MEMORANDUM TO DR. CHAMBERLAIN

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP91M00696R000900030001-4
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 27
• Document Creation Date: December 16, 2016
• Document Release Date: October 8, 2004
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: March 11, 1976
• Content Type: MEMO

Approved For?ease 2004/11/04: CIA-RDP91M00694000900030001-4
1. draft has incorporated all of the substantive
points in the two DOD drafts. The definitions in one of the DOD drafts
are stated in the proposed NSCID 1 and apply to all NSCIDs and DCIDs.
They do not have to be repeated here.
2. Suggest that you support
amendments:
draft with the following
a. Add to the end of paragraph 2: "Intelligence Community
organizations shall contribute in their areas of responsibility
to the national intelligence products produced under the auspices
of the Director of Central Intelligence." This is taken from
the second page of the DOD drafts and levies a requirement not
stated elsewhere.
b. "other requirements..." in the last line of paragraph 3
is vague. Suggest that the last line be replaced with: "national
intelligence requirements." This language would identify the DCI
as the source of "other requirements relating to the national
security" in accord with paragraph 2 of this NSCID.
c. Change "...a national level current intelligence
publication..." in the second line of paragraph 5a to:
"...national current intelligence items and publications..."
This would make the term consistent with the definitions
of national intelligence and current intelligence, would
permit more than one national current intelligence publi-
cation, and would be consistent with the last sentence
of paragraph 5b., which calls for contributions to items
as well as publications.
d. In paragraph 6b, change "...departments and agencies
of the Intelligence Community." to "...Intelligence Community
organizations." This would be consistent with the definitions
in Section 2(b) of E.O. 11905.
25
Approved For Release 2004/11/04: CIA-RDP91M00696R000900030001-4
 Approved For Sase 2004/11/04: CIA-RDP91M006900900030001-4
e. Paragraph 7(b) calls for the DCI to make the
determination of where to place new production responsibilities.
The DOD drafts call for the CFI to make this determination.
On the basis of responsibilities assigned to the CFI and the
DCI in the E.O., this could be argued either way. The present
NSCID 3 calls for the DCI, in consultation with USIB,to make
this determination. This may be a task for a follow-on to
USIB. Propose that it be left as a DCI responsibility, even
if he exercises it as Chairman of CFI.
25
Approved For Release 2004/1 ?CIA-RDP91 M00696R000900030001-4
 ILLEGIB Approved For Release 2004/11/04: CIA-RDP91M00696R000900030001-4
Approved For Release 2004/11/04: CIA-RDP91M00696R000900030001-4
 Approved For ease 2004/11I04,;,.CIA-RDP91M00696 0900030001-4
Those intelligence activities in which U. S. Government sponsor-
ship riy be revealed on a need- to--know basis, but the public disclosure
of.which could be detrimental to the United States. These activities
may be classified, and include, among other activities, collection
of foreign positive intelligence information, (as authorized by
NSCID-2), certain.operational support, overt acquisition of foreign
OVEMP ACTTVIT7:}:S
? materiel, monitoring of foreign radio and television broadcasts,
exploitation of foreign press information, and certain exploitation
of defectors and other special aliens,_the interrogation of refugees,
escapees and PO,Ts, and the debriefing of non-briefed and certain
briefed legal travellers.,
Approved For Release 2004/11/04: CIA-RDP91M00696R000900030001-4
 jp :, N
Approved For ?ase 2004/11/04: CIA-RDP91M00690900030001-4
NSCID No. 3
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL INTELLIGENCE
Intelligence Production
For the purpose of coordinating the foreign intelligence
production activities of the several Government departments
and agencies in the interest of national security, and pursuant
to the provisions of Section 102 of the National Security Act of
1947, as amended, and Executive Order 11905, 18 February 1976,
the National Security Council hereby authorizes and directs that:
E.O.
3. (d) (iv)
1. The Director of Central Intelligence shall:
a. Act as the President's primary adviser on foreign
intelligence and provide him and other officials in the
Executive Branch with foreign intelligence including National
Intelligence Estimates; develop national intelligence require-
ments and priorities; and supervise production and dissemina-
tion of national intelligence.
b. Act as the principal spokesman to the Congress for
3. (d) (xi) the Intelligence Community and facilitate the use of foreign
intelligence products by Congress.
c. Promote the development and maintenance by the
Central Intelligence Agency of services of common concern
3. (d)(xii) to the Intelligence Community organizations, including multi-
discipline analysis, national level intelligence products, and
a national level current intelligence publication.
3. (d) (xv)
d. Consult with users and producers of intelligence,
including the Departments of State, Treasury and Defense,
the military services, the Federal Bureau of Investigation,
the Energy Research and Development Administration, and
the Council of Economic Advisors, to ensure the timeliness,
relevancy and quality of the intelligence product.
Approved For Release 2004/11/04: CIA-RDP91M00696R000900030001-4
 Approved For ease 2004/11/04: CIA-RDP91M0069E00900030001-4
2. The senior officials of the CIA, Departments of State,
Treasury, and Defense, ERDA and the FBI shall contribute in
4. (a) (2) areas of his responsibility to the national intelligence products
produced under auspices of the Director of Central Intelligence.
3. The Central Intelligence Agency shall produce and dissem-
inate foreign intelligence relating to the national security, including
foreign political, economic, scientific, technical, military,
4. (b)(2) sociological and geographic intelligence to meet the needs of the
President, the National Security Council, and other elements of the
United States Government.
4. The Secretary of State shall produce and disseminate
foreign intelligence relating to United States foreign policy as
4. (c) (2) required for the execution of his responsibilities and in support
of policy-makers involved in foreign relations with the United
States Government.
5. The Secretary of the Treasury shall produce that intel-
4. (d)(3) ligence required for the execution of the Secretary's interdepartmental
responsibilities and the mission of the Department of the Treasury;
4. (d)(4) and contribute intelligence and guidance required for the development
of national intelligence.
6. The Secretary of Defense shall produce and disseminate,
as appropriate, intelligence emphasizing foreign military capabilities
and intentions and scientific, technical and economic developments
pertinent to his responsibilities.
7. The Administrator of the Energy Research and Development
Administration shall produce intelligence required for the execution
of his responsibilities and the mission of the Energy Research and
Development Administration, including the area of nuclear and
atomic energy.
Approved For Release 2004/11/04: CIA-RDP91M00696R000900030001-4
 0 9
Approved For Release 2004/11/04: CIA-RDP91M00696 00900030001-4
Intelligence Community Staff
DCI/IC-76-1268
MEMORANDUM FOR: Members of the Committee on Foreign Intelligence
FROM E. H. Knoche
Acting Deputy to the DCI for the
Intelligence Community
SUBJECT Revision of NSCID No. 3, "Intelligence Production"
a. A redraft of the existing NSCID No. 3, which it
is recommended the CFI approve for forwarding to the
National Security Council as part of a proposed new package
of NSCIDs. (Tab A)
b. The existing NSCID No. 3, effective 17 February
2. In accordance with your direction at the 25 February
CFI meeting, the existing NSCID No. 3 has been reviewed in the
light of Executive Order 11905. The result is a complete rewriting
of NSCID No. 3, in part because much of the present NSCID deals
with the National Intelligence Survey program which has been
terminated. Differences between the NSCID now in effect and the
revision are these: (Paragraph numbers are keyed to the revision.)
a. Title First two words deleted:
GGORBINATION-OF INTELLIGENCE PRODUCTION
Approved For Release 2004/11/04: CIA-RDP91M00696R000900030001-4
 Approved For Rase 2004/11/04: CIA-RDP91M00696000900030001-4
b. Preamble
A new preamble has been substituted, using words
provided by the CIA General Counsel. The purpose is to
make clear that all of the relevant authorities available
to the President and the NSC are the legal basis for the
NSCIDs.
c. Paragraph 1
The subparagraphs describing production and
dissemination responsibilities of the various Intelligence
Community elements contain the exact wording from pertinent
subparagraphs of the Executive Order. This replaces
paragraph 7 a. through d. of the existing NSCID.
d. Paragraph 2
The definition of national intelligence is a
shortened version of what now appears in paragraph 5 of
NSCID No. 3. Subparagraph b. is from E.O. 11905, Section
3 (d) (1) (iv) and Section 4 (a) (2).
e. Paragraph 3
The definition of departmental intelligence is
from paragraph 3 of the existing NSCID No. 3. Subparagraph
b. is adapted from paragraph 6 of the existing NSCID No. 3.
f. Paragraph 4
Subparagraph a: The definition of interdepart-
mental intelligence is from paragraph 4 of the existing
NSCID No. 3.
Subparagraph b: This statement is not in the
E.O. or the existing NSCID but is considered a useful
addition.
Subparagraph c: This is from E.O. 11905, Section
3 (d) (1) (xiv).
Subparagraph d: This is the last sentence of
paragraph 5 in the existing NSCID No. 3.
Approved For Release 2004/11/04: CIA-RDP91M00696R000900030001-4
 Approved For ease 2004/11/04: CIA-RDP91M0069 00900030001-4
g. Paragraph .5
Subparagraph a: The definition of current
intelligence is from the existing NSCID No. 3, paragraph 2a.
Subparagraph b: This is from E.O. 11905,
Section 3 (d) (1) (xii).
Subparagraph c: This is adapted from the present
NSCID No. 3, paragraph 2b.
h. Paragraph 6
Subparagraph a: The definition of basic intelli-
gence is adapted from paragraph la. of the existing NSCID
No. 3.
Subparagraph b: This replaces paragraph 1 of
the present NSCID No. 3; it recognized the NIS program has
ended but leaves the way open for revival of something like
a NIS program if the DCI so decides.
Subparagraph c: This CIA service of common
concern function has not previously been listed in a NSCID.
It is included as a follow-on to the charge CIA had under
the NIS program to maintain an outline of all basic intelli-
gence. The CIA AEGIS program responds to this requirement.
i. Paragraph 7
This paragraph resulted from a DoD initiative.
The subject of "estimative intelligence" was not`separately
broken out in the present NSCID No. 3. No definition of
"estimative intelligence" is in the present NSCID No. 3.
Subparagraph b. is derived from E.O. 11905, Section 3 (d)
(1) (iv) and subparagraph c. from E.O. 11905, Section 4
(a) (2) and the production responsibilities assigned in the
E.O. to the individual organizations of the Intelligence
Community.
Approved For Release 2004/11/04: CIA-RDP91M00696R000900030001-4
 ?
Approved For Release 2004/11/04: CIA-RDP91M0069600900030001-4
j. Paragraph 8
Subparagraph a. is adapted from paragraph 7
of the existing NSCID No. 3.
Subparagraph b. is adapted from paragraph 8
of the present NSCID No. 3.
Subparagraph c. is derived from paragraph 3 i.
of the present NSCID No. 1.
3. The task group considers that the revised NSCID No. 3
is unclassified, whereas the existing version is classified SECRET.
4. It is recommended the Committee on Foreign Intelligence
approve forwarding the attached redraft of NSCID No. 3 to the
National Security Council for its approval, but that the forwarding
be deferred pending completion of the redraft of the other NSCIDs.
E. H. Knoche
Approved For Release 2004/11/04: CIA-RDP91M00696R000900030001-4
 Approved For?ease 200 f 91LH& 1M006961~000900030001-4
Intelligence Community Staff
DCI/IC-76-1257
15 March 1976
MEMORANDUM FOR: Members of the Committee on Foreign Intelligence
E. H. Knoche
Acting Deputy to the DOI for.the
Intelligence Community
SUBJECT Update of NSCID No. 7, "Critical Intelligence
Communications"
1. References are:
a. A redraft of the existing NSCID No. 7, which it
is proposed the CFI approve for forwarding to the National
Security Council as part of a new package of NSCIDs, if the
CFI rejects the proposal, submitted by separate memorandum
of 9 March 1976 that the NSCID No. 7 be rescinded. (Tab A)
b. The existing NSCID No. 7, effective 17 February
2. In accordance with your direction at the 25 February
1976 meeting, the task group which is reviewing all of the NSCIDs
examined NSCID No. 7 and recommended that it be rescinded. This
has been concurred in by all elements of the Intelligence Community
except NSA.
3. The Director, NSA, on 9 March recommended by memorandum
to Mr. Ellsworth's office that NSCID No. 7 be retained, noting
"...it is questionable whether the language in
Executive Order 11905 fully covers the Secretary
of Defense responsibility as 'Executive Agent of
the Government to provide for the establishment,
operation and perfection of such communications
means necessary to provide the most timely trans-
-. mission of critical intelligence to higher authorities'."
Approved For Release 20 N'U., "I
P91 M00696
25
 p"- Approved Forease 2004/1 M0069000900030001-4
4. As the memorandum already provided to CFI members
indicates, the basic elements of NSCID No. 7 are contained in
Executive Order 11905, and the review task group considered this
made reissuance of NSCID No. 7 unnecessary.
is
5. This is not a
only four paragraphs
major issue s
long and ther
i
e
nce the existing NSCID No. 7
is no controversy as to
its
contents. The only
issue was dup
l
ication between E.O. 11905
and
NSCID No. 7 in the
event the NSCI
D
were reissued.
Attachment: as stated
7 t~rI T~
Approved For Release 200 ~4i1~R1M00696R000900030001-4
 Approved For D-1pa 2 & l 1". 1 M00696R000900
15 March 1976
SUBJECT : Comments on NSCID 2, 3,
5 and 7
Before making any comments, I
would again like to go on the record as
saying that other than agreeing reluctantly
to definitions of national and departmental
intelligence, whether it appears in NSCID
1 or 3, I would hope that we would try very
aggressively not to include all of the other
definitions. For whatever purpose they
serve, there is not a one of them that is
not included under the rubric of national
or departmental intelligence.
NSCID No. 2
I have looked at the DoD change
sheets and my only reaction is that for
their paragraph 5 I would like to go back
to the original version in the
draft.
I don't understand the purpose of the
definitional statement tabled by DoD on
"overt activities. " As far as I can tell, it
does no damage but I can't see that it
represents progress either.
N
M
M
I
Approved For Release 2004/11/04: CIA-RDP91 M00696R000900q
 Approved For EF COQ ,11/Q4fj IV
Pp1 M00696R0009001
NSCID No. 3
I would stop at the end of paragraph 3
in the DoD draft of 9 March, and I would
delete through paragraph 7.
I will yield to Dave Blee.
NSCID No. 7-
I would still like to see this one
deleted, but can go along with the re-
draft if we have to have one.
Paul V. Walsh
ADDI
Page Two
Approved For Release 2004/11/04: CIA-RDP91 M00696R00090
 Approved For0ease 2004/11/04: CIA-RDP91M0069.00900030001-4
Re: Proposed Changes to Draft NSCID 2
1. DOD-suggested definition of "overt activities."
a. DOD has raised an issue that is not widely
perceived in or out of the Intelligence Community.
There is confusion and disagreement on what the terms
covert, overt, and clandestine mean; particularly
in the distinction between covert and clandestine.
Categories of foreign intelligence are carefully
defined in NSCIDs 1 and 3, and the terms overt and
clandestine are used, but undefined, in NSCIDs 3 and
5 respectively. The definition proposed by DOD could
be improved on, but an authoritative definition is
needed. Current approved CIA and JCS definitions
are attached.
2. DOD-proposed Page 2.
a. The proposal to include counterintelligence
information in paragraph 4 should be rejected as
not appropriate to the scope of this NSCID. The
preamble mentions overt foreign intelligence
collection and not counterintelligence collection
activities. Counterintelligence activities
are covered in NSCID 5. Note that counter-
intelligence is not a function assigned to SECDEF
in Section 4(e) of E.O. 11905.
b. b. The proposal to include "associated
biographic information" in paragraph 4 is in accord
with present division of responsibilities on
biographic intelligence, but should not be
construed to preclude other Intelligence Community
components from collection or producing biographic
intelligence on military personalities.
Approved For Release 200 kCIA-RDP91M00696R000900030001-4
k4
 Approved For*ease 2004/11104-:- CIA~RDP91 M0069000900030001-4
c. Suggest that the paragraph 5 in DCI/IC 76-1245
be retained instead of the proposed DOD substitution.
The first sentence in the ICS version states the
functions assigned to CIA by Section 4(b)(2) of E.O.
11905 and is a necessary reference to the "assigned
functions" stated in both versions. Suggest that,
at the end of the paragraph, "Senior U.S. Representative"
be retained rather than "U.S. Chief of Mission."
Coordination with the Department of State includes
coordination with a Chief of Mission, in accord with
the Secretary of State's wishes. "Senior U.S.
Representative" would cover situations where a
U.S. military commander has responsibilities that
might otherwise be assigned to the Department of
State.
d. It is not clear why DOD wants to drop
paragraph 6 of the ICS version. Suggest it be
retained.
e. Concerning paragraph 6 of the DOD version
(paragraph 8 of the ICS version), suggest that both
use the language of Section 4(b)(6) of the E.O:
"...from cooperating sources in the United States."
Suggest that the last sentence of the DOD version
be added to end of the ICS version to acknowledge
interests and expertise, other than CIA's, in this
type of exploitation.
f. Suggest concurrence in the inclusion of
"public" in the second line and "foreign" in the
third line of DOD's paragraph 7, as stated in
Section 4(b)(6) of the E.O.
g. Suggest the ICS version (paragraph 10)
be adopted, which requires the DCI to coordinate
foreign language exploitation with other departments
and agencies; rather than paragraph 8 of the DOD
version, which requires other departments and agencies
to coordinate with the DCI.
25
Approved For Release 2004/11/04: CIAA-RDP91M00696R000900030001-4
 ISEET
Approved For'sase 2004/11/04: CIA-RD 9 001-4
25)
25
LOSSARY
E
GY
OFFICE OF TRAINING
September 1964 Copy NR 9091
GROUP 2
Approved For Release 2004/11/04: CIA-RDP91 M006
SECRET
AT ~ u"' N A L
Excluded from outomo c
downgrading and
0001 4 dedassifice4ion-
25
 Approved For*ease 2004/11/04: CIA-RDP91M0069000900030001-4
SECRET
COVERT ACTION OPERATIONS: Operations planned and executed
so as to conceal true sponsorship, and to permit the
sponsor plausibly to deny any responsibility for them,
should this become necessary. Such operations are con-
ducted in furtherance of national policies and objectives
in the political, propaganda, economic and paramilitary
fields, as a complement to the sponsor's overt missions
abroad. Though clandestine techniques are used to assure
concealment of sponsorship; covert operations usually are
intended to produce a visible result and are thus distin-
quished from purely clandestine operations.
COVERT ASSOCIATE: An individual who cooperates in covert
action for ideological reasons, without monetary compen-
sation and under no control except dedication to the
activity in which he is involved.
COVERT DISRUPTIVE ACTION: Activity undertaken in support
of countersubversion Tv.), such as harassment of
individuals, provocations, fomentation or prevention of
riots, and organization or dispersement of mobs.
CRYPTANALYSIS: The analysis of encrypted messages; the
steps or processes involved in converting encrypted
messages into plain text without initial knowledge of the
key employed in the encryption.
CRYPTONYM: Code word or letter group used for purposes
of s~ ecurity, especially in communications, to designate
operations, projects, persons, organizations, or sensitive
geographical areas.
CRYPTOSYSTEM: The associated items of cryptomaterial and
the methods and rules by which these items are used as
a unit to provide a single means of encryption and de-
cryption. It embraces the general cryptosystem and the
specific keys essential to the employment of the general
cryptosystem.
CUSTOMER: See: CONSUMER.
CUTOUT: An intermediary or device used to obviate direct
contact between members of a clandestine organization.
DEAD DROP: An unattended repository where messages or
material may be placed by one member of a clandestine
organization and recovered by another, thus serving as a
cut-out (q . v .) . Cf. LIVE DROP. See: MOVING:, DEAD DROP .
25
Approved For Release 2004/11/0 C6i '- 6R000900030001-4 25X
 Approved For*ease 2004/l1yP - 69.00900030001-4
n 25
CELL SYSTEM: The grouping of personnel into small units
that are relatively isolated and self-contained. In the
interest of maximum security for the organization as a
whole, each cell has contact with the rest of the organi-
zation only through an agent of the organization and a
single member of the cell. Others in the cell do not
know the contact agent, and nobody in the cell knows the
identities or activities of members of other cells.
Cf. NET.
CHICKENFEED: Build-up material (q.v.) specifically
designed to make an opposing service receptive to sub-
sequent deception material (q.v.).
CIPHER: A method of concealing the meaning of a message
either (1) by replacing its letters by other letters or
numbers in a predetermined manner (a substitution cipher)
or (2) by changing the order of the letters according to
certain rules (a transposition cipher).
CIVIC ACTION: The accomplishment by military forces of
projects useful to the local population in such fields
as health, sanitation, education, public works, agriculture,
transportation, and communications.
CLANDESTINE COMMUNICATIONS: Any system of clandestine
int terchange o.f messages or material between elements of
a clandestine organization. Includes personal meetings,
cut-outs, a.ir drops and sea delivery as well as written
messages and radio or telephone communications.
CLANDESTINE OPERATION: A coordinated complex of activities
designed to accomplish an intelligence, counterintelligence,
or other similar purpose, sponsored and conducted by a
governmental department or agency, or jointly by two or
more such entities, in such a way as to assure secrecy or
concealment. Cf. COVERT ACTION OPERATIONS.
CLASSIFICATION: Designation of the degree of i.mporta.nce
to the national security involved in a document, article,
or piece of information--and, consequently, of the security
precautions required to protect it. See: also CONTROL (2).
TOP SECRET: Information and material, the defense
aspect of which is paramount, and the unauthorized
disclosure of which could result in exceptionally
grave damage to the nation.
SECRET
25
Approved For Release 2004/11/04: CIA-RDP91M00696R000900030001-4
 'Approved For ease 2004/11/04: CIA-RDP91 M0069*0900030001-4
SECRET
OPERATIONAL CONTROL: Comprises those techniques employed
with thtent to assure that an operation is responsive
to the direction of the sponsoring service. Such tech-
niques are usually identified with the operational
administration, motivation, or personal relationships
involved in a clandestine project.
OPERATIONAL DATA: Information on the true identity of
the source of an information report and on the circumstances
under which the information was acquired.
OPERATIONAL INTELLIGENCE: (1) Information or intelligence
needed for planning, conducting, and exploiting an
operation. (2) Information regarding the conduct of an
operation.
OPERATIONS OFFICER: Sometimes used synonymously with
CASE OFFICER q.v.), but more frequently denotes an officer
who supervises and directs the activities of several case
officers.
OVERFLIGHT: Clandestine or covert air operations which
in-r volvelying over hostile territory.
OVERT OPERATIONS: Activities conducted.in such a manner
that they may be attributed to or acknowledged by the
sponsoring government.
PAPER MILL: An individual or group that produces infor-
mation, true or fabricated, for sale to any willing buyer.
See: PEDDLER:
PARA DISPATCH OFFICER (PDO): An officer who accompanies
an agent or group o agents infiltrating by air and who
gives the jump orders to the agents when the aircraft
reaches the drop zone.
PARAMILITARY FORCES: All ASSETS (q.v.) which are acquired
foruse in covert paramilitar.vv operations.
PARAMILITARY OPERATION: (1) An operation undertaken by a
pa~ ra.m _l nary I orce. 72) An operati_ on involving the use
of violent methods (e.g., sabotage, guerrilla warfare).
0
25
25
Approved For Release 2004/11/04: CIA-RDP91M00696R000900030001-4
 (Wl'l H THE NATO,