(SANITIZED) THOUGHTS ON USIB REORGANIZATION

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP91M00696R000900010001-6
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: C
• Document Page Count: 5
• Document Creation Date: December 20, 2016
• Sequence Number: 1
• Content Type: NOTES

Approved For Release 2006/05/29: CIA-RDP91M00696R000900010001-6
vUad7o V~Tj L
THE DIRECTR OF 1-0 # D V --?o/
VENTRAL INTFENCE
National Intelligence Officers 12 March 1976
NOTE FOR: Director of Centrai-'Intelligence
FROM . George A. Carver, Jr.
Deputy for National Intelligence Officers
SUBJECT Thoughts on USIB
Reorganization
1. Attached an informal note from my
colleague (the NIO for Conventional
Forces) w was intended only for me but which
I think merits your reading. You can skip the first
paragraph, which deals with issues we have already
discussed at some length; but Dan's specific
thoughts on the reorganization of USIB (beginning
at paragraph 2) are worth considering.
2. Dan has a background, hence, perspective that
i
s unique. In his Navy career, he has alternated in
duty between intelligence billets and line. positions
at sea, including command in combat at various
echelons from a single ship to a flotilla of which
he was the admiral. He has also served most
effectively on the DCI's staff as an NIO. He thus
can view the USIB problem from a point of view o!-a military consumer, a military intelligence officer,
and from the perspective of your office.
j George A. Carver, Jr.
D/DCI/NIO
cc: Mr. Lehman
Mr. Knoche CN' i i.; iA
 pproved.Fpr Rase 20:005129 : CIA- WP91
ty f
MEMORANDUM FOR: D/DCI/NIO
SUBJECT : USIB Reorganization
1. You requested that any strong feelings on various re-
organization ideas be provided to you. I continue to agree with
your draft memorandum of last week on the position of the NIO
structure, recommending the deferral of some other broader Community
type reorganizations until certain basic decisions had been made.
It well covered the subject. Specifically, I favor your option for
the NIOs as a separate DCI staff element (under a leader who for
cosmetic conformity to the Executive Order should not be called
"Deputy" but rather something else.) I regard the options placing
NIOs under any part of the CIA structure as not good in that the NIOs
would necessarily appear to be part of one agency (and in due course
probably become so). I concur in your rationale for not subordinating.
them under the IC staff -- although this option is less objectionable
than the others. I also favor continuation of the "extended range
functions" as presently limited as useful to the DCI, although I have
not yet found the need to move in on reconnaissance as have some of
our colleagues. I do not favor the restoration of any significant
 Approved For Release 2t ffj s; 5A r IM00696R 00900010001-6
group of drafters styled a la ONE - because such an organization
reduces participation by the community in the highest and most
important level of national production. I also favor a strong
(but separate) voice for CIA in USIB deliberations and, as is
explained below, more rather than less participation by the in-
dividual military services.
2. In your discussion, you specifically recommended deferral
of restructuring USIB at the present time. I agree again but do
wish to lay out for your future consideration some thoughts on USIB
reorganization particularly as it concerns participation by the
military services.
3. There are two conflicting considerations on the role of the
military services in substantive intelligence discussions, and the
possible effects of such roles.
A. One viewpoint considers that with a voice for DIA (or
some reconstituted variant) and the separate services as well at
USIB, the military in effect have four votes toward substantive
decisions. This in turn can allow a monolithic stand against the
wishes of those agencies not similarly unified. In addition, so many
of the positions taken by service representatives are parochial in
CQi-NHXNI IA' L
Annrnvcrr' Cnr Dolo.+nr, nnnnm_c>n r'in r J)n4nnnnr1nr+r-~n
 pp; : :I? ; r:
Approved For R se 6%O~12~:`CA-'Rb 1M00696R 0900010001-6
.10
nature and often waste needless and valuable time at the conference
table. Assuming that NIEs and SNIEs continue to represent the DCI's
text (vice the USIB members) and that voting at USIB meetings will not
be instituted, this argument does become specious in a practical sense.
I have observed that parochialism is not exclusively reserved to the
services and others are just as obstinate with much smaller parishes.
B. An opposing viewpoint holds that because the services (out
of tactical necessity) will continue to have analytical skills, often
unique experiences, and practical as well as theoretical knowledge
on military matters they should have at least as strong a voice in
(reconstituted) USIB deliberations as they do at present. This also
has the advantage of having nor-.tendency toward suppression of dissenting
views. The DCI can best be served by being advised of both sides of
contentious substantive issues particularly where the subject matter
(e.g. military) may be outside his background knowledge. With some
14 years in the intelligence business, I have observed at USIB de-
liberations some personalities of very strong personal and professional
opinion-(a recent Director DIA and a slightly earlier one at NSA readily
come to mind) whose single voice could well ignore opinions he did not
share. Such opinions, while they may seem parochial, may also be right.
Actually we have all observed that when parochialism manifests itself at
the USIB table, either orally or in dissenting footnote, it is so very
patent that it redounds to the discredit of its exponent.
C i'h i ]' El _. 1 A
t
AnnrryPd FcrR?I?asP 200Fi105129 - CIA-RDP91M00696R000900010001-6
 Approved For Release ill, M00696R 0900010001-6
-4-
4. In this assignment I have observed genuine (and not illogical)
fear of military dominance in substantive intelligence and less strongly
manifest, but nonethiess there, a fear of the appearance of being
dominated by the military. The hypersensitivity reflected by the
latter is obviously an overreaction which should be watched, lest it
lead to the underrepresentation of military viewpoints.
5. The outcome of any OSD reorganization of military intelligence
remains unknown, but it is not beyond reason to foresee a somewhat
truncated DIA working for OSD, and a smaller J-2 working in the Joint
Staff. If both have estimative functions, we are liable to see efforts
to seat both at-a reconstituted USIB, possibly at the expense of the
service intelligence organizations. Should such come to pass, I favor,
and so recommend, that the military services continue to have at least
as much voice in substantive intelligence output at national level as
at present.
1-DEB
C?iiL1'tJiP
AnnrnvPrl Fnr RPIPasP 2006/051?9 - (IA-RfP91M00696R000900010001-6