DRAFT RESPONSE TO BILL BUNDY

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP91M00696R000700120003-4
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 12
• Document Creation Date: December 15, 2016
• Document Release Date: March 12, 2004
• Sequence Number: 3
• Publication Date: May 7, 1976
• Content Type: LETTER

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DATE
REPLY REQUESTED
7 May 1976
SPEED LETTER
LETTER NO.
YE
D
N-76-199
TO :
Dick Lehman
FROM:
William E. Nelson DD/O
ATTN:
SUBJECT: Draft response to Bill Bundy
Dick:
I scribbled some marginalia. On the whole
a good job.
Bill
SIGNATURE
REPLY
DATE
Page 2: This whole section strikes me as being dated. I'm not sure the
"
.
mood isn't changing faster even in the "mainstream
Page 5: I object to the DCI saying the underlined. The analyst may not like
clandestine activity but he ought to at least moot the point in view
of the fact that it is USG policy to do it.
(nor do we expect them to defend things they themselves do not accept)
Page 7: Compared to what? (Sentence reads: We desperately need clandestine
collection, but it is expensive and dangerous.
Page 8: Affected? Last sentence of last paragraph on page: In any case, ther
is no question that the nation's confidence in its intelligence
service has been shaken;
SIGNATURE
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F F
T T
Dear Bill,
Some days ago I promised you a reply to your thoughtful
letter. It has taken longer than I expected because your letter
served to trigger some reexamination of our situation.
Your thesis as we understand it is that the overt,
analytic side of the Agency should be organizationally di-
vorced from the clandestine. This would open the door to a
reestablishment of close links between intelligence analysis
and the intellectual resources of the universities. Confront-
ing this, we have asked ourselves four questions. What is the
present state of these relationships? What improvements could
be achieved by the divorce you propose? What would be its
costs? Would the costs be worth the gain?
Let me say at the beginning that I can only agree with
your view that the intelligence profession does not stand well
in what you call the "mainstream" of American thought. That
said, however, it must also be said that our problem is much
narrower in one sense and much broader in another than you
imply.
It is narrower because the opposition in principle to
clandestine operations is confined to a relatively small but
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TI
highly articulate and influential group. These critics are
strongest in the major universities, and strongest there in
the Eastern ones with which you and I are most familiar. With
a few exceptions, they represent the liberal arts and social
sciences rather than the physical sciences, and within the
social sciences they do not include many scholars of Communist
societies. On the other hand, the "mainstream" strongly in-
fluences the editorial: (and the news) content of the New York
Times, the Washiton Post, the New York Review of Books, the
New Yorker, etc. These publications build a sort of prison of
fashionable attitudes. When we deal with the currents of in-
tellectual life outside prison walls, we find a great deal of
sympathy and support.
On the other hand, the problem is much broader than intel-
ligence. The "mainstream" has, to varying degrees, turned its
back on defense and on foreign policy. A few will have nothing
to do with government itself. A much greater number believe
that our national energies should be concentrated on domestic
problems. Their concern over intelligence issues is obviously
great, partly because of the lurid way in which these issues
are presented and partly because these issues epitomize for
them the misdirection of American society. Nonetheless, their
concern is more a symptom of neo-isolationism than its cause.
We are convinced that any public acceptance of the Agency, or
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of its present analytic component, as a respectable participant
in American intellectual life must wait until the "mainstream"
rediscovers that guilt is no substitute for foreign policy in
a less than benign world and until it again becomes respectable
to participate and assist in national government.
Even then, I concede, we will have problems, but not as
great as you anticipate. The fact is that we have never been
isolated from the best of academia even during the worst of
the recent period. In fact, we are probably less "monastic"
now than we have ever been. The difference is that the people
with whom we deal find it necessary to be circumspect if they
are not to be hounded by the emotional and the trendy among
their colleagues. For this reason you are probably unaware
just how deep and extensive these relationships are. Some ex-
amples, at the risk of inflicting on you a statistic or 'two:
-- You tell of the immense amount of contact
that "used to exist" between the overt
side and the universities. The Office
of Political Research (formed when ONE
was broken up) has maintained through
all the nastiness of the past few years
regular and active exchange:
? At Harvard, Princeton, Stan-
ford, MIT, Amherst, etc.,
with 39 senior faculty;
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'At Chicago, California, Michigan,
etc., with 41 senior faculty;
? At other institutions (in
cluding six foreign) with 32
senior faculty.
-- You asked how long it has been since a scholar
from the outside joined the Agency for a year
or so. The answer is that there are two such
on board now.
-- You note that our people used to be able to
go freely to academic centers. This year
we have 17 analysts on sabbaticals at various
universities. Over a hundred others, openly
identified as CIA, have attended almost 60
professional meetings (American Political
Science Association, etc.) and 32 presented
or were scheduled discussants of papers.
-- OPR and the Offices of Economic and Strategic
Research all have panels of distinguished
scholars to review their output and their
programs. Many of these people put in a
good deal of time at Langley.
Perhaps in the long run more important, we are making a
major effort to breaK our product out of its security wrappings.
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Tw.J
There is already a respectable flow of unclassified or declassi-
fied CIA product to the academic world. We'expect it to grow.
In our experience, all but the most hysterical of faculty
and students are sophisticated enough to make a distinction be-
tween the overt and analytic and the covert and operational.
While our analysts on campus have a great deal of arguing to
do when there are revelations of clandestine activity, they are
lei
not held responsible, nor do we expect them to defend things
.`' they themselves do not accept.
Recruiting is another matter. It is true that we have
more exceptional applicants than we can take, and that we are
able to hire impressive young officers. You are quite right,
however, that we are not drawing the cream of the crop as both
DDI and DDP did in the 50's. I wish this were not the case, but
the fact-is that in the 70's people of this caliber simply are
not interested in federal service of any kind (except possibly
Congressional staff work).
We assess our academic relationships, taken overall, not
to be in bad shape, especially when we consider the strains to
which they have been subjected by largely irrelevant events.
Obviously they can be improved. In particular we would like to
have the very best men from the very best schools competing to
join usand we would prefer that our associates on the campuses
did not have to worry over the effect their association might
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have on their students or their peers. A divorce from the Clan-
destine Services would help, at least in the latter instance,
but its effect on recruitment or on our ability to broaden our
present exchanges would be marginal. Any fundamental change
must await an even more fundamental change in the fashionable
view of what an intellectual owes to his country. This will
depend more on the personality and policies of the next Presi-
dent, or the one after that, than on anything we do in intel-
1igence.
What do we lose by separation of analysis from operations?
In our view, a great deal. It is interesting that the Senate
Select Committee and its staff opened.4w, hearings largely con-
vinced that there should be a divorce and ended, grudgingly,
much less convinced. Its recommendation (pp. 449-451, copy
attached) finally was that the new Oversight Committee should
"give consideration" to this. idea. Its objective, moreover,
was primarily to relieve the DCI of a potential conflict of
interest. The Harvard University Institute of Politics, Study
Group on Intelligence Activities, produced a paper on this sub-
ject vihich is also quoted in the Select Connittee's report
(pp. 527-532, copy attached). I think the Study Group has the
equities about right, especially in the dangers of placing the
DDO in State or Defense, or of trying to maintain it in an in-
dependent position.
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I would put even more weight, however, on the interdepen-
dence of Operations, Intelligence, and Science and Technology.
As you remember, the linkage between the analyst and the clan-
destine operator was once tenuous indeed. It is still not as
close as we would like it, but year by year it improves;
In your letter you treat only with the substantive con-
tribution that the operator can make. I think you downplay far
too much the value of lengthy,on the scene immersion in a
nation's politics, but there is an even more important consider-
ation. We desperately need clandestine collection, but it is
expensive and dangerous. We cannot afford to have it operate
in a vacuum if it is to operate with reasonable efficiency and
minimum risk. It must therefore be closely linked to the analys ;;r
function. The greatest value of this. relationship comes from
the contribution of the analyst, not of the operator. The
operator learns from the analyst what sources to seek and what
questions to ask. He gets a continuous evaluation of his pro-
duct. The analyst in turn gets a clear picture of the reliability
and access, of the source, and he can ask the follow-up questions.
Thus, the collection process can be steered to make it more re-
sponsive to national requirements, and to make the ultimate
product substantially more reliable.
In sum, we come out with different answers than yours on
the four questions posed earlier. First, our external relation-
ships in this country, while hardly ideal, are not in bad shape.
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Certainly they have not been so damaged that radical surgery
is essential. Second, we doubt that the surgery you propose
would cure the patient; our particular difficulties are symp-
toms of a more general malady. Third, we rate the costs and
risks of the operation considerably higher than you do. Finally,
as we add these answers up in May 1976, the costs do not seem
worth the gains.
One additional point. I think you will find that the
concept of an evaluation function independent of policymaking
is firmly lodged in doctrine. Our officers from top to bottom
take it seriously indeed. Had j any mind to change it, I would
lose our best people by platoons. Nor are they unaware that,
they have no monopoly on knowledge and wisdom. They are en-
couraged to face outward, to seek information and advice wherever
it, may be had, and to engage in informed debate with their lay
colleagues. And this exchange, even in these harried times,
continues to be fruitful.
I do not wish to appear complacent, however. After a
bruising political campaign things may add up quite differently.
Nor have we had time to assess the impact on the public of
the Select Committee's report. In any case, there is no question
that the nation's confidence in its intelligence service has
been shaken; restoration of that confidence is my highest pri-
ority, and I will do whatever seems needed.
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For now, our emphasis is on seeking greater understanding
in the Congress and the press. After a few months, we will take
another look. If organizational measures look sensible, we'll
take them. As you point out, these are not things to be rushed
at.
Again, many thanks for your letter. As you can see, we
take these questions seriously. And it is healthy that we can
debate them seriously with our distinguished alumni.
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ATE
TRANSMITTAL SLIP D ,- May 76
TO:
ROOM NO. BUI D
7E26 Hqs.
At long last a draft response to
Bill Bundy. The delay is mainly be-
cause I found great difficulty in
finding a suitable tone. Please let
me have any comments by COB Thursday,
6 May. I hope to get it to the DCI
Monday next.
Richard Lehman
ROOM NO. BUILDING
7E44 H~
I FORM O 24 I REPLACES FORM 36-8 FEB WHICH MAY BE USED.
t!T7
(47)
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