WHITE HOUSE OPTION

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP91M00696R000900070004-7
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 11
• Document Creation Date: December 15, 2016
• Document Release Date: August 5, 2004
• Sequence Number: 4
• Publication Date: January 31, 1976
• Content Type: MF

SECRET
Approved For
31 January 1976
MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence
SUBJECT . White House Option
1. From what you told me yesterday, two major problems seem
to be outstanding. Defense's share of intelligence budget and out-
put is treated in a separate paper. This paper deals with the
membership of the FIC and its relationship to the Advisory Group.
2. The question would appear to be whether State and
Treasury should be added to the FIC or, alternatively, whether
their concerns can-be met by giving added functions to the Ad-
visory Group. I think the answer to both of these should be no.
There are two basic principles involved, as well as practical
considerations. The principles are:
-- The FIC must be kpet small if it is
to be workable.
-- The Advisory Group must have no
operational role if clear lines of authority
are to be maintained.
3. There would be some advantages for you in having a State
member in FiC, and indeed Colby's original proposal provided for
one. I gather, however, that Defense found this very hard to swallow
in that State, with no assets of its own, was being invited to play
around with Defense assets. Defense even sees in this a precedent
for eventual State review of the full Defense budget. I suggest you
go along with Defense on this. You can do without a State member
and solve that problem in other ways. But you are going to have to
oppose Defense on its major objection, and that will go down a lot
easier if you go along with Defense on the membership question.
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4. All the arguments against State are even stronger against
Treasury. Treasury takes a lot from intelligence and contributes
virtually nothing to it. There is little understanding in Treasury
of intelligence issues. Treasury membership on a "board of directors"
for national intelligence would be grotesque. Moreover, if Treasury
were a member, it would be difficult to argue against JCS' and then
against ERA, etc. Much better to stay with a three-man group.
5. Both State and Treasury have legitimate concerns as
consumers, hewwevcr, and State has concerns as a producer of national
intelligence. These sort out roughly as i`ollows:
-- Consumers, as policy officers, have an
interest in the evaluation of product and in the
general thrust of the collection-production
effort. This is now a function of PISCIC and in
the new scheme would be assigned to the Advisory
Group.
Producers, as intelligence officers, have
strong and quite specific interests in require-
ments, tasking, and guidance to collectors. This
function is now divided among EXCOM, USIB, several
of the USIB Committees, and ad hoc arrangements
between individual producers and collectors.
Under the new scheme, the function as a whole.
would be assigned to the FIC, with the implicit
understanding that one of FIC's first tasks
would be to rationalize this structure.
-- State, Treasury, and others, as institutions,
have a strong interest in ensuring that the views
of their intelligence officers (and often in the
real world their policy officers) are reflected
in national intelligence products. This interest
is now met through their membership on USIB and
some of its other Committees. It is so far only
implicit in the new scheme that you will protect
these interests. (Bill's version specified a
National Intelligence Board for this purpose.)
6. It appears to me that the concerns expressed yesterday by
Kissinger relate directly to these functions and not to the greater
management aspects of FIC. I believe they can be met without ex-
panding its core membership. You should consider:
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-- First, drop the concept of "observers"
in the FIC, and especially avoid having any
directive that specifies laho the observers
are. Otherwise, you are likely to have every
Tom, DDick, and Harry in the federal establish-
ment clamoring to get in and peer over your
shoulder while you try to horse-trade with
Ellsworth and Hyland.
-- Second, have the directive state that
the Chairman of the FIC will invite repre-
sentatives of non-member agencies to participate
whenever they have a major interest. For in-
stance, you would as a matter of course invite
the Deputy Secretaries of State and Treasury to
participate in FIC discussion of collection
needs, but not in development and management of
systems designed to meet those needs.
-- Third, make it explicit that INR's full
membership in the USIB Committees dealing with
collection, or whatever replaces them, will be
maintained.
-- Fourth, make explicit the continued
existence of a successor board to USIB, ad-
visory to the DCI. This Committee will have
as members the heads of the major producing
intelligence agencies, including INR, and
will assume those functions of USIB that are
not transferred to the FIC, including the
production of National Intelligence Esti-
mates. The right of dissent will be main-
tained.
7. The Advisory Group is another sort of problem. As I noted
yesterday, it probably won't work, but on the other hand is not es-
sential to the scheme. The ideal course would be to eliminate it
in favor of some sort of working group under FIC (with State and
Treasury participants, of course). Duval tells me, however, that
some sort of independent body---external to the Community--is a po-
litical necessity. That being the case, you might want to push for
merging the Advisory Group into the MSC itself. This would be less
cumbersome and no less effective. If this won't fly, you can readily
live with the Advisory Group with functions as presently defined.
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State and Treasury are members and thus have a major voice in an
area--product review--where they have major concerns. The Advisory
Group is a proper locus for this, and can in addition set policy
for the FIC. But it would be a bad mistake to give it any sort of
role in requirements or production. This would cross wires with
the FIC in a way that would make present arrangements look like a
model of good management.
RICHARD LEHMAN
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FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE
POLICY AND RESOURCE CONTROL
-(Note: Intelligence product
continues to flow
directly from the DCI
to the NSC)
- Vice President
- Secretary of State
- Secretary of Defense
,/Deputy Assistant to the President for
National Security Affairs 1-0IV,,.,
Observers4)
Director of Central Intelligence, Chrmn.
"'Deputy Secretary of Defense
DEFEN'-~ DEPARTMENT
Nation-- Intelligence
Ac'. vi tie s
Activities
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FFO.REIG
~Q2~,"=ZZ T T';
STATE DEPARTMENT
National Intelligence
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FACT SHEET
FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE ADVISORY GROUP
The Foreign Intelligence Advisory Group shall be composed
of:
Assistant to the President for National
Security Affairs
Secretary of State
Secretary of Defense
Secretary of'Treasury
Attorney
General
Chairman
of
the Joint Chiefs of Staff
Director
of
the Office of Management and Budget
Director
of
Central Intelligence
.~Observers
The Foreign Intelligence Advisory Group shall:
Conduct a periodic review of national intelligence
priorities and requirements.
Review the production of finished intelligence with
respect to relevance to the policy concerns of the
consumer and overall quality.
Review at least annually the program of the 40
Committee.
The Foreign Intelligence Advisory Group shall be supported
by the NSC staff.
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FACT SHEET
FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE COMMITTEE
The Foreign Intelligence Committee shall be composed of:
Director of Central Intelligence, Chairman
Director of Central Intelligence, Chairman
Deputy Secretary of Defense for intelligence
Deputy Assistant to the President
for National Security Affairs
Observers
It shall report directly to the NSC.
The Foreign Intelligence Committee shall:
? Act as a board of directors for national intelli-
gence.
' Give direction and guidance on national substantive
intelligence needs.
? Control resource allocation for the National Foreign
Intelligence Program. -?-.~
? Establish intelligence requirements-and give guidance
on0tlfiei collection and production 't-national intelli-
gence, security of intelligence material and arrange-
ments with foreign countries.
The Foreign Intelligence Committee shall be supported by
the Intelligence Community staff, headed by the Deputy to
the Director of Central Intelligence for the Intelligence
Community.
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im.
FACT SHEET
FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE ADVISORY GROUP
The Foreign Intelligence Advisory Group shall be composed
of:
Assistant to the President for National
Security Affairs
Secretary of State
Secretary of Defense
Secretary of Treasury
Attorney General
Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff
Director of the Office of management and Budget
Director of Central Intelligence
,Observers,
The Foreign Intelligence Advisory Group shall:
? Conduct a periodic review of national intelligence
priorities and requirements.
? Review the production of finished intelligence with
respect to relevance to the policy concerns of the
consumer and overall quality.
? Review at least annually the program of the 40
Committee.
The Foreign Intelligence Advisory Group shall be supported
by the NSC staff.
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FACT SHEET
The reconstituted 40 Committee shall consist of:
Assistant to the President for National
Security Affairs, Chairman
Secretary of Defense
n~ Secretary of State
Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff
Director of Central Intelligence
Official observers shall be:
!a Attorney General
OI%M representative
The 40 Committee shall:
App
rove all new covert actions
? Approve certain sensitive reconnaissance activities
? Conduct continuing reviews of ongoing covert actions
Formal meetings of the 40 Committee are required for all
approval actions of the 40 Committee.
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FACT SHEET
ID i S' "e> 5,
INTELLIGENCE OVERSIGHT PROCESS
Intelligence Oversight Groun
Chaired by: Deputy Attorney General
Other members: Deputy Assistant to the President
f_ or National Security Affairs (?)
.PFIAB member designated by the
President (?)
Counsel to the President
Working Group: General Counsel, DOD
General Counsel, CIA
Legal Advisor, DOS
Duties: ~ 4x-n- Lam-" V y4
C v r- 4 Intelligence Comm, unity, 'ct.-,to
propre a le a~,a ty.
r' 4? Receive and consider reports onefq vtionable
Counsels of intelligence agencies, who may report
despite opposition of agency head; and individual
agency employees may send reports to the Group.
? Make periodic reports, at least quarterly, to
Attorney General and PFIAB.
Attorney General
? Receives and considers report from Intelligence
Oversight Group and PFIAB.
? Makes periodic reports, at least quarterly, to
the President on questionable activities, if any.
President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board
? Receives and considers reports of questionable
activities from Intelligence Oversight Group.
? Reports its views on these activities to the
Attorney General.
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FACT SHEET
EXECUTIVE ORDER AND SECRECY
I. Executive Order will be published containing:
' Responsibility of the Community leadership
(Foreign Intelligence Committee, etc.)
' Charters for each agency (generally taken from
existing National Security Council Intelligence
Directives).
' Restrictions on intelligence activities.
' Oversight of intelligence agencies.
? Secrecy Agreements provision.
IT. To protect intelligence secrets, the President will:.
A) Submit legislation to protect "Sources and Methods
B Require all Executive Branch officials to sign a
Secrecy Agreement as a condition for receiving
certain classified foreign intelligence informa-
C) NSC will conduct a review of the classification
system.
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