MANAGEMENT COMMITTEE PERFORMANCE

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP91M00696R000900060001-1
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: C
• Document Page Count: 12
• Document Creation Date: December 15, 2016
• Document Release Date: August 30, 2004
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: March 5, 1976
• Content Type: MF

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5 March 1976
MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence
FROM : B. ans, Executive Secretary
SUBJECT : Management Committee Performance
1. Action Suggested: Task the Committee to be a policy formulation
body advisory to the DCI. Create two Subcommittees, namely, an Admin-
istrative Subcommittee chaired by the DDA and a Resource Subcommittee
chaired by the Comptroller so as to free the Committee for policy formula-
tion, innovation, and general oversight. Appoint DDCI as Chairman and
eliminate Vice Chairman position.
2. Background:
A. Weaknesses
(1) Three years of experience with the Management Com-
mittee format suggests it is a reactor rather than an innovator.
The Committee has drifted into a forum in lieu of coordination.
Its potential as a body for conceiving or ratifying major policy
positions has not been realized. An examination of topics which
occupy most agendas indicates that far too much time is being
spent on "housekeeping. " Its focus on resource-related matters
has become superficial when compared to the considerations and
options which would be vented in a strenuous coordination process
at the staff level.
(2) Perhaps the Committee's greatest deficiency is that
it is not a body that can exercise follow-through and periodic over --
sight, even on those items which have commanded its attention.
Essentially it is a reactor to paper forwarded by its individual
members, in most casesthe DDA.
(3) There is a tendency to defer until a "winter confer-
ence" or some DCI planning session the major problems we may
anticipate.
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B. Strengths
Mr. Colby felt the Committee resolved a number of parti-
cularly important problems which, in another environment, would
require his personal involvement. Additionally, all members_
welcome Committee Meetings as a forum for an uninhibited exchange
of views. When compared to past culture in the Agency, it is ecu-
menical with each Deputy and Senior Staff knowing more about other
Directorate problems and plans. It can be said that the Committee
has transacted more business than that accomplished by the Deputies'
meetings with the Executive Director.
3. An Alternative:
A. Appoint the DDCI as Chairman. It would also accommodate
the "fact of life" that the DCI seldom attends a Committee Meeting
since he must ultimately pass judgment on its recommendations.
B. Create subordinate committees to the Management Com-
mittee, one for administration and the other directed to resource
management. The Administrative Subcommittee chaired by the DDA
would be composed of the four Associate Deputy Directors with, of
course, the Director of Personnel, Director of Training, Director
of Finance, AO/DCI or any office head sitting in on those meetings
pertaining to his responsibilities. The Resource Subcommittee
chaired by the Comptroller would be composed of the senior planning
officers from each Directorate, with the Subchairman free to call
meetings as required on individual topics at the Associate Deputy
Director level.
C. With regard to the work of these two Subcommittees, the
Management Committee would ordinarily meet on only those items
where an issue cannot be resolved at the Subcommittee level. Other-
wise, the S ubcommitte es would refer their work back to the line for
review and approval by the appropriate Deputy Director(s). If DCI
approval is required, it would come forward as an ordinary action
memorandum. Additionally, each Subcommittee Chairman is free
to recommend to the Chairman that the Committee meet on any topic.
It would be helpful for each Subcommittee to have a charter on what
actions must be reviewed by each. Initially, a useful guideline would
be to meet (or obtain telephonic concurrence) on major actions which
the DDA and Comptroller are forwarding to the DCI for approval..
statutes or regulatory issuance dictate otherwise,
the Executive Secretary could at his discretion forward to the DDCI
for sign off "for the DCI. " If in doubt, the DDCI would consult the
DCI.
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4. Administration: The Executive Secretariat will continue to sup-
port the Committee. Perhaps the Executive Secretary should officially
become Executive Secretary to the Committee. Each of the Subcommittees
will be supported by the Subcommittee Chairman's own staff. They (DDA
and Comptroller Staffs) will keep the Executive Secretary informed of topics
being reviewed so that he will not inadvertently forward to the DCI for approval
a paper related to a topic under discussion. The Executive Secretary's role
as a monitor of performance in response to Committee actions will be limited
to reminding the Committee Chairman as well as the Chairmen of the two
Subcommittees of topics they are obligated to report on. One of the early
chores of the senior Committee would be to establish periodic reporting
requirements to the DCI. In coordination with the Comptroller and DDA,
the DDCI will develop periodic listings of major issues or policy questions that
seem to warrant Committee attention. Each member would be obligated to
surface topics for review, but a much less structured environment would
prevail than has been the case in the past, i. e. , every agenda item supported
by a paper.
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No. 1 Resource Matters
Your first priority is to get a workable resource review
process established so that the CFI can effectively deal with _.; t'.
the decisions on the fiscal 1978 budget which will be made-during
the following nine months.
The process to be designed will be a complicated one since
each of the basic programs (the NRP, the CCP, the GDIP, and
CIA) operate on slightly different program and budget cycles--
due both to their own internal organizational needs and to
different relationships with the Office of Management and Budget.
Probably for the FY 1978 cycle you will have to settle for a less
than optimal arrangement-due to the relative inflexibility
of all the processes now underway. Basic things which should.
be done this year include: development of a preliminary definition
of the Intelligence Community; holding a review of some sort
under CFI auspices on each of the NFIP programs; Mnn end.).-j
to the OIB/DoD joint review of the CCP and GDIP and establish-
ment of a new October OMB review process; and issuance of some eZ94SpIteS ~~.,...
central guidance to each program manager on the results of the
Early this year a working group under IC Staff auspices with
program manager participation should be established to work out
an acceptable resource review process for FY 1979, building on
the efforts started this year for FY 1978.
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While work is underway to develop a workable process for
1978 and 1979, you will need to hire a Community deputy director
and settle on his charter. For the moment it is probably wise
to restrict his, and thus the IC Staff's, charter to matters
closely related to the resource task. Such a charter should
clarify to the extent possible the relative roles and responsibilities
of the CFI/IC Staff and the various program managers within the
Intelligence Community. This will be particularly important for
the ultimate success of the CFI arrangement.
A particularly critical issue facing the CFI right now is the
definition of the roles of the three principals. As the NSC
member has no real operational responsibility for. any aspect
of the Community's business, he should be inclined to think of
himself as a member of a Community board of directors, rather
than an advocate for any particular program. We have suggested
to you that you will need to behave in a similar, ecumenical
fashion if your objectivity towards all programs is to be
established. (To do this, we suggest you consider the CIA
deputy as the advocate of the Agency's program before the CFI,
enabling you--supported by the IC Staff--to take an "objective"
view.) A particular problem to the CFI's ability to function
will be posed if the Defense member conceives of himself as
in effect the "manager of the Defense program" rather than a
member of a board of. directors. If he sees himself in this light,
he will probably need internal Defense staffing, and the IC
Staff will tend to be regarded as only the DCI's staff. If,,
on the other hand, he can be persuaded to take a broader respon-
sibility, the IC Staff can more effectively function as staff
to the whole CFI.
After basic decisions on the issues noted above have been
made, attention should be given to the organization and staffing
of the Intelligence Community Staff. It is particularly important
not to make major organizational and staffing changes until the
basic charter and responsibilities of the IC Staff have been
elaborated in some detail.
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The resource process and the organization of the CFI demands
your priority attention because you must make certain decisions
now in order to be.in a position to do other things in a few
months. The production issue is different. A working process is
in being (albeit somewhat uncertainly given the Executive Order's
silence on the subject), and the need for specifying definite
arrangements is less pressing. Still, uncertainties must be
removed and new forms established or momentum will be lost.
The first choice which needs to be made here is the "scope"
of the activity to be carried out by the NIOs or a successor
organization. Is this organization to be focused on everything
of significance in a given geographical or substantive area, or,
alternatively, is this organization to be concerned essentially
with estimates only? There should be searching debate on these
issues.
Following a decision on the above, there should be developed
a series of papers or presentations setting forth what appear
to be the four principal options for organizing conduct of your
national intelligence responsibilities. The options would seem
to be:
Placing all CIA production activities under the deputy
for the Intelligence Community.
Placing only the functions of the NIOs or a successor
organization under the deputy for the Intelligence
Community but leaving other CIA production under the
Agency deputy.
Placing all CIA production including NIOs under the
Agency deputy.
'Placing all CIA production responsibilities under the
Agency deputy in an administrative sense but preserving
a command line from both the DDI and DDS&T production
components and the NIOs directly to the DCI.
Having done this, you should be in a position to make a
decision on the above and follow that with such charter, per-
sonnel, and organizational changes as may be required.
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No. 3 Internal CIA Organizational Changes
(Other Than Those Which Flow From the Production Issues Above)
After basic choices are pretty well in mind on the two
issues above, attention should be focused on developing options
for the charter of.the new CIA deputy director. The following
are a suggested series of responsibilities. They should be de-
bated extensively, further refined, and elaborated on paper
somewhere.
Having overall responsibility for CIA resource matters
and related. relationships with the CFI.
Having overall responsibility for Agency relationships
with OMB and Congressional committees involved in
budgetary matters, but under the policy direction of
the CFI.
Managing the Agency's involvement in any CFI-/IC Staff
reviews of Community performance on selected issues.
Reviewing and/or organizing effective planning processes
within CIA in such areas as computer policy, RD&E policy,
and product relevance. (Overview of these responsibilities,
because they affect many components, should be centralized.)
Reviewing command and control mechanisms (the Inspector
-General, the Office of the General Counsel, the
Comptroller, the Agency regulations-setting staff)
within CIA to ensure the adequacy of these mechanisms
and effective implementation of Agency-wide policy.
(We have been criticized in these areas over the past
year. One individual should be in charge of overseeing
this broad area.)
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Establishing a continuing review of Agency personnel
policies, particularly as they relate to supergrades.
(An effective Agency-wide personnel process at the
supergrade level would help establish a cadre of senior
managers with in-depth experience in all aspects of
Agency activity.)
Reviewing existing internal organizational arrange-
ments to be sure they are facilitating our overall
mission. (Only a central manager can effectively
raise and resolve organizational issues which cut
across existing organizational lines.)
Serving as de facto head of the DCI Area (except the
IC Staff) and the E Career Service.
Consideration must also be given to rethinking the role
of the Agency Management Committee in light of the new
responsibilities of the deputy director. Probably this body
should be continued in some form but made advisory to the deputy.
Changes in regulations will be required.
Another problem to be considered is the nature of the staff
support'to be given to the CIA deputy. Probably the CIA Comptroller
and his office should constitute principal staff support for the
CIA deputy. Possibly he will require some personal staff or
another element separate from the Comptroller to handle certain
of his new responsibilities. ..When experience with the new
arrangement has been gained, the organization and functions of
the Comptroller's Office will need to be reconsidered.
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No. 4 Disposition of Certain CIA Staff Functions
Within the DCI Area are several staff functions which have,
in the past, to varying degrees supported the Director of Central
Intellignece in both his Community and his Agency roles. The
charter and reporting lines of two of these organizations, the NIO
and the CIA Comptroller, will have been settled above.
There remain to be discussed the functions and reporting
channels of the Office of Legislative Counsel, the Office of
General Counsel, and the Inspector General. In each case a
decision should be made whether these staff functions report to
both the Community and Agency deputies or whether they report
directly to the Director in all but administrative matters for
which they should:report to the deputy director for CIA.
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No. 5 The Allocation of USIB Functions and the Re-creation of
Certain USIB Committees
To the extent possible, decisions on future USIB committees
should be made in the context of the preceding considerations.
To the extent that they have not been treated, specific decisions
will be needed on the continuing need for certain committees
and functions and their reporting channels.
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No. 6 Rewriting the NSCIDs and Other Charter Documents
No final decisions should be made here until the choices
above have been fully considered and decided upon. A question to
be considered: Should the NSCId as an "art form" be continued
at all, given the newly constituted CFI and its responsibilities?
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