LETTER TO MR. PRESIDENT FROM GEORGE W. ANDERSON JR. ADMIRAL USN (RET.)

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP91M00696R000700020023-3
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 8
• Document Creation Date: December 21, 2016
• Document Release Date: January 29, 2009
• Sequence Number: 23
• Publication Date: August 8, 1975
• Content Type: LETTER

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'HASH I NGTON
PRESIDENT'S FOREIGN LNTELLIGtNCE ADVISORY BOARD
August &, 1975
The National Intelligence Estimates should be among the most important
documents issued by the intelligence community. They.are the natural
backdrop to guide the Depart-neat of Defense in formulating force levels
and R&D programs, and should serve Congress in their authorization
and appropriation hearings. Certain of them also serve as the founda-
tions from which to derive arras limitation negotiating positions.
Underlying each of these objectives is the presumption that the NIE
will substantially influence the thought processes of key Government
decision-makers regarding Soviet military capabilities.
by the facts; as a consequence, it is deficient for the purposes. it should
serve.
Through 1985") is seriously misleading in the presentation of a number
of key judgments and in projecting a sense of complacency unsupported -
In our view, NIE 11-3/8-74 ("Soviet Forces for Intercontinental Conflict
This NIE assesses that for the next ten years. it is extremely unlikely
that the Soviets will conclude they could launch an attack which would
prevent devastating U. S. retaliation. This judgment is presented
confidently, with the force of fact, although the cumulative evidence on
which it is based is conflicting, often flimsy, and in. certain cases does
not exist;
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- With respect to Soviet ICBM accuracy and the survivability of
the U. S. MINUTEMAN force, the data is inconclusive and has been very
differently interpreted by the experts. A number of uncertainties which
have puzzled analysts for six years have been accommodated in the TIE
by averaging the worst and best cases w'ien the data. could readily support
either interpretation;
-- with regard to Soviet antisubmarine capabilities, it assumes
our POLARIS/POSEIDON submarines will remain invulnerable through.
1985;
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%vrich give very:
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-- with regard to Soviet capabilities against our bombers, it
ignores the vulnerability of S=C bases to cruise and ballistic missiles
from submarines operating off U. S. shores, vulnerability of t:,.-- air-
craft to mid-course intercept, and does not take adequate account of
emerging data which may indicate an i. zproving Soviet low altitude
air defense capability;
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-_ the NIE gives the appearance of a neE assesannertt and thus, the
added weight of "operational" consideration, when In substance it is not
(For example, it assumes without detailed examination the survivability
of the U. S. command and control apparatus, and accepts optimistic 25X1
These general criticisnis may be best illustrated. by a brief review of
available evidence which contrasts with NIE judgments in three critical,
areas: Soviet ICBM accuracy, POLARIS vulnerability, and U. S. bomber
penetrability.
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Soviet ICBM Accuracy
The hard data on both. the presently deployed Soviet ICBM force and the _
new Soviet ICBMs does not allow any confident, precise deter inat_o*
of accuracy.
Concerning the new Soviet ICBMs -.- the SS-18 and SS-1.9 ~
r fire
One w01?IC~ ' expect, as in. trbe case of .. S. syster xs
that these difficulties would be worked out in the next_few years, probably
before the systems are deployed in large numbers.
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The difference between the NLE
assessment and the possible greater accuracy suggested herein is-
equivalent to an almost 10-fold increase in explosive effect on tare 2525X1
SLB\4 Survivability
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The NIE asserts that there should be little worry as to the survivability
of the SLBi\4 farce now or in the next 10
Years. _ This conclusion is based
parties ly upon. U. S. superiority in "classical" AStti technicr g I . _
yie capebL1LtLes not yet realized.by the U. S. R&D comrntjty.
--+ -oo- -^----? ~- ~4-?+?~vas. .~~ i3 vrrrjr PussLQle Mat this technological area
t , 11 ? ld .
The Soviets are pursuing at least
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Since we cannot plan on always getting solid intelligence, it erna.y be e?
very long time before we are able to determine the nature. of these
new threats. Under these circumstances, it is imprudent to make
judgmental conclusions that rm.riimize the potential for a technological
breakthrough for the next ten years and thus future Soviet capa7aMtiees
in this vital area.
Bomber Penetration
p
The conclusion that the Soviet air defenses today are -relatively ineffec-
tive against the planned U. S. low-altitude bomber strikes is based
on a largo amount of. intelligence information which sug ests two, defi-
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While both of these conclusions may be justified by informations collected
in the past, data is beginning to emerge which suggests a.-potential for -
marked change wit:-Lin the period of the estimate. Specifically, Sovi.et_
homeland air defense practice altered significantly about 1972.25X1
The above change may also reflect an improving capability against low
altitude penetrators in a number of other areas where there are intel-
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For the longer term, many Soviet activities Seen nt fh - i:Mr4
are not fully understood.
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Taken. as a whole, the uncertainties inherent in a cornprehei live
assessment of Soviet air defense capabilities do not support the NI
view that ". . it is unlikely that the Soviets will be able to cope with
sophisticated low altitude attacks during the next 10 years"
Having. identified what we believe to be serious deficiencies in this
NI.E, there follows a series of observations examining the nature of
the problems and some suggestions for their resolution.
Observations on the Intetl.li gen ce Estimating Process
The root cause of the problems experienced both by the intelligence .
community and the users of intelligence is the lack.. of factual evidence
and.the difficulty of forecasting ten years intei the. future. Because of
the importance attached to some intelligence subjects; there is an
understandable desire to fill sorne of the intelligence holes with judg_
R .
x:~.erts.. These judgments can then gain an acceptance approaching
fact, and can. then lead both the intelligence corgi unity and the users
of intelligence into a single viewpoint -,7/hich rejects alternatives, and
can persist too long. Only when some surprise arises, totally contrary
to the intelligence trend, is the pattern broken and another "review"
ordered of the intelligence effort.
When decisions must be made, they are almost always based on
incomplete information. When they involve intelligence information,
the decision-maker should wish to know not only the facts but also the
best judgments of the intelligence con,rnunity and have some feeling
for the uncertainties connected with these conclusions, including other
possible situations consistent with the data. These uncertainties should:
lead the decision=maker to consider whether he should hedge his bets
or to be prepared for possible reverses connected with failures of
actions (or inactions) based on these assessments..
This is not an easy process; no one knows how to weigh judgmental
uncertainties. For this reason vie look upon the process of atternptixxg
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to analyze and corrununicate uncertainties in the area of national
assessment as a process with which we must coatinue to e~ r -nsnt
trying various modes in an attempt to find a more satisfactory pro-
cedure. This leads us to the foil owing ggestions:
the highest priority for consideration and implementation.
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5uagyestions for Resolving Observed Deficiencies
1. Those aspects of intelligence which are considered critical
by key decision-makers should be subject to separate a.ld corn etitive
analyses and such alternate views as are developed should be pr esenteec.t
to the President and other users. In our view, this suggestion deserves
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II. To avoid.. the tendency of decision-maters to force the intel-
ligence community- to came up with positions when the data is too 25X1
the following suggestion may be helpful. The user should forreula;._ ... .
alternative.choiczs of action in such a way as to permit the intelligence.
cornrr_unity to marshal.its evidence around each alternative- .' Thus, the
community would be asked to make its best case that we face a seriou.q
problem, and its best case that we do not.
The purpose of this suggestion is to try to maintain. an awareness of
the limitations in the intelligence information. In additions it. stimulates
the user -to provide important feedback to the intelligence community
Q=i his interests and problems which, in turn, can motivate the intel-
ligence community to provide a more complete and useful product to
the user.
III: NIE 11--3/8-74 has the tendency to phrase the estimate as
a net assessment,/thatis, to include an assessment of U. S. capabiiitie-s
inthe face of the threat in question We suggest that the National Security
Council adopt a three-step process. The first step is the generation of
a purely intelligence docu_rner_t, the NIE, which carefully avoids the
'impression that a net assessment has been performed. The second step.
would involve a.genune net assessment, requiring participation by both
the intelligence community and other agencies (Depar tent of Defense,,
State, etc. ), under the aegis of the NSC. The third and final step would
involve a thorough critique of the net assessment document for the NSG
by an entity which is enabled to function with an appropriate degree of.
independence.
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ti.r
Su rr , ;IE
malcex would be better served by a e
that policy f4ct and teat e