CABLE TO PRIORITY(Sanitized) FROM DIRECTOR

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP91M00696R000700100013-5
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 11
• Document Creation Date: December 15, 2016
• Document Release Date: March 31, 2004
• Sequence Number: 13
• Publication Date: January 7, 1977
• Content Type: CABLE

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FOR PROCTOR FROM LEHMAN Y
1. THE FOLLOWING PROVIDES ADDITIONAL BACKGROUND ON THE
PROCESS OF COMPETITIVE ANALYSIS EXPERIMENT AND THE EFFECT OF
PUBLICITY ON THE EFFORT. Y
2. IN EARLY MAY OF 19676 THE DEPUTY TO THE DCI FOR NATIONAL
INTELLIGENCE, AT THAT TIME MR. GEORGE CARVER, MET WITH MR- ROBERT
GALVIN, CHAIRMAN OF THE ESTIMATES EVALUATION COMMITTEE OF PFIAB,
TO DISCUSS IN GREATER DETAIL THE METHODSn PROQBHCEDURES, AND
OBJECTIVES FOR CONDUCTING THE EXPERIMENT. THE AGREEMENT FINALLY
WORKED OUT BETWEEN MR. BUSH AND LEO CHERNE- AND COORDINATED WITH
GEN.-SCOWCROFT, HAD THE FOLLOWING PRINCIPAL PROVISIONS= Y
A. THE 1976 ESTIMATE OF SOVIET FORCES FOR INTERCONTINENTAL
ATTACK WOULD BE PREPARED IN ACCORDANCE WITH ESTABLISHED COMMUNITY
PRACTICES. THOSE WORKING ON THE ESTIMATE WOULD BE REFERRED TO
AS THE "A" TEAMS. M
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B. IN ADDITION, WITH RESPECT TO THEIREE KEY ISSUES SELECTED
BY THE DCI IN CONSULTATION WITH GEN. SCOWCROFT, "B" TEAMS WOULD
BE FORMED OF EXPERTS INSIDE OR OUTSIDE OF GOVERNMENT. THESE
PERSONS SHOULD HAVE EXPERT KNOWLEDGE IN THE APPROPRIATE FIELDS,
WHO HAVE OR CAN BE GRANTED THE NECESSARY SECURITY CLEARANCES
BUT WHO ARE NOT THEMSELVES ENGAGED IN THE PRODUCTION OF THE BASIC
COMMUNITY ESTIMATE. Y
C. THE "A" AND "B" TEAMS WOULD HAVE THE SAME BODY OF
INFORMATION AVAILABLE TO THEM AND ADHERE TO THE SAME PRODUCTION
SCHEDULE. DURING THE COURSE OF THE STUDIES, THE TEAMS WOULD
HAVE AN OPPORTUNITY TO INTERACT ON THENEIR FINDINGS -- NOT TO
STRIKE COMPROMISES OR REACH CONSENSUS. JUDGMENTS BUT TO EXPLAIN
AND DEFEND THEIR FINDINGS BEFORE THEIR PEERS. Y
D. FINAL "A" AND "B" III DRAFTS WOULD THEN BE PRODUCIED,
WITH EACH TEAM PREPARING Itttlill"R111111 COMMENTS ON THE OTHER'S FINDINGS.
THE ENTIRE PACKAGE WOULD BE CONSIDERED BY THE NFIB. THE INTELLIGENCE
COMMUNITY ESTIMATE WAS TO BE HANDLED IN STANDARD WAYS. THE "B"
TEAM STUDIES AND THE "A" AND "B" TEAM COMMENTS ON EACH OTHER'S
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WORK WOULD BE PACKAGED SEPARATELY AND FORWARDED ONLY TO SELECTED
RECIPIENTS -- AMONG WHOM WILL BE THE PFIAB AND THE SPECIAL ASSISTANT
TO THE PRESIDENT FOR NATIONAL SECURITY AFFAIRS. Y
E- LATER, THE ASST- TO THE PRESIDENT FOR NATIONAL SECURITY
AFFAIRS, IN CONSULTATION WITH THE DCI AND PFIAB, WOULD REVIEW
THE EXPERIMENT AND CRITIQUE ITS RESULTS. Y
31 DAS YOU KNOW, MR- BUSH DESIGNATED AS
THE INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY COORDINATOR AND MANAGER FOR THIS
AND SUPPORT FOR THE ^B^ TEAMS -- WITH A RESPONSIBILITY TO FOLLOW
SUBSTANTIVE PROGRESS BUT NOT TO INTERVENE IN THE ANALYSIS OF THE
COMPETITIVE TEAMS. THE THREE TOPICS FOR STUDY WERE SELECTED IN
CONSULTATION WITH THE NSC STAFF AND THE ESTIMATES EVALUATION
COMMITTEE OF PFIAB. THESE WERE SOVIET ICBM ACCURACY, SOVIET LOW
ALTITUDE AIR DEFENSE CAPABILITY, AND SOVIET STRATEGIC POLICY
AND OBJECTIVES. GUIDANCE ON THE COMPOSITION OF THE "B" TEAMS
WAS RECEIVED FROM THE PFIAB AND THE TEAMS WERE STRUCTURED TO
CONFORM REASONABLY CLOSELY TO THOSE GUIDELINES.
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4. AS THIS PFIAB VISUALIZED IT, THE EXPERIMENT WAS DESIGNED
TO TEST THE HYPOTHESES--USING THE SAME EVIDENCE AS THAT AVAILABLE
TO THE INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY--THAT EITHER THE RANGE OF UNCERTAINTY
AROUND SELECTED SOVIET THREAT PARAMETERS {ICBM ACCURACY, LOW ALTITUDE
AIR DEFENSE CAPABILITIES}.WAS SUCH THAT THE THREAT COULD BE GREATER
THAN THAT REFLECTED IN THE NATIONAL ESTIMATES OR--IN THE CASE OF THE
ESTIMATE OF SOVIET STRATEGIC POLICIES AND OBJECTIVES--THAT SOVIET
STRATEGIC OBJECTIVES ARE, IN FACT, MORE AMBITIOUS AND THEREFORE
IMPLICITLY MORE THREATENING TO U.S. SECURITY THAN THEY APPEAR TO THE
AUTHORS OF THE-NIES. IN ORDER NOT TO BE CHARGED WITH PREJUDICING
THE RESULTS THE DCI CHARGED THE MANAGER OF THE EXPERIMENT TO ASSUME
A NEUTRAL ROLE IN THE ANALYSES. GUIDANCE ON THE SELECTION OF TEAM
LEADERS WAS RECEIVED AND ACCEPTED FROM THE'ES19TIMATES EVALUATION
COMMITTEE OF THE PFIAB AND THE TEAM LEADERS THEN HAD THE DOMINANT
ROLE IN SELECTING AND RECRUITING THEIR ASSOCIATES. THE TEAMS WERE
ADVISED BY THE CHAIRMAN OF THE ESTIMATES EVALUATION COMMITTEE OF
PFIAB, MR. GALVIN, THAT THEY WERE,NOT TO FEEL OBLIGED TO FIT THE
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EVIDENCE TO A PREDETERMINED CONOCLUSIDON IF1 IN FACT, THEIR
ANALYSES INDICATED OTHERWISE. THE TEAMS WERE -- NONETHELESS --
MADE UP OF ANALYSTS OF SOVIET MILITARY MATTERS WHOSE PAST VIEWS
WERE KNOWN TO HAVE COINCIDED WITH THE HYPOTHESES BEING EXAMINED.
THE EXPERIMENT CONSEQUENTLY WAS NOT REALLY BALANCED, IN THAT IT
DID NOT INCLUDE "C"'TEAMS WHO-WOULD SYMPATHETICALLY EXAMINE
ALTERNATIVE INTERPRETATIONS OF THE EVIDENCE THAT MIGHT LEAD TO
EVALUATIONS OF SOVIET MILITARY STRENGTH AND PURPOSES MORE BENIGN
THAN EITHER THE COMMUNITY OR THE "B" TEAM STUDIES. 5'
5. THE SELECTION OF TEAMS TO STUDY ONLY THE MORE SOMBER
HYPOTHESES WAS DONE PRIMARILY OUT OF CONSIDERATION FOR PFIAB'S
EXPRESSED CONCERN THAT THE THREAT HAD BEEN UNDERSTATED IN THE
NIES. IT IS ALSO TRUE, HOWEVER, THAT ON THESE ISSUES THE DOMINANT
VIEWS WERE IN FACT MORE POLARIZED THAN MULTI-VALVED.. IN RESTROSPET,
HOWEVER, WE DID NOT FULLY FORESEE THHI PROBABILITY THAT THE TEAM
"B EXPERIMENT WOULD GENERATE SUCH PRESSURES FOR PUBLICITY IN
THE MEDIA AND COINCIDE WITH INCREASING PUBLIC ACTIVITY BY THOSE
WHO ARE ALARMED ABOUT THE EAST-WEST MILITARY BALANCE.
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6. THE EXISTENCE AND NATURE OF THE COMPETITIVE ANALYISIS
EXPERIMENT WERE RELATIVELY WIDELY KNOWN IN WASHINGTON BY MID-
UMMER -- BUT IN A -CLASSIFIED CONTEXT -- AND ALL THE PARTICIPANTS
HAD BEEN CAUTIONED ABOUT THE DAMAGE THAT COULD BE DONE BY
UNAUTHORIZED PRESS LEAKS. AS YOU KNOW, HOWEVER, THE "BOSTON GLOBE"
AND THE "WASHINGTON STAR" ON OCT 20 PUBLISHED IDENTICAL ARTICLES
BY WILLIAM BEECHER WHICH PROVIDED THE OUTLINE AND SOME OF THE
ESSENTIAL DETAIL OF THE EXERCISE. WE HAVE BEEN UNABLE TO DISCOVER
THE SOURCE OF THIS STORY. STRONG REPRESENTATIONS WERE MADE BY
MR. BUSH'TO ALL THE "A" AND "B" TEAM PARTICIPANTS CONCERNING THE.
NEGATIVE EFFECT SUCH PUBLICITY COULD HAVE ON THE UTILITY OF THE
EXPERIMENT.- MR. BUSH ALSO CONIFERRED WITH DR- CHERNE, CHAIRMAN
OF PFIAB, AND ASKED THAT THE PFIAB MEMBERS,BE ADVISED OF HIS
VIEWS CONCERNING THE DISUTILITY OF FURTHER EXPOSURE OF-THE
EXPERIMENT IN THE PUBLIC DOMAIN. THE INDIVIDUAL PFIAB MEMBERS
WERE REQUESTED TO USE ANY INFLUENCE THEY MIGHT HAVE WITH THE
PARTICIPANTS IN THE EXERCISE TO DISCOURAGE FURTHER LEADS. TO THE
PRESS. M
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7? IT WAS ORIGINALLY ANTICIPATED THAT THE BASIC NIE AND
THE "B" TEAM STUDIES WOULD BE CONSIDERED BY THE NFIB IN NOVEMBER
AND THE RESULTS BRIEFED TO THE PFIAB AT THEIR DECEMBER MEETING --
THE LAST SCHEDULED BEFORE THE INAUGURATION. ALTHOUGH THE NFIB
SCHEDULE FOR NIE 11-3/8-76 SLIPPED INTO DECEMBER, THE PFIAB STILL
WANTED TO HEAR FROPT BOTH THE COMMUNITY TEAMS AND THE^B^ TEAMS
ON THE RESULTS OF THE EXPERIMENT COMPLETED SO FAR. THE PFIAB
FELT THAT THE EXERCISE WAS CLOSE ENOUGH TO BEING COMPLETED THAT
THEY SHOULD REPORT ON IT TO THE PRESIDENT AT THEIR LAST MEETING
WITH HIM: Y
8? THE BRIEFING OF PFIAB TOOK PLACE ON 2 DECEMBER. THE
INTENT WAS NOT TO PRESENT FINAL VIEWS BECAUSE THE PFIAB CHAIRMAN,
DR. CHERNE, DID NOT WISH TO HAVE THE BOARD.PASS JUDGMENT ON THE
EXPERIMENT UNTIL ALL STAGES HAD BEEN COMPLETED. IT IS FAIR TO
SAY, -HOWEVER, THAT THE BOARD WAS PLEASED WITH THE RESULTSIU ON
BOTH SUBSTANTIVE GROUNDS AND FOR WHAT IT REPRESENTED IN THE WAY
OF BRINGING ALTERNATIVE OUTSIDE VIEWS TO BEAR ON THE ANALYTICAL
PROCESS. Y
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9. A FEW DAYS'AFTER THE PFIAB BRIEFING ANOTHER BEECHER
ARTICLE ON THE EXPERIMENT WAS FEATURED IN'THE BOSTON GLOBE. THIS
ARTICLE WAS EVEN MORE EXPLICIT THAN THE ORIGINAL IN ITS INVIDIOUS
HANDLING OF THE NATIONAL ESTIMATIVE PROCESS AND CIA IN PARTICULAR.
SINCE THEN THERE HAVE BEEN NUMEROUS ARTICLES BY BINDER {NY TIMES},
MARDER {WASHINGTON POST}, KRAFT {WASHINGTON POST}, AND OTHERS,
WHICH HAVE BEGUN TO PLACE THE COMPETITIVE STUDY IN BETTER PERSPECTIVE.
INCREASINGLY, IT APPEARS THAT THE POLITICIZATION OF THE PIPES'
TEAM STUDY IS BEING RECOGNIZED FOR WHAT IT IS -- A DELIBERATE,
ORCHESTRATED, AND ONE-SIDED VIEW OF A FOREIGN AND DEFENSE POLICY-
ISSUEI. THIS IS RATHER DIFFERENIT FROM WHAT WAS ORIGINALLY
INTENDED, WHICH WAS A CONTROLLED USE OF OUTSIDE SPECIALISTS FOR
A PURELY INTERNAL METHODOLOGICAL EXPERIMENT- Y
10. ALMOST ALL OF THE PUBLICITY CONCERNING THE EXPERIMENT
HAS BEEN CONFINED SO FAR TO THE REPORT OF THE TEAM DEALING WITH
SOVIET STRATEGIC OBJECTIVES AND POLICIES. MUCH OF THIS HAS NOT
BEEN VERY WELL INFORMED, AND IT HAS CREATED AN ENVIRONMENT WHICH
WILL MAKE DIFFICULT THE FINAL EVALUATION OF THE EXPERIMENT
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AGAINST THE ORIGINAL PURPOSES OF THE DCI AND PFIAB. IF ONE
COULD SET ASIDE THE DIN AND CLAMOR OF THE PRESS AND THE DISTORITONS
SERVED UP FOR PUBLIC CONSUMPTION, HOWEVER, IT WOULD BE FAIR TO
SAY THAT THE EXPERIMENT AS A WHOLE WORKED OUT IN MANY WAYS MUCH
AS IT WAS ORIGINALLY SFT UP TO DO. FOR THE MOST PART THE WORK OF
THE ^B^ TEAMS -- PARTICULARLY ON THE TWO PURELY TECHNICAL TOPICS WAS SERIOUSLY AND RESPONSIBLY DONE AND THE RESULTING DIFFERENCES
OF VIEW WERE NOT TRIVIAL. THERE WAS SOME USEFUL INTERACTION
AMONG THE TEAMS ON SUBSTANCE. IN PARTICULAR: Y
A. "A GREATER EFFORT WAS MADE IN PREPARING THE ESTIMATE TO
DOCUMENT CONCLUSIONS.THOROUGHLY, TO BE PRECISE IN TERMINOLOGY
{ESPECIALLY ABOUT SOVIET DOCTRINE}, AND TO AVOID GENERALIZATIONS
ABOUT THE FUTURE WHICH WERE NOT SOLIDLY GROUNDED IN DEMONSTRABLE
INTELLIGENCE ANALYSIS. Y
B. INCREASED CAUTION WAS INTRODUCED INTO ESTIMATIVE PREDICTIONS,
FOR THE PERIOD 5 TO 10 YEARS HENCE, AND ESPECIALLY ABOUT THE FUTURE
CAPABILITIES OF SOVIET DEFENSES TO LIMIT PENETRATION AND DAMAGE.
THIS CAUTION AROSE IN PART FROM EVIDENTIAL UNCERTAINTIES ABOUT
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THE FUTURE EFFECTIVENESS OF SOVIET ACTIVE AND PASSIVE DEFENSES,
BUT ALSO IN PART FROM "B" TEAM ARGUMENTATION ABOUT THE SENSITIVITY
OF CONCLUSIONS TO OPERATIONAL FACTORS AND RED-BLUE INTERACTIONS
CWHICH ARE INHERENTLY VERY DIFFICULT TO PREDICT AND REQUIRE
DETAILED NET ASSESSMENT. Y
11. A MAJOR CONTENTIOUS ASPECT OF THE PIPES "B" TEAM
REPORTII, HOWEVER, WAS THAT MORE THAN HALF OF IT COMPRISED A
SWEEPING CRITIQUE OF INTELLIGENCE ESTIMATES AND METHODOLOGY OVER
THE PAST 10 YEARS AND MORE DEALING WITH NIE TREATMENT OF MANY
SOVIET STRATEGIC PROGRAMS AND CAPABILITIES. THIS FLOWED FROM A
PERMISSIVENESS IN THE DCI/PFIAB AGREEMENT WHICH WAS INTERPRETED
TO ALLOW THAT. PARTICULAR "B" TEAM TO GO FAR BEYOND THE SCOPE OF
ITS INITIAL EXPERIMENTAL TASK OF MAKING A PROFESSIONALLY RESPONSIBLE
CASE THAT SOVIET OBJECTIVES WERE MORE AMBITIOUS AND MORE DANGEROUS
TO US INTERESTS THAN ESTIMATED IN NIES. THIS CONTRIBUTED TO
THE EXCESSIVELY COMBATIVE-AND POLITICALLY VOLATILE NATURE OF THE
PIPES "B" TEAM REPORT, AND LENT ITSELF TO PRESS LEAKS DESIGNED
TO DISCREDIT THE ESTIMATIING PROCESS AND THECIA. Y
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12. WHILE THE DCI'S VIEWS ABOUT SOVIET OBJECTIVES AND
EXPECTATIONS EXPRESSED IN THIS YEAR'S NIE ARE NOT SUBSTANTIALLY
.DIFFERENT FROM THOSE OF LASTYEAR, IT IS CERTAINLY TRUE THAT OVER
THE LAST SEVERAL YEARS THE BILLBOARD EFFECT OF SUCCESSIVE ESTIMATES
HAS BEEN TO PRESENT 'AN-INCREASINGLY STARK PRICTURE OF OVERALLI
SOVIET INTENTIONS-AND CAPABILITIES. THE DCI IS DETERMINED TO
MAKE CLEAR THAT THE INCREASING CONCERN EXPRESSED BY THE INTELLIGENCE
COMMUNITY REFLECTS AN ACCUMULATION. OF EVIDENCE AND ANALYSIS ABOUT
THE SCOPE, VIGOR AND PERSISTENCE OF SOVIET OFFENSIVE AND DEFENSIVE
PROGRAMS IN THE STRATEGIC FIELD. HE IS EQUALLY DETERMINED TO
REBUFF ALLEGATIONS' THAT THESE INTELLIGENCEIE@PERCEPTIONS 1221
SOMEHOW REPRESENT A VICTORY OF THE^B^ TEAM OVER A RELUCTANT BUT
FINALLY OVERWHELMED GROUP OF INSTITUTIONALLY-BIASED ANALYSTS
AND ESTIMATORS IN THE CIA. TO THIS ENDn HE HAS RECENTLY SPOKEN
ON "FACE THENATION^ AND PLANS TO INCLUDE A {CLASSIFIED} LETTER
OF TRANSMITTAL WITH EACH COPY OF NIE 11-3/8-76 STRESSING THE
INTEGRITY OF THE ANALYTICAL AND. ESTIMATING PROCES. E2, IMPDET. d
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RLEHMAN
D/DCI/NI
I
GEORGE BUSH/DCI
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RICHARD LEHMAN
D/DCI/NI
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