STATUS REPORT ON PRM 30-TERRORISM

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP91M00696R000100030007-6
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 5
• Document Creation Date: December 15, 2016
• Document Release Date: June 3, 2004
• Sequence Number: 7
• Publication Date: August 19, 1977
• Content Type: MF

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19 August 1977
NEMORANDUM.FOR: Mr. Lapham, A/DDCI
FROM . Cord Meyer, Jr.
SUBJECT . Status Report on PRM 30.- Terrorism
Attached is a memorandum for the'record of the most
recent working group meeting on PRM 30.
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Cord-Meyer, Jr.
Attachment: M/R
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SECRET
19 August 1977
MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD
SUBJECT: PRM-30 Working Group Meeting
1. The PRM-30 Working Group met on Tuesday morning, 18
August, from 1000 to 1115 hours, in the White House Situa-
tion Room. The purpose was to review the second draft of
the PRM, dated 15 August, and to clarify and resolve (if
possible) serious differences on three issues. These con-
cerned policy on dealing with terrorists, coordination of
intelligence activities, and the chairmanship of the new
interagency group on terrorism. The meeting was chaired by
Colonel William Odom, Military Assistant on the National
Security Council Staff. CIA was represented by Mr. Cord
Meyer, SA/DDCI, and the undersigned from DDO/PCS/ITC.
Intelligence Issue
2. Colonel Odom led off with the intelligence issue.
It soon became evident that such differences as existed were
between Dr. Jane Pisano of the NSC Staff and everyone else.
The PRM subgroup on intelligence had recommended the chartering
of an intelligence subcommittee on international terrorism
under the DCI's Critical Collection Problems Committee
(CCPC); and this was in fact the position taken in the
initial PRM draft. However, in the second draft, that
position had been recast as two options .-- a subcommittee on
intelligence under the CCPC, or one under the proposed
Interagency Group. This change had come as a complete
surprise not only to CIA's representatives, but also to
those from other agencies. (CIA's views taking exception to
this change had been communicated to Colonel Odom by the
SA/DDCI on the previous day.)
3. Dr. Pisano put her case in terms of a question:
what role, if any, should the Interagency Group have in
coordination of intelligence activities concerning terrorism?
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She volunteered new language which would recognize a CCPC
subcommittee's role in dealing with "technical" intelligence
collection and dissemination problems, but would then give
responsibility to the Interagency Group and its Executive
Committee under the SCC "for discussing and proposing policy
recommendations, including establishing requirements, setting
priorities, (and) assessing the adequacy of intelligence
efforts." CIA's response was that there were already clearly
defined channels and mechanisms for doing these things, and
that these were indeed being added to and strengthened under
the new PRM-1l reorganization plan. Moreover, representation
of the intelligence agencies on the Interagency Group was in
large measure intended to facilitate that Group's dialogue
with the Intelligence Community.
4. All other representatives that spoke on the issue
supported the CIA position. State (John Karkashian) saw no
need for an intelligence subcommittee of the Interagency
Group, and expressed complete satisfaction with the respon-
siveness of the intelligence agencies under the past CCCT
Working Group set-up. The JCS representative 25X1
1who had been well
prepared by DIA) opted s rong iT or all provisions of the
CCPC study. One Justice representative (Thompson Crockett)
noted that "assessing the adequacy of intelligence efforts"
would require much information as to sources and methods,
and that the Interagency Group was certainly not the forum
to get into that. The discussion closed with the observation
of Larry Gibson (Associate Deputy Attorney General) that,
"while there was probably not much consensus on the other
issues, there was certainly consensus that no one wanted
this proposed change."
5. The net result with regard the PRM's Section III on
intelligence was that Dr. Pisano's options will be dropped,
a subcommittee under the CCPC will be recommended, and the
Interagency Group's involvement will be reflected in a
single sentence along the following lines: "The Executive
Committee (of the Interagency Group) would have respon-
sibility for discussing and proposing policy recommendations
on the adequacy of intelligence efforts."Justice requested
that two paragraphs defining terrorism and international
terrorism be included. These,had been in the version of
Section III worked out last week between Justice and CIA,
but had not been included in the NSC's second draft of the
PRM.
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Policy Issue
6. The sharp differences on policy for dealing with
terrorists that were evident at the 9 August session were
defused rather quickly with Colonel Odom volunteering to
drop his so-called alternative approach (essentialy a "no-
policy" option, allowing the individual agencies to develop
their own operational guidelines). Odom explained that he
had been bothered by two concerns -- the fear that any
statement on policy would almost certainly leak and be
subject to misinterpretation and speculation, and that a
publicly proclaimed policy on terrorism would not be accept-
able to Dr. Brzezinski. In the discussion that followed, it
was clear that all present felt that there had to be some US
Government policy and that the "firm-but-flexible" formula-
tion came closest to it. The Treasury representative (Robert
O'Brien) noted that the various agencies "should not be
forced or allowed to fly by the seat of their pants" on this
matter. And John Karkashian of State spoke for "one policy,
but with multiple strategies for dealing with terrorists."
7. It was agreed that Colonel Odom will substantially
recast the policy section, indicating consensus for "a firm
policy, with flexibility in strategies for dealing with
terrorist incidents according to the circumstances and the
capabilities of the agencies involved." Stress would be
placed on agencies developing operational guidelines under
the broad policy according to their individual needs, and
then coordinating these as necessary under the aegis of the
Interagency Group.
Chairmanship Issue
8. The question of who should chair the Interagency
Group remained unresolved, and the matter will be put to SCC
principals. Justice favors the co-chairman option, with
Justice as its second-choice. State continues to press its
own case. Moreover, according to John Karkashian, State
would step aside in favor of'Justice rather than accept co-
chairmanship. Robert O'Brien of Treasury tabled lengthy
comments on the issue, mostly directed against the Justice
position, but recommending as a new option the designation
by the NSC of an "independent Executive Coordinator." Later
developments indicated that DOD was prepared to support this
position. However, Colonel Odom stated flatly that "the NSC
option was not a viable one."
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9. The Department of Transportation representative
then weighed in, stating that he felt the options should not
go to the SCC principals without a recommendation indicating
Working Group preferences. Justice supported this, and the
key agency representatives were polled. The State option
was supported by five -- State, Transportation, Treasury,
Defense and CIA. The co-chairmanship and Justice options
were supported by two -- Justice and ERI:)A. The CIA position
was presented as that we would willingly serve and cooperate
with whoever chairs the group; that we did not, however,
believe co-chairmanship was a good idea; and that, if required
to choose, we preferred State chairmanship.
10. Although the above poll pretty much decided the
matter, it was followed by a rather heated and acrimonious
exchange among Justice, State, and Treasury as to how the
key positions on chairmanship were to be presented in the
PRM. It was eventually agreed that the NSC Staff's wording
on.advantages-vs.-disadvantages would be discarded in favor
of new, one-page position statements to be prepared by State
and Justice.
11. The NSC Staff will now re-draft the PRM to reflect
decisions taken at this meeting. It will then be sent out
to PRM Working Group members for clearance, probably about
the middle of next week (22-26 August), with the hope that
another Working Group meeting will not be needed. Colonel
Odom has tentatively scheduled the PRM for consideration at
the 30 August meeting of the SCC.
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Distribution:
Orig & 4 - SA/DDCI
1 - C/PCS (via PCS/EXO)
:S .- t
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