ADMIRAL TURNER'S QUESTION RE THE CHAPTER OF THE CHURCH COMMITTEE'S REPORT WHICH CONCERNS THE 'ORGANIZATION OF THE INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY AS A WHOLE'

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP91M00696R000700110006-2
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: C
• Document Page Count: 7
• Document Creation Date: December 15, 2016
• Document Release Date: February 24, 2004
• Sequence Number: 6
• Publication Date: February 16, 1977
• Content Type: MF

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MEMORANDUM FOR: B-.,F.- McMahon, Jr.
Commander, U.S. Navy
? Executive Assistant to
DCI-Designate
FROM:
16 February 1977
Special Assistant to the DCI
SUBJECT: Admiral Turner's Question re the Chapter of the
Church Committee's Report Which Concerns the
"Organization of the Intelligence Community
as -a-Whole"
1. Attachdid are excerpts from the Church Committee Report which
discuss the organization of the Intelligence Community: Chapter "
The Director of Central Intelligence" and Chapter "G: Reorganization
of the Intelligence Community." What follows is a brief summary of
these two chapters and their recommendations, as well as some comments
on what we understand to be the current views of the SSCI (Inouye
Committee) on the same subjects.
2. Chapter. E considers the DCI in his three roles as coordinator
of the Intelligence Community, producer of National Intelligence, and
head of the CIA.
--a-. DCI as coordinator: the Committee comments that the
DCI is not in a position to command the different departments
and agencies concerned with intelligence to respond to the
needs of policymakers because he lacks authority to allocate
intelligence resources. The Committee supports the CFI concept
but wonders if the CFI can be effective--for example, in enabling
the DCI to review tactical military intelligence operations--
without modification of the peacetime authority of the Secretary
of Defense.
b. DCI as producer of National Intelligence: the Committee
comments that the DCI faces obstacles in ensuring objectivity
in his national intelligence judgments because of "pressures
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advantages and potential disadvantages of this latter proposition, and _
concludes with a recommendation that the appropriate Congressional
oversight committees study both questions.
5. We understand that the SSCI (Inouye Committee) continues the
concern of the Church Committee regarding the DCI's roles as coordinator
of the Community,.producer.of.National Intelligence, and head of CIA.
Some impressions gathered by the Intelligence Community Staff and the
Office of Legislative Counsel regarding the thinking in the Inouye
Committee include:
a. DCI as coordinator, or Community Resource Manager:
Although-the Church-Committee strongly endorsed this
concept, it noted that shaping a committee process which
respected the direct executive powers of both the Secretary
of Defense and the DCI presented a problem. The Inouye
Committee generally favors the CFI and the consolidated NFIP
budget, process which resulted from E.O. 11905. While the
Church Committee recommended founding this process in. legisla-
tion, the Inouye Committee wishes further testing of the
existing process before taking a position on the' question of
legislation.
" In addition, the Inouye Committee' is interested in
the DCI's power to establish Community collection requirements..-
already"substantial in the imagery and SIGINT fields. Along
with the House Appropriations Committee, the Inouye Committee
would like to further investigate the question of DCI oversight
of'tactical military intelligence operations in order to eliminate"
wasteful duplication.
The Inouye Committee's Charters and :Guidelines Sub-
committee (Senator Hathaway) is drafting an "overall charter"
for the Community and it is possible that proposed legislation
could be ready by late spring. Also, the Carter Administration
intends to review Community organization through a Policy Review
Memorandum (PRM/NSC #11) which will examine the powers of the
DCI to manage Community resources either through committee
negotiation (as in the CFI's successor organization, the Policy
Review Committee/Intelligence) or through direct executive
authority, such as the DCI now has over-the CIA.
b. DCI as-producer-of National Intelligence:
Given the fact that there is general agreement that the
DCI should be the principal foreign intelligence adviser to the
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first. answer a more basic question:- in his role as Community
leader, how much of the DCI's authority should be-directly
executive and how. much should be expressed through negotiation.
with other-agencies and departments (primarily Defense) which
retain-executive control of particular national intelligence
elements and
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