CONFIRMATION QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP91M00696R000700110014-3
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 48
• Document Creation Date: December 15, 2016
• Document Release Date: February 24, 2004
• Sequence Number: 14
• Publication Date: January 10, 1977
• Content Type: MISC

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CONFIRMATION QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS
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1. Why do you feel that you are qualified to assume the responsibilities of
Director of Central Intelligence?
2. Do you see any potential conflict of interest in your serving as DCI
and your holding any of your present financial interests?
3. If requested by this Committee, on the basis of conflict of interest,
will you divest yourself of any assets?
4. Your predecessor has stated that the Director of CIA must be someone
who has the trust and confidence of and direct access to the President.
Do you feel that you have a solid working relationship with President
Carter and will have sufficient access to him?
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RESPONSIBILITIES TO CONGRESS
5. What do you perceive to be your responsibilities to the Congress as
Director of Central Intelligence if you are confirmed for that position?
It will be my policy- to be as responsive as possible to the Congress.
I will respond to the best of my ability within whatever oversight
framework the Congress cpnsiders suitable and seek to develop a good
working relationship between the Congress and both the CIA and the
Intelligence Community.
I recognize, for instance, that arrangements for budget authorization
and review of Intelligence Community funding needs are still in the process
of development, and I will work with the President's Committee on Foreign
Intelligence, which I will chair, to assure that the Congress gets the kind
of budget information that it requires.
I will also make every effort to meet congressional needs for sub-
stantive information, consistent with my responsibilities to the President
and to the National Security Council for the provision of intelligence
inputs on policy problems currently under consideration.
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6. What is your view of the degree to which Congress should oversee
intelligence activities?
Congress has far-reaching legislative oversight and appropria-
tions responsibilities under the Constitution. Obviously, appropriate
committees of Congress must have knowledge of intelligence activities
so that they can exercise these fundamental responsibilities I fully
recognize this, and I am committed to working with Congress in this
regard.
I think the American people want strong and effective congres-
sional oversight that imposes clear accountability on intelligence
organizations, while at the same time preserving the effectiveness of
the U.S. foreign intelligence effort.
Because of the sensitivity of much of the information involved,
I would hope that the Congress can see its way clear to concentrate its
oversight activities to the extent feasible and eliminate any requirements
that I provide the same sensitive information to a sizeable number of
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.7. What policy will you follow in providing information to the
Congress and in keeping the Congress informed?
I clearly recognize that the Congress must be adequately
informed in order to make proper and informed judgments in matters
of legislation and oversight. Committees must acquire required
information within their jurisdiction to carry out these responsibilities.
Information provided by the Executive to the Congress which requires
protection under statute or Executive order must, however, be handled
accordingly by the Congress. Further, the Congress exercises its
prerogative of nondisclosure through executive sessions and other
closed rrieetings. Similarly, the Executive must exercise its prerogatives
of nondisclosure in matters of executive privilege and clear statutory
mandates.
I trust that an atmosphere of comity and understanding will allow
a mutual resolution of this problem and. avoid confrontations. The
national interest must always be the paramount consideration.
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8. What is your opinion as to the effectiveness of congressional oversight
of CIA over the years?
The effectiveness of the congressional oversight is ultimately a
matter for the Congress itself to judge. However, it appears to me that
each House is now exercising conscientious and thorough oversight
through designated committees.
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9. Do you feel that CIA should have the authority to conduct
covert activities abroad?
As I have said publicly several times since my
nomination, in this somewhat ugly world we live in we cannot abolish
the capacity to conduct covert actions altogether. The President,
confronted with a foreign development which is a serious threat to
important U.S. interests, should have a variety of capabilities
for response. One of these capabilities, for use in extra-
ordinary circumstances, should be covert action.
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10. What would be your test to determine if a covert operation
should be undertaken?
I believe it is necessary for the U. S. Government to maintain
a covert action capability, but I would encourage the use of covert action
only where vital American interests are involved. I would also argue for
prior determinations that an overt program could. not accomplish the
same purpose, and that the covert operation had a high chance of success.
I would also insure that the President was fully knowledgeable of the
operation and supported it.
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11. Would you explain to us the procedures that are followed under the
provisions of Section 662 of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, as
amended, with respect to so-called covert action?
Under Executive Order 11905, the Operations Advisory Croup is
charged with reviewing proposals for covert action. Upon the recommendation
of the Group, a proposed covert action goes to the President for decision.
If the President finds that"the proposed activity is important to the national
security, he can approve it. Where the activity involves a release of funds
from the Agency's Reserve, 0'14B is notified and a withdrawal approved.
After the President has made his finding, relevant committees are notified
of a new finding; and at the committee's earliest convenience, the Director
of Central Intelligence briefs them on a description and scope of the activity.
As you are aware, this currently involves briefing four Senate
committees (Foreign Relations, Appropriations, Armed Services, -and the
Select: Committee on Intelligence) and three House committees (Appropriations,
Armed Services, and International Relations).
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12. What role do you feel Congress should play in covert action?
I strongly believe that Congress should be kept advised. of
covert actions in a timely fashion through certain designated
Members. This is what is now being done under Section 662 of the
Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, as amended. I am not sure if the
precise arrangements under that Section are entirely desirable,
however.
Section 662 requires that the President personally certify
to the Congress the need for all covert actions undertaken.
Secretary-designate Vance has expressed his approval of this
procedure. I would point out that in some instances, it may be
harmful for the U.S. head of state to be so formally identified
with such activities.
Moreover, Section 662 requires that covert actions be reported
to seven committees of Congress, with a total of more than 55
Members. This may be more than is necessary, and perhaps.-this
number could be reduced.
Finally, the Foreign Assistance Act is, in my view, an in-
appropriate place for this provision. It would be better to place
covert action reporting requirements in the National Security Act..
Some of these suggestions have already been made by the T?.urphy
Commission which recommended that Section 662 be amended to re-
quire reporting of covert actions to a Joint Committee on National
Security, and to omit any requirement for the personal certification.
of the President as to their necessity.
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13.. What is the proper role of a secret intelligence organization in an
open society?
Organizations which must operate in secret contravene the spirit
of an open society to a degree, yet it is an inconsistency which nearly all
Americans recognize as essential. It is one that is well established in
the field of national defense, for example. The remedy to the inconsistency
is to insure that intelligence agencies are accountable to the established
institutions of Government. The agencies must act strictly within their
charters, and cannot operate so as to abridge or in any way infringe on
the constitutional rights of Americans.
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14. What is your concept of your role as Director of Central Intelligence?
Especially with respect to responsibilities to the so-called Intelligence'
Community? (See attached paper on "Role of DCI")
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. What is your concept of the'objective of the CIA?
The intent of Congress in creating the Central Intelligence Agency
was to establish a focal point in Government whereby intelligence from
all producing. agencies would be coordinated, correlated, evaluated, and
disseminated to the upper echelons of Government for the formulation of
national security policies. This centralization would assure that all
information vital to the formulation of such policies was provided.
Further, under the direction of the President and the National Security
Council, the Agency would carry out such other duties as deemed
necessary in the national interest.
The objective of the Agency is to meet national security requirements
as fully effectively and efficiently as possible utilizing all intelligence
assets and resources of Government. The Agency must be unaffected by
any considerations which would in any way result in biased and unobjective
intelligence reporting.
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What are the strengths and weaknesses of 1- ,.0. 11905?
I think E.O. 11905 was a positive step. For the first time the
respective authorities and responsibilities of the various intelligence
agencies and departments have been delineated and clarified; provision
has been made for strong central supervision and direction of intelligence
activities by the DCI; strong internal and external oversight mechanisms
have been established to assure that intelligence activities are proper and
lawful; and detailed restrictions on intelligence activities have been spelled
out in order to safeguard the civil liberties of the American people.
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t1
18. What relative roles should civilians and the military have in
producing intelligence?
Both civilian agencies and military organizations have important
roles in the intelligence process.
Generally speaking, the military forces have special intelligence
requirements that are related to their operational missions. This means
that the Department of Defense must have its own intelligence capability
with respect to both collection and analysis of foreign military informa-
tion relating to national defense.
Coordination mechanisms have evolved over the years to avoid
unnecessary duplication and to assure full coverage.
The role of the President's Committee on Foreign Intelligence in
developing the National Foreign Intelligence Program budget is an
important element of the system, since the CFI reviews funding needs
of all elements of the Intelligence Community.
. Coordination process in the substantive area is probably most
important in the production of National Intelligence Estimates. The
positions in these estimates are those of the DCI; they are arrived at by
a process, managed by my National Intelligence Officers, during which
the positions of all civilian and military intelligence agencies are con-
sidered fully. When agreement cannot be reached on the position I
judge to be the soundest, either civilian or military agencies may take
exception in the estimate itself.
This process allows the policy makers to make their decisions
based on national estirnat~!s which fully cover all sides of the issues
involved. It is the best assurance that estimates are not slanted or biased
either in favor of the military or the civilian agencies.
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1.9.
What is your position as to releasing the budget figures of. CIA.
and the Intelligence Community?
I have expressed a personal view in favor of some kind of disclosure
of budget figures. My predecessors, however, have been against pub-
licizing the budget, and the weight of opinion in the Intelligence Community
is still against budget disclosure. I would like time to analyze this problem
further and assess what impact disclosure would have before committing
myself to a particular course on this.
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,tt
;0. Do you feel CIA classifies more information than needs to be'
classified.. If so, what can be done to reduce the amount of
information classified?
The issue has been a proper balance to assure that the public is
informed and that national security is not endangered. As DCI, I will
carefully review Intelligence Community programs to identify those
activities which require continued protection and those areas where a
broader disclosure will not be harmful. I understand that with the
issuance of Executive Order 1.1652 regarding classification and declassi-
fication, the Agency has been able to reduce by 50 percent the number of
materials classified. I will periodically assess classification procedures
and strive toward the maximum dissemination possible consistent with
national security.
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2,1. Should Government classification of information be governed by
statute or Executive order? Why?
.The essential point is that whatever classification system is
adopted must afford sufficient protection for sensitive information.
Linden- the National Security Act of 1947, the Director of Central
Intelligence is made responsible for the protection of intelligence
sources and methods. The continued success of our foreign collec-
tion programs rests on this protection. Executive orders and court
decisions con_cern.ng secrecy have recognized this statutory responsi-
bility and have granted the Agency a degree of latitude and flexibility
to mold its security programs to assure the protection of intelligence
sources and methods. Any statutory classification program must grant an
equal degree of protection, and must be administratively worktable.
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Are CIA personnel overseas adequately protected? If not, what
can be done by the Executive Branch to improve this situation? Do
you support bills which have been introduced to provide criminal
penalties for disclosure of information leading to the identification
of CIA employees under cover?
I think it is important that the country protect the dedicated men
and women it sends overseas to engage in foreign intelligence activities.
If these people are to be effective, they usually must not be openly
identified as intelligence personnel. I think there is much that both
the Congress and the Executive Branch can do to improve the "cover"
arrangements made for these people. For example, Congress might consider
providing explicit statutory authority for the Director to make adequate
"cover" arrangements.
The exposure of individuals involved in the foreign intelligence
operations of the United States can seriously jeopardize their.personal
safety and the safety of their families and associates. Although the
nation has already witnessed tragedy in this respect, groups and
individuals within the United States, whose avowed purpose is to destroy
the nation's foreign intelligence capability, are still attempting to
discover and publish the identities of intelligence personnel. In my
view, existing law is almost completely inadequate in deterring this kind
of malacious act. I strongly support legislation that will strengthen.
existing law in this respect.
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24. What is your position on past Agency practices such as assassination
plots, mail intercept programs on U.S. mail, and drug testing on unsuspecting
humans?
The previous management of CIA long ago determined that such practices
were unacceptable, and clear instructions prohibiting such activities were
issued prior to any outside disclosure or pressure. I support those decisions
100 percent, and will do all within my authority to insure that those programs
are never resumed.
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How will you insure that abuses that have cropped up in the past
will not happen in the future? How will you make sure you will know what
is going on?
'Frankly, I do not think there is much danger of past abuses being
repeated. Agency personnel are fully aware of the proper limits on domestic
activities and have been directed to report any abuses that come to their
attention. I have been impressed by. the caliber and integrity of the people
in the Agency whom I have met to date. Director Bush has publicly stated
his own admiration and esteem for his colleagues at CIA.
I would note that the Agency itself identified and remedied its own abuses.
In addition, new internal and external oversight mechanisms have been
created by E.. 0. 11905. The roles of the Inspector General and the General
Counsel have been expanded within the Agency. A civilian oversight board
has been established outside the Agency. Also, E. 0. 11905 has eliminated
many of the "gray areas" by spelling out restrictions on intelligence activities.
There is no question that vigorous oversight and supervision are
essential, but I think we must also recognize that there is a real danger of
smothering initiative and incentive. I think a delicate balance has to be
struck, and it will be my job to see that it is.
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26. What would you do if the President asks you to carry out an
order which you have reason to believe is illegal?
I am quite confident that days of improper requests to CIA are
behind us. Previous improper requests created such a furor that I
do not believe we will see any more. However, if asked to order CIA to do
an improper act, I would first point out to the requester that the request
was improper, and how it was so. I would attempt to obtain a retraction
of the order and, if unsuccessful., would refuse to follow it. If it came
down to carrying out the order or resigning, I would resign.
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Are you in favor of making public the names of journalists, academics,
or others who have cooperated with the CIA?
I believe that any American has the right to voluntarily cooperate
with his Government. I do not, therefore, believe it would be proper for
the Agency to release such names which might result in harassment of
these individuals. I believe that it a matter of individual privacy.
The Agency, of course, has already adopted a policy of not entering
into any paid or contractual relation with any full-time news correspondent
or string accredited by the U.S. news service, newspaper, periodical,
radio or television network or station.
The Agency, on the other hand, has several kinds of relationships
with scholars and academic institutions. These include paid and unpaid
consultations between scholars and CIA research analysts, and contacts
with persons who travel abroad.
They also include contracts, made only with the approval of a corporate
officer of the institution, for scientific research and development work and
.
for research in the social sciences on matters related to foreign affairs.
Such relationships should continue to be completely voluntary. I think it
is entirely consistent with academic feeedom and with the free search for
truth for an individual to want to assist an agency of the Federal Government
in providing the best possible assessments for the policymakers. We do
not want to break important links between academia and the Government.
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28. Is the CIA cooperating with the House Select Committee on
Assassinations?
CIA officials have had a number of meetings at Agency initiative
with Mr. Sprague and others on his staff in order to explain our records
systems to them and prepare for their investigation. Of course that
Committee has not yet received its authorization for the 95th Congress, and
also is not in a posture to receive classified material. Once these problems
are resolved, it is our intent to cooperate completely, and the Agency has
so informed the Committee.
It is`nry-understanding that the Senate Select Committee on
Intelligence has a S ibcomrrritte.gon_ Assassinations, and that staff
members have reviewed a substanti --a``mount--f>f?-E IA-.material The
Agency will also continue its cooperation with this Subcommittee:.. -- =
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2.9 What are your views of public accounts of CIA activities in
Micronesia?
It is my understanding that the Select Committee has scheduled
executive session hearings on these press reports. It would not be
appropriate for me to discuss this in open session.
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_3.0-. There has been much recent discussion of activities of "friendly"
foreign intelligence services in the U.S. Charges have been made that
CIA allows these services a free hand in the U.S. in exchange for the
privilege of unharassed CIA operations abroad. What is your view of the
necessity of liaison arrangements and the propriety of permitting these
groups to operate in the U.S. , often against U.S. interests?
I have stated that I believe in the necessity of a strong intelligence
capability. Significant information can often be obtained through liaison
with friendly intelligence services, and I will support the practice of
maintaining such liaison arrangements in consonance with American foreign
policy aims and U.S. law. With regard to the question of operations of
foreign intelligence agents in the U.S., regardless of the country they
represent, this is an internal security matter, properly the preserve of the
Justice Department and FBI. In my view, there can be no agreements made
with any foreign intelligence services which violate U.S. laws,
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--3-C: The Intelligence Community recently authorized a competitive
team approach to preparation of the NIE on Soviet strategic forces,
whereby a group of outside experts was assembled to evaluate all
available intelligence and reach conclusions independently from those
normally tasked with preparing such estimates. I understand the
results of the two groups were quite different. What do you think of
this competitive evaluation concept and do you think it would be usefully
utilized for other estimates?
The competitive team approach was an innovative development in
the preparation of National Intelligence Estimates. I hope to encourage
innovative approaches in all areas of CIA's performance. The results of
this participation of outsiders in the estimating process are to be reviewed
by the National Security Council, and I would be reluctant to comment on.
the efficacy of the concept prior to the results of the full-scale review of
this experiement.
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Question: The GAO does not audit the expenditures of the CIA.
--' Are you willing to allow GAO to conduct audits of CIA
activities?
Answer: That is a question I will certainly look into. I am not
thoroughly acquainted with the rules and procedures of the
Congress pertaining to the control and distribution of GAO
documents and reports, or the extent to which they are
available to the membership and staffs. Any worthwhile GAO
study would necessarily cover some very sensitive activities
which would require careful protection. I have no preconceived
ideas about it but, in principle, I should think something
could be worked out with both Houses of the Congress whereby
GAO documents and reports could be made available to the duly
constituted oversight Committees within some mutually agreeable
constraints.
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31, Do you agree with Secretary of State-designate Vance that U.S.
Ambassadors abroad should get anything they request from CIA Station
Chiefs?
I fully support Presidential directives designating Ambassadors as
Chiefs of the Country Team in their Embassies, to be kept as fully informed
as possible. Station Chiefs have the duty to afford the most careful
protection to their sources and activities. Should there ever be
differences over what an Ambassador might be told, I would participate
in the decision myself.
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On Page 2 of your prepared statement, you state that at no time did
you know of any plots to assassinate foreign leaders or subvert foreign
governments nor any discussions or decisions concerning CIA covert
actions. You sat in on National Security Council meetings and the Cuban
Missile crisis, and other top level meetings. Was there never any
discussion of CIA covert activities, even as options, at any of these
meetings ?
I can add nothing to my comments in my prepared statement on
these matters.
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Concerning the January 14, 1977 column in the New York Times
by Mr. John Oakes, do you subscribe to the suggestion in that article
that the CIA since it was founded has "frequently canted" its intelligence
estimates ?
As you know, there was a real question about this in the Kennedy
White House in connection with the Bay of Pigs. Let me reiterate
again to the committee that my pledge as DCI will be to insure that
the Intelligence Community maintains the highest standards of integrity
and objectivity possible, free from any biases.
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How can you reconcile your former conscientious objector status
with your responsibilities as head of an intelligence organization?
As Director I intend to serve to the utmost of my ability and will
carry out fully my statutory responsibilities.
I believe that my service as a civilian for the Government from 1951
to 1964 including my participation on the National Security Council's
Executive Committee during the Cuban Missile Crisis of 1962 attest
to this commitment.
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Do you approve of what Daniel Ellsberg did? Would you as head
of CIA support those who leak classified information as a matter of
conscience?
What action would you take as DCI if CIA employees leaked information?
I did feel that I had to agree with Ellsberg to submit an affidavit
indicating that he did not commit a criminal act.
As DCI I would not tolerate the revelation of classified information
by any unauthorized person.
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Would you leak classified information if ordered to do so by
President Carter, as you stated that you did on orders from
President Kennedy?
Serve as DCI at the pleasure of the President and with the consent
of the Senate. This is a sensitive question and involves presidential
prerogatives. I can assure you, however, that if so requested to
disclose foreign intelligence information I will assert my statutory
responsibilities to protect any intelligence sources and methods
involved.
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In your testimony carried in the New York Times you stated your
belief that Judges, Congress, and even citizens could make judgments
about classification. How do you reconcile these views with your
responsibilities as DCI?
I believe that the statement carries an implied rationale that given
the facts ....
I am aware now as head of CIA that some classification is required.
I stand on my earlier statements.
At the time of the Ellsberg disclosures, there was a national clamor
against oversecrecy in Government and the need for an open debate on
the critical issue of Vietnam.
I felt then as I do now, that there is overclassification in Government
and that any judge, Member of Congress or informed citizen can make a
judgment as to information which is clearly improperly classified. I
would have hoped that the Ellsberg incident would have served to focus
attention on the need to establish clear classification criteria and would
have drastically reduced overclassification.
As DCI I will make it my firm policy to protect only that information
which requires protection and to disclose as fully as possible information
consistent with proper security safeguards.
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Were you asked what position you would like in the new
administration and if so did you suggest the position of DCI?
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Concerning Chile, what was your role in or knowledge of US -sponsored
covert operations to overthrow the existing Chilean government in 1963-64,
which former ambassador Edward Korry alleges were "conceived by the
Kennedy Administration and executed by the Johnson team? "
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Do you belong to any organization, clubs etc. which have
restricted membership?
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Does your personal background and/or your former representation
of prominent Middle Eastern leaders present any problems to you in
terms of bias in judgment?
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 Approved Fo lease 2004/08/30 : CIA-RDP91 M0069faR000700110014-3
Have you or your firm ever represented a group or individual
in litigation against the CIA?
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 Approved Folease 2004/08/30 : CIA-RDP91 M0069W000700110014-3
To your knowledge, did any of your clients, personal or corporate,
have any contact or connection with the CIA? If yes, does this present
you with problems of conflict of interest?
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 Approved ForWIease 2004/08/30 : CIA-RDP91 M0069GROO0700110014-3
Do you have any classified documents now in your possession?
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 Approved For*0Iease 2004/08/30 : CIA-RDP91 M0069%R000700110014-3
As a staff aide to the President, did you sign any secrecy
agreements requiring CIA's prior approval before publishing any
classified information in your possession?
Were there any classified CIA documents in the material that
you removed from the White House, and what was the level of
classification?
Did you first check with anyone in CIA on the propriety of
publishing classified information?
Did you sign any security agreements during your previous Government
service?
Do you believe that you met the obligations of those agreements?
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Please comment whether you perceive any problems of personal
or professional conflict of interest or of personal bias arising from
your legal representation of:
a. Leon Templesman & Son and its chief, Maurice Templesman, who
we understand is a honorary counselor of 2"aire, and whose business
interests include prominent activities in South Africa, Zaire and some
connection with Chilelk
b. The government of Iran
This was a single negotiation in the fall of 1976 in which I was one
of several of the law partners participating for the government of Iran
with the Occidental Petroleum Company. It was not a personal relationship.
c. The government of Panama
d. The government of the Republic of the Congo (now Zaire)
e. Concerning Newfoundland, did your representation of Newfoundland
involve you in any matters of controversy concerning fishing rights or
lobster rights. (This might be of concern to Senator Hathaway of the
SSCI and other New England senators. )
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f. Egyptian President Anwar Sadat
In the fall of 1976, 1 represented Sadat in negotiations for publishing
a book that he has written.
g. Northville Industrial Corporation (independent oil distributors, transhipment
facilities in Bonaire, Netherlands, Antilles
h. Continential Grain Co.
i. General Motors Corporation
j. Kidder, Peabody (New York stockbrokers)
k. Lazard Freres
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1. Norton Simon, Inc.
M. Warner Communications, Inc.
n. Government of Sierra Leone
o. Landor Associates
p. Any other corporate or personal clients
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All CIA employees take a polygraph interview when they enter on
duty with the Agency. Would you volunteer to do the same?
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 40
E] UNCLASSIFI,~,Q NTERNAL r 1kAfl ^ SECRET
D rnvcrl I~a~l l)flfld/f1R/3f1 (_IA_RIIP n 6Q flld_3
ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET
SUBJECT: (optional)
FROM:
Legislative Counsel
EXTENSION
NO.
7D35 HQ
6126
DATE
10 January 1977
TO: (Officer designation, room number, and
building)
DATE
OFFICER'S
COMMENTS (Number each comment to show from whom
RECEIVED
FORWARDED
INITIALS
to whom. Draw a line across column after each comment.)
1. Richard Lehman
D/DCI/NIO
7E47 HQ
The attached questions and
answers were prepared by this offic
2.
for Mr. Sorensen in his upcoming
confirmation hearings before the
Senate Select Committee on Intellige
3.
We would appreciate your comments
by 3: 00 p.m. today. Thank you.
4.
2
5.
Office of Legislative Counsel
6.
7.
8.
9.
10.
11.
12.
13.
14.
15.
X1
FORM 61 0 USEDIITPREV IO S ^ SECRET ^ CONFIDENTIAL ^ INTERNAL ^ UNCLASSIFIED
3-62