MEETING WITH STAFF MEMBERS FROM SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP91M00696R000700100003-6
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 3
• Document Creation Date: December 15, 2016
• Document Release Date: March 31, 2004
• Sequence Number: 3
• Publication Date: March 14, 1977
• Content Type: MF

Approved For Rely 2004/05/13 : CIA-RDP91 M00696R0SW00100003-6
i
MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief, Congressional Support Staff
Center for Policy Support
SUBJECT Meeting with Staff Members from Senate
Select Committee on Intelligence
1. On 8 March I met with Messrs. Hal Ford and Ted
Ralston of the Senate Select Committee Staff. The meeting
had been requested by Ford to discuss the NIE 11-3/8 Team B
report, which he currently has under study. He took the
opportunity of the meeting to discuss as well the Alsop
article on 0, our estimates of Soviet defense spend-
ing, and the degree of acceptance of CIA costing estimates
in the Intelligence Community.
The Team B Report
2. Mr. Ford was interested in learning who authored
the economic section of the Team B report and what we think
of it. I told him that the section was written by II 25X1
I pointed out specifically that
charge that our past cost estimates
consistently understated the threat is not
true. The magnitude of Soviet defense.acti-
vities has always been measured in dollars--
not rubles--and these estimates did not
change.
assertion that there has never been
competition for resources in the USSR--as
claimed in earlier NIE's--is not true. There
has been, and continues to be, competition
for resources in the. USSR.
25X1
SEt ET
Approved For Release 2004/05/13 : CIA-RDP91 M00696R000700100003-6
 H ET
Approved For Rel? le 2004/05/13: CIA-RDP91 M00696R0OV00100003-6
policy preferences of the analysts is simply
not true.
accusation that previous estimates
used economics dishonestly to further the
These points seemed to coincide with the views of Ford
and Ralston on the subject.
The Alsop Article
3. Ford was interested in learning the source of the
information in the Alsop article, as well as the facts re-
garding the handling of 0, the reporting of the new 25X1
information, and last year's change in our estimates of
Soviet defense spending. I told him that the article appears
to be pure and pointed out that the account of the
lie detector episode is version--one which is 25X1
unique to his memory. Ford commented that this did not
surprise him inasmuch as 0 has been talking with 25X1
Alsop for years. I then showed him the correspondence
by which we had kept important officials informed of our
interpretation of the new information. Ford requested a
copy of a memo dated 17 October 1975 signed by Paul
Walsh. The memo apprised the Secretary of Defense that
we had established the basic credibility of 0 and 25X1
that the major problem with our old estimates was an under-
estimation of ruble-dollar ratios for military hardware.
4. With respect to our estimates of defense spending,
I explained that they are derived by al I 25X1
methodology and, except for some minor inputs, are indepen-
dent of the information reported by II I indicated 25X1
that 90 percent of the change resulted from new information
of prices of military goods in the USSR, which has been
accumulating over the past several years, and briefed him
on the timing and sources of this information. The criti-
cal importance of information as an independent
-check on our estimates--an in giving us the courage to
move in the direction that the analysis of the new infor-
mation was leading us--was also pointed out. Both Ford and
Ralston appeared to be satisfied with the explanation.
The Acceptance of CIA Estimates
5. Mr. Ford asked who it is within the Administration
that is challenging the CIA cost estimates and what is
the nature of the challenge. My answer was as follows.
SECS EI
SR M 77-10032
Approved For Release 2004/05/13 : CIA-RDP91 M00696R000700100003-6
 Approved For Rele 2004/05/13fA--bP91 M00696R0M00100003-6
There is no serious challenge to the CIA estimates from
within the Administration. If there is a challenge it comes
from outside of the Government. Even there, 25X1
are the only antagonists that we have been
able to find. Within the Intelligence Community, the DIA
and the individual services treat the CIA estimates as
national estimates and represent them as such. Outside
of the Community, the DoD is an avid consumer of the
estimates, which are used extensively in the Secretary
of Defense's posture statements, Indeed, much of our
work is in response to DoD requests.
6. Mr. Ford was somewhat surprised by this response
and by the voluminous correspondence from Andy Marshall
defending our estimates and requesting military economic
studies. Ford asked for copies of the correspondence,
which I gave him. He had thought that the DoD, and Andy
Marshall in particular, was our principal antagonist. I
pointed out that, while the DoD naturally would like the
estimates to be higher, it remains a strong backer of the
direct costing method.
25X1
Acting Chiet
Military-Economic Analysis Center
OSR
Distribution:
Original & 1 - Addressee
2 - D/OSR
1 - NIO/Strategic Programs
1 - NIO/Economics
1 - NIO/Conventional Forces?
1 - Dep. to the DCI for National
Intelligence
1 - Ch/USSR/EE Div, OER (Diamond)
1 - (DB-4E)
5 - OSR Division Chiefs
9 ' - MEAP
4 - MEAL Branch Chiefs
1 -
1 - MEAC-080-7
OSR/MEAC/I (March 15, 1977)
Approved For Release 2004/05/13 : CIA-RDP91 M00696R000700100003-6