WHERE YOU SHOULD SIT

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP91M00696R000800010001-7
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 13
• Document Creation Date: December 15, 2016
• Document Release Date: August 5, 2004
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: January 2, 1976
• Content Type: MF

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2 January 1976
MEMORANDUM FOR: Ambassador Bush
SUBJECT Where You Should Sit
1. As you requested, we have convened the available
members of the CIA Study Group to develop for you the
issues you should consider in deciding where to locate
your office. In this paper we examine the relative
merits of the White House, the EOB, some other downtown
location such as East Building, and Langley itself, in
terms first of symbolism and second of the practical
necessity for staff support. Both symbolic and practical
factors could have quite different weights, however,
if the DCI's role were radically changed. We therefore
discuss the potential impact of the various organiza-
tional options now on the table, and finally make some
tentative recommendations.
Location as a Symbol
2. For the President. The President's interests
in this matter will of course govern. He has not to
our knowledge stated a view, but we assume that his
interests and yours are parallel: you should be located
where you can best provide'him substantive* support and
manage the national intelligence apparatus.
3. For the Congress. In your confirmation hearings,
it was made emphatically clear that Congress continues
to expect the DCI to be apolitical. Congress established
the DCI and CIA to provide an objective view of events
foreign, independent of policy or politics. As great
national issues such as arms limitation agreements and
weaponry budgets have come to depend more and more on
Throughout this paper, the word "substantive" is used
to mean the subject matter of intelligence, the product
of the system.
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intelligence assessments, Congress in dealing with these
issues has increasingly looked to the DCI to provide
it the same kind of independent assessment that he
provides the Executive. Congress has also become,
rightly or wrongly, increasingly suspicious of any
military influence on those assessments.
4. We believe that the Congress would view your
setting up headquarters in the White House, or even
in the EOB, as associating you too closely with policy
and politics, especially given the circumstances of
your confirmation hearings. And indeed we believe it
would be very difficult for you to'avoid being caught
up in matters outside the intelligence field if you,
as a close associate of the President, were so con-
veniently placed. Congress would presumably be in-
different as to whether you placed yourself at East
Building or at Langley. We are convinced, however,
that in the present atmosphere the reaction on the
Hill to your moving into the White House or EOB would
greatly complicate your task in taking over an already
complex job.
5. For the Community. The senior officers of
the Community and their departmental supervisors will
be interested in two matters: the extent to which the
DCI wields real power, either directly through authorities
granted him or indirectly through his relations with
the President; the extent to which the DCI will be
"impartial" in judging Community issues, i.e. will
separate himself from the interests of CIA. The first
of these is of course crucial to your success in estab-
lishing yourself as DCI. To us the second is considerably
less important.
6. The National Security Act of 1947 established
CIA as the DCI's staff. The other agencies of the
Community, however, view CIA as on an equal footing
with them under the DCI as Community leader. Although
this issue has never been fully resolved, past DCI's
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have increasingly made a distinction between Agency
and Community affairs. If this reflected an increase
in the DCI's real power over the Community as a whole,
it would have some logic behind it, but in the absence
of such authority it merely results in weakening his
ties to his institutional base in CIA. Moreover, if
a DCI is to be "impartial," particularly in judging
substantive issues, and if he is to be "above" CIA.,
he will have to develop a new substantive staff of his
own to enable him to do so. Not only would this be
complex and. expensive, but it would de:;troy the raison
d'etre of the CIA analytic organization, a national
asset unchallenged as the best the government has.*
7. From the Community point of view, this adds
up as follows. operating from an office in the White
House would clearly reinforce your position within the
bureaucracy, where you would be seen as wielding Presi-
dent.i.a.l authority. Location in the EOB would convey
the same impression, but somewhat less strongly. A
DCI working from East Building or Langley, however,
would need to symbolize Presidential backing in other
ways. (This is relatively easy and we recommend some
ways to do it below.) An appearance of impartiality
on Community issues can be achieved by locating anywhere
except at CIA Headquarters, and it may well be desirable
to provide a symbol that your responsibilities to the
Community are important. But we believe that under
present circumstances this is not an issue that should
be governing in your decision.
S. For CIA. CIA views itself as the DCI's real
strength. It feels it has been unjustly pilloried and
ridiculed by the Congress and the press. It has been
held together by a discipline and esprit that is not
*Thi.s is not said from complacency. It could be a
great deal better.
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ti
usually seen in government these days. This cohesive-
ness is maintained primarily by the confidence of
professional officers that the duties they are perform-
ing in the national interest will eventually be confirmed
by Congress and the public as an essential and patriotic
service. Any move by a DCI that could be interpreted
as an attempt to disassociate himself from CIA would be
destructive indeed. A move downtown would be seen in
this light, unless it was made in the context of a
reorganization endorsed by the Congress that reaffirmed
the necessity for a strong and independent CIA. On the
other hand, CIA has been restive under the situation
that has arisen when the DCIrs Community responsibilities
and staff are co-located and organizationally confused
with his Agency ones. Physical separation of his
Intelligence Community staff from CIA would clarify
roles and relieve tensions.
The Problem of Staff Support
9. As stated above, the DCI's responsibilities to
the President are to give him the best possible substan-
tive support and to manage the Community with maximum
efficiency. For an officer serving the President it
is of course desirable to be located as close to the
Oval office as possible, but this must be balanced
against his need for enough staff to be effective.
A White House office probably could accommodate no more
than a personal assistant and a secretary or two. In
the EOB it might be possible, given enough Presidential
steam, to stake out space for, say, 50. The East Build-
ing complex could'be rebuilt to house several hundred.
Langley can house several thousand. It is presently
overcrowded, but could absorb additional DCI staff.*
10. The question then is how much staff you will
need in your immediate office: Here we distinguish between
management and resource matters and substantive ones.
They are equally important but quite different. The
former tend to arise on a periodic basis; they in-
volve relatively small paper flows and meetings with
*It would also Be possible to establish an entirely
new headquarters downtowzr, but expense and time con-
siderations would argue against it.
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relatively few people; they move at a deliberate pace;
meetings and decisions can usually be scheduled well
in advance. For these reasons it might be possible to
manage the Community and even the Agency from a downtown
location with an immediate staff of 50-100 people,
although at some inconvenience to your senior component
heads.
.ll. Substance is quite another matter. Events
abroad cannot be scheduled and the flow of incoming
intelligence is continuous. Meetings'tend to be called
on short notice. The flow of paper is large (about 1.5
million individual messages and documents a year into
CIA), the number of people required to handle, absorb,
select and analyze is also large (over 2000 in CIA)
and there are substantial requirements for computer
support. The range of subject matter is wide; DCI's
have in the past found they can develop understanding
most efficiently by discussion with the desk analysts
themselves in various combinations.
12. We believe that substance underlies every
phase of the DCI's activities, including the managerial
and that he cannot be effective in any of them without
a strong substantive base. One of the DCI's primary
functions is to participate personally in the deli-
berations of the NSC, Verification Panel, WSAG, etc.
The president's need for efficient management of
intelligence is evident only at budget tie; his need
for information and judgment is continuous. Moreover,
the DCI was put in business by the Congress to
"correlate and evaluate," and Congress continues to
expect him personally to provide a substantive input
to it as well as to the Executive. Equally important,
responsible choices among expensive collection means
and sophisticated assessment of intelligence perfor-
mance can only be made on the basis of solid under-
standing of the substantive issues.
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13. We are convinced that you must retain a
strong substantive analytic capability under your
control if you are to perform these functions, and
in part.cular to give independent assessments to the
President, the NSC, and Congress. Whether this control
is exercised directly, or through a Deputy Director, or
through a separate Director of CIA is not crucially
Important. What is important is that you be able to
draw on resources that are dedicated to serving you
and your customers, something no departmental intelli-
gence organization can or should undertake to do.
Moreover, Particularly in the military' analysis field
where very large Service budgets are at stake, you
must be in a position to assure the President and
Congress that you have independently checked Community
findings. In the real world, this can only be done
by relying on your own analysts for key portions of
the work.
14. It is theoretically possible for CIA at
.Langley to provide a DCI downtown with the substan-
tive input he now gets, but the practical problems
would be very great. Electrical corctmun.ications are
no substitute for personal contact. The costs in
supervisor and analyst time alone would be excessive.
There would be a major loss in the responsiveness of
the system under normal conditions, and in crisis
confusion and wear and tear on human beings would be
multiplied. Moreover, taking analysts away from Langley
to brief the DCI would remove the key men from the infor-
mation flow. These considerations would hold whether or
not the DCI has an NIO Staff. The NIO's must have
personal contact with the DCI, but they must also have
personal and continuous contact with the analytic base.
15. If you are to play a strong substantive role
as we believe you must, your practical alternatives
are to install yourself at Langley or to move CIA pro-
duction downtown with you.* The complications of moving
downtown, however, are so great that we recommend you
consider it only if you see major bureaucratic advantage
to be gained in the context of a radical reorganization.
it would place you near the President with a very strong
staff (but the size of that staff would rule out the
White House, EOB or even'the East Building complex).
in- the longer run, explore technological substitutes.
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On the other hand, it would be a major undertaking(
expensive in time, money, and disruption. It would
involve almost all the Directorate of intelligence,
major portions of the Directorate of Science and
Technology, and a number of support functions, notably
computer facilities. (These elements are tightly
integrated; there is no way they could themselves
be divided without great cost in efficiency). Moreover,
the integration of production with the collection and
R&D functions of CIA is mutually strengthening, and
this too would be lost.
16. Finally, we would emphasize one general. ob-
servation. Ease of consultation 'and personal contact
is extremely important to the efficiency and cohesive-
ness of organizations. Fourteen years ago CIA assembled
the central elements of its Directorates at Langley.
It is :not an exaggeration to say that the Agency could
not have met the challenges of the 60's and 70's if these
components had. been physically separated as well as
semi-autonomous. Transactions that require a walk to
the next wing usually are carried out; components linked
by a shuttle-bus trip tend to work in isolation from
one another, and misunderstandings grow. A manager who
can assemble the experts he needs in five minutes can.
operate efficiently; one who needs an hour will gradually
accumulate new experts in his immediate office. We
believe a DCI who does not spend a great deal of his
time at Langley will inevitably be forced over time
to build a new and duplicative CIA around him.
impact of Organizational Change
17. In this section we discuss the six options
contained in the NSC/OMB Study, plus the variant sug-
gested by Mr. Colby, in the light of these symbolic and
practical considerations.
18. Option I, the unitary organization containing
CIA, NRO, and NSA. The major changes necessary to.
create such an organization and make it effective have
not been addressed and would presumably be the primary
duty of its first director. For this purpose he would
have to engage himself deeply in the affairs of all
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E:.
three organizations and, initially at least, might need
to delegate his substantive responsibilities. He would,
., need a substantial staff. Under these
nonetheless
circumstances he might consider East Building, more or
less centrally located among Langley, the Pentagon, and
Ft. Meade. Neither the White House nor the EOB could
accommodate him, but his institutional authority would
be so great that indirect signs of Presidential support
would be no more important than they are to Cabinet
officers.
1.9. Options II and I.IA, the DGI With budgetary
authority over. NR5 and NSA. The DGI of these options
would. be institutionally quite strong, though not as
strong as under option I. His Community role and his
relations with Defense would be important and would
require a large staff; it might be desirable for him
to set these apart from his CIA role. On the other
hand, he would need CIA's substantive support. He might
therefore consider splitting his office, maintaining a
Community office and staff at East Building, but keeping
his personal headquarters at Langley. (The considerations
with regard to the White House and EOB are the same under
Option II as under Option I.) Option IIA, which sub-
ordinates CIA production directly to the DGI, is a
situation in which he might see moving these elements
downtown as advantageous. Because he would not need
an office at Langley, his position as Community leader
could be emphasized.
20. Option IV and Mr. Colby's variant, a slightly
strengthened DCI. Mr. Colby's proposal calls for two
offices and two deputy DCI's, one downtown with the
DCI's Community Staff, one at Langley with the Agency;
such an arrangement is equally consistent with NSC/OMB
Option IV.. We believe it would be both practical and
desirable, if the DCI's institutional ties to CIA were
not wakened thereby. While Mr. Colby had East Building
in mind, an EOB location could also be considered.
The IC1 will need every bit of Presidential support he
can get, and we believe the Congress would not see this
arrangement as "politicizing" the DCI as long as his
primary office continued to be at Langley.
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21. C ions III and IIIA, the DFI as coordinator.
The DF1 would be weaker than the present DCI. To
remain effective, he would have two realistic choices:
to place himself at Langley and tie himself as closely
as possible to CIA (in effect, to treat the DCIA as a
Deputy); or to place himself in the White House, with a
staff in the EOB, and make the most of his role as
Presidential staff officer. Under IIIh, with CIA pro-
duction trasnferred to the departments, we believe he
would have no choice but to function from the White
House or NSC complex*. Under these options location
at East Building would be the worst course; it would
effectively isolate the DFI.
Recommendations
22. In sum, there are four 'fundamental considerations
that must govern your job as DCI:
---For the President you should be the senior
national intelligence officer and manager
of the Community (and maintain the staff this
requires).
--For the Congress, you should provide assurance
that you are able to take positions independent
of the policy departments and of political con-
cerns.
--For the Community, you should demonstrate that
you have the President's confidence and backing
as its manager.
-For CIA, you should cement your institutional
base through leadership and participation.
23. The problem that confronts any DCI is how he
reconciles these irreconcilables, at what point he chooses
to stand on a scale that runs between total concentration
on. management of the Community and total concentration
on substantive issues. Your predecessors have repeatedly
considered moving their offices out of Langley to con-
centrate on management and have repeatedly rejected the
idea as inconsistent with what they believed were the
substantive requirements of the job. The next few months,
His job would be quite different. from that of the
present DCI and Congress' concern over this might be
less.
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however, could see a redefinition of the DCI`s role
to emphasize his management responsibilities. None-
theless, given the uncertainties in the present
situation, we recommend that you:
--First. Maintain an apolitical position. This
means that unless the job is radically changed
you should avoid locating yourself too close to
the President.
--Second.. Maintain your institutional. links to CIA,
especially to its analytic elements. This means
spending at least half your tim6 at Langley, and
keeping your substantive staff there.
--Third. Establish the fact that you have Presidential
backing through devices that do not have political
overtones. For instance, we understand that
President Ford is considering a revival of President
Johnson's "Tuesday Lunch" (Rusk, McNamara, Wheeler,
Helms, Rostow). Your presence there would make
point. You might also consider:
* A. weekly appointment with the President.
Regular participation in the President's
morning intelligence briefing. (This is
manageable, even daily, although it would
be onerous.
? Maintaining an accommodation office in the
EOB. Such a pied-a-terre would not require
full-time staff, but its existence would
carry some bureaucratic weight. You might
well hold certain meetings there to under-
score your position.
-Fourth. Consider seriously placing your Community
staff in East Building and maintaining an office
there. However the Community is eventually
organized, there are psychological advantages
in making a clearer distinction between your
Community and CIA roles, and there are points
be gained in CIA by straightening lines
between you and it.
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--Fifth. More generally, do not cut your
direct ties to Langley unless you have
acquired statutory authorities much stronger
than those you now have.
L.
C.
Dirks
G.
F.
Donnallev
J.
H.
Taylor
R.
Lehman
4;t~ 8 6 XV .aa
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 Strong
DCI.
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OPTIONS
Schlesinger
Taylor NSC OMB
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DCi DCI's Resource
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"Monolith"i National/Departmental Balance"
DNI DGI/SEP DCIA I DGI/SEP DCIA
III Repts thru DGIi Repts thru DGI
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Prc grams Programs Pao rams
DNI
DNI
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EXCOM
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assumes responsibilities
Chart assumes new Deputy Secretary of Defense
Ca ec1ve
11
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(Variant on IV)'
DCI, 2 DEPS
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DCI
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DDCI
of ASD(1)
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~_~ ------- -_ _ .Defense
Coordinator Wak Coordinator, efense Or
"Status Quo Plus" I ~~ ------ -"
IV
II
Rejected
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III
Advises on Advises on NFIP,
DFI/SEP DCIA I DFI/SEP DCIh
Advises on ! Advises on
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Dep Sec
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NFIP,
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