THINGS TO INCLUDE IN ESTIMATIVE PRODUCTS

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP91B01306R001400030001-3
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 69
• Document Creation Date: December 23, 2016
• Document Release Date: November 21, 2013
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: September 12, 1989
• Content Type: MEMO

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THE FOLLOWING DOCUMENTS
ARE ATTACHED:
(Please do not remove)
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.A OO Q?
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SUBJECT:
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ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET
SUBJECT: (Optional)
'2 Things to Include in Estimative Products
/ FROM:
Fritz W. Ermarth
Chairman, NIC
EXTENSION
NO.
NIC #00947/89
DATE
12 September 1989
TO: (officer designation, room number, and
building)
DATE
OFFICER'S
INITIALS
COMMENTS (Number each comment to show from whom
so whom. Draw a line *cross column after each comment.)
RECEIVED
FORWARDED
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STAT
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The Director of Central Intelligence
Washington, DC 20505
NIC 00947/89
National Intelligence Council 12 September 1989
MEMORANDUM FOR:
FROM:
Subject:
All NIOs
D/AG
SRP
NIC/PO
Fritz W. Ermarth
Chairman, National Intelligence Council
Things to Include in astimative*Products
Although we have talked about the need for these elements,
T want to emphasize the necessity- of including the following in
estimative products:
A Retrospective Assessment
Every product on a subject that is not brand-spanking new
ought to say something about what has changed since the topic
was last looked at and, especially, where if anywhere earlier
judgments were off the mark. This does not have to be
elaborate; it should not be defensive. Frequently a brief
comment in the scope note will handle the job. In complicated
estimates, comments throughout the text are in order and may
deserve summarizing in a "what has changed" box.
Alternative Scenarios
When we are estimating the future, alternative outcomes or
scenarios are obligatory even when there is strong consensus
within the Community as to the most likely course of events.
In my experience, the single-outcome estimate does two kinds of
damage. First, it denies the reader our feel for the shape of
uncertainty, forcing him to supply his own alternatives without
our help.. Second, it undermines our credibility and leaves the
impression that we seek safety in group dogma. Alternatives
should be real possibilities, thoughtfully developed, not
strawmen deliberately designed to make the most likely
prognosis look overwhelmingly persuasive. Depending on subject
CL BY SIGNER
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SECRET
Subject: Things .to Include in Estimative Products
matter, ranges of outcomes for quantitative Values or times for
some predicted event may he appropriate. Or the "conditional
alternative" may fill the bill, i.e., if factor "X" is more
important than we believe likely, then scenario "B" becomes
more likely.
Information/Collectionn Gaps and Implications
Before the reps disband, the NIO should assemble their
collective sense of information gaps and implications for
collection and analysis. It is repeatedly claimed that this is
delicate because_it implies a performance...report on collectors
or analytic shops. Nevertheless, pulling together such
judgments is, I believe, one of the most important things we
can do to help Community program managers. We may want to work
out a uniform product or-format-for. codifying these judgments.
For the present, I recommend simply 4 memo for the record,
written by the NIO, codifying the views of. the coordinating_
team without attribution (except where an agency wishes to be
identified). These would be distributed-within the
Intelligence Community; occasionally they may be important
enough to discuss at NFIB.
rit Ermarth
CC: DDCI
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EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT
ROUTING SLIP
TO:
ACTION
INFO
DATE
INITIAL
1
DCI
X
(12
DDCI
X
3
EXDIR
4
D/ICS
5
DDI
X
6
DDA
7
DDO
8
DDS&T
9
Chm/NIC
X
10
GC
11
IG
.
12
Compt
13
D/OCA
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14
D/PAO
15
D/PERS
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Counsel/)CI
X
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3627 (1?-81)
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(7
14 Jul. 89 STAT
Any further instructions to C/NIC or
SRP?
DCI note wa to get C/NIC comments"
and then imp1.?nt.
-
STAT
STAT
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A
EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT
ROUTING SLIP
TO:
ACTION
INFO
DATE
INITIAL
1
DCI
X
2
DDCI
X
3
EXDIR
4
D/ICS
5
DDI
X
6
DDA
7
DDO
8
DDS&T
9
Chm/NIC
X
10
GC
11
IG
12
Compt
13
D/OCA
14
D/PAO
15
D/PERS
-
16
D/Ex Staff
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18
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X
19
Counsel/DCI
1
20
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3637 (10-!1)
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ER 89-1772/2
13 July 1989
MEMORANDUM FOR: Senior Review Panel
FROM: Director of Central Intelligence
SUBJECT: Recommendations on National Intelligence
Estimates
1. I have reviewed the recommendations regarding national
intelligence estimates contained in your 27 April 1989 memo to
the DDCI ?and found them to be excellent. I have asked the
Chairman of the National Intelligence Council to follow up on
your suggestions.
2. In addition, I want to commend you on your ongoing
contributions to the national intelligence estimate production
process. You have a keen grasp of what will be relevant for
the readers of our estimates, and I rely heavily on your frank
and cogent comments on the drafts and terms of reference. I am
continually impressed that a panel of only six people has such
breadth and depth of knowledge and that it can provide such
? detailed comments on such a large and diverse number of
estimates. The Senior Review Panel is an extremely valuable
contributor to the quality of our national intelligence
.products.
3. Thank you for your excellent work. I look forward to
reading your review of the Agency's reporting on China.
eootAt\i,?`po.4
William H. Webster
DECL OADR
STAT
DCI
EXEC
REG
1/"-~o200 ./(1
S E.0 R E T
?AAt L:
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ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET
SUBJECT: (optional)
Recent Changes in NIC Products
EXTENSION
-00rag"
NO.
NIC teq1-89
FROM:
David D. Gries
Vice Chairman, NIC
DATE
7 July 1989
TO: (Officer designation, room number, and
building)
DATE
OFFICER'S
COMMENTS (Number each comment to show from whom
to whom. Draw a line emu column after each comment.)
RECEIVED
FORWARDED
INITIALS
1.
C/N1C
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STAT
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Central Intelligence Agency
Washington, D.C. 20505
^
Executive Secretariat
10 Jul 89
STAT
Re SRP - quickly came up with attached,
may have couple of other papers tomorrow
Later portion is McMahon's and Casey's
PAR on Amb Leonhart - gives a flavor
for their respect for SRP, and records
show that Mr. Casey met with the
Q4A-t- p,e)
Panel and individual members during
/\
his tenure as DCI.
7 Jul from Gries is a thick package,
you might want to see that one.
STAT
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The Director of Central Intelligence
Washington, D.C. 20SOS
National Intelligence Council
NIC 00738-89
1177TT177nnTir-"
MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence
Deputy Director of Central Intelligence
FROM:
David D. Gries
Vice Chairman
SUBJECT: ¢ Changes rft-N=P odlYer8
Dick Kerr suggested that we alert you to recent changes in the
presentation and management of NIC products. Some-61-te=ilianT472
oginate_with_the NIC; of-heTT'Orig-ie_Aitli Dick Kerr And
IESenior_Review Panel (SRW---ATA=haveff=b7f_=matklngteT-,f-ox__
. .
CFElon-poli7E17ffiAkets-tbra-s-p-ou=mesialgeN
At Tab_A-a-re-exampl-es-rof-4)e7ctirt-its We are i-r7,17-32,
c Hugh Montgomery of the SRP for this idea7--The=InfelTigence Community
often need-s?E(3 produce brief-77,51-Icy=orAnted papers on very short
notice. The Executive Brief is now the vehicle. These briefs
represent the views of the Intelligence Community, but are not
formally coordinated--thus allowing fast turnaround.
At Tab B are several recent "White Covers" in which the Key
Judgments include graphics. This change comes under the heading
of modernizing our product.
At Tab C are examples of the use of bullets (see the clipped
pages) compressing the message of an entire product into four or
five short sentences. Placement of the bullets before the Key
Judgments is designed to focus the reader's attention. We are
indebted to Dick Kerr for this idea. Feedback from customers has
been good.
At Tab D is a memo alerting NIOs to the availability of part-time
editors to work on NIC Estimates. The editor's task is to improve
presentation, structure and style. Among recent Estimates that have
benefited from the work of these editors are the Israeli Estimate,
the West German Estimate, and the Estimate on the Soviet Navy.
At Tab E is a copy of a handbook I recently prepared for
managers and drafters of Estimates.
Attachments: 25>
As stated
cc: Senior Review Panel
. -? . ?
CONFIDENTIAL
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Executive Rcgistg
86- 4090
MEMORANDUM FOR: Senior Review Panel
FROM: Deputy Director of Central Intelligence
SUBJECT: Retrospective Evaluations
9 September 1986
1. Two and a half years ago, as Chairman, National_inte1l4gence
Council, laiked_the_SRP__to_take on as nfie-of'its-?responCitillitiesIthe
evaluation of earlier estimates to see how well they stood the test of
time. TheiSRPT:having-done-an-earlier_revra=o-f_a_dozen hitrafral.
e?st1E-dra for the DCI, responded to my request positively and dic--1-7--airg
(eVTIddfibb-of-vs.timates prepared in the first six months of 1982 and in
the first six months of 1983. Mitt---evaliiati-on-was-very-u-sefill
(ii1M7t-674Tm:,
2. Unfortunately, because the SRP was so shorthanded for an extended
time, this effort lapsed. Now that the Panel is back at strength, I
believe it would be useful to resume these evaluations. I am uncertain
whether the earlier approach of addressing all the estimates during a
given period of time is the most useful. For example, another approach
would be to review estimates on specific substantive areas of importance
over a period of two or three years, e.g., the Philippines, Soviet
matters, the Middle East, etc. A drawback of this a roach is that it
would cover a much smaller number of estimates.
3. I would appreciate the Panel's discussing this and making a
recommendation to the Director and me on how it would propose to carry
out these retrospective evaluations.
cc: DCI
Acting, C/NIC
Robertt . Gates
SECRET Cl By Signer
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?
[mein Registri
86- 2655
10 June 1986
NOTE TO: Acting Chairman, National Intelligence Council
Senior Review Panel
FROM: Deputy Director for Central Intelligence
1. The Director just finished reading an NIE with which he had a
number of problems and agreed ibmigggvoaa IN? comments. What he did
not realize was that the estim-a-te had already been substantially revised
to take into account SRP comments. This is not the first time he has had
to read documents twice because of this confusion of paper.
2. Henceforth, the NIO should provide the SRP with a draft estimate,
the SRP should prepare a memorandum for the Director with their comments
on the draft, and the NIO should make appropriate revisions to the draft
and prepare a note for the DCI and me on which SRP suggestions were
accommodated and which were not -- and why. The revised draft estimate,
the SRP comments and the NIO response should all be forwarded together to
the Director and Deputy Director. In some cases, it may be worthwhile to
Include the initial draft examined by the SRP so that we can see the
problems they were concerned about even if they have been corrected by
the NIO.
CONFIDENTIAL Cl By Signer
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P00-:. NV
? The Director of Central Intelligence
Washington, D.C. 20505
NIC 00738-89
National Intelligence Council 7 July 1989
MEMORANDUM FOR:
FROM: David D. Gries
Vice Chairman
SUBJECT:
Director of Central Intelligence
Deputy Director of Central Intelligence
Recent. Changes in NIC Products
Dick Kerr suggested that we alert you to recent changes in the
presentation and management of NIC products. Some of these changes
originate with the NIC; others originate with Dick Kerr and the
Senior Review Panel (SRP). All have the aim of making it easier for
senior policymakers to grasp our message.
At Tab A are examples of Executive Briefs. We are indebted to
Hugh Montgomery of the SRP for this idea. The Intelligence Community
often needs to produce brief, policy-oriented papers on very short
notice. The Executive Brief is now the vehicle. These briefs
represent the views of the Intelligence Community, but are not
formally coordinated--thus allowing fast turnaround.
At Tab B are several recent "White Covers" in which the Key
Judgments include graphics. This change comes under the heading
of modernizing our product.
At Tab C are examples of the use of bullets (see the clipped
pages) compressing the message of an entire product into four or
five short sentences. Placement of the bullets before the Key
Judgments is designed to focus the reader's attention. We are
indebted to Dick Kerr for this idea. Feedback from customers has
been good.
At Tab D is a memo alerting NIOs to the availability of part-time
editors to work on NIC Estimates. The editor's task is to improve
presentation, structure and style. Among recent Estimates that have
benefited from the work of these editors are the Israeli Estimate,
the West German Estimate, and the Estimate on the Soviet Navy.
At Tab E is a copy of a handbook I recently prepared for
managers and drafters of Estimates.
Attachments:.
As stated ?
cc: Senior Review Panel
_GGitipieetert-At-
x-
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e.A
SECRET
The Director of Central Intelligence
Washington, D.C. 20505
National Intelligence Council
EXECUTIVE BRIEF
NIC 00680/89
16 June 1989
ETHIOPIA'S PRESIDENT MENGISTU: THE MORNING AFTER
o For the moment, having cowed his opponents and purged the officer
corps, Mengistu is secure in power following last month's coup attempt.
o But his military has been seriously weakened, and setbacks at the hands of
northern rebels coupled with economic woes and popular discontent may
well prove his undoing in the longer run.
o The Eritrean rebels are unlikely to relieve the pressure on him by accepting
his offer to talk; even if they do, peace prospects are dim.
o The Soviets will continue to provide military aid while urging him to
negotiate a settlement in Eritrea and improve relations with the West,
especially the US, whose participation Moscow seeks in a peace effort.
o Mengistu will make a show of complying without, however, compromising
his ambitions for military victory in the north.
This Executive Brief was produced by the National Intelligence Officer for Africa. It
reflects the judgments of Intelligence Community analysts presented at a meet.iqg on .
9 June 1989.
1
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SECRET
ETHIOPIA'S PRESIDENT MENGISTU: THE MORNING AFTER
Mengistu's Survivability
For the time being, Mengistu seems
stronger politically than before last
month's aborted putsch by senior
military officers. His East German
trained security forces and the
Presidential Guard proved their
effectiveness -- the coup leaders
are all dead, under detention, or in
hiding -- and he quickly .made
wholesale changes in the officer
corps, replacing professionals with
loyalists.
Nonetheless, Mengistu's respite will
be short. The problems that plague
Ethiopia are worsening rapidly:
Militarily, the regime is now
much more vulnerable to
initiatives by the rebels in
Eritrea and Tigre. Atop the
turmoil and demoralization
within the armed forces caused
by the coup attempt, Mengistu
has imposed new senior officers
who are politically reliable but
have little or no qualification for
conducting military operations.
-- Economically, immediate
pressures stem from an acute
shortage of foreign exchange.
More fundamentally, the
economy has been drained by
Mengistu's war effort and
contorted by his statist policies.
Exports, productivity, and per
capita income are declining, and
the regime can squeeze few
more resources from the
population.
-- Psychologically, war-weariness
combined with fear has left the
general populace even more
cynical than before. When it
appeared the coup might
succeed, many Ethiopians
welcomed it. Since then, in
contrast to customary passivity
in most segments of the
population, student demon-
strators have openly defied and
ridiculed Mengistu.
Any would-be challenger will no doubt
draw lessons from the aborted coup: to
succeed in overthrowing him, Mengistu
would have to be killed, his security
forces neutralized, and Ethiopian
nationalism taken squarely into account.
Last month's plotters mistakenly
assumed that, once they struck an
arrangement with the Eritrean
rebels, they would receive wider
support within the military. But
most military officers are as
nationalistic as Mengistu and would
be reluctant to make fundamental
concessions to the rebels.
Prospects for War and Peace
The Ethiopian military establishment
is in disarray. Up to 500 officers
are in detention, some have been
executed, and defections among
those not under arrest will likely
increase. The air force is resentful,
justifiably mistrusted by Mengistu,
and largely out of action. While we
expect Mengistu to refrain from
large scale retribution, the damage
to morale from political interference
may further devastate military__
capabilities.
2
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The countrywide campaign to
dragoon teenagers into service
persists despite past debacles from
ill-trained recruits who cut and ran.
Last month's attempt against
Mengistu was motivated in part by
disgust with this practice.
Seasonal rains have begun, further
favoring the guerillas. We expect
the two main groups -- the
Eritrean People's Liberation Front
(EPLF) and the smaller Tigrean
People's Liberation Front (TPLF)--
to resume the coordinated
operations that have had telling
effect in recent months. - They will
probe for weaknesses rather than
launch frontal attacks that might
coalesce government forces. Lines
of communication linking Eritrea to
the south are likely targets.
EPLF leaders no doubt calculate
that time is on their side and that
they have no interest in lifting
pressures on Mengistu by accepting
his recent "unconditional" offer to
negotiate a settlement.
Even should talks get underway, they
would have little chance of success
because neither side is willing to
compromise on the ultimate status of
Eritrea -- the EPLF wants independence,
while Mengistu will offer only limited
autonomy at best.
The EPLF might consider a formula
for loose confederation, but
probably not while Mengistu is still
in charge. For his part, the
seriousness with which Mengistu
made his recent offer is not yet
clear. Tactical imperatives favored
pleasing foreign audiences --
particularly the Soviets -- and
buying time. An indicator of
deeper motivation would be
abandonment of the regime's
"lowlands" initiative, a year-long
effort to divide Eritreans under the
guise of selective "autonomy." The
TPLF has sought to upstage
Mengistu by agreeing to talk, but he
is unlikely to accept its
preconditions.
Moscow's Burdensome Client
To Mengistu's displeasure, the
Soviets stood on the sidelines
during the coup attempt. They
seem to have been prepared to let
him fall and deal with a successor.
But they are unlikely to deliberately
undermine him. We expect
Moscow to honor the current
military assistance agreement until
it expires in 1991, after which arms
aid will be pared down as part of
the worldwide Soviet cost-cutting
effort. On the other hand, the
2,000 or so Cuban troops in
Ethiopia may well begin departing
much sooner, perhaps in the
coming months -- their basic
mission, deterring Somali
aggression, being no longer
relevant.
The Soviets are in a quandn/ in
dealing with Mengistu. On one
hand, they have lost patience with
his quest for a military solution to
the Eritrean rebellion and his
mismanagement of the economy.
On the other, they seem unwilling
to exercise leverage over him by
constricting the flow of vital military
aid. They will carefully watch his
pursuit of the latest offer to
negotiate. Anxious to reduce
burdens without the appearance of
abandoning their client, they will
also seek opportunities to enlist US
participation in "cooperative" or
"parallel" efforts to find a
settlement.
3
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Relations with the US
Mengistu wants to improve relations
with the US despite suspicions --
that Washington had a hand in.last
month's events. Western economic
assistance is essential for salvaging
his economy, and he fears
sanctions proposed in Congress
that would pinch Ethiopian coffee
exports -- the main foreign
exchange earner. He also
(mistakenly) believes that the US
enjoys influence over the Eritreans
and their Arab backers. To woo
Washington and general. Western
goodwill, he will avoid provocative
steps such as the "red terror" of
1977, the vengeful response to an
earlier challenge to his rule.
But Mengistu will stubbornly resist
compromising on matters of most
importance to the West. The far?
reaching reforms necessary for
reversing Ethiopia's downward
economic slide would undermine
his political control mechanisms
and violate his collectivist vision.
Moreover, the immediate pressure
to negotiate a northern settlement
has been alleviated now that he has
announced his offer. He can turn
his attention to preparing for rebel
initiatives on the battlefield,
rebuilding the military, and pursuing
-- illusory -- victory.
4
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The Director of Central Intelligence
Washington, D.C. 20505
National Intelligence Council
EXECUTIVE BRIEF
HOW VULNERABLE IS GORBACHEV?
NIC 00600-89
30 May 1989
o With the removal of the "dead souls" from the Central Committee,
Gorbachev has enhanced his ability to push reforms more aggressively
and made it harder for his more orthodox opponents to remove him.
o But the continuing bad news on the economy, the assertiveness of various
nationalities, and the assault on the party apparatus during the recent
elections have created serious frictions within the regime and could
eventually lead to a major challenge to his position as well as his policies.
o The intelligence agencies disagree over the probability of such a challenge
during the next three or four years and also over the appropriate degree
of confidence to attach to such assessments.
Nb/USSR, State/INR, DIA, and NSA, noting Gorbachev's recent
political successes and continuing ability to push significant initiatives
at home and abroad, are reasonably confident that his odds of
remaining in power during this period are good (70-80 percent).
CIA/SOVA holds that the problems in the country are so serious and
the political situation is so volatile that no judgment can be made with
much confidence. It sees only a 50-50 chance of Gorbachev's
surviving unless he retreats significantly from his reform policies.
This Executive Brief reflects the views of the Intelligence Community expressed at a
warning meeting held 23 May 1989. It was drafted by the National Intelligence Officer for
the Soviet Union and informally coordinated within the Community.
1
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HOW VULNERABLE IS GORBACHEV?
There is substantial agreement
among the Intelligence Community
agencies on most issues related to
the Soviet leadership.
Most analysts agree, for example,
that Gorbachev turned the recent
elections to his favor and strength-
ened his position with the 'removal
of the "dead souls" from the
Central Committee at the April
Plenum.
These changes show considerable
ability to control the Politburo,
make a move against him more
difficult, and will help him push the
reforms more aggressively.
There is a growing disparity,
however, between Gorbachev's
power to make personnel changes
and his ability to demonstrate that
his policies are making things
better. Compromises on economic
policy are very evident and more
radical reforms have been put on
hold.
The party apparatus is under
challenge; nationality unrest is
increasing and potentially could
threaten the system; and economic
policies have failed to improve the
economy or the consumers lot.
As a result, tensions within the
regime and society have risen and
could produce a challenge to
Gorbachev's position as well as his
policies.
There is a significant disagreement
among agencies, however, on the
probability of such a challenge over
the next three to four years and the
degree of confidence to place in
such assessments.
Nb/USSR, State/INR, DIA, NSA,
and some analysts from various
agencies acknowledge that
uncertainties are greater now but
are reasonably confident that the
odds of Gorbachev remaining in
power over this period are good
(70-80 percent).
They point to Gorbachev's
political skills and the weakness
of the opposition, the results of
the Fall and April plenums, the
continuing effort to press
political reform, and the ability
to push significant initiatives in
foreign and security policy.
While acknowledging political
risks inherent in some reform
policies and the more volatile
political and social environment
in the USSR, they judge that
these problems will likely be
manageable and don't expect a
crisis sufficient to cause
Gorbachev's removal in this
time frame.
They believe that support for
change at home (evident in the
elections) and Gorbachev's- -'
foreign
foreign policy successes have
substantially increased the
stakes and cost of a challenge
and made one less likely.
2
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Alternatively, CIA/SOVA and
other analysts believe the
political situation is now so
volatile that no judgment about
Gorbachev's position beyond the
next few months can be made
with any confidence.
While recognizing
Gorbachev's strength and
skill, they see an intensi-
fication of the leadership
struggle and resistance to his
policies becoming more open
and threatening.
The threats to order
unleashed by Gorbachev's
reforms along with the
seeming intractability of the
economic problems con-
fronting the country are in
their view creating a very
unpredictable environment in
which events could readily
spin out of control and give
Gorbachev's more orthodox
opponents the upper hand.
While not arguing that such
an attack will necessarily
happen, they believe the
conditions are right and the
threat is already great. They
see only a 50-50 chance of
Gorbachev's surviving unless
he retreats significantly from
his reform policies.
Indicators
These two views reflect different
perspectives on what and how
evidence should be weighed and
evaluated.
Those who hold a more upbeat
assessment of Gorbachev's
prospects consider the broader
setting of leadership politics
today, but rely more on
indicators of power in the
Kremlin--ability to make
personnel changes, trends in
policy, the exercise of
responsibility--as well as foreign
policy accomplishments and
domestic policy initiatives as the
keys to assessing staying power.
Had Gorbachev not scored
dramatic successes last fall and
more recently, Gorbachev's
prospects would not look so
solid to this group.
The other view is shaped more
by the greater volatility of the
political and social scene now
than in the past, the mounting
domestic criticism of
Gorbachev's policies, the failure
to show positive results from his
program, and the lessons of
Khrushchev's ouster. While
agreeing that Gorbachev scored
a major victory in May, they
focus more on the unpredictable
and risky environment his
policies have created.
In effect, the more dramatic
nature of change and the turmoil
it has created have fractured
somewhat the earlier consensus
on how best to judge
Gorbachev's prospects. Thus,
short of Gorbachev's removal or
noticeable decline in power
indicators, this disagreement will
likely persist.
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Soviet Naval Strategy and
Programs Toward the
21st Century
National Intelligence Estimate
Key Judgments
These Key Judgments represent the views
of the Director of Central Intelligence
with the advice and assistance of the
US Intelligence Community.
Top Secret
NIE 17-15-89W
June 1989
Copy 3 3
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Soviet Naval Strategy and
Programs Toward the
21st Centin*
? We expect Gorbachev to cut spending on the Navy. These cuts will
produce significant changes in Navy procurement and force struc-
ture, but not in missions or strategy.
? The Soviet Navy's emphasis on strate ic strike and the defeat of
enemy naval forces will continue.
? Integration of naval, land, and air forces into combined-arms
operations under the concept of the Theater Strategic Operation
will improve.
? The Soviets will actively pursue naval arms control in an effort to
erode the US maritime advantage, conserve resources, and achieve
some political and propaganda benefit
Handle via COMINT Channels
1 Top Secret
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? The Impact of US-Backed
Counternarcotics Programs on
Andean Cocaine Countries
Interagency Intelligence Memorandum
Key Judgments
Information available as of 10 May 1989 was
used in the preparation of this Memorandum,
approved for publication on that date by the
Chairman of the National Intelligence Council
Secret
NI IIM 89-10001W
May 1989
Copy
43
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The Impact of US-Backed
Counternarcotics Programs on
Andean Cocaine Countries
? US-backed counternarcotics efforts, despite modest successes,
have not significantly disrupted cocaine production and distribu-
tion from Colombia, Bolivia, and Peru.
? A cutoff of US counternarcotics assistance would lead to even more
cocaine production and would cause current counternarcotics
programs to lose what momentum they now have.
? No Andean government is likely to install more effective counter-
narcotics programs without massive, sustained US assistance.
? Such measures as extradition of nationals or the widespread use of
herbicides will lead to increased danger for US personnel in the
region.
1
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Director of Central Intelligence
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Israel and the Palestinians:
Prospects for the Uprising
and the Peace Process
National Intelligence Estimate
Key-Judgments
These Key Judgments represent the views
of the Director of Central Intelligence
with the advice and assistance of the
US Intelligence Community.
Secret
NIE 35-89W
June 1989
c?PY 14
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Israel and the Palestinians:
Prospects for the Uprising
and the Peace Proces
? We see no sign of a fundamental breakthrough in the peace process
in the next year. The uprising will become more vicious and
violent, unless Palestinians on the West Bank and Gaza see
progress toward ending the Israeli occupation.
? Nonetheless, the recent Israeli initiative, PLO flexibility, and a
more constructive Soviet role have created some chance for incre-
mental change and opportunities for US diplomacy.
? The Shamir government is under no significant pressure from
Israelis to go beyond its recent election initiative; strong outside
pressure on Israel and the PLO probably would be needed to bring
about elections.
? PLO moderation will persist in the next year; the PLO also will
demand a role in negotiating a final settlement but might make
significant concessions on initial Israeli-Palestinian talks.
? If the peace process is not advanced, we expect more terrorism and
Arab pressure on the United States in the next two to three years.
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Director of secret
Central
Intelligence
_
The Impact of VS.,,pock....
Progra
Andean Cocaine
Interagency Intelligence Memorandum-
Secret
Ni IIM 89-10001
May 1989
Copy 547
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Intelligence
NI IIM 89-10001
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The Impact of US-Backed
Counternarcotics Programs
on Andean Cocaine
Countries
Information available as of 10 May 1989 was used
in the preparation of this Memorandum.
? The following intelligence organizations participated
in the preparation of this Memorandum:
The Central Intelligence Agency
The Defense Intelligence Agency
The National Security Agency
The Bureau of Intelligence and Research, Department of State
also participating:
The Deputy Chief of Staff for Intelligence,
Department of the Army
The Office of Intelligence, the Drug Enforcement Administration
The Office of Intelligence, the US Customs Service
This Memorandum was approved for publication by the
Chairman, National Intelligence Council.
Secret
May 1989
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ADMINISTRATIVE -- INTERNAL USE ONLY
26 June 1989
MEMORANDUM: All NIOs
FROM: David D. Gries
Vice Chairman
As many of you are aware, the Analytic Group has available a number
of experienced part-time editors to help you with the language, writing
and presentation of your draft estimates. I urge you to avail yourselves
of their services, is their supervisor; he is the man to
contact.
is the former editor of Problems of Communism. He also
teac es a course on the Soviet Union at George Washington
University. is an excellent editor and writer as well as a very
good critic.
Phil Stoddard was Deputy Assistant Secretary of State in INR. He has
very strong editing skills, including a knack for pulling the main
points out of murky prose. Phil has worked on Executive Briefs and
Estimates for Marten van Heuven, Larry Budde, and Jack O'Donnell.
is a retired DO officer who was among
other senior jobs. is an outstanding writer. Ear ier in his
career he wrote Estimates for the Office of National Estimates.
another retired DO Officer, was
and membe-t=of?t-h-6-1-11-torial
is an accomplished writer
Board for Studies in Intelligence.
and editor.
Dave Blee has undertaken writing tasks for Murat Natirboff for the
last several years. Retired from the DO, he held several and
division and staff chief jobs, most recently,LIIJDave is a fine
writer.
Not all these officers are avaliable all the time and many are
limited in the amount of time they can work. But our expectation is that
one of them should be available when needed. I believe that Martin,
Larry, and Jack will confirm that these editors are most useful when the
draft first arrives on your desk. I urge you to make use of them,
working throughI Meanwhile,I
are available for drafting and rewriting as in the past. Our part-rime
editors generally are not available for those more time consuming tasks.
cc: C/NIC
David D. Cries
ADMINISTRATIVE -- INTERNAL USE ONLY
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STAT
STAT
STAT
S TAT
STAT
STAT
I r1 I
STAT
STAT
STAT
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TABLE OF CONTENTS
INTRODUCTION
3
HOLDING THE POLICYMAKERS' ATTENTION
3
MANAGING THE EFFORT
4
GUIDELINES FOR DRAFTERS
5
OUTLINES THAT HAVE WORKED
6
MAPS, PHOTOS, CHARTS, GRAPHS, TABLES, DIAGRAMS, CARTOONS...
7
EXPRESSING DISSENT
10
COLLECTION GAPS
11
STRENGTHENING COORDINATION
13
MARKETING THE PRODUCT
14
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ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET
SUBJECT: (Optional)
Recommendations from the Senior Revieg)Panel on NIEs
NO.
FROM:
Fritz W. Ermarth
Chairman, NIC
TO: (Officer desi nation, room number.,,,
building)
2 4 MAY 1989v
DATE
EXTENSION
NIC #00583-89
REalvto
yVDDCI
FOARDED
(5b
OFFICER'S
MMMS
DATE
23 May 1989
COMMENTS (Number each comment to show from whom
to whom. Draw a line across column after each comment.)
3.
q-13 4.
DCI
/
S.
4* 6.
7.
a.
9.
10.
11.
Fritz W. Ermarth
C/NIC 7E47 HQS
13. ?
IS.
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is--a very quick, estimative, and Community product, written ly
the NIO but chopped by the Community, on a hot policy topic.
We've already done a few (see an example at TAB B). To make
this work the NIO must be a good thinker, a good writer, and a
good substantive leader of his community clientele. He must
also know the policy issues well. We agree that longer term
projects, including most estimates, tend to take too long. But
we do find that, when the customer imposes a deadline, we can
usually meet it. That indicates NIO leadership can tighten up
schedules where needed.
As regards NIE format, we agree with the SRP that we must make
skillful use of the scope note (or a brief footnote) to explain
assumptions and purposes. We also agree that "after action"
assessments can be useful in some cases (see below). On a
related matter, we plan to do more in identifying collection
gaps when doing estimates. Community components are sensitive
about this because it constitutes a "report card" on
collectors, so we need to keep results within the family. We
disagree with the SRP on the need for bibliographies in NIEs;
that is more appropriate to the research products of the
Community's agencies.
We also disagree with the SRP's characterizing the big military
estimates as not really estimative. Their nature -- and
burden, alas -- is that they are very estimative on so many
issues that they look like encyclopedias. Many DCIs and NIOs
have tried to change this art form over the past 20 years, but
we keep coming back to what we have as the best -- or least
worst -- way of doing a permanent line of business. The NIEs
on Soviet military forces are nothing like the old National
Intelligence Surveys (NIS), which were really detailed country
studies with no estimative content. We would recommend against
reviving the NIS, and, should they be revived, against the NIC
doing them.
Finally, I would like to make a recommendation of my own. I
believe the SRP could very usefully be tasked to undertake
fairly long-term "after action" studies of our analytical
record on major intelligence topics, not just in NIEs but in
published research and analysis and current intelligence
reporting of national importance. Where a substantial amount
of spade work is called for, qualified analysts could be
detailed to support the SRP but shielded against retaliation if
the results of their work are disquieting to the home office.
A number of topics for such a performance review suggest
themselves:
Did we anticipate the radicaliSm of Gorbachev's reform
strategy? If not, why not? Are we analytically,
intellectually geared up for its effects?
2
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The Director of Central intelligence
Washington, D.C. 20505
NIC #00583-89
National Intelligence Council 23 May 1989
MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence
Deputy Director of Central Intelligence
FROM: Fritz W. Ermarth
Chairman
SUBJECT: Recommendations from the Senior Review Panel
on National Intelligence Estimates
I appreciate the opportunity to review the comments and
recommendations on NIEs that the SRP sent you last month
(TAB A). I and the NIOs, who also reviewed the SRP's memo,
find most of them sound and promising, even though familiar.
We have been working hard to achieve brevity, and have made
progress in the last year or so. Excepting the big military
estimates, NIEs now average about 17 pages with 2.5 pages of
Key Judgments. I think we may be approaching a brevity limit
for most estimates unless we exclude the reasoning behind
essential judgments, which I believe would be counterproductive
in another direction. To help the busiest readers, we have
lately added a new element: a distillation of Key Judgments in
headline/bullet form at the beginning of each estimate.
Graphics are a major help to all estimates. We have actually
increased our reliance on graphics greatly in recent years,
even in political estimates. To do more, we probably need to
bring a graphics specialist into the NIC; we now rely totally
on CPAS, which serves us nobly, but not solely.
The roles of NIOs vary quite a bit because their responsi-
bilities vary. In the future, I plan to give more stress to
collegiality within the NIC in estimate preparation. I have
also concluded that we need a senior, full-time editor to
polish drafts before they leave the NIOs bands.
The SRP made a number of comments that fall under the heading
of timeliness and policy relevance. We simply have to assure
these qualities or we are not worth our pay. In tune with the
SRP's suggestion, we've upgraded the "sense of the community"
memo to the level of the "NIC Executive Brief." The -aim here-
1
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is a very quick, estimative, and Community product, written by
the NI? but chopped by the Community, on a hot policy topic.
We've already done a few (see an example at TAB B). To make
this work the NIO must be a good thinker, a good writer, and a
good substantive leader of his community clientele. He must
also know the policy issues well. We agree that longer term
projects, including most estimates, tend to take too long. But
we do find that, when the customer imposes a deadline, we can
usually meet it. That indicates NIO leadership can tighten up
schedules where needed.
As regards NIE format, we agree with the SRP that we must make
skillful use of the scope note (or a brief footnote) to explain
assumptions and purposes. We also agree that "after action"
assessments can be useful in some cases (see below). On a
related matter, we plan to do more in identifying collection
gaps when doing estimates. Community components are sensitive
about this because it constitutes a "report card" on
collectors, so we need to keep results within the family. We
disagree with the SRP on the need for bibliographies in NIEs;
that is more appropriate to the research products of the
Community's agencies.
We also disagree with the SRP's characterizing the big military
estimates as not really estimative. Their nature -- and
burden, alas -- is that they are very estimative on so many
issues that they look like encyclopedias. Many DCIs and NIOs
have tried to change this art form over the past 20 years, but
we keep coming back to what we have as the best -- or least
worst -- way of doing a permanent line of business. The NIEs
on Soviet military forces are nothing like the old National
Intelligence Surveys (NIS), which were really detailed country
studies with no estimative content. We would recommend against
reviving the NIS, and, should they be revived, against the NIC
doing them.
Finally, I would like to make a recommendation of my own. I
believe the SRP could very usefully be tasked to undertake
fairly long-term "after action" studies of our analytical
record on major intelligence topics, not just in NIEs but in
published research and analysis and current intelligence
reporting of national importance. Where a substantial amount
of spade work is called for, qualified analysts could be
detailed to support the SRP but shielded against retaliation if
the results of their work are disquieting to the home office.
A number of topics for such a performance review suggest
themselves:
Did we anticipate the radicalism of Gorbachev's reform
strategy? If not, why not? Are we analytically,
intellectually geared up for its effects?
2
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Did we underestimate the staying power of Najibullah,
Noriega, Derig Tsiao-ping? If so, why?
Have we done well or poorly in anticipating the behavior of
the Khomeini regime?
I realize that "track record" review of this kind is often
objectionable to those reviewed. Still it seems odd that we
formally review, inspect, audit, and monitor just about every
aspect of our work except our product. The SRP -- which we
know as a thoughtful friend of our work -- could do the whole
Intelligence Community a service by judiciously stepping into
this gap.
Attachments:
As stated
Fri W. Ermarth
3
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NIC #0058389
23 May 1989
SUBJECT: Recommendations from' the Senior Review Panel
on National Intelligence Estimates
DCl/C/NIC:FWErmarth:bha(23May89)
Distribution:
Orig DCI
1 - EA/DCI
1 - DDCI
1 - ER
1 - VC/NIC
5 - SRP
1 - Each NIO
1 - NIC/PO
2 - C/NIC
4
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? .
The Director of Central Intelligence
Washington..D.C. 20505
27 April 1989
Senior Review Panel
E''- - I P7/7,1
MEMORANDUM FOR: Deputy Director of Central Intelligence
FROM: SeniorRemiew,Ranel
SUBJECT: -Thoughts,/om,,the-r--IntelligenceProduction-Process
1. We are most appreciative of your visit yesterday, and
welcomed the stimulating conversation which ensued. We were
particularly pleased to share some of our mutual concerns on the
intelligence production process. We very much lookw-Locwarcl-to-
pecodiaoopporitunitiesmIn.the.neax.fut tkre,..ta.explare.wi_th....you
2. As an initial effort, we thought it might be useful to
you to recapitulate briefly some?of the subjects yesterday's
conversation touched upon together with a few quick reactions
which may be worth further thought as we pursue the "guidelines"
project.
a. SenathEstimates. We start and return to our
conviction that most Estimates are simply too long for their ?
intended readership. Even the Key Judgments not infrequently
exceed the tolerable length of a terse, tightly-reasoned .
Estimate. Any arbitrary restrictions must contemplate
iexceptions, but we think it -11111ght,be.a-eseful-experi.ment-to-
estahlish,,for,the,,general ,.. run , of,-po litical_ and?economici.
,Bstimatesftm,rmaximumlensttllooth-tor-the-Key-Judgmelits-"the--
ext,,mgf?,,,t.he,EstImate.itoelf: (We would of course exempt the
traditional mainly military Estimates, such as those in the
11- series, which are more reference tools than Estimates as
such.
b. Ihe'Rbitof-the-NIOs% Our recent experience with
Estimate drafts confirms our impression of substantial
.unevenness in both substance and style. A more active role
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SUBJECT: Thoughts on the Intelligence Production Process
by the NIO's in the pre-coordination drafting process--and
more frequent collegial reviews inside the NIC--might help to
smooth out some of the rougher spots.
c. New-Art-Form. Recognizing the difficulty of
capturing and holding the attention of busy policymakers, we
think there might be appreciable advantage in devising a new
art form designed primarily, but not exclusively, for that
limited audience. Its hallmarks should be brevity and very
quick reaction. We shall be commenting further on this
concept, but offer as a tentative title for what we have in
mind "National Intelligence Executive Brief."
d. 4.41B,Format. We believe that two former--and one
irregularly employed--elements of the NIE deserve renewed
consideration. Specifically, there was substantial utility
in the inclusion of a selective bibliography and a succinct
list of key intelligence gaps. And the use of a Scope Note
defining both the aim and the special characteristics of the
Estimate might well be made mandatory. Along with these
published passages, we think new consideration should be
given to reviving an in-house Estimate post-mortem or brief
"after-action" report by the managing NIO as a guide both to
subsequent collection efforts and future updatings.
e. Ti"? One of the Agency's special strengths is
its production of superb graphics: succinct, informative,
and attention-getting. DDI publications are light years
ahead of.NIC hard covers. The National Estimates should
clearly expand use of all forms of graphics to sharpen
impact, promote readability, and reduce text to manageable
proportions. We see considerable merit in including graphics
in Key Judgments.
f. NIE-Production Cycle. It appears to us that the
? time between conception and production for both scheduled and
non-scheduled papers is,-growing longer by a factor of
months. Recognizing that the drafting and coordination
phases can be time-consuming, we nonetheless suggest that
tighter managerial direction-of the entire cycle should be
able to reduce the time required by a significant factor.
g. Relatedly, NIC's quick response capability
is visibly weakening. The SNIEs have by and large lost their
special punch and appeal and have become virtually
indistinguishable from the general run of non-scheduled
production. If the title and original purpose for which
SNIEs were designed are to be meaningful, we believe that
more rigorously enforced time.and space limitations need to
be established and enforced to restore their "special"
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SUBJECT: Thoughts on the Intelligence Production Process
character. (The scope of these restrictions would need to
take into account the acceptability of the new art form
mentioned in paragraph 2.c., above.)
h. The-NIS Concept. Lacking the traditional NIS
reference volumes, NIE's haw come to include helpful.but
nonessential background material which could better be made
available to the consumer in some other form. While we do
not espouse resuscitation of the NIS format as such, we do
believe that there should be a better way to build up a
reference library of background materials for use by staffs
and analysts, thereby obviating the necessity for inclusion
of such information in the text of the NIEs. Possibly the
greatest benefit from such an approach would be to restore
the "estimative" element of Estimates by reducing the
temptation to take the easier path of including much
historical and backward-looking material. Similarly, we
wonder if periodic reference NIEs such as those in the "11-"
series might not more appropriately be published under some
other rubric.
i. Themii4in We agree that the revised format of the
NID has much appeal in its present form, but we offer one
additional refinement which-'could easily be incorporated:
expansion of the table of contents marginally by including
under each heading a brief summary of the contents and
conclusions of the article in question.
3. You will recognize that we have attempted to encapsulate
the highlights of our discussion. We will wish to consider them
further, separately and collectively, and would of course be
pleased to discuss any of them in more consecutive detail at your
convenience. Again, we greatly look forward to working closely
with you in every way in which we can be supportive of you and
the DCI.
William Leonhart
Hugh bntgomery
John D. Wilson -?
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SUBJECT: Thoughts on the Intelligence Production Process
ODCl/SRP:thelma
Distribution:
Original - Addressee
1 - Executive Registry
1 - SRP File
1 - SRP Chrono
1 SRP (Amb. Leonhart)
1 - SRP (Gen. McPherson)
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National Intelligence Council
The Director of Central Intelligence?
Washington. D.C. 20505
EXECUTIVE BRIEF
NIC 00545-89
15 May 1989
EFFECTS OF FURTHER US ECONOMIC SANCTIONS
AGAINST PANAMA
-- Further US -economic sanctions will not cause Noriega's
ouster.
The costs to Panama of additional US sanctions would be
much smaller than those that Noriega has already
survived.
A trade embargo and financial restrictions would mainly
affect Panama's private sector and US firms, not the
regime.
The longer such sanctions last, the greater the
long-term reduction in the US economic position in
Panama.
This Executive Brief reflects contributions and views of the
Intelligence Community at a meeting on 12 May 1989. It
responds to a request by Deane Hoffmann, Senior Director,
International Economic Affairs, National Security Council.
It is based upon analysis done by with
contributions from South
America-Caribbean Division, Office of African and Latin
American Analysis/CIA.
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? EFFECTS OF FURTHER ECONOMIC SANCTIONS
AGAINST PANAMA
Trade Embargo
An embargo that simply prohibited trade between the United
States and Panama, without otherwise restricting transactions
by US companies or citizens there, would depress private
business activity by as much as 7 percent during the first
month or two.* After new suppliers of imports and new markets
for exports were located, however, the effects would be much
less, down to perhaps 3 percent of gross domestic product (GDP)
over the course of a year if the sanctions continued that long.
In 1988, Panama's exports to the United States were $297
million, mainly bananas and seafood. At least half of the
exports could be redirected to other markets almost
immediately. Petroleum exports, mainly for the refueling of
ships transiting the Canal, would not be affected. Imports
from the United States, worth $633 million in 1988, consist
almost entirely of goods that could be obtained elsewhere,
though at somewhat higher prices. Petroleum stocks and
alternative supplies are ample.
Other nations, especially those in Latin America, are
unlikely to support a US embargo. Instead, they would step in
to supplant US trade. Import restrictions would, however, be
costly to US firms in Panama that depend on supplies from the
United States, and many of them would leave Panama if they
expected the embargo to last more than a few months.
Financial Restrictions
Currently, the International Emergency Economic Powers Act
(IEEPA) prohibits (with several exceptions) cash payments to
the Noriega regime from the US government or US citizens.
There are several alternatives for additional prohibitions of
financial transactions. Prohibiting US firms in Panama from
any transactions there would impose costs that might total 1 to
3 percent of GNP over and above the costs of a trade embargo.
US investment in Panama totals $1.5 billion, most of it in
petroleum pipelines and refining, agriculture, fishing, and
banking. Were such restrictions imposed, US operations could
be run by Panama or replaced by foreign firms. The impact on
Panama's economy depends on how quickly this replacement
occurs, as well as on how much business confidence deteriorates.
* GDP is expected to decline by about five percent in 1989 in
the absence of additional sanctions. The figures given here
and elsewhere are in addition to the decline already projected.
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The most comprehensive move of barring all transactions
between US persons, including the US Government, and any
Panamanian entity would be tantamount to removing the US
presence. While this would have a substantial economic impact
on Panama--possibly cutting GDP by more than 10 percent -- it
would pose serious problems for the United States. For
example:
-- US SOUTHCOM would need entirely new supply networks.
-- Operation of the Canal would become difficult if not
impossible.
Closing the loopholes in existing regulations would make
them more effective. It would, for example, prohibit US firms
from giving discounts to the Panamanian Government to
circumvent the prohibition of paying taxes in cash. Such
measures would deny the regime an additional $4 million per
month.
Noriega's Control Not Threatened
Unlike the IEEPA sanctions, which directly reduce the
Panamanian Government's revenues, new sanctions on trade and
finance would primarily affect private firms and households.
Government revenues would decline by only about $2 million per
month from the current average take of about $50 million. PDF
businesses would not be much affected. Moreover, Noriega would
probably be able to continue to insulate key elements of the
military from the ill effects of Panama's economic problems.
Considering that Noriega has already weathered the
repercussions of a much larger economic shock -- a 20-percent
decline in GDP last year -- he should be able to ride out any
problems caused by the direct impact of such additional
measures. Indeed, the regime might actually be able to benefit
by taking over abandoned US enterprises.
Thus, the effectiveness of these policies in stimulating or
contributing to Noriega's ouster would depend mainly on the
reactions of the Panamanian opposition. That is difficult to
foresee amidst the turmoil caused by the election debacle. We
judge that additional financial sanctions would not by
themselves stimulate a popular uprising against Noriega. They
would, however, contribute to the pressure generated by the
other diplomatic and military steps taken by Washington.
Politically, added sanctions would be a manifestation to the
PDF of US seriousness of purpose and as such would be
potentially most effective when coordinated with other measures
in a short-term strategy to bring about Noriega's departure.
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Longer Term Effects
The major impact of additional sanctions would be felt
during the first month or two; as the Panamanian economy
adjusted, their cost to Panama would gradually diminish. If
additional economic sanctions were enacted, but Noriega
nevertheless held on to power, it would be difficult to justify
removing them. (This is particularly true of the existing IEEPA
sanctions, because of the large sums that have accumulated in
the escrow accounts that would then be paid to Panama.) The
lonaer trade and financial sanctions were to last, the greater
would be the long-term reduction in the US economic position in
Panama.
Economic sanctions that fall largely on the middle class
would, over time, induce the exodus of people who have been the
backbone of the opposition to Noriega and are vital to an
eventual economic recovery. Over an extended period added
sanctions could.become a political liability because their
economic impact would fall heaviest on an opposition that is
already ambivalent about the continuation of current US
sanctions.
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?
"11.??????1101?1?11.
Date,
ROUTING AND TRANSMITTAL4I-P 1 MAY 1988-0
TO: (Name, office symbol, room number, kV" -
building, Agency/Post)
1. Deputy Director
Initials
Oate?
6744
2.
3. _
S
C
.
5.
Action
File
Note and Return
Approval
For Clearance
Per Conversation
As Requested
For Correction
Prepare Reply
Circulate
For Your Information
See Me
Comment
Investigate
Signature
Coordination
Justify
REMARKS
?
P-O0O-ik
?
T use this form as a RECORD of approvals, concurrences, disposals,
clearances, and similar actions
FROM: ( erne, org. symbol, Agency/Post)
Senior Review Panel
,Room No.?Bldg.
Phone No.
5041-102 OPTIONAL FORM 41 (Rev. 7-76)
Pritscribed by GSA
GPO : 1987 0 - 196-409 FPMR (41 CFR) 101-11.20e
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The Director of Central Intelligence
wamntorhoC.20505
11 May 1989
Senior Review Panel
nyd/
MEMORANDUM FOR: Deputy Director of Central Intelligence
SUBJECT: Guidelines for the Production of National
Intelligence
REFERENCE: - SRP Memorandum of 27 April 1989
1. In your recent meeting with us, you asked that we send
you our thoughts on the adequacy of current guidelines for the
national intelligence production process. Our referenced
memorandum described certain aids to the readability of estimates
which( together with the views which follow, we would like to
reaffirm. In the interim we have conducted a thorough review of
the genesis and evolution of published instructions pertinent to
this subject. As you know, the most recent version of the
guidelines was approved by the NFIB on 24 September 1987 and
issued over the signature of the Acting Chairman of the NIC on 30
September 1987. We append a copy of this document for your
convenience.
2. We have analyzed these guidelines in the light of
predecessor instructions on the same subject and of subsequent
and current practice. We think that the 1987 guidelines retain a
number of strong and valid features, particularly:
a clear presentation of the types of interagency
intelligence products, preparation times, approval
procedures, and, most significantly, acceptable lengths.
(NIE: text 10-20 pages; Key Judgments
1-4 pages--SNIE and SIIM: text less
than 10 pages; Key Judgments not more
than 2 pages)
an emphatic stress on ensuring both the integrity and
objectivity of the intelligence process and the
independence of the Intelligence Community from policyr
community pressures.
protection of alternative view and dissent procedures.
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SUBJECT: Guidelines for the Production of National Intelligence
We conclude that, with the exception noted in paragraph 4.b.
below, the 1987 guidelines continue to provide clear and
practical parameters for the preparation of national intelligence
products, provided that they are honored more in the observance
than in the breach.
3. We come to this view for three additional reasons: (a)
reaffirmation of the 1987 guidelines would be less unsettling and
procedurally more economic than attempting a major revision for
marginal improvements; (b) the NIC has made, and continues to
make, significant improvements in conforming its production to
the 1987 prescriptions; the primary need now seems to us not
revision of ground rules but compliance with the guidelines which
NFIB has formally approved; (c) enforcement of the 1987
stipulations on product length would be unprecedented, a major
accomplishment for present Community leadership, and a notable
service to its policy consumers.
4. Our review prompts us as well to offer two further
suggestions:
- a. If the 1987 guidelines meet with your approval, we
believe it would be helpful for NFIB to reissue them over
your name or that of the DCI as a reflection of current
policy for all participants in the Estimate production
process. Internally, you might also wish to underline the
need for closer observance of the specific provisions of the
guidelines, pointing out that exceptions to them will require
your approval prior to moving ahead.
b. Our parallel look at the average length of time
required to complete even SNIEs leads us to propose that you
recommend to the NFIB the creation of a new art form which,
for the sake of convenience, we have called the "National
Intelligence Executive Brief" (NIEB). This new format would
be designed to restore the immediacy and timeliness the early
SNIEs once enjoyed. The proposed NIEB would be characterized
by the following attributes:
(1) It would consist of a maximum of three pages
in length, with a summary paragraph or introduction.
(2) It should be completed, including necessary
coordination, within a maximum of 36 to 48 hours and
approved by the DCI.
(3) It would be prepared only in response to
critical developments requiring the immediate attention
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SUBJECT:- Guidelines for the Production of National Intelligence
of the policymakers at the most senior level. (If this
additional publication is approved, the 1987 guidelines
will require corresponding modification.)
5. If these suggestions seem to you to have initial merit,
we would be happy to discuss them further, to explore with you
their possible relationship with the proposed new review process,
and to assist in any way toward their implementation.
William Leonhart
John B. McPh rson
tAX Jkoft40
Hugh 5iontgoirtery
Richard L. Walker
Attachment
ODCl/SRP:thelma
Distribution:
Orig - Addressee w/att
1 - ER w/att
1 - SRP File w/att
1 - SRP Chrono w/att
1 - SRP (Amb. Leonhart)
1 - SRP (Gen. McPherson)
ENA1
Jon D. Wilson
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CONFIDENTIAL
4
30 September 1987
MEMORANDUM FOR: National Foreign Intelligence Board Principals
FROM:
H. F. Hutchinson, Jr.
Acting Chairman, National Intelligence Council
SUBJECT: Guidelines for Interagency Intelligence Production
The Guidelines for Interagency Intelligence Production, as approved and
amended at NFIB on 24 September 1987, are attached for your information.
These Guidelines replace a similar document issued by DCI William Casey on
27 July 1981. Please disseminate to the appropriate elements of your
organization.
Attachment:
As stated
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30 September 1987
GUIDELINES FOR INTERAGENCY INTELLIGENCE PRODUCTION
This Notice replaces the 27 July 1981 DCI guidelines for interagency
production of national intelligence.
Purpose
These guidelines are intended to strengthen the Intelligence Community's
capacity to support the DCI in producing national_ intelligence responsive,to
the needs of senior consumers while assuring the objectivity and integrity
of the process. The system must be able to anticipate and respond quickly
to foreign trends and developments that create new requirements for
estimative intelligence products. These will be formulated primarily with a
view to assisting senior policymakers at the NSC and Cabinet level, although
they normally will have wider application and receive wider distribution.
These products will be predominantly estimative and usually will address a
limited number of policy relevant key questions. They should generally be
short and focused; accordingly they should contain no more factual and
historical detail than necessary to provide context for the findings,
judgments, and projections.
Types of Interagency Intelligence Products
National Intelligence Estimate (NIE)
The NIE provides the most authoritative judgments of the Intelligence
Community on subjects of highest policy concern to the United States.
Judgments and projections will be derived from the most comprehensive
intelligence data and research available but will be presented in a concise
form. The main text will develop the analyses and estimative judgments over
the period of the NIE, evaluating alternative scenarios where appropriate, .
and identifying indicators associated with alternative scenarios.
The time projection for a NIE usually will be in terms of years. For
most NIEs the preferred length is in the range of 10 to 20 pages with
background data and detailed discussion carried in annexes. The Key
Judgments should be proportionately brief, in the range of one to four
pages. An Executive Summary, following the Key Judgments, should be
considered in the case of unusually complex or detailed papers. The time
allocated for preparation of the NIE will generally be in terms of months
although it may be required within weeks on occasion. The nomination of
topics, the formulation of concept papers and terms of reference, and the
review and coordination process through NFIB discussion will be more
deliberate and thorough than for other interagency products.
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Special National Intelligence Estimate (SNIE)
While the SNIE shares many of the characteristics of the NIE, it differs
from the latter in several significant ways. The SNIE addresses more
specific and urgent problems; urgency is the dominant of these two
criteria. The SNIE is an unscheduled interagency intelligence product while
the NIE is scheduled and listed in the annual production plan. The time
projection for a SNIE usually will be in terms of weeks or months. The
preferred length of a SNIE is less than 10 pages, with very limited -
background data or description. Key Judgments of SNIEs should be very brief
and normally not exceed two pages. The time allocated for preparation is
days to weeks. The nomination of topics, the formulation of Concept Papers
and Terms of Reference, and the coordination process will be accelerated.
Interagency Intelligence MeMorandum (IIM)
The IIM will address.,problems of high policy concern to the United
States, although not the highest concerns where the NIE is more
appropriate. The IIM provides an Intelligence Community assessment of data
and events, with a considerable amount of evidential or methodological
detail, and usually will be estimative. It is the appropriate interagency
product when the primary objective is a Community judgment on factual matter.
There is no set time horizon for the factual determinations or the
estimates made in the IIM. There are no prescriptions for length or format
beyond succinctness appropriate to the subject requiring Community
judgments. The Key Judgments, and Executive Summary where appropriate,
should be proportionately brief. An IIM usually will be prepared over a
period of months. The process of nominating topics, formulating Concept
Papers and Terms of Reference, and the review and coordination will be
deliberate and thorough without sacrificing timeliness. The product usually
will be coordinated at the senior working level and approved by the
Chairman, National Intelligence Council.
Special Interagency Intelligence Memorandum (SIIM)
The SIIM has much the same relationship to the IIM that the SNIE has to
the NIE. While the IIM usually is scheduled, the SIIM is an unscheduled
interagency intelligence product. It provides an assessment of data and
events and usually will provide a near term projection of the immediate
situation. The preferred length of a SIIM usually is less than 10 pages;
the key judgments should not exceed two pages. The time projection for a
SIIM usually is weeks to months. The process for nomination of SIIM topics
and the SIIM coordination process will be accelerated. The SIIM usually
will be coordinated at the senior working level and approved by the
Chairman, National Intelligence Council.
Memorandum to Holders (M/H)
Any of the interagency intelligence products may be amended by a M/H if
changes in intelligence information or analysis justify a modification but
the changes are not extensive enough to justify a new product. The
procedures followed will be the same as for the basic documents they amend.
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The Interagency Process
Topics for interagency intelligence products may be suggested by any
senior officer in the intelligence or policy communities. A request may be
made directly to the Director Central Intelligence or the appropriate
National Intelligence Officer or to them through departmental channels.
The NIO is responsible for advising the DCI on the policy relevance,
importance, and utility of the topics nominated for interagency production.
The utility of the product for the policy community should be clearly
demonstrated, the requirement for an Intelligence Community judgment should
be justified. The NIO must assist the Intelligence Community in limiting
its formal interagency intelligence production to a clearly articulated
need-to-do basis vice a nice-to-do approach. Topics of general interest but
not meeting NIE/SNIE criteria might be more suitable for an IIM or SIIM, or
might better be addressed by single agency production. The NIO
recommendation is critical in reducing the time demands on NFIB principals
and focusing the resources of the interagency process on the most important
topics.
The DCI is the approving authority for initiating interagency
intelligence products. Some topics will be approved following NFIB
consultetion on the annual interagency production plan. Others will be
proposed as the need arises and approved following such formal or informal
NFIB consultation as appropriate.
The appropriate National Intelligence Officer will manage the production
of the interagency product on behalf of the DCI. The NIO is responsible to
the DCI to ensure maximum Intelligence Community participation in the
production, balancing the requirements for timeliness and thoroughness. The
NIO, in consultation with the representatives of the NFIB principals, will
modify the attached production checklist to fit the circumstances.
The NIO will as a rule prepare a draft Concept Paper and Terms of
Reference in consultation with NFIB representatives and policy officers.
Policy community participation is especially important here to ensure
relevance of the final product. The Concept Paper, incorporating Key
Questions, and the Terms of Reference then will be approved in draft by the
DCI and will be the basis to proceed.
The draft Concept Papers and TORs for scheduled NIEs and I1Ms then
should be furnished to NFIB principals for their review and subsequent
coordination by their representatives. For SNIE's and SIIMs, this review
and coordination will be accelerated, depending on the urgency of the paper.
The NIO will consult with NFIB representatives on designating drafters
and contributors. The NFIB principals should relieve drafters of regular
duties to the maximum extent possible until their special assignments to the
estimate have been fulfilled. Participants in developing and coordinating
the draft should be aware of policy community concerns, drawing upon its
expertise when appropriate, but NFIB principals must ensure that the
integrity and objectivity of the intelligence process are maintained. To
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this end, the NIO and the NFIB representatives must ensure Intelligence
Community independence from policy community pressures or participation in
the drafting and coordination processes. The DCI usually will review draft
texts of estimates at the time they are submitted to NFIB representatives
for coordination to confirm that the paper and its Key Judgments meet the
criteria established by the Concept Paper and Terms of Reference. He will
reserve his decision on the estimate until after he receives recommerkdations
from NFIB.
The NFIB representatives should have sufficient delegated authority to
agree to changes in the text at the coordination meeting such that, except
in the most unusual circumstances, they will be supported by their agencies.
Changes submitted after coordination usually will be reviewed by the
representatives before sending the text to the NFIB principals. For
scheduled NIEs, NFIB agencies should have 10 working days to review final
drafts prior to the NFIB meeting. For SNIEs, agencies should have five
working days to review final drafts, except for the most time-sensitive
estimates. Final coordination by NFIB principals may be by telephone vote,
without benefit of an NFIB, meeting whenever timeliness dictates or other
factors indicate this as a preferable option.
Alternative views usually should be succinctly stated in the body of the
estimate with a concise statement of the reason for the views, but the NIO
must not:let the discussion of alternative views distract from the logical
flow of the estimate.
Attachment: Summary Production Checklist
4
CONFIDENTIAL
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_?, ?
CONFIDENTIAL
'SUMMARY PRODUCTION CHECKLIST
I. TOPIC INITIATION
A. SCHEDULED ANNUAL PRODUCTION OR
(most NIEs and IIMs, no
SNIEs or SIIMs)
1. NIO annually solicits
or anticipates require-
ments from intelligence
and policy commnities
2. NIC incorporates re-
quirement(s)%in produc-
tion plan and seeks
NFIB review and DCI
approval
3. NIO initiates work to
meet projected comple-
tion date
II. CONCEPT PAPER (CP) and TERMS
A. NORMAL TRACK
(all NIEs and IIMs)
1. NIO develops CP and
TOR in consultation
with Community
2. NIO seeks DCI endorse-
ment on CP and TOR
3. NIO seeks NFIB rep
coordination on CP and
TOR
B. OUT-OF-CYCLE PROPOSAL
(all SNIEs and SIIMs, some
NIEs and IIMs)
1. NIO continually receives
or anticipates new
requirements from intelli-
and policy communities
2. NIO reviews new require-
ments with NIC and community
contacts on an accelerated
basis for proposed SNIEs and
SIIMs
3. To seek approval for NIE or
IIM, go to step I.A.2. For
SNIE or SIIM, go to step
II.B.1.
OF REFERENCE (TOR) DEVELOPMENT
OR B. FAST TRACK
(all SNIEs and SIIMs)
1. NIO develops CP (and
time permitting TOR) in
consultation with Community
on accelerated basis
4. NIO distributes coordinated
CP and TOR to DCI and NFIB
5
CONFIDENTIAL
2. NIO seeks accelerated DCI
endorsement of CP (and TOR)
3. NIO seeks accelerated
NFIB rep coordination
on CP (and TOR)
4. NIO distributes coordinated
CP (and TOR) to DCI and NFIB
Attachment
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?
CONFIDENTIAL
III. .DRAFT DEVELOPMENT
A. NORMAL TRACK
1. NIO works with
drafter to produce pre-
coordination draft
2. NIO provides draft
to DCI while simul-
taneously seeking
NFIB rep coordination
on draft
IV. APPROVAL AND PUBLICATION
A. NORMAL TRACK
1. NIO distributes
coordinated draft to DCI
and NFIB principals for
consideration
2. IIMs approved and
published by C/NIC
unless DCI calls
NFIB meeting
3. NIEs discussed and
approved at NFIB
meeting unless
telephone vote is
called ?
END OF TRANSMISSION
OR B. FAST TRACK
1. NIO works with drafter to
produce pre-coordination
draft on an accelerated
basis
2. NIO provides draft to (XI
while simultaneously
seeking accelerated
NFIB rep coordination
on draft
OR B. FAST TRACK
6
CONFIDENTIAL
1. NIO distributes
coordinated draft to DCI
and NFIB principals for
consideration
2. SIIM approved and
published by C/NIC
unless DCI calls
NFIB meeting
3. SNIEs discussed and
approved at NFIB
meeting unless
telephone vote is
called
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STAT
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Declassified in Part- Sanitized Copy Approved
CIA-RDP91B01306R001400030001-3
KUuIlrL RNLI I KANblYlly-M, SLIP
_ ?
for Release 2013/11/21 :
Date
7 ApR 1989
TO: (Norm office symbol, room numbe(
bonding, Agonoy/Post)
1. (3 Deputy Director
Initials
7-IC
Date
i DCZ Agtd(GC 3 Ay
(A484)
3. ADCZ
4.
5. I
Action
File
Note and Return
AppLoval
For Clearance
Per Conversation
As Real), ,estsd
For Correction
Prepare Reply
Circulate
For Your Information
See Me
Crrent
investigate
Signature
Coordination,.
Justify
REMARKS
-
tete g4P bQtzto-4_
C.9
af\
DO NOT use this form as a RECORD of approvals, concurrences, disposals,
clearances, and similar actions
FROM: (Name, erg. symbol, Agency/Post)
Senior Review Panel
Room No.?Bldg.
Phone No.
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CIA-RDP91B01306R001400030001-3 FPRIR (41 GFR)101-11.ZGG
Declassified in Part- Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/11/21 : CIA-RDP91B01306R001400030001-3
SECRET te19-//7/702-
The Director of Central Intelligence
Washington, D.C. 20505
27 April 1989
Senior Review Panel
MEMORANDUM FOR: Deputy Director of Central Intelligence
FROM:
SUBJECT: vgThoixgiht;s?NoTinwt-ITemlTit7egflxiig7e.ncem-Pired-u-ert-i-iToin=Pre-ce-s-s
1. We are most appreciative of your visit yesterday, and
welcomed the stimulating conversation which ensued. We were
particularly pleased to share some of our mutual concerns on the
intelligence production process. We very much flookiwfo-rward,.to..
pe-rTi-od,ilogio_pporitu-Riat4e-s-wri-nwt7heiffrkea=r-awfu,tusemEtoste-x-plo:remtw7i,thvayou
ana-,y_Ls110.41vswbic_terourmoPan-eawnirght-vabewh-e.lpf?Euamirtaimy_o-_ui,...
2. As an initial effort, we thought it might be useful to
you to recapitulate briefly some of the subjects yesterday's
conversation touched upon together with a few quick reactions
which may be worth further thought as we pursue the "guidelines"
project.
a. (aemgthillofmmatas, We start and return to our
conviction that most Estimates are simply too long for their
intended readership. Even the Key Judgments not infrequently
exceed the tolerable length of a terse, tightly-reasoned
Estimate. Any arbitrary restrictions must contemplate
Iexceptions, but we think it a5iIghtmirbel.auwasperxiyment.-to.
,establd,shawfoximthem7Eraid=runwoLmpaILti,ead,..and.e-Gonomlo,..
4Eat4smagmammaw&muirmilreTelnitlFeWmaUdgments?an-d'arc
taLmggmith-emaatitmartenwits (We would of course exempt the
traditional mainly military Estimates, such as those in the
11- series, which are more reference tools than Estimates as
such.)
b. irih"--ewrOcAlorofAmtl-telowNliOs,. Our recent experience with
Estimate drafts confirms our impression of substantial
unevenness in both substance and style. A more active role
SECRET
py Signers
.UPARIBC6*EXMAUMAURV64
MPA) imPluttMtWOWAVt*
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D
EX2C.)
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SECRET
SUBJECT: Thoughts on the Intelligence Production Process
by the NIO's in the pre-coordination drafting process--and
more frequent collegial reviews inside the NIC--might help to
smooth out some of the rougher spots.
c. N-ewl?-kr,bmEorm-., Recognizing the difficulty of
capturing and holding the attention of busy policymakers, we
think there might be appreciable advantage in devising a new
art form designed primarily, but not exclusively, for that
limited audience. Its hallmarks should be brevity and very
quick reaction. We shall be commenting further on this
concept, but offer as a tentative title for what we have in
mind "National Intelligence Executive Brief."
d. aNillE41?Forma-r. We believe that two former--and one
irregularly employed--elements of the NIE deserve renewed
consideration. Specifically, there was substantial utility
in the inclusion of a selective bibliography and a succinct
list of key intelligence gaps. And the use of a Scope Note
defining both the aim and the special characteristics of the
Estimate might well be made mandatory. Along with these
published passages, we think new consideration should be
given to reviving an in-house Estimate post-mortem or brief
"after-action" report by the managing NIO as a guide both to
subsequent collection efforts and future updatings.
e. GtgPETTIg% One of the Agency's special strengths is
its production of superb graphics: succinct, informative,
and attention-getting. DDI publications are light years
ahead of NIC hard covers. The National Estimates should
clearly expand use of all forms of graphics to sharpen
impact, promote readability, and reduce text to manageable
proportions. We see considerable merit in including graphics
in Key Judgments.
f. fraDEmBredign Cyclg. It appears to us that the
time between conception and production for both scheduled and
non-scheduled papers is growing longer by a factor of
months. Recognizing that the drafting and coordination
phases can be time-consuming, we nonetheless suggest that
tighter managerial direction of the entire cycle should be
able to reduce the time required by a significant factor.
g. Relatedly, NIC's quick response capability
is visibly weakening. The SNIEs have by and large lost their
special punch and appeal and have become virtually
indistinguishable from the general run of non-scheduled
production. If the title and original purpose for which
SNIEs were designed are to be meaningful, we believe that
more rigorously enforced time and space limitations need to
be established and enforced to restore their "special"
2
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SECRET
SUBJECT: Thoughts on the Intelligence Production Process
character. (The scope of these restrictions would need to
take into account the acceptability of the new art form
mentioned in paragraph 2.c., above.)
h. ?The?N4S=Goncept. Lacking the traditional NIS
reference volumes, NIE's have come to include helpful but
nonessential background material which could better be made
available to the consumer in some other form. While we do
not espouse resuscitation of the NIS format as such, we do
believe that there should be a better way to build up a
reference library of background materials for use by staffs
and analysts, thereby obviating the necessity for inclusion
of such information in the text of the NIEs. Possibly the
greatest benefit from such an approach would be to restore
the "estimative" element of Estimates by reducing the
temptation to take the easier path of including much
historical and backward-looking material. Similarly, we
wonder if periodic reference NIEs such as those in the "11-"
series might not more appropriately be published under some
other rubric.
i. The=NTD,: We agree that the revised format of the
NID has much appeal in its present form, but we offer one
additional refinement which could easily be incorporated:
expansion of the table of contents marginally by including
under each heading a brief summary of the contents and
conclusions of the article in question.
3. You will recognize that we have attempted to encapsulate
the highlights of our discussion. We will wish to consider them
further, separately and collectively, and would of course be
pleased to discuss any of them in more consecutive detail at your
convenience. Again, we greatly look forward to working closely
with you in every way in which we can be supportive of you and
the DCI.
William Leonhart
Hugh bntgomery
I ID. L. 64. 6,allt)
John D. Wilson
3
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SECRET
SUBJECT: Thoughts on the Intelligence Production Process
ODCl/SRP:thelma
Distribution:
Original - Addressee
1 - Executive Registry
1 - SRP File
1 - SRP Chrono
1 - SRP (Amb. Leonhart)
1 - SRP (Gen. McPherson)
4
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r.,ArA.0 1IV r. z..r.tAcr, atuA
ROUTING SLIP
TO:
ACTION
.INFO
DATE
INITIAL
1
DCI
2
DDCI
X
3
EXDIR
4
DPCS
'5
DDI
X
6
DDA
7
DDO
8
DDS&T
9
Chm/NIC
100C
11
IG
12
Compt
13
D/OCA
14
D/PAO
15
D/PERS
_
16
D/Ex Staff
17
D/T BA/DT
X
18
19
20
21
22
SUSPENSE
Date
Remarks
To #17: Please pass originals to addressees and
ensure a copy is placed in their personnel
files.
ER 89-3769,/112
Ne4kits"
Executive Secretary
14 Sep 89
Date
3637 00.80
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EALILuilvE SECRETARIAT
ROUTING SLIP
TO:
ACTION
INFO
DATE
INITIAL
1
DC1
//
ODDC1X
V7
3
EXDIR
4
D/ICS '
5
DDI
X
6
DDA
7
DDO
8
DDS&T
9
Chm/NU:
10
GC
11
1G
12
Como
13
D/OCA
14
D/PAO
15
D/PERS
16
D/Ex Staff
17
DADA/DT
X
18
19
20
e
"er
e----. ,
22
(
DCI \
SUSPENSE
Date
iS LL'
REG
Remarks
To #17: Please pass originals to addressees and
ensure a copy is placed in their personnel
files.
ER 89-3769a1d2
3637
(10-81)
Executive Secretary
14 Sep 89
Date
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CIA-RDP91B01306R001400030001-3 :entral Intelligence Agency
NOTE TO:
Washington.D. C.20505
14 September 1989
SUBJECT: Typescript on Yel'tsin
our typescript, The USSR's Boris Yel'tsin:
Larger than Life was very well received at the White
House. It arrived just before the meeting with
Yel'tsin and participants felt it was right on the
mark. Your description of his characteristics, his
approach and ego were perfect.
I would like to add my compliments to those of
General Scowcroft and Robert Gates at the National
Security Council in preparing a timely and informative
typescript. A job well done.
icharcic.icer
Deputy Director of Central Intelligence
STAT
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