FURTHER THOUGHTS ON PRM-11 ISSUES

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP91M00696R000200010009-5
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 28
• Document Creation Date: December 15, 2016
• Document Release Date: February 26, 2004
• Sequence Number: 9
• Publication Date: May 6, 1977
• Content Type: MF

Approved For ease 2004/05/13 : CIA-RDP91 M00696R000200010009-5 J~--^~ ~-
Name
MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence
FROM : Comptroller
VIA . Deputy Director of Central Intelligence
SUBJECT : Further Thoughts on PRM-11 Issues
h'Y
G MiAy ~9 7
1. During your session with us the other day on our paper
on the options available under PRE` 11, you asked several fundamental
questions about the nature of the authorities we thought you needed
to do your job. Following the meeting we spent some additional time
talking with Mr. Bader about his related efforts and got from him
some further insight into your questions. As I understand it, you
have divided the question of authorities into three basic areas:
those dealing with the ability to task the Community to do your
bidding, those which involve enhanced bud tr1 authority, and those
which deal with line authority. Mr. Bader suggested that a paper
dealing with some of the issues inherent in these concepts might
be helpful to you, and we offer the following.
2. We see the problem similarly but would argue that line
authority and tasking are in fact one and the same thing. Tasking
in our view is a subset of line authority and not an independent,
stand-alone variable. But let us take you through our reasoning.
To do that we will talk about the tasking question first, then line
authority, and then budgetary authority.
3. There is a good deal of confusion surrounding the concept
of tasking. Let us elaborate on two different views as to what
tasking means. You are today under the 1947 Act charged with pulling
together intelligence from all the various producers and collectors
in the Intelligence Community and integrating it for the considera-
tion of policy makers. You thus have the legal authority to ask
for the product of all Community components and to ask collectors to
collect certain kinds of information. In the case of CIA you cannot
only ask that the information he collected but direct that that task
25X1
Approved For Release 2004/05/13 : CIA-RDP91 M00696R000P00010009-5
 Approved FdHZelease 2004/05/13 : CIA-RDP91 M006`R000200010009-5
be accomplished; and if it is not done to your satisfaction, you
are in a position to change that. With respect to the other
collection entities in the Community, however, all you really
can do at the present time is ask. The mechanisms available
to you to ask the Community to contribute on problems basically con-
sists of the DCI committee structure, which is a vehicle for the
articulation to others of your requirements and needs. You have at
the present time all the authority you need to ask through these
mechanisms that work be done. What you lack is the ability to enforce
those requests, i.e., to ensure that requests are met in whatever
timefrarne is appropriate. Because the DCI's role in the Government
is important and cannot simply be ignored, the collegial committee
process resting essentially on the consent of the participants often
works, although rarely as crisply and efficiently as is idealy possible.
In short, tasking should mean not only the ability to ask for
information but the ability to ensure that you get it. The former
you have; the latter you lack. It is line authority over the Community
components involved which would give you the latter. It is for this
reason that we would argue that the concept of tasking is in fact
integral to the concept of line authority.
.4. What would it mean if you had the ability to task the Intelli-
gence Community to answer to your needs in the way we have suggested
above? To answer this question, we picked the management problem
you mentioned at our recent meeting--.how far does your present staff
authority have to be augmented to gain effective control over NSA?
Or, as you put it, how much of the existing dotted line between the
DCI and NSA would have to be inked in to give the DCI the necessary
authority to manage NSA? As the solid line representing the authority
of the DCI over NSA increasingly replaced the dotted line of staff
guidance, the solid line that now extends from the Secretary of
Defense to NSA must be correspondingly broken to reflect theDCI'S
increased authority. Thus, we have a twofold problem. Any increase
in the DCI's ability to direct or manage NSA must be accompanied by
a proportionate dimunition of the power Defense now holds over NSA.
The force of logic influences us to state that you cannot both have
line control and not have it; or to answer that there is no such thing
as a little line control. It seems to be indivisible. The owner
of the heaviest solid line calls the shots and establishes the ground
rules for the other players. But let's look at what powers the DCI
now has to make NSA responsive to his direction and, then, enumerate
what we think he must have to carry out his responsibilities. Some
place between the powers the DCI now has over NSA and. those we believe
he should have, the border between the dotted staff line and the
solid command line will be crossed.
Approved For Release 2004/0'3' ?IA~RDP91 M00696R000200010009-5
 Approved For Fease 2004/05/13 : CIA-RDP91 M00696R000200010009-5
5. The DCI is faced with two distinct managemen situations
as he strives to carry out his responsibilities to the President.
He must manage the diverse resources of the Intelligence Community
toward the fulfillment of long-term national intelligence objectives
and, on an ad hot basis, he must be able to utilize these same resources
to support the President in crisis situations. Crisis management
puts a different stress upon management capabilities than do the
work-a-day problems he faces that are not time urgent. Therefore,
we should examine the need for increasing the DCI's authority over
NSA in both situations.
.6. The DCI's present ability to "direct" NSA is made up of
three separate but obviously interrelated approaches. First, is his
unquestioned authority to promulgate broad collection guidelines
in the form of Key Intelligence Questions and other more specific
national intelligence requirements. Secondly, he can, through the
budgetary process, veto some NSA activities, change the pace of on-
going activities where progress is closely related to dollar limits,
and he can encourage new initiatives by providing funds to encourage
NSA-originated initiatives. Lastly, he can selectively use the force
of his personality and his access to the President to bring a re-
calcitrant Agency into line. The promulgation of broad guidelines
and the selective use of special access to higher authority are text-
book mechanisms that are traditionally used by staff personnel to
get the job done. Strong budgetary power is one of the keystones
of line authority. Thus, the DCI today has the usual staff powers
plus one of the essential elements of line authority. The other
essential element of line authority is the capability to reward
directly those who effectively carry out their assigned responsibilities
and to punish just as directly, those who do not. The rewards and
punishment element of line authority encompasses the ability to hire
and fire personnel, to have unrestricted access to all parts of
your subordinate organizations and to evaluate the performance of
subordinates against the tasking they have been given by their chief.
7. How can the DCI use the tools he now has to direct NSA?
If the DCI decides that the needs of national intelligence require
more economic reporting and less military reporting from NSA, he
can issue collection guidance requirements that "task" collection
systems to increase their economic reporting. No one will question
the DCI's right to issue collection guidance and if the Director,
NSA, and the Secretary of Defense agree with the DCI, the necessary
adjustments will be made. If they do not agree, the collection ratio
between military and economic coverage will remain more or less the
same. The DCI, in the course of time, will find out that NSA is not
responding to his tasking. At this point, he can wait for the next
Approved For Release 2004/05/13 : CIA-RDP91 M00696R000200010009-5
 budget. cycle, or he can appeal to the President to to the Secretary
of Defense to honor the DCI's request to collect more economic intelli-
gence. The DCI may decide this is really not a proper problem to
bring to the President's attention, and the DCI will then have to
pick up his budget stick. He will soon discover, however, that
he cannot find an effective place within NSA to use the budget stick
to cause a shift from military to economic reporting. The same
collection systems serve both reporting categories. This is also
true of the processing mechanism. There is nothing to veto; no
unit to deprive of funds and no slots he can refuse to fund. The
choice may be to cripple the ability of NSA to collect intelligence
at all or to let them continue their practice of selectively respond-
ing to DCI collection guidance. Thus, all the tools in the DCI_'s
inventory can prove to be ineffective in the most elemental test
of his powers-the bringing of collection systems into line with
national intelligence needs. He can, of course, given a world of
"limitless" resources, give NSA the extra funds they would need to
expand their overall collection capability in general and thereby
increase economic coverage, but that is rarely a real option.
8. As would be expected, a crisis situation which calls for
a rapid shifting of collection emphasis to support the President's
need for the rapid formulation of foreign policy initiatives shows
even more clearly the handicaps the DCI must overcome to orchestrate
collection and production resources. With his present powers, the
DCI can order his human source collection mechanism to respond, and
the DDO will move immediately to redirect its collection assets.
The DCI's Human Resources Committee is not even relevant to this process.
In fact, most DDO collectors have only the vaguest notion of this
Committee. One leg of the DCI's collection triad has responded
immediately to his direction. The other two legs of the triad, re-
presented by SIGINT and reconnaissance systems, are not as easy
to redirect in crisis situations. The assets of the CCP and the NRP
are owned by the Secretary of Defense. If the Secretary perceives
the crisis with the same level of priority as does the DCI and if
he agrees with the "trade off" involved with any redirection of
collection assets, then all will go relatively well.. The DCI's SIGINT
and COMIREX Committees will work their collegial magic, and the technical
collection systems will slowly swing around to focus on the crisis.
The DCI has effectively matched Community resources with national
intelligence needs. Or has he? Maybe the Secretary of Defense
played the key role. For what would have happened if the Secretary
had not agreed with the importance of the crisis and refused to go
along with the collection trade off that would occur if.his CCP
and NRP assets were moved from their standing collection responsi-
bilities? In that case the collegial committee process would not
Approved For Release 2004/05/13 : CIA-RDP91 M00696R000200010009-5
 Fly ftsJ f %WJ1~ . *, g s o02M1W09-5
work as haAr proved
in with its attendant delays, and the DCI's effectiveness in focusing
Community resources on a crisis area would not be as impressive.
In essence, the DCI can do anything with the resources of the CCP
and the NRP that the Secretary of Defense lets him do. In short,
you are not in a position to make trade off collection decisions
because it is the Director of NSA who must do the balancing between
your needs and those of the components or organizations which he
serves most directly in a command sense. Giving you line authority
over the two other parts of the Community as suggested in our earlier
paper, the NRO and the CCP, would put you and not the Director of
NSA in the position of weighing the competing intelligence and military
needs. And it is, of course, for this reason that Defense will
most strenuously argue with proposals to remove these components
from the Department.
9. If Defense controls the resources of the CCP and the NRP,
and if the DCI has essentially the same staff guidance relationship
to both, why is it that the reconnaissance assets seem more responsive
to DCI guidance than do the COMINT collectors? Of the two technical
DCI resource tasking committees, COMIREX works more effectively
through the collegial process than does the SIGINT Committee. In
fact the COMIREX Committee has often been held up as a model. for the
other collegial committees to emulate. The answer to this is rather
simple. COMIREX assets are limited by technology to collecting
data within a narrow spectrum of national intelligence needs. Moreover
there is a great degree of Community acceptance of COMIREX targets.
Photographs seldom help us to understand the political process of a
target nation. They are of limited use against economic targets.
Pictures do not tell us much about basic research or the pre-prototype
stages of weapon systems developments. Overhead photography, however,
is a remarkably effective collector against targets of military
significance. The importance of the military targets covered by
COMIREX assets is understood and accepted. The limitations of this
technology to collect against other targets is also understood.
Therefore, the COMIREX Committee meets in an atmosphere of relative
harmony with limited possibilities for significant "trade off" arguments.
Discounting telemetry and ELINT collectors which enjoy the same
relative target commonality as photographic satellites, SIGINT Committee
COMINT assets have the technological potential for collecting against
all national intelligence requirements. The probability of disagreement
is correspondingly broad and the likelihood of agreement without
extensive compromise and long delays is improbable. There are, of
course, other differences between the collection programs represented
by the COMIREX and SIGINT Committees but they are not as fundmental.
Approved For Release 2004/05/1:;E b0191 M00696R000200010009-5
 Approved ForDlease 2004/05/13: CIA-RDP91 M0069p00200010009-5
CIA's histroical role as the technological leader in satellite
photography and the physical location of important program managers
within CIA and under the line control of the DCI also improve the
DCI's ability to match COMIHEX resources against, intelligence needs.
Since the DCI and the Secretary of Defense have fewer disagreements
over photographic, telemetry or ELINT targets, DCI requirement guidance
is more effective and the need for DCI line control to match resources
against requirements is not as critical. The opposite is true with
COMINT collectors. Without real line authority there is no way of
making sure COMM collection will be guided by your perception of
national intelligence needs.
10. in our meeting on Wednesday, there was a good deal of discussion
about what it would mean to you if you were in fact responsible
for not only the CIA but also the CCP and NRO in a line management
sense. Questions were raised as to whether the management job was
so large that your ability to carry out substantive responsibilities
would be seriously compromised by the time required to be spent
on managerial duties. Basically, we think this is somewhat of a
red herring. There are many Government officers who have responsibility
and authority over programs larger than that which would emerge
if CIA, NRO, and CCP were combined. Further, we think there is a
plausible argument that line control over those other two organizations
would in fact make your Community resource and other responsibilities
easier to handle than they now are. You would then have the more
manageable task of making your organization responsive. The collegial
Community management process developed over the years and further
enshrined in E.O. 11905 is, because it is built on a Presidential
order which cannot modify statutory responsibilities, necessarily
a cumbersome and time-consuming apparatus. If your real authorities
were clearer, it can be argued that the managerial task you would
have would in fact be simpler. In the last analysis, the question
is really one of delegation. in combining the three organizations,
it would be important to build an effective staff organization which
enabled you to focus the organization on the questions you wished
addressed, and it would be necessary to build procedures to ensure
that the large questions in which you wanted to be involved were
brought to your attention but the others were handled by subordinate
elements. In other words, the way in which you delegated your authority
and indeed your management style would probably be as critical to
the question of whether or not you had time for substance as would
the size of the organization you would be managing.
11. We have talked about tasking and about line authority and
argued that one is but a subset of the other. 'What of the various
proposals to give you expanded budgetary authority in the Intelligence
Approved For Release 2004/05/13 : CIA-RDP91 M00696R000200010009-5
 Approved Foi"Kelease 2004/05/13 : CIA-RDP91 M006000200010009-5
Community without line authority? To answer this question let us
lay out the two different models which as far as we are aware have
been attempted?in the Government and give you a sense of what each
would mean and how it would work.
12. The first of these is essentially reflected in the existing
IC staff arrangement. You were given under the Executive Order
last year what is essentially a staff responsibility to the President,
not unlike that of OMB, to advise him on the appropriate mix and
disposition of resources within the Intelligence Community. The
authority you have been given under the Executive Order is limited
to making a recommendation on the proper allocation of resources.
If a decision is made, it must be the President's or the Secretary's
of Defense, and you have no legal responsibility for the defense of
the program before the Congress or the execution of it once it is
approved except in the case of CIA. The ability to recommend actions
on the budget is a powerful tool although it has, as we pointed
out in our previous paper, limitations.
13. Another model which has been suggested would involve appro-
priation of funds to you for that portion of the Intelligence
Community for which you wish to have a budget responsibility. These
:. funds would be directly apportioned by you among the various programs
:. which make up the Community. In such an arrangement, you would theoreti-
cally be given the power to run an effective budget process, to raise
issues and decisions with the President, and to defend the program
? before the Congress, and to execute the budget as you saw fit within
any limitations imposed by outsiders. There is precedence for such an
arrangement. The so-called poverty program set up by President Johnson
in the Office of Economic Opportunity (OEO) in the early 1960s in
fact was designed to function in this manner. The basic concept
was that funds would be appropriated to the Director of OEO but
that the responsibility for actually conducting programs would generally
be delegated to other existing departments of the Government. The
Director OEO would shape the budget in accordance with his priorities,
defend it before Congress, but leave the day-to-day management of,
for example, manpower training programs, to someone else, in this
case the Secretary of Labor. By the.late 1960s when OEO's appropriation
was about $2 billion, about $1 billion was appropriated to the Director
of OEO but transferred thereafter by him to the Secretary of Labor
for the conduct of manpower programs. The idea had a good deal of
appeal but in fact was largely judged a failure. (The whole program
was thought by many to be a failure; here we are discussing only
this peculiar budgetary arrangement.) The fact was that the Secretary
of Labor had vastly more influence over the budget which legally
Approved For Release 2004/03-FDP91 M00696R000200010009-5
 Approved F , lea a 200 05/CEO CiE 1 ~ -5
was to be prepared by tphe irec/Or. ~i ~n
given the original concept established in law. This happened for
very human reasons, and we doubt that were you, for example, to
have a similar responsibility with respect to NSA today the situation
would be much different. Because the Secretary of Labor operated
the manpower programs, because he had good Congressional contacts,
because OMB turned to him for advice on these programs rather than
to Director OEO, because even the White House turned to the Secretary
of Labor instead of the Director OEO for advice, OEO found itself
essentially rubber stamping what the Secretary of Labor had already
agreed to do with others. In fact OEO was never able to get the
Labor Department to concentrate on the areas it thought were important
in the manpower program area. Doubtless there have been other analogous
approaches to this problem in previous times although we personally
are not aware of any of significant size. In this particular case,
after a fair amount of backbiting between OEO and the Department
of Labor and a growing recognition by everyone that little was gained
by appropriating the money to OEO, a decision was eventually made
to appropriate the funds for these programs directly to the Department
of Labor. No one knew the difference.
14. A net assessment of that experience is that it was not
worth the trouble. In addition, our previous paper suggests to
you what we believe are some of the other important limitations of the
budgetary tool alone are. Also, we explained our view that your
assumption of a more far-reaching budgetary role within the Community
would lead to demands from others in the Community, particularly the
Department of Defense, that you separate yourself from CIA. This
in turn would require that you take at least the production apparatus
out of CIA so that you would be able to fulfill your most fundamental
intelligence responsibility, thereby raising the question of whether
CIA without the production apparatus could continue to exist. Perhaps
more fundamental from your point of view, however, you would be
left with line command over essentially only the production apparatus
and faced with a "residual" CIA (i.e., the CIA today minus the DDI
and the NIOs) which reported around you in a line command sense
to either the NSC or the President. We doubt that the budgetary
authorities you would gain would compensate for the losses sustained
through your separation from the CIA and the end runs which would,
we think, occur with some regularity.
15. Thus, we return to the argument posed in the earlier paper,
that it is line command over the essential elements of the Community
which you need to do the job which others expect you to do. In this
connection, we might explore one further option. If it is clear
NE.
Approved For Release 2004/05/13 CIA-RDP91 M00696R000200010009-5
 that it
-'p c~~er20O1Lf~~CYI~~$11a1~~
be established, is it necessarily clear that it is the w o sou d
exercise this authority? Why not, for example, make the CIA responsible
to the Secretary of Defense and establish a position of Intelligence
Community czar within the Department of Defense? This solution is
conceptually the same as giving line authority over the Intelligence
Community to the DCI, and it would solve the Community management
problem analyzed in our earlier paper. This arrangement would have
the great strength of not provoking an enormous battle with the
Department of Defense. In avoiding that battle, however, we believe
that you would create several others which would be equally, if
not more, difficult. Perhaps the only issue on which almost any
Congressman (from conservative to liberal) will agree regarding
CIA is that it must be independent of the policy making apparatus
of the Government. A proposal to include CIA within the Department
of Defense would we think provoke a very strong and negative reaction.
In a large study of this question last year, we pursued this option
at some length and considered whether there might not be some arrangement
which would accommodate to those concerns. We considered, for example,
the idea that the DCI might be established as a statutory official
within the Department of Defense responsible for the management
of all intelligence including CIA and that in an arrangement similar
to the Joint Chiefs of Staff, he would be able to see the President
independently on substantive or other matters of concern. The concept
has a certain appeal and it would in fact solve a number of managerial
concerns. In the last analysis, however, we believe that the approach
is flawed. Customers in departments and agencies other than Department
of Defense would see such a move as a threat to the support which
they now receive. This would be particularly true in the case of
the Department of State. We doubt that a CIA lodged in the Department
of Defense could attract the quality of personnel it needs to do
its job, primarily because the intelligence profession must always
be viewed within Defense as sup ,port to the Department's primary
responsibility to guarantee the nation's military security. Despite
legal provisions guaranteeing the independence of the Director in
a substantive sense from the Secretary of Defense, we doubt such
independence could in fact be guaranteed or that others would believe
that it could.
16. We hope that this paper is helpful to you. We would be
happy to either pursue some of these ideas.further on paper or
explore them with you in another meeting. There may also be practical
problems on which you may like short papers. One of these might
be concerned with the management structure you might need to exercise
line control over. CIA, NSA and the NRO.
25X1
James U. 'raylgr
Comptroller
~ fir' .%"...~u
Approved For Release 2004 t'13'FAiRDP91 M00696R000200010009-5
 I OFFICIAL R, 'TING SLIP
Approved Foelease 2004/05/13 :CIA-RDP9
wt t3
-- NAME AND ADDRESS _
_DATE
INITIALS
5
6
AC'tlO i
131;ECT REPLY
PREPARE REPLY
APPROVAL
DISPATCH
RECONMENO.ATiOH
T
U'. N, ERT
FILE
RETURN
G>; A URREi1CE
1INFORNATWN
SIGNATURE
Attached is a copy of the final
paper which Mr. Knoche forwarded
to the DCI.
? RETURN TO SENDER
VOLD NE NO. DATE
Jame . a -.or, ec. AG 4/26/77
237 Use previous editions tirUSGPO: 197G-202.953 (40)
Fca -
1^aF, 71" 7
M 0606300010009-5
Approved For Release 2004/05/13 : CIA-RDP91 M00696R000200010009-5
 'TC.E AG:L,L~G '
Approved For lease 2QP /05/13: CIA-RDP91 M
~~ _or,r 1?R/4i /f
JI 4v-6 szll /, a 6" ~Iv
elLvw~ At OW4,11 xrt-~- -~I 9t ~r
06900200010009-5
Approved For Release 2004/05/13 : CIA-RDP91 M00696R000200010009-5
 Approved ForT elease 2004/05/13 : CIA-RDP91 M0069 00200010009-5
22 April 1977
Approved For Release 2004/Q~i, I9 $ ; `(3VA fDP91 M00696R000200010009-5
 Approved Fo!elease 2004/05/13 : CIA-RDP91 M006000200010009-5
Topic Page No.
Summary ......................................................>..
1
Basic Options and Recommendations ................................. 2
Reduction of Responsibilities ................................ 2-3
Increase in Budgetary Statutory Authority .................... 3
Budcetary and Line r4anagement Authority ...................... .3
The DCI and How He Got Ihere ...................................... 4-7
DCI - Powers and Responsibilities ................. ........... 7-9
DCI as the Intelligence Resources and Production Czar ............. 9--11.
The DCI and a Pine Tuning option Option.................................. 11-12
DCI with Line and Budgetary Control Over National Programs........ 12--14
New Management Problems ............................................. 14-15
Approved For Release 2004/05/ 4 CIA-RDP91 M00696R000200010009-5
 Approved Fo1"lelease 2004/05/13 : CIA-RDP91 M006000200010009-5
CIA VIE"iS ON THE FUTURE MANAGEMENT OF THE INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY
TO . Director of Central Intelligence
FEJM: Deputy Director of Central Intelligence
It seems evident to us that your role as DCI and the way in which
the Intelligence Community is managed are going to be altered, to
some extent, either by legislation or Executive Order. In the debate
over past problems and the discussion of new "guiding" principles that
are being advocated by the diverse interest groups involved in this
process, there is a real danger that too much attention may be diverted
from the basic issue. As one of the involved organizational interest
groups that will. be, perhaps, dramatically affected by organizational
changes, and because we were here and were a part of the process
that has shaped the DCI?s role, we wanted to present the problems
and issues as we understand them. We have not examined all possible
options, nor do we intend this paper to be considered as an alternative
to the PRRM-11 study. Our insights and analysis are based upon our
collective experience modified and sharpened by the clarity hindsight
always provides.
Su ri mar_y
In any discussion of the future management of the Intelligence
Community, the role of the DCI emerges as the central issue. Does
his authority allow him to carry out his job as the head of the
Intelligence Community in general and of the CIA in particular?
In our paper we have tried to define the DCI's responsibilities
and to balance them against his enabling authorities. We found
that there is a serious imbalance in the DCI's ability to manage
the resources of the major components of the National Foreign
Intelligence Program. While the DCI's responsibilities are clear,
it is just as apparent that he cannot be expected to improve signif i-
cantly the intelligence product by matching resources against national
Approved For Release 2004I11 ` : ~IA-RDP91 M00696R000200010009-5
 Approved ForlTelease 21004/0.5/13: CIA-RDP91 M00679 00p2010010009-5
intelligence requirements unless e as line commanr
budgetary authority over CCP1 NRP and CI11P. Nor can he ensure that
intelligence activities of the Community are compatible with the
Constitution and'Presidential policy guidance without real authority
over the Community. The process of logic, the experience of the
past several years, the evolutionary trend toward centralization
in the Community, and the demands of a changing world for improved
and-more responsive intelligence production capability have led us
to this conclusion.
Basic -Opt ions- and- Recommendati.ons
in the planning for the reorganization of the Intelligence
Community there is only one non-negotiable principle. The United States
must continue to have at least as effective an intelligence capability
as it has now. In our view there are two basic motivations which
should underlie proposals for basic change in the Intelligence
Community---a desire to improve the quality of the intelligence product
and to provide more efficient management. We and the Senate Select
Committee place more weight on the former; 0110 and the House Appropriations
Committee will probably focus on the latter; the President wants
and the country deserves both. For us, at least, the key question
is: How do we get better intelligence? Under any reorganization,
the head of U.S. Intelligence can only carry out. his responsibility
to protect and enhance the national security if he is given sufficient
and appropriate authority. He must be effectively supported by
an all-source production unit, an overseas oriented clandestine
collection capability with viable cover, innovative technical collection
capabilities in the SIGINT and reconnaissance areas, and such other
support units as may be required.
With FIRM 11, the question of whether to give to the DCI some-
what more authority, a lot more authority, or perhaps to abandon the
effort to weld the various intelligence components into an effective
community is once again the subject of heated debate. In the last
analysis, there are only three fundamental options, though there are
many detailed variations on these themes, and all focus on the central
issue in the current debate, your responsibilities and authorities.
Should the.DCI's -responsibilities -be reduced to those he can
handle under his present authorities? `[3i option would presumably
be based on a frank assessment that there is really no way to give
the DCI an effective role in the management of the Intelligence
Community, save that which he now has in the production world by
virtue of the 1947 Act, and thus that the sensible approach would be
to return to the basic arrangements which applied before the creation
Approved For Release 2004/ h-3.?! Cl R' DP91 M00696R000200010009-5
 Approved FoMelease 2004/05/13 : CIA-RDP91 M00 po 0200 10009-5
of a serious effort to dive the DCI budgetarya controback` lids for
Intelligence Community. It would however a step
those who regard ,effective central management of American intelligence
as important. Pursuing this approach would be an admission that
the Executive Branch cannot solve what many in the Community and
in the Congress consider an important management problem. We would
in fact be acknowledging that only the Conqress can cope with the
managerial and budgetary issues which arise between components within
the Intelligence Community.
that would happen if the DCI's statutory authority over the
Intelligence3'Community-budget or some significant part of. it was
increased? -iff vii q to the DCI real budgetary authority (in contrast
to what is now essentially a staff role with respect to preparation
of the Intelligence Community budget for the President) would greatly
increase his leverage and hence his ability to shape the Intelligence
Community. There is, however, a basic problem: Giving the DCI
statutory responsibility over budgetary matters outside CIA without
also giving him line management authority would mean that the Director
of NSA, the Director of the NRO, and possibly the directors of certain
other components of the Community (perhaps including CIA) would
have two bosses: one to whom they responded on general management
and policy issues, and one to whom they responded on issues having
to do with the budget. Such an arrangement would be awkward, to
say the least--both for program managers and for the DCI of the future.
Would an increase in the DCI's statutory budgetary authority.
and his line management authority over major parts of the Intelligence
Community be a wise choice? This is the classical solution for every
similar management problem: Make one man responsible for the management
of the whole enterprise and hold him accountable for doing a good
job. From the DCl's perspective, the most important parts of the Intelli-
gence Community not under his operational control are the Consolidated
Cryptologic Program (CCP) and the National Reconnaissance Program
(NRP). Removing the CCP and the NRP from the Department of Defense
may not be politically feasible. It is, however, workable if approached
with a spirit of trust, cooperation, and institutional responsiveness
to military requirements, and it could provide unified command over
all national intelligence activities and ensure increased efficiency
and coordination of national intelligence programs.
We believe it is line management authority over important
elements of the Intelligence Community which the DC-1 needs to do the
job which many expect him to do. But let us take you through the
reasoning that led us in CIA. to recommend this choice instead of
a more evolutionary approach.
f? 4
Approved For Release 2004/05~ bi RDP91 M00696R000200010009-5
 Approved For Rayease 2004/05/13: CIA-RDP91 M00696WO 0200010009-5
The DCI and How He Got There
CIA was established by the National Security Act of 1947.
For approximately the first 20 years of its existence the DCI functioned
effectively as the head of the CIA, Few within the Executive Branch
or in the Congress paid much serious attention to the Intelligence
Community as a community or to the Dr-I as head of that Community.
CIA existedin some isolation, certainly in comparison with today,
from its partners in the intelligence process and tended to see
itself as an elite organization somewhat aloof from others in the
Community. At the same time, until relatively recently, CIA functioned
in a highly decentralized way with real operating authority largely
delegated to the four line Deputy Directors and with DCls who selected
those issues of interest to them and pursued them inside and outside
the Agency but who generally did not consider themselves as managers
of the whole of CIA.
Both of these characteristics of CIA during this period
flourished because the President, the Congress, and the public had
relatively low levels of interest in CIA and because the Agency's
goals and methods, to the extent they were understood, enjoyed wide
public and Government support.
During the late 1960s and early 1970s a number of developments
began to call into question these relatively well established patterns.
Growing public disaffection over the U.S. Government role in Southeast.
Asia and the Agency's prominent part in it promised eventually to
create an atmosphere of massive public mistrust of. Governmental
decisions made in secret and to call into question much that CIA
did. Watergate clearly contributed to public perceptions about
the need for secrecy in Government and raised troubling questions
for many components of the Intelligence Corry unity who were sometimes
accused of operating secretly only to conceal embarrassing mistakes.
In that explosive atmosphere a New York Times story on alleged abuses
by CIA during the 1960s generated-a very 'vigorous move by both houses.
of the Congress to examine in great detail what had previously been
largely ignored or accepted in many cases (though not always) as
normal and acceptable.
In retrospect, another important development occurred during
this period and continues to affect us very much today: the 1971 study
of the Intelligence Community carried out at. 0MB by Jim Schlesinger,
later to become DCI. Broadly, the study asserted that the Director
should be an effective head of the whole Intelligence Community
and argued that the lack of leadership within the Community had pro-
duced a serious management problem which needed attention.
Dr. Schlesinger observed that the lack of leadership over the whole
Approved For Release 2004/05/13 CIA-RDP91 M00696R000200010009-5
 ?0A.yCWFW_ 94ypp1~ ~ 09-5
Cnmmunit4I i vg4 CF c @ *P_,44R
of the Community led to duplication of effort and waste, and lowered
the auality of the product.. Dr.. Schlesinger recommended the creation
of the Intelligence Community Staff and broader involvement of the
DCI in the Community resource review function.
Public attitudes arising from the O.S. Government's conduct
of the Vietnam War, the Watergate situation, critical internal Executive
Branch looks at Intelligence Community management, and the investigations
by Congress--far from assuring the public and the nation's leadership
that intelligence was effectively managed and under adequate oversight
review-have so far led instead to continuing examination of the
problem. Today it seems clear that the Executive Order issued by
President Ford last year, a serious effort to establish workable
mechanisms to cope with many of the problems identified in recent
years, was only an interim step in the further definition and solution
of a larger problem.
Working within the existing framework of legal authorities
which give the Department of Defense legal responsibility for the
conduct of some 80 percent of the Intelligence Community program
(in budget terms) and the Director of Central Intelligence direct
authority for only 20 percent of the program, Executive Order 11905
further codified the broad consensus which has emerged in recent
years that someone should be in charge of the Intelligence Community,
and that "that" someone was the DCI. On the other hand, because
existing authorities did not permit giving legal authority for all
aspects of the Community to the DCI, the framers of the Executive
Order adopted a collegial management arrangement in which the Director
would attempt to control the budget process as a first among equals,
and the White House itself would assume some responsibility for
the control of possible impropriety through the establishment of
an Intelligence Oversight Board.
in assigning more and more responsibility to the DCI for Co-n-
rnunity management, however, both the Schlesinger report and the Executive
Order made it more and more difficult for the DCI to function as the
head of CIA. The Executive Order implicitly recognized this when
it stated that the Deputy Director of Central Intelligence should
be responsible for the day-to-day management of CIA.
Pushed towards responsibility for the whole Community,
but lacking the legal authority to assume that responsibility and
very mindful of strong Presidential and Congressional desires
, Directors have taken. advantage osuch
that they assume leadership L
mechanisms as are available to them to lead without a clear basis
S CSI`
Approved For Release 2004/05/13 : CIA-RDP91 M00696R000200010009-5
 in statut rouekl l s& 1O P1.3 : &A 2bF 1%M6-64 ( 1 09-5
within CIA, where there is a widely-held perception that recent
DCIs have bent over backwards to cooperate with other elements of
the Intelligence,Community, sometimes at the expense of CIA, in
order to preserve their ability to carry out their Community leadership
role. Within existing legal authorities, it is easy to see why
this perception would exist. Many are aware that the fabric which
knits together the Intelligence Community is extremely frail, that
it depends heavily on personal not institutional arrangements and
authorities, and that serious problems which pit one component of
the Community against another must be avoided at any reasonable
cost in order to preserve the fabric of the Community and the DCI's
ability to function as its leader.
`.there is another problem which was caused by the collegial
arrangements created by the Executive Order. As the CFI (now the PRC)
has evolved, it is increasingly clear to many members of the Intelli-
gence Community that individual components need to take steps to help
insure that the PRC principals are adequately informed in detail
on the issues presented. This has produced pressures on individual
Community components, like CIA, to inform a wider audience than
ever before of the need for decisions on programs which go to the
PRC for approval and--in effect--to be as responsive as possible
to demands for information in order to assure that the "right"
decisions are made. Because it has been physically difficult to
get busy PRC principals together for meetings--and because the more
widely based the decision--making process becomes, the more necessary
time-consuming prior coordination and information sharing becomes--there
has been in the minds of many within CIA a general degradation of
the quality, crispness, and security of the decision-making process.
Similarly, increasing outside demands for information about
the Intelligence Community and CIA have created internal pressures
for centralization of certain kinds of decision making, certainly
in the Community as a whole, but also within CIA. As people outside -
the Community ask increasingly informed and penetrating questions
about individual programs which relate or appear to relate to other
parts of the Intelligence Community, there is an increasing need for
centralization of decision making to insure that the Community has
properly coordinated itself before it is subject to such probing.
Similarly, within CIT historic decentralized patterns of management
have been changing rapidly to accommodate to these outside pressures.
A CIA case in point: The 0 agent satellite was lost to Congress
in its consideration of the 1977 Budget largely because of outside
perceptions that the Science and Technology Directorate was building
a satellite which the Operations Directorate was not convinced it
Approved For Release 2004/05/13 : CIA-RDP91 M00696R000200010009-5
 ,~ppppro -@
needed. '.l't 1?Sr,vR8Jr C3LTL.7~7E. ( ~7 yt2'C1nlIRPx,i'"J`V1?`c @@QQ(t0 45
consideration of many problems. In the not too distant past, this
was only rarely required and hence all too often not pursued.
While the Executive Branch and the Congress were in effect
telling the Director to assume more and more responsibility within the
Co,rmunity but failing to give him the necessary authority to do
so; Congressional interest, growing out of the investigations, in
control and oversight has been working simultaneously to enhance
accountability not only over CIA but over other parts of the Community
as well. As this process has broadened and deepened, however, CIA
has perceived its past flexibility--the very thing which made it
different and better in the eyes of its own employees----as diminished.
In recognizing. that the DCI was becoming more and more
a Community creature and less and less a Director of CIA, the
Executive Order wisely noted that the Deputy Director should assume
the CIA leadership role. However, the DDCI is the only "program
manager" within the Intelligence Community who works directly for the
DCI. Because of this unique relationship, it is awkward for him to
push aggressively for the interests of CIA during a jurisdictional
or resource allocation dispute with another "program manager."
`the DDCI, therefore, is different from other managers who can exercise
lesser restraint and who have another appeal route through their
line command organizations. The problem becomes particularly acute
when the DDCI is aware that in pushing his own Agency's interests
he may put the Director in a position which threatens the frail
arrangements he has for coordination in the entire Coimmuni.ty. This
problem is but a symptom of the larger management problem referred
to, namely, the Director's lack of authority over the entire Community
to cone with the responsibilities which others expect him to carry
out.
In sum then, for a variety of reasons, as many have demanded
that the DCI assume a larger Community role, the arrangements under
which he has been forced to do so have made it increasingly difficult
for CIA. This should not be construed as an argument for a return
to the halcyon days of the 1960s. It seems clear enough that the
demands for leadership of the Community require attention instead to
a firmer articulation in law of the Director's responsibilities
and-authorities for the whole Community or a substantial part of it.
The DCI-- Powers and Responsibilities
DCI responsibilities within the Community now appear to fall
into two categories; those for which he has adequate real authority
r
EC
S _
Approved For Release 2004/05/13 : CIA-RDP91 M00696R000200010009-5
 Q0 0 0
Approved For` ""lease Q4/05/13 ? CIA-RDP91 M s
220p
accepted by most in the Intell igence Co:rmunlty an y . .e
does not. Basically, we believe the DCI has adequate authority or status
to fulfill the following responsibilities:
-Advisor to the President and the NSC;
-Collation and production of national level intelligence
for civilian and military needs;
?--Covert action;
-Control of intelligence related liaison with foreign
governments, and protection of sources and methods,
(within CIi,though probably not in the Community as
a whole).
At the present time we believe the DCI lacks the necessary authority
to carry out these responsibilities well:
-Management of intelligence community resources;
?---Warning and crises reporting;
-Coordination of counterintelligence activities;
~- 1Zepresentation of the Intelligence Community before
Congress;
--Coordination of Community collection resources;
w.~ztequirements and collection guidance direction for the
Community;
--Evaluation of the effectiveness of national intelligence
programs and ensuring that intelligence activities are
compatible with our democratic system and policy objectives.
The nation and the Intelligence Community have lived with this
situation for some time now and may be able to make do for some
years while we wait for the evolutionary process to centralize
the necessary enabling authority in the Office of the Director.
Pour separate but interrelated forces, however, appear to be working
against the evolutionary process as a solution.
The pace of centralization in the Intelligence Community is
being encouraged by advancing technology involving more complex
Approved For Release 2004/054`:0IA?F2lP91 M00696R000200010009-5
 Approved For lease 2Q04105113 CIA-RDP91 M0069b`Il OOi20t0010009-5
opposing weapons systems, nuc ear pro].iteration, near r.ea time collection
systems, and the increasing need for centralized integrated data processing
techniques that are necessary to enhance our warning and crisis reporting.
The growth of the Director's Community role is being accelerated
by the desire of both Congress and the President to achieve Government
efficiency through streamlining and reorganization, as well as post-Watergate
legislative efforts to make the Intelligence Community more accountable
to Congress and our democratic system. Finally, the diminishing
availability of real dollars for intelligence purposes also argues
-persuasively for centralized management in order to ensure the most effec-
tive use of resources to meet the intelligence requirements of the consumer.
The DCI-as the IntelligenceYResources -and Production-Czar
There are basic variations in the organizational structure
that would strengthen the DCI's role as the head of the Intelligence
Community. The DCI, as the SSCI Bill suggests, could be given budge-
tary authority over all the Intelligence Community or major parts of
it. This would mean that all funds would be allocated to the DCI for
disbursal to the separate components of the intelligence Community.
The DCI would then have a strong resource tool that he could use to
exert influence over the Intelligence Community. But what would the
Community look like and, if this approach were pursued, in particular,
what would happen to the DCI's position as the head of the Community?
To enhance his role as the President's Intelligence Resources Czar
and principal foreign intelligence advisor, the DCI probably should
move his office to a central location physically near the President.
His status in the Community would be increased by proximity to the
President and the move would further demonstrate that the role of
the DCI was, in fact, changed. To assure others in the Community and
elsewhere of his objectivity, it would also be necessary to separate
the DCI from his line control over the CIA. Physically and logistically
detached from CIA, however, the DCI would need either to take part of
CIA with him or to create a new staff to assist him in carrying his
dual role as the President's principal intelligence advisor and the
Exchequer of the Intelligence Community. The latter function could
be handled by the existing IC Staff organization though it would
probably be reorganized somewhat to deal with its responsibili-
ties in a new context. The more detailed the use of his budgetary
authority, the larger the DCI's staff would have to be.
The staff he uses to support him in his role as the President's
intelligence advisor would also be dependent upon the depth of his
attention to the production process. The DCI may elect to use a small
staff like that of the National Intelligence Officers to oversee the
Approved For Release 2004/ a DP91 M00696R000200010009-5
 nce and t.a
oroductionApbr l P 1966 1~ . 5Fi4= 10009-5
provide substantive support or I Presic' `~:.
Alternatively, he could co-opt the entire Directorate of Intelligence
and exercise direct control over the production mechanism, probably
blending the NIOs into the DDI or vice versa to create an integrated
national production unit. ri'he DDI could report directly to the DCI
but. should probably continue to be physically housed at CIA Headquarters.
Thus, under this arrangement, the DCI and the IC Staff would be located
downtown while the DDI would remain in the CIA headquarters building.
The DCI would exercise line control over t1he IC Staff and the DDI.
CIA would be reconstituted as a new organization containing what is
now the DDO, the DDS&T, and the DDA and would continue to report to
the NSC for policy control and guidance. Similarly, the NRP and the
CCP program managers would continue to report to the Secretary of
Defense on all but resource matters.
The DCI would now have the organization and the statutory author-
ity to advise the President and to control the financial resources of
the Community. He still, however, faces some formidable problems.
While he exercises budget and fiscal control over the Community,
he has line control only over the intelligence production component.
The "collectors" report to different masters for command direction.
Lack of line control over the major collectors would seem. to limit
the DCI's ability to make the collection mechanism more responsive
to his national intelligence requirements and, in the last analysis,
to focus the collection effort in support of the production process.
Our experience with the budgetary influence the DCI was able
to exert over the Intelligence Community through the mechanism
of the PPC has indicated that the purse string can be used effectively
generally to influence or to coordinate national programs over a two
or three--year-period of time. By itself, however, the budgetary
process is not sufficient to carry out all the basic responsibilities
that we have listed above. For years, although 0.10 has had budgetary_
control over. Government departments and agencies, it has not been
able to use this Hower to exert the kind of direction over them 0MB
believes is desirable. The budgetary process can be used much more
effectively negatively than it can positively. With this power you
can exercise a slow veto over programs you wish to terminate but it
is difficult to exercise bold initiatives or to explore new and
imaginative programs solely through the control of funds in a long
budget cycle. Instead a DCI needs to have the major collection
systems immediately responsive to the requirements of his production
organization. Over time it has become clear that some of these
systems, particularly those in NSA, are in real life somewhat less
I-A
Approved For Release 2004/05/13 : CIA-RDP91 M00696R000200010009-5
 than resp zn~~33 jj--~ z of m can onl 9-5
be brought o respond t~roug cum ersome,
and time-consuming collegial procedures. Moreover, the lack of cen-
tral authority has meant that the case for the development of certain
collection capabilities clearly needed to solve important analytic
probl ms has not been effectively made either to Congress or to the
OMB. the contemplated follow-on tol :is a particular
case in point
In summary, the DCI as Resources and Production Czar, measured
against the yardstick of responsibilities vs. authorities, has signif-
icant problems. He does not have command authority over covert action
programs, community collection resources and intelligence--related
liaison with foreign governments. Thus, his ability to represent
the Intelligence Community before Congress, to make collection systems
more responsive to the national intelligence production process with
the ultimate aim of improving the final product, and to ensure that
intelligence activities are compatible with policy guidelines and
our democratic system, appears to be handicapped. In fact, the DCI,
even with vastly increased budget and fiscal authority, still cannot
balance his responsibilities with enabling authorities. Separating
the DCI from CIA, his sole power base, without giving him broader
command powers could result in less coordination of collection
activities and a larger gap between collection and production with
a resulting diminution of our national intelligence product.
The DCI and A-Fine Tuning Option
Before going on to an option that gives the DCI both line and
budgetary corinnand over the Intelligence Community, let us examine
what could be done to change the status quo enough to improve the
national intelligence product and to meet the desires of the
President and-the Congress. Some have suggested that the DCI could
maintain control over CIA and use somewhat increased budgetary a.uthor-
ity to manage the Intelligence Community. Depending upon the extent
to which his present budgetary powers are increased, this option,
from an internal CIA view, could be called "fine tuning." For example,
the DCI could be given the budget preparation powers he now must exercise
in a collegial context within the PRC. He could, under this arrangement
prepare the entire budget of the Intelligence Community for submission
to OM and exercise reprogramming powers without the need for con-
currence from State or DOD. This is a significant step short of the
management responsibilities under the Czar option, as the DCI would not
be responsible for administering the budget after Congress had acted to
appropriate funds except in the area of reprogramming. This option
increases the DCI's ability to use the budget tool: to manage the
25X1
D CT
Approved For Release 2004/05/13 CIA-RDP91 M00696R000200010009-5
 Approved le s ff 4/O.W13 : cdI j $ PP8jQ@09
Intelligence Commun nity g a s art -5
imaginative leadership over the Community, for the budget tool is
too cumbersome a mechanism to use to stimulate the Community to
develop imaginative and resourceful approaches to meet future demands
for an improved intelligence product.
If we increase the DCI's budgetary authority, as stated in
the- SSCI Bill, we significantly increase his authority over the
Intelligence Community, as he is now responsible for disbursing the
funds allocated to him throughout the Community. Giving this power
to a DCI who has also maintained his control over CIA goes far
beyond what could be titled a "fine tuning" option. Moreover, it
is doubtful that the rest of the Intelligence Community, irrespective
of the extent of his budgetary authority, would readily accept a DCI
as the head of the Community who had not separated himself from
CIA.
Under this option the DCI would control the production of
national intelligence and maintain his command over CIA and the
Community's clandestine collection and covert action capability.
He still would have difficulty, however, in representing the Intelli-
gence Community before Congress and in directing the collection
resources of the NRO and NSA. While his direct influence over
the Intelligence Community would not be improved to the point
that he is capable of meeting all his responsibilities, he would
not lose the ground he would lose in the Czar option essentially
because he could retain his direct control over CIA. Improvement
in the responsiveness of collection agencies to the requirement
of the national intelligence process, provision of an effective
oversight authority for the Community, and an increase in efficiency
from a more centralized management authority would have to await
for a further. development of the evolution process.
The DCI with-Line'and Budgetary Authority over National -Proqrc-u-ns
11be Czar and "fine tuning" roles for the UCI outlined above, both
in varying degrees, meet two tests of the DCI's requirement for suffi-
cient authority to manage the Intelligence Community efficiently, and
thereby improving the intelligence product. First, he would directly
control the production and analysis of national intelligence. Secondly,
he would have the budgetary authority that is an essential part v ofhim
give
any management system. Neither of these two roles, however,
the ability to integrate the collection and production elements of the
Intelligence Community. It is difficult to see how the intelligence
product can be significantly improved without the ability to orchestrate
Approved For Release 2004/053 :'CIA `RbP91 M00696R000200010009-5
 collections stem a~ production components. Budge' y powers are
irther ti AP rto ~~a 2 9 1 l c I eRQP ~OB69~' O 2O Oi B> J15
the DCI's personal relationship with national program managers as a
management device when critical issues are at stake is not likely
to prove any more effective in the future than it has in the past.
Following this chain of reasoning leads to the conclusion that the
DCI should have as much authority over the other two major national
programs as he does over CIA.
hasize the DCI's role as the President's substantive
em
f
p
e
I w
intelligence advisor, that in turn requires that the DCI have an
independent intelligence production capability under his control, and
the time to shape its output to meet presidential and other national
remirements. Such a DCI cannot spend the bulk of his time either
on management and resource problems or on fighting fixes stirred
up by the Congress, the press, and the Department of Justice.
A DCI with a relatively small staff could have under him three
statutorily established separate agencies. Their directors would
report to him and their budgets would be allocated to him. But under
authority delegated by the DCI their directors would be responsible
for the management and administration of their agencies. The
Directorate for Intelligence would remain within the CIA for pur-
poses of management and administration, but the Deputy Director for
Intelligence would report directly to the DCI on substantive matters.
Undoubtedly this arrangment would create some management difficulties
for the new Director of CIA. Given line and budget control over CIA,
CCP and the NPP, which use 80 percent of the dollars and 75 percent of
the manpower, the DCI would be able to balance his ledger of responsibilities
and authorities. The foreign intelligence units of the Community repre-
sented by State/INR, DIA, intelligence arms of the uniformed services,
ERDA, FBI and Treasury fulfill important departmental needs. But their
programs are small and little, if any, increases in either efficiency or
monetary savings could be expected to accrue from centralized management.
Thus we would not include these programs within the DCI'S direct purview.
in addition to the expected benefits to be gained from a unified command
structure, DCI line and budgetary control over the national intelli-
gence programs would meet the major concerns of the Congress and
accorrolish a balanced authority for the centralization and the
accountability of the Intelligence Community without destroying
the opportunity for dissent from departmental units.
Such a solution would create a DCI not overly burdened with
management. He would have capabilities for intelligence production
under his direct control and the authorities necessary to ensure that
collection served those capabilities properly. It would preserve
Approved For Release 2004/05/13 : CIA-RDP91 M00696R000200010009-5
 the inteclARV4 kIR tW2994 13bp gVP$-'1iM@O6 d00b2ODd':W09-5
And, because in this first stage the NP.P and CCP would remain separate,
it would be reversible, either if the arrangement proved a failure
or in the event of war. This last would make it at least marginally
more palatable to the DOD. Moreover, it is a real change, and one
that should satisfy the President's desire for centralized authority.
It would not go as far toward efficient centralized management as
the DCI's power would allow but the preservation of the unique quali--
ties and strengths of CIA seem to us worth this cost. Overall, it
would place relatively more weight on the DCI as substantive adviser
to the President and relatively less on the DCI as administrator.
At a later stage, after the dust had settled and after the DOD was
persuaded that the detachment of the CCP and NRP had been accomplished
without reducing the intelligence support afforded to it, rationali-
zation of the various collection capabilities under the DCI might
be undertaken.
This option presents the greatest potential for a signicant in-
crease in the ability of the Intelligence Community to collect, analyze
and disseminate national intelligence. It also contains the danger of
leading to a considerable decrease in our present capability because
of the possible weakening of CIA through the separation of the DCI.
Which of these two diverging paths the future holds seems to be largely
dependent upon the managerial ability of the DCI, the Director of. CIA,
and the organizational structure that they must work within. To begin
with, some of the most troublesome problems of the past would no longer
have any relevance. There would be no controversy over who produces
national intelligence. Similarly, the argument that the DCI, whatever
you call him, is still the Director of CIA first and foremost, would
lose credibility as the Director of CIA and the program managers of the
CCP and NRP would have the same leader. Disputes among these giants of
the Community would have the same forum for argument, the same route
for appeal and the same judge for decisions. CIA's special relationship
with the DCI would no longer detract from the DCI's credibility in
the Community as a dispensor of resources and an arbiter of disputes.-
New Management Problems
Nevertheless, a very real jurisdictional conflict remains. The
benefits of granting the DCI line command and budgetary control over
such major parts of the Intelligence Community must be balanced by
the immediate management problems that he would have as a result
of his increased authority. Given time, good will and a pragmatic
approach your new challenges appear manageable. First we should
Approved For Release 2004/05/13 : CIA-RDP91 M00696R000200010009-5
 r ecognizeA bvb
gence programs that is necessary to carry out your responsibilities,
we have in turn increased the Secretary of Defense's concern that
the tactical requirements of the Services will not receive adequate
attention. This is an essential. point and the very real concerns
of. DOD must be satisfied. Some of the collection capability of the
CCP and NRP is tactical by any definition and it may be wise to trans-
fer the clearly tactical portions of these national intelligence pro-
grams to the DOD. This could take place over a period of time to
avoid the disruption that would be caused by an abrupt shift. Even
with a DOD tactical intelligence collection capability and the best
of intent, there would be areas of real disagreement between DOD
and the DCI over what portion of national intelligence resources
should be used to satisfy DOD requirements. The command relation--
ship between the DCI and the NSC and the strong DOD position on
the NSC should provide the Secretary and the Joint Chiefs with both
an adequate appeal mechanism'and a forum to bring pressure on the
DCI to be more responsible. An NSC committee chaired by the President's
Assistant for National Security Affairs with clear policy guidance
jurisdiction over the DCI and his national. foreign intelligence
programs could lessen DOD concern on this issue. The war and peace
resource control controversy is also an integral part of the DCI's
inter-relationship with the Secretary of Defense. An arrangement that
assured DOD that their wartime intelligence needs would be accommodated
could also alleviate further their concern over the loss of DOD
command control over CCP and NRP. Some parts of the General Defense
Intelligence Program are concerned with strategic intelligence of
national interest and could be examined on a case-by-case basis to
see if they should be included under the DCI's authority over
national intelligence programs.
Whatever shape the reorganization of the Intelligence Community
takes and however the scope of your role is defined, the DCI should
establish the capability to make significant internal realignments
of national intelligence elements and committees under his command
in the coming years.
Approved For Release 2004/05/f3-: Cliff- P91 M00696R000200010009-5