THE MANAGEMENT OF NATIONAL PRODUCTION

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP91M00696R000200020043-6
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 13
• Document Creation Date: December 15, 2016
• Document Release Date: April 21, 2004
• Sequence Number: 43
• Publication Date: May 6, 1976
• Content Type: MF

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6 May 1976
MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence
FROM E. H. Knoche
George A. Carver, Jr.
SUBJECT The Management of National Production
The following proposal for the management of non-
current national production has been developed jointly
by Messrs. Knoche and Carver and reviewed with Admiral
Murphy. It reflects an approach on which all three
of these officers agree and which they feel will take
care of your concerns about present arrangements while
preserving and improving a flexible instrument de-
signed to help you discharge what are among your most
important responsibilities: being the substantive
fount of national intelligence.
1. Organizational Location: The entity managing
national non-current productions will be part of the
Office of the Director of Central Intelligence, re-
porting directly to and being supervised directly by
him. This entity and its head, however,"will have to
work continuously in close, cooperative concert with
your Agency Deputy, your Community Deputy and their
respective subordinates.
2. The Basic Building Block --- National' 'Intelli--
gence OffIcers: The basic conceptual building block
of the new entity will be that of the National In-
telligence Officers, essentially as they are now
constituted but with some adaptation and modification.
a. Each NIO will be a senior staff officer
(slotted at the GS-18 level or military
equivalent) who will serve the DCI directly
and speak in his name as his senior coun-
sellor on that NIO's area of substantive
responsibility.
-- The mix of NIOs will be 'flexibly "adjust-
able in accordance with-the DCI's wishes.
The number of NIOs and the apportionment
of portfolios among them will depend on
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your perception of the DCI's needs and
your concept -- at any given time -- of
what are the major areas of substantive
responsibility (functional or geographic)
for which you want the support of a desig-
nated NIO.
The NIOs will be used as a device to knit
the Community together and also to bring
in fresh thinking from outside the Com-
munity plus, where possible, outside the
government. They will be drawn as much
as possible from throughout the entire
Intelligence Community, plus non-intel-
ligence government components and, where
feasible, the non-governmental world. In
principle, NIO assignments will be rota-
tional ones of two to three-year duration.
The NIOs will not constitute a separate
production office (see below). Each of
them will serve you as an advisor in his
or her specialty and as a coordinator who,
acting on your behalf, can focus the re-
sources of the entire Community on par-
ticular problems of major substantive
importance.
To minimize the risk of bureaucratic lay-
ering, each NIO will -- in principle --
be limited to one Assistant (at the GS-
15/16 level or military equivalent) and
one secretary. This rule might be adjusted
in certain individual accounts, but the
reasons for giving an NIO more than one
Assistant would have to be exceptional and
doing so would require your personal approval,
b. The NIO structure will have a small editorial
staff (three to five people) to assist in
maintaining the quality of output.
c. The NIO structure would also have a small
reproduction facility to maintain flexibility
and capacity to cope with requirements as
they arise without unduly burdening the
Agency's publications components.
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d. The NIO structure will be headed by a senior
officer, who will have no other duties and
who has your personal trust and confidence.
In effect, he will be your deputy for national
intelligence, though for any of a variety of
reasons -- cosmetic, political or other --
you may care to give him some different
title. He will report directly to you in
the sense that he will not be subordinate
to either of your two principal Deputies.
(Should you develop the Chief of Staff con-
cept, the ground rules for relations between
the head of the NIO structure, the Chief of
Staff and you yourself can be worked out at
that time.) The head of the NIO structure
will be accountable to you for the total
work of that structure and the total qual-
ity of its performance. He will also be
responsible for ensuring that, at any given
time, the totality of requests for intelli-
gence support levied on the intelligence
community by policy level consumers through
this structure do not overburden the system
(thus inhibiting the effectiveness of its
responses). When circuits are in danger of-
becoming overloaded, he will raise this
problem directly with requesting consumers
(or ensure that it is so raised) and endeavor
to get them to refine their requests or put
them in some priority order, advising you of
the problems involved as appropriate and en-
listing your help when necessary.
3. Responsibilities: The NIO structure will be
responsible and accountable to the DCI for:
a. The management of non-current national
production including:
-- Formal National Intelligence Estimates
and Special National Intelligence Es-
timates
-- National Intelligence Analytical
Memoranda
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Interagency Intelligence memoranda
and studies
-- Intelligence Alert Memoranda
-- Other analyses and assessments of varying
degrees of formality requested by senior
consumers -- or commissioned to fill an
obvious need which the consumers them-
selves might not clearly perceive -- whose
preparation involves the work of more
than one component of the Intelligence
Community.
b. Supervising the preparation of the DCI's
substantive briefings to senior Executive
Branch bodies (e.g.-, the National Security
Council and its major subcommittees such as
the Washington Special Action Group) and
his substantive briefings to various Con-
gressional committees.
c. Providing a coordinating mechanism, operating
in the DCI's name and on his behalf, to focus
the talents and resources of all Community
components involved on problems of particular
importance, e.g., the work on Soviet collec-
tion now done'by the NIO for Special Activities.
d. Maintaining continual dialogue with senior
consumers'at the Assistant Secretary level
or above, or their military equivalents, to
ensure that their needs are identified, that
they receive the best intelligence support
obtainable to assist them in their policy
duties, and to provide a channel for continuous
feedback and two-way communication on intel-
ligence matters. This responsibility will
also entail the service function (in each
major substantive area) of giving the policy
level consumer one point of contact to which
he can turn for any form of intelligence
support, knowing that his request will be
brokered to those elements of the Community
best equipped to handle it.
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e. Within the Intelligence Community, develop-
ing and maintaining continuous interaction
and dialogue among all who work on any given
substantive area -- collectors, analysts
and producers ---- so that they can get to know
each other and all can benefit from the con-
tributions of their colleagues.
f. In the DCI's name, maintaining contact with
knowledgeable experts outside the government
in each major substantive area to improve the
flow of ideas and ensure that intelligence
production benefits from the best analyses
and thinking attainable anywhere within the
United States.
g. Developing major substantive requirements
through the operation of the substantive
aspects of the Key Intelligence Question
mechanism or whatever modified successor to
that approach is endorsed by the present
DCI. (In this sphere, and related areas,
the NIOs will work closely with your Com-
munity Deputy and the latter's staff as
outlined in paragraph 9 below.)
h. Performing any other services the DCI wants
them to perform, such as giving him an inde-
pendent appraisal of the probable risks, bene-
fits and chances of success of covert action.
proposals.
4. Production Mechanism:
a. Except in rare instances, the NIOs would not
function as a production office* and the NIO
structure would not include a drafting staff.
There could be (and have been) occasional instances
where, on matters of great sensitivity, some senior
official such as the President or his Assistant for
National Security Affairs might want a substantive
comment quietly prepared by only one person.
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would be done by line officers drawn from
the Community component or components best
equipped to handle the particular project
in question.*
c. The-drafting of national products would be
done- under- the supervision bf -the NIO respori- -
sible for the project in question., The
draft produced would not be viewed as an
institutional product, i.e., neither the
office nor the component to which the
drafter(s) belong would be bound by the draft
or obligated to support it during the coordina-
tion process.
d. After a draft has teen produced and reviewed
(see paragraph 5 below), it would be submitted
to concerned line components for coordination
and discussion. The precise nature. of these
coordination procedures would vary with the
formality of the document ---- NIEs and SNIEs
being the most formal. In every .instance,
however, line entities would have ample op-
portunity to express their views during the
coordination process and the'NIO responsible
would be under an obligation to ensure that
the final product. fairly reflected signifi--?
cant" differences' of judgmental opinion wheni
.rid _where - these 'occurred. *'~
-- -
The procedure-s..for.minimizing the disruption of line
offices' work and erosion of Zine command jurisdic-
tion entailed by this approach are outlined in para-
graph 6.
Coordination between and among Intelligence Community
components is an essential feature of the production -
of truly national products. The concept of coordination
operative here, however, does not involve the develop-
ment of consensus -- lowest common demoninator -- judg-
ments.. Divergent views will be submitted, as they :should
be, to the clash of debate and argument among knowledge-
able experts, but where significant differences of in-
formed opinion remained unresolved on important issues,
these differences will be clearly, even sharply, re-
flected in the final finished products so that policy
level consumers -can know that there are such differences,
what they are, and what are their bases.
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5. Collegial Review (The Intelligence Advisory Panel):
One criticism of the current approach has been that national
products do not, at any stage in their production, for-
mally receive collegial scrutiny and review. This defi-
ciency will be rectified by the following steps:
a. The creation of an Intelligence Advisory
Panel to the DCI. This Panel will consist
of approximately three dozen people of extra-
ordinary competence in key substantive areas,
who are also articulate, logical and generally
insightful. The members of this Panel would
be drawn from within the intelligence Commu-
nity, the non-intelligence components of the
government, and -- to the extent feasible ---
the outside world:- academia, industry, and
even (if possible) the world of journalism.
b. The optimum point in the production process
for collegial review is after the basic draft
is prepared and before it is circulated for
coordination. Consequently, on each NIE/
SNIE or other significant national product
(unless deadlines make this absolutely im-
possible), three people will be picked from
the Intelligence Advisory Panel to go over
that particular product at that stage in its
production.*
-- Arrangements will be made for the Panel
members to have copies of the draft in
sufficient time to go over them thoroughly
in private.
Normally at least two of the three members of the Panel
convened to review a particular paper (national product)
will not be specialists in the subjects addressed in
that paper. For example, an optimum panel to critique
an estimate on German political developments would in-
.elude a Sovietologist and an Economist -- plus, perhaps,
a Far Eastern expert, who could subject it to critical
scrutiny from the standpoint of a sophisticated out-
sider.
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After that, the three Panel members in-
volved will meet in Washington and spend
whatever time is necessary -- usually a
day -- going over the draft of the national
product with the NIO (and his/her Assistant),
the project chairman and the drafters.
They will critique the draft for adequacy,
balance, objectivity, coherence and overall
quality, ensuring that it addresses the
right questions, is clear, is cogent, and
takes proper account of ancillary issues
and critical variables.
-- Membership on the Intelligence Advisory
Panel would not entail a large expenditure
of time over a prolonged period, but it
would entail a willingness to work in-
tensively for periods of short duration.'
The reason for having a Panel of approxi-
mately three dozen is to ensure that on
any given national product, one could
select three good reviewers appropriate
to that particular project.
c. The Intelligence Advisory Panel will not
only provide a mechanism for the most useful
kind of collegial review; it can also serve
as a vehicle for giving the DCI advice on
the overall quality of the national produc-
tion effort and engaging in that effort the
best talent available in the United States.
While the Panel would seldom, if ever, meet
as a whole (except, perhaps, for an occa-
sional ceremonial dinner), various members
of it could and would be convened to parti-
cipate in seminars or discussion groups
critiquing the totality of our effort in
various fields (as well as serving on
troikas specifically reviewing specific
papers).
d. Though the panel would be advisory to
the DCI, its normal point of contact
with the- DCI's office would be the
head of the NIO structure. The latter,
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in turn, would need a full-time special
assistant (who could be styled the
Panel's Executive Secretary) who would
handle the details involved.
6. The Minimization of Line Disru Lion: Since
the NIO structure will not have its own independent
drafting staff and, hence, will be forced to borrow
talent from line components, some intrusion on line
offices is inevitable. The amount of this intrusion,
however, can be minimized by the following steps:
a. There will be created a steering
group consisting of the head of the
NIO structure and the heads of the
major production components of the
Intelligence Community (or their
designees). This group will meet
regularly to review the totality
of the national production effort
and ensure that the workload in-
volved is properly and fairly
.distributed. This group -- or sub-
committees'it appoints for these
purposes -- will keep production
schedules and requests for specific
projects involving extensive work
under continuing review to ensure
that the disruption to line compo-
nents is minimized and that the
tasking necessitated by requirements
for national products is handled in
the most efficient, least disruptive
fashion possible.
b. Each NIO will be specifically charged
with levying his tasking requirements
through the appropriate chain of com-
mand of the Intelligence Community
component or components involved. The
particular procedures used by each NIO
with each individual Community component
will be worked out with that component's
head so that the NIOs make their contacts
with his office in the way that components
head wants them made.
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c. Any component head who feels that NIO-
sponsored tasking is disrupting his
office will be encouraged to take this
matter up initially with the NIO in-
volved, then with the head of the NIO
structure and -- if that does not prove
satisfactory directly with the DCI.
d. The NIOs individually and the head of
the NIO structure will work cooperatively
with all component heads and will sup-
port any reasonable requests for addi-
tional resources these component heads
feel are needed to handle requests for
national products passed through the NIO
structure.
7. Credit: Some measure of tension between staff
entities and line components is inevitable, but the
procedures just outlined will do much to minimize fric-
tion. One additional step, however, is also necessary
in this sphere -- the proper apportionment of credit
for work done by others:
a. When a national product involves the
work of more than one Intelligence
Community component, identification
of the offices and components con-
tributing to it will appear in a
prominent place on either the cover,
the title page, or the first page of
the work in question.
b. In those instances (and there will be
many) where a request from a senior
consumer, passed through the NIO struc-
ture, in fact can be and is met by a
product which is predominantly the work
of a single Community component, that
component will get full credit for the
response. Usually, this will involve
having the response printed as a product
of the component which produced it and
simply forwarded by note or buckslip
from the NIO to the consumer, with the
transmittal vehicle calling attention
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to the fact that the consumer's request
was taken care of by the attached "CIA
Memo," "DIA Memo," etc.
8. The CIA Relationship: One of the NIOs' main
functions is to help knit the Community together as
an organic.. whole and, in producing national intelli-
gence, draw on the totality of Community resources.
It is a fact of life, however, that the bulk of the
Community's analytic talent (not all of it by any
means, but nonetheless the bulk) is to be found in
CIA, whose legitimate equities and interests must
be protected for a variety of obvious reasons. Thus,
the NIO/CIA relationship is both special and crucial.'
It must be symbiotic and in no way adversary. Ar-
rangements will be worked out with your CIA Deputy
to ensure that he is kept abreast of all of the use
that the NIOs are making of CIA resources. These ar--
rahgements will take whatever form and follow what-
ever procedures are desired by your CIA Deputy,. It
will serve all interests to ensure that the CIA con-
tributions to the process are not obscured in the
assembly of a Community product.
9.. Relations with the Deputy to the
DCI "for 'the
Intelligence Community: Though the NIOs, under this
concept,would not be a component of the IC Staff sub-
ordinate to.the D/DCI/IC, the relationship between the
NIO structure and the D/DCI/IC will obviously have to
be a close and cooperative one -- particularly with
respect to the DCI committees (formerly USIB com-
mittees) on whom the NIOs will have to draw and
rely for many things and for which your Community
Deputy has supervisory responsibility. The mechanics
of this relationship will be worked out in a manner
mutually agreeable to your Community Deputy, the head
of the NIO structure and -- of course -- yourself.
a. These arrangements will be devised
to ensure an improved, constructive
and mutually supportive relationship
between the NIO structure and the
Intelligence Community Staff to
--- give your Community Deputy
guidance with respect to basic
needs, requirements, future per-
spectives, etc.
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help the D/DCI/IC strike the
right balance between resources
and substantive needs, matching
the former to the latter wherever
possible but arranging substantive
needs in priority order in areas
where resources are inevitably
finite.
- assist the D/DCI/IC in his and his
staff's evaluation work.
b. These arrangements will also be de-
liberately structured to minimize areas
of non-productively overlapping respon-
sibilities. The NIOs, for example, will
be in continuous touch with consumers to
stay abreast of their evolving needs; the
IC Staff will be responsible for after-
action evaluations of products and ser-
vices -- but both will contribute to
giving you overall assessments of the
Community's total performance.
10. Support to the DCI: Under the concept here
proposed, the NIO structure is an integral part of
the DCI's office. There will, therefore, have to be
continuing close contact between its head, your Agency
Deputy and your Community Deputy (plus, if you create
one, your Chief,of Staff). All of these officers will
endeavor to ensure, collectively, that you receive the
most efficient and the best possible support in the
discharge of all of your responsibilities and, hence,
that you are able to give the President and his senior
advisors products of the highest quality and, overall,
the best intelligence in the world.
E? H. Knoche
George A. Carver, Jr.
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