100th.
On Appropriations. Rudman served for
several years as de facto chairman .of the Com-.
merce-Justi-State. Subcommittee._ Although.
Nevada's Paul Laxalt formally chaired the
panel, he was content to let Rudman handle
most of the day-to-day work and manage the
annual appropriations bill.
Defense of the Legal Services Corporation,
targeted for extinction by the Reagan adminis-
tration, has been one of Rudman's most visible
causes on the Commerce-Justice spending
panel. A self-appointed "watchdog" over the
agency, he argues that Congress has corrected
many of the past problems ? especially alleged
political involvement by agency officials ? that
have made it a target of conservative criticisms.
Rudman's most successful maneuver on
behalf of the Legal Services Corporation came
in 1984, when he helped work out a coinpromise
proposal that pleased both friends and critics
by extending restrictions on lobbying and po-
litical activities, while also providing recipients
of legal services protection against the loss of
assistance.
A former state attorney general, Rudman
has been an outspoken supporter of tough
federal enforcement of trade and antitrust
laws. In 1982 he waged a heated battle against
the American Medical Association, which
wanted to prevent the Federal Trade Commis-
sion from pursuing violations of antitrust and
consumer protection laws by professionals. He
used his position on Appropriations to push
through an amendment allowing the antitrust
regulations if the agency did not interfere with
state laws governing the subject.
Rudman is also a force on the Appropria-
tions Subcommittee on Defense. Ever since his
maiden speech in the Senate, he has been
expressing concern over the "fascination" he
feels Pentagon strategists have with compli-
cated, expensive, high-technology weaponry.
Instead, Rudman wants the United States
to buy cheaper, less complex weapons that are
easier to maneuver and maintain. One of his
targets was the Viper, a disposable bazooka
920
that had grown far more expensive and compli-
cated than originally planned. After a deter-
mined assault by Rudman, the Pentagon even-
tually canceled its Viper contract.
? Rudman ? also feels the Pentagon could
achieve savings in personnel costs by eliminat-
ing unnecessary duplication in its bureaucracy.
In 1985, he proposed a 10 percent reduction in
non-combat support personnel, which he said
would produce a savings of 813 billion over
three years. Later in the year, he won Appro-
priations approval of an amendment to save
some $800 million by freezing the number of
employees at the previous year's levels.
At Home: Democrats would have been
hard-pressed to oust Rudman from the Senate
in 1986 even if they had been well-organized.
and well-financed. As it turned out, they were
neither. Neither of the state's best-known
Democrats ? former Sen. John Durkin or
former Rep. Norman E. D'Amours ? ex-
pressed much interest in a long-shot challenge
to Rudman. Only when the Democratic nomi-
nation threatened to go by default to a sup-
porter of Lyndon H. LaRouche Jr. were party
leaders able to coax Endicott Peabody, a for-
mer governor of Massachusetts (1963-65), into
the race.
Peabody had moved to Hollis, N.H., sev-
eral years earlier to practice law. But while he
possessed a familiar name, he had not cut a
wide swath in Granite State politics. In 1984,
Peabody lost a race for a seat in the 400-
member New Hampshire House of Represen-
tatives, and he was vulnerable to charges of
being a carpetbagger.
For Peabody to have even an outside
chance of winning, a conservative independent
candidate ? retired Navy officer Bruce Valley
? needed to carve deeply into Rudman's base.
That did not happen. Valley mustered only 5
percent of the vote. while Rudman swamped
Peabody by a margin of nearly 2-to-1.
Rudman had come to Washington in 1980
without experience in elective politics, but with
a reputation for activism that he built during
six years as New Hampshire attorney general.
He overhauled the little-noticed office in
the early 1970s by creating a consumer protec-
tion division, and he successfully fought the
legalization of gambling in New Hampshire.
That gave him the statewide recognition he
used in his contest for the Senate in 1980.
Rudman's background dovetailed with one
of his major campaign themes ? the need for
clean government. He pledged not to accept
any contributions from out-of-state political
action committees and recommended a two-
term limit for senators.
f
in Dori - Caniti7Ad Coov Approved for Release 2013/11/26 CIA-RDP91B01306R000500030005-9
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/11/26: CIA-RDP91B01306R000500030005-9
As a former legal counsel to Gov. Walter
Peterson (1969-73). Rudman was clearly
viewed as a part of the New Hampshire GOP's
moderate wing. But he was not anathema to
conservatives. Rudman campaigned on a plat-
form of increased defense spending and opposi-
tion to the Equal Rights Amendment.
Although the 1980 Senate race marked his
debut as a candidate ? the state attorney
general's post was. appointive ? Rudman
proved to be an aggressive campaigner. inter-
spersing political argument with stories of his
days as a platoon commander in Korea.
Rudman led the 11-man GOP primary
with only 20 percent of the vote, but moved
quickly to unite the party by installing the
-primary runner-up, former, state. _Rep... (now
Goy.) John H. Sununu as his campaign man-
ager: Former Gov. Wesley- Powell, who ran-
third in the primary. briefly considered running
in the fall election as an independent ? a move
that would have seriously crippled Rudinah
against Durkin, the Democratic incumbent.
But Republican leaders, including Ronald Rea-
gan. persuaded Powell to stay out.
New Hampshire - Junior Senator
Durkin tried to consolidate his position
with New Hampshire's conservative electorate
by attacking Soviet expansionism. but Rudman
peppered Durkin's generally liberal. pro-labor
voting record. Rudman criticized Durkin for
representing "big labor- and not New Hamp-
shire.
Reagan's long coattails helped sweep Rud-
man to victory. Although Durkin ran 70.000
votes ahead of President Carter, he fell short of
Rudman by 16.000.
It was sweet revenge for Rudman. Bad
blood had developed between the two politi-
cians in 1974, when Rudman was a member of
the state panel that overturned the certifica-
tion of Durkin's election in a virtually even
contest with Republican Louis C. Wyman.
(That forced a 1975 special election that Dur-
- kin. won.) _ .
Durkin returned the favor shortly after-
ward. When Rudman was nominated by Presi-
dent Ford to chair the Interstate Commerce
Commission, Durkin worked behind the scenes
to block the nomination. Rudman subsequently
withdrew his name.
Committees ?
Select Committee on Secret Military Assistance to Iran and
the Nicaraguan Opposition (Vice Chairman)
Select Ethics (Vice Chairman)
Appropriations (9th 01 13 Republicans) ?
Commerce, Justice. State. the Judiciary and Related Agencies
(ranking); Defense; Foreign Operations; Interior and Related
Agencies; Labor, Health and Human Services. Education and
Related Agencies.
Budget (11th 01 11 Republicans)
Governmental Affairs (4th of 6 Republicans(
Federal Spending. Budget and Accounting (ranking); Oversight
of Government Management; Permanent Subcommittee on In-
vestigations.
Small Business (3rd of 9 Republicans)
Innovation, Technology and Productivity (ranking); Government
Contracting and Paperwork Reduction.
Elections
1986 General
Warren B. Rudman (R)
Endicott Peabody (D)
Bruce Valley (I)
154.090
79.222
11,423
(63%)
(32%)
( 5%)
Previous Winning Percentage: 1980 (52%)
Campaign Finance
Receipts Expend-
Receipts from PACs itures
1986
Rudman (R)
Peabody (D)
Valley (I)
5852.877 $5,200 (0.6%)
$309.968 546,950 (15%)
S37,410 $955 ( 3%)
$831.098
$307,760
$35,322
Voting Studies
Presidential Party
Support Unity
Conservative
Coalition
Year S 0 S 0 S 0
1986 90 8 89 10 91 8
1985 84 14 80 17 78 20
1984 81 17 79 19 74 26
1983 85 15 82 17 80 20
1982 73 27 79 20 69 31
1981 83 14 82 16 70 25
S = Support 0 = Opposition
Key Votes
Produce MX missiles (1985)
Weaken gun control laws (1985)
Reject school prayer (1985)
Limit textile imports (1985)
Amend Constitution to require balanced budget (1986)
Aid Nicaraguan contras (1986)
Block chemical weapons production (1986)
Impose sanctions on South Africa (1986)
Interest Group Ratings
Year ADA ACU AFL-C10
1986
1985
1984
1983
1982
1981
10
10
30
25
35
15
83
68
82
40
47
53
14
0
18
35
21
CCUS
84
86
84
58
52
94
921
npriaccifiari in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/11/26: CIA-RDP91B01306R000500030005-9