BRIEFING ON STRATEGIC ESTIMATES FOR THE SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP91M00696R000100060003-7
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 21
• Document Creation Date: December 15, 2016
• Document Release Date: February 17, 2004
• Sequence Number: 3
• Publication Date: June 21, 1975
• Content Type: MF

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21 June 1975
MEMORANDUM FOR: Mr. Duckett
Mr. Proctor
SUBJECT Briefing on Strategic Estimates for the Senate
Select Committee
1. As has been discussed at several Executive Committee meetings,
the DCI has been asked to give the Senate Select Committee a briefing
on National Intelligence Estimates and the process by which they are
produced, using estimates of Soviet strategic capabilities (both offensive
and defensive) as a particular, detailed example. Precisely when this
briefing is to be given is still unclear, though late on Friday afternoon
(20 June) it looked as if the briefing might have to be given next Wed-
nesday (25 June). As of 1900 Friday, the Wednesday session appeared to
be dead letter but the briefing needs to be prepared with all possible
dispatch since it probably will have to be given within the next week to
ten days and the actual advance notice of the precise time which we re-
ceive will be very short. The DCI does, of course, want this briefing to
be first-rate and to give an exposition that is thorough, detailed, en-
lightening and convincing. He also wants it to be supported by appropriate,
well-designed graphics which contribute to its overall impact.
2. The DCI is envisaging a four-part presentation with the final
part being a statement by some senior consumer (Jan Lodal, if possible)
of the value of our national intelligence product and the way in which
it is used. Attached is a draft outline prepared jointly by Mr. Stoertz
and It has been reviewed by the DCI, who considers it es-
sentially what he wants though he does have a few suggestions (as noted).
The nature of these suggestions is indicated by his marginal comments
which he added in pen. (There are also other marginal comments made in
pencil on the attached draft. These arel and though the pen/ 25X1
pencil differentiation may not be clear on the Xerox copy, the two hand-
writings are distinguishably different.)
3. The DCI has asked to me to get all interested and concerned parties
together (i.e., the recipients of this memorandum) to go over this draft
outline in detail. His purpose is to jell what we want to say and ought
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to cover so that the actual text can be written and the graphics prepared
with dispatch. (Both the text and the graphics will also be checked with
this memorandum's recipients before the briefing is considered final.)
4. Since there is much work to be done and the time is short, I
would appreciate it if we could convene in my office at 1400 on Monday,
23 June, to discuss this outline. I will have my secretary get in touch
with yours at opening of business on Monday to confirm this time or arrange
another mutually convenient one if necessary. I realize that snap meetings
may complicate your schedules, all of which are full, but it is important
that we get together as soon as possible so that the work which needs to be
done can be undertaken with maximum efficiency.
George A. Carver, Jr.
Deputy for National Intelligence Officers
Attachment:
Draft Outline
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20 June 1975
iV`'
MEMORANDUM FOR: The Director
SUBJECT Possible Senate Select Committee Staff
Briefing
1. Attached is Howard Stoertz' andl
first cut at the outline of a possible bile ing tor the
Senate Select Committee staff on how National Estimates
are produced and the problems involved in their production
using strategic Estimates as a concrete example and
employing three years -- 1964, 1970 and 1974 -- as
illustrative concrete benchmarks.
2. Howard leaves for Geneva tomorrow (21 June).
I..you ave a chance during the latter part of the after-
noon we wouldlike to caucus with you so that we may
jointly discuss his ideas w ile he is still in Washington.
After we get jelled conceptually with you, we will
circulate copies of this proposal to others -- Ed Proctor,
Carl Duckett, etc., for their comments and reactions.
eo e A. Carver, Jr.
Deputy for National Intelligence Officers
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UNCLASSIFIED CONFIDENTIAL
OFFICIAL ROUTING SLIP
TO
NAME AND ADDRESS
DATE
INITIALS
1
Mr. Carver
2
$
4
5
6
ACTION
DIRECT REPLY
PREPARE REPLY
APPROVAL
DISPATCH
RECOMMENDATION
COMMENT
FILE
RETURN
CONCURRENCE
INFORMATION
SIGNATURE
Remarks:
Attached is a detailed outline of part III of
the briefing which was discussed last Saturday.
I propose to obtain comments on the outline from
those offices with equities in this matter (NIO/USS
NIO/CF, DDI and DDS&T). After a go ahead from you
and the Director, we will complete the briefing
boards (vu-graphs) and prepare a full text of the
briefing.
E TO RETURN TO SENDER
DRESS AND PHONE NO. DATE
p 6/19/75
is ived For R
UNCLA C AIIN F
FOAM M0. 237 Use previous editions
1-67 L I
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Statement
W. E. Colby
Director of Central Intelligence
before
CIA Subcommittee
of the
House Select Committee on Intelligence
June 12, 1975
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Mr. Chairman:
Historically, nations have conducted but not talked
about intelligence. Much of what they did may have been
known by their adversaries and others, but a refusal to
comment permitted the adversary an option as to how he
replied. Official confirmation compelled him to strike
out. This was perhaps most graphically illustrated in the
U-2 incident over the Soviet Union in 1960. Khrushchev's
memoires recount his knowledge over several years of these
flights, his exposure of our cover story, and his possession
of our pilot. They also state that the official confirma-
tion by our President of his personal responsibility for the
operation forced Khrushchev to react sharply, since an
intelligence incident had been raised to a confrontation
between Chiefs of State.
The legislation, control and supervision of American
intelligence established in the National Security Act of
1947 reflected this traditional approach. The legislation
delegated decisions to the National Security Council, pro-
vided broad powers to conduct intelligence activities, and
phrased functions in vague and general language. External
supervision was sporadic and sympathetic, in tune with the
consensus on foreign policy which marked the times.
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Under this arrangement, mistakes were made by intelli-
gence. Some operations went awry, and the Agency in some
cases overstepped its proper bounds. I fully understand
and support the Constitutional process that requires that
these be investigated. The allegations made about CIA are
serious and, if not resolved, could undermine the public
confidence and support which are so necessary to any insti-
tution in our country. I must raise a cry of alarm,
however, at the direction in which I see this process turn-
ing, as I fear that it can result in a dangerously erroneous
image of American intelligence today and permanent and
potentially fatal injury to its sources for tomorrow.
While CIA has made mistakes, they were few and far
between. Scrutiny of the intensity aimed at CIA applied
to almost any other American institution of its size and
complexity would, I believe, find ana:Lagous missteps in
a twenty-seven-year history. More importantly, CIA itself
has recognized its errors and issued clear instructions to
prevent such missteps in the future. In May of 1973, CIA
collected from its employees their memories of questionable
{ activities it might have conducted in years past. These
were assembled and reported to the Chairmen of the CIA
oversight committees, and a flat assurance was given by me
that improper activities would not be conducted in the
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future. This was reaffirmed during my confirmation
hearing, where I made it clear that CIA would operate
within the law, and a detailed set of instructions was
issued by me in August 1973 correcting each and every
one of the areas in which missteps were reported in the
past.
The Vice President's Commision's summary of its
findings on CIA's domestic activities is relevant in
this context. I quote: "A detailed analysis of the facts
has convinced the Commission that the great majority of the
CIA's domestic activites comply with its statutory authority.
Nevertheless, over the 28 years of its history, the CIA
has engaged in some activities that should be criticized and
not permitted to happen again." The Commission noted that
some of these activities were initiated or ordered by
Presidents, some fall within a doubtful area, and some were
plainly unlawful. It commented that "the Agency's own
recent actions, undertaken for the most part in 1973 and
1974, have gone far to terminate the activities upon which
this investigation has focused."
The subject of assassination has now come to dominate
current public comment about CIA and has raised deep concern
among many of our citizens. Mr. Chairman, the current policy
is clear. In 1972, my predecessor issued a directive that
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"no such activity or operation be undertaken, assisted
or suggested by any of our personnel." In the set of
directives I issued in August 1973, I stated that "CIA
will not engage in assassination nor induce, assist or
suggest to others that assassination be employed." As for
proposals, plots or attempts involving CIA, or actions by
independent elements with which CIA may have been in
contact, it is more sensational than valuable to try to
reconstruct the atmosphere, the policies and the perceived
threats and responses within our government 10-20 years
ago. Public exposure of such matters today does no
service to the United States, past or future, since our
policy now is explicit. To the extent these matters
require investigation, I believe they should be conducted
in executive session.
With respect to surveillance, improper files and other
interference with the rights of American citizens, I refer
you to my public testimony given to the Senate and House
Appropriations committees in January and February of this
year. These matters were also the specific subject of
clear policy directives in August 1973 to ensure CIA's full
compliance with the law. The Vice President's Commission's
report on these matters, quoted above, summarizes well this
subject, and should place it in proper proportion.
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Am I objecting to further investigation, Mr. Chairman?
No, I welcome it. It is essential that our citizens under-
stand how intelligence has changed over the twenty-eight
years since 1947. It is essential that the public appre-
ciate that the United States has developed the finest
intelligence service in the world. Our leadership, and in
this I include the Congress, is served by knowledge of
foreign affairs and developments which would have been
inconceivable twenty-five years ago. On a daily basis,
Congress and the executive are made aware of the exact
strengths of the strategic forces arrayed against us.
Thanks to our remarkable strides in the technology of
intelligence and in the skill and experience of the
analysts with access to such remarkable data, our judgments
are informed, not shallow. We also benefit from the courage
and dedication of the career intelligence personnel serving
their country abroad, frequently at great risk and without
hope or desire for public appreciation. Our intelligence
is independent of departmental interests and policy prefer-
ences, but we have established a structure through which
differing views can be surfaced rather than suppressed, and
sharpened rather than fuzzed.
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The result not only protects our country better, it
enables our country to negotiate on a basis of knowledge
rather than confront on a basis of fear. It enables us
to resolve local disputes in the world rather than see
them flare up and entwine great powers in dangerous con-
test. More than once, an intelligence assessment of a
critical international situation has enabled our govern-
ment discreetly to bring together quarreling parties and
avoid an outbreak of conflict. CIA's officers have quietly
assisted friends under pressure or threat in many countries
to stand up to otherwise irresistible pressures without
the clamor of official U. S. or military action. A real
investigation of American intelligence must also encompass
these aspects, whose continuation depends on secrecy and
whose contributions to our country's interests must be
assured.
Even with such an improved understanding of modern
American intelligence, there is work to be done. Those
ambiguous guidelines of 1947 need to be clarified in
legislation and external as well as internal directives.
The permissive external supervision of years ago must be
replaced by regular and responsible review, as it has
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grown in recent years. And, Mr. Chairman, it is patently
clear that our intelligence must be better protected from
irresponsible leaks and exposures if its essential quality,
the confidence of the foreigners and Americans who work
with us, is not to be withdrawn.
Most of all, Mr. Chairman, all of us Americans, intelli-
gence professionals, elected officials, the fourth estate,
and our citizens as a whole must insist on a sense of
responsibility to our nation as we look at our intelligence
structure. We intelligence professionals must be responsive
to our constitutional and legal requirements, and I believe
we are. These investigations must be comprehensive in their
conception as well as their detail. And we must seek sober
judgments about intelligence, not shrill sensation.
An adversary prosecution focused on missteps is appro-
priate for a court or for a prosecutor; it is not appropriate
to achieve a comprehensive understanding of an institution
as complex and important to our country as intelligence.
Thus, I hope we can focus primarily on our country's needs
for intelligence in the '70's and '80's, rather than its
missteps in the '50's and '60's.
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CIA/DIA JOINT ANALYSIS GROUP STUDIES 1963-1965
YEAR JAG STUDY TITLE
1963
JAG 6-63 Alternative 1.0 Year Projections of Soviet
Military Forces
JAG 7-63 Alternative 10 Year Projections of Soviet
Military Posture
Working Paper No. 6
JAG 8-63 Alternative Soviet Space Programs 1962-1980
Working Paper No. 7
JAG 9-64 Alternative Projections of Soviet Military
Postures (1962-1974)
Working Paper No. 8
JAG 10-64 Alternative Projections of Soviet Military
Postures (1962-1974)
Working Paper No. 9
JAG 11-64 Alternative Projections of Soviet Military
Postures (1962-1974)
Working Paper No. 10
JAG 12-64 Alternative Projections of Soviet Military
Postures (1962-1974)
Working Paper No. 11
JAG 13-64 Alternative Projections of Soviet Military
Forces (1965-1975)
JAG 14-65 Alternative Projections of Soviet Military
Forces (1967-1975)
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YEAR
ESTIMATE
NIE 11-3-64
Soviet Air and Missile Defense Capabilities
thru Mid-1970
NIE 11-8-64
Soviet Capabilities for Strategic Attack
M/H NIE 11-8-64
Soviet Capabilities for Strategic Attack
NIE 11-3-65
Soviet Strategic Air and Missile Defenses
NIE 11-8-65
Soviet Capabilities for Strategic Attack
NIE 11-3-66
Soviet Strategic Air and Missile Defenses
NIE 11-8-66
Soviet Capabilities for Strategic Attack
M/K NIE 11-8-66
Soviet Capabilities for Strategic Attack
NIE 11-3-67
Soviet Strategic Air and Missile Defenses
NIE 11-8-67
Soviet Capabilities for Strategic Attack
NIE 11-3-68
Soviet Strategic Air and Missile Defenses
NIE 11-8-68
Soviet Strategic Attack Forces _
NIE 11-3-69 Soviet Strategic Defenses
NIE 11-8-69 Soviet Strategic Attack Forces
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YEAR ESTIMATE TITLE
NIE 11-8-70 Soviet Forces for Intercontinental Attack
NIE 11-3-71
M/H NIE 11-3-71
NIE 11-8-71
Soviet Strategic Defenses
Soviet Strategic Defenses
Soviet Forces for Intercontinental Attack
NIE 11-3-72
Soviet Strategic Defenses
NIE 11-8-72
Soviet Forces for Intercontinental Attack
M/H NIB 11-3-72
Soviet Strategic Defenses
NIB 11-8-73
Soviet Forces for Intercontinental Attack
NIE 11-3/8-74
Soviet Forces for Intercontinental Conflict
Thru - 1985
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 FRANK CHURCH. IDAHO. CHAIRMAN
JOHN G. TOWER. TEXAS. VICE CHAIRMAN
PHILIP A. HART. MICH. HOWARD H. BAKER. JR., IN,
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RO3_RT MORGAN, N.C. RICHARD S. SCHWEIKER. PA.
GA,? HART, COLD.
WILLIAM G. MILLER, STAFF DIRECTOR
' I Cnfeb . lc lcz
enale
SELECT COMMITTEE TO
STUDY GOVERNMENTAL OPERATIONS WITH
RESPECT TO INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES
(PURSUANT TO S. RES. 21, 94TH CONGRESS)
WASHINGTON. D.C. 20510
May 27;, 1975
Mr. William E. Colby
Director of Central Intelligence
Central Intelligence Agency
Washington, D. C. 20505
Dear Mr. Colby:
In the field of foreign intelligence, the Senate Select
Committee wishes to examine the following: (1) the quality
and utility of National Intelligence Estimates (NIEs);
(2) the authority the DCI exercises over the entire intelli-
gence community; and (3) how successfully the Foreign
Intelligence agencies of the United States alert policy-
makers of impending events, e.g., the Middle East War of
1973.
Attached to this letter is a memorandum briefly describ-
ing the issues which the Committee wishes to examine at this
stage of its investigation, the additional. documents which
the Committee now requests, and a number of officials the
Committee staff proposes to interview. The Committee would
appreciate receiving these documents as soon as possible so
that they would be available for review prior to discussions
with the experts from within the agencies In addition,
the Committee would welcome your suggestions for additional
documents or the names of other officials which might con-
tribute to our understanding of these matters.
I am sending a copy of the attached memorandum to
Secretary Kissinger and Secretary Schlesinger also.
On behalf of the Committee,fj/I wish to thank you for
your assistance. /
Si'cerely,
Attachment
rank Church
VChairman
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May 21, 1975
SUBJECT: Foreign Intelligence Case Studies
The Select Committee wishes to study the following foreign intel-
ligence issues:
1. The Utility and Quality of National Intelligence Estimates
In order to understand and evaluate the National Intelligence Estimate
process, the Committee wishes to study how relevant the NIEs are to
policymakers and how they are used; how-the objectivity of the product is
affected by foreign policy preferences of the individual intelligence
agencies; how effective the final product is in reflecting divergent
opinions; and how changes in the process initiated in 1973 have affected
the quality, independent judgment, and utility of the NIEs.
To illustrate the NIE process, the Committee has chosen to focus- on
the estimates of Soviet strategic offensive and defensive-systems since
1964. Among the basic issues raised during this perked were. the pro-
jected number of Soviet ABM and offensive missile launchers and the capa-
bilities of the.Soviet SS-9 triplet, the SA-5, the Backfire bomber, and
Air Defense Systems.
II. DCI Authority over the Intelligence Corununity
The Committee would like to evaluate how well the DCI has been able
to carry out his formal responsibilities of: (1) preparing a consolidated
.intelligence program budget; (2) establishing intelligence requirements; 1
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(3) coordinating and evaluating all intelligence activities, and (4)
eliminating inefficient activities.
To begin, the Corrlittee wishes to look at how the DCI establishes
intelligence requirements through the USIB; what role the DCIIs Intel-
ligence Resources Advisory Corunittee (IRAC) plays in the formation of t1
intelligence cornnunity budget; and how effective the DCI's Intelligence)
community Staff is -in coordinating and evaluating the intelligence actin
ties of the community.
III. Adequacy of the Foreign Intelligence Agencies Alerting Function
The Cornrrittee wishes to review the Foreign Intelligence Agencies.
record of alerting policynrakers of sudden tactical changes in the world)
situation. In particular, the Committee would like to examine the cir-- i.
cumstances of three recent cases in which the intelligence community
apparently gave inadequate advance alert: (1) the outbreak of the 3,973
Arab-Israeli war; (2) the eruption of the 1974 Cyprus crisis; and (3)
the detonation of India's nuclear device.
In order to carry out these reviews, the following eloci.nents axed
requested:
I. NIE Process
A. CIA Documents
1. The final estimates for years 1964-1974 on Soviet strateg
offensive and defensive missile capabilities, NIE 11-8,
NIE 11-3, and 'TIE 11-38, plus the Memoranda to Holders.
2. The tenors of reference and all interagency working papers
submitted as part of the strategic offensive and defensiv
missile. estimate process for the years 1964, 1968-74.
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