PROPOSED REORGANIZATION OF THE NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE STRUCTURE

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP91M00696R000900070007-4
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 5
• Document Creation Date: December 15, 2016
• Document Release Date: August 5, 2004
• Sequence Number: 7
• Publication Date: January 30, 1976
• Content Type: MF

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30 January 1976
MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence
SUBJECT Proposed Reorganization of the
National Intelligence Structure
1. Based on what was shown us by Q yesterday,
I recommend you support this proposal in its entirety,
providing your authority and independence in the sub-
stantive production field are confirmed. The scheme
has a few weak points, but they are overshadowed by
its strength. It incorporates, or is not inconsistent
with, all of the twelve points you made to the President
except (possibly) tactical intelligence. More detailed
comments follow in paragraphs 3-9 below, and a diagram
of the arrangement as I understand it is attached.
2. Assuming the President takes this route, the
next step will be to ensure that the fine print of
the Executive Order fully reflects his intent and your
interests. This will require most careful staffing.
Equally important, you should insist on the freest
possible hand in developing the substructure for the
FIC.
3. The 40 Committee. In the current atmosphere
this is a sensible arrangement and indeed may be a
necessity. There used to be a good argument that the
President should be in some way insulated from the
process so that he could disclaim responsibility, but
that day is clearly gone.
4. Oversight Committee. This too is a sensible
measure, especially since it avoids placing this re-
sponsibility either on PFIAB or NSCIC. If it were not
a political necessity, however, I would argue that we
run a danger of.too much oversight.
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5. The "Advisors". This is probably the weakest
element of the proposal.. The purpose is obviously to
keep the FIC small and therefore workable, but a price
is paid. NSCIC was supposed to provide consumer review.
It didn't work because the chairmanship and the initative
were in the hands of policy officers for whom this is
not usually a matter of immediate concern. The respon-
sibility is now put on the principals, who are even less
likely to gather regularly for this purpose. in the
real world, however, NSCIC's inactivity has been no
great loss. In our experience the only way to find
out what consumers really want is to be aggressive about
it, to maintain close day-to-day contact on substantive
matters. You might also want some sort of working group
under the FIC.
6. Membership of the FIC. The major difference
between this proposal and Mr. Colby's is the substitu-
tion of the Deputy Assistant for National Security
Affairs for the Deputy Secretary of State. This is
apparently a sop to Defense, which didn't want State
playing in a game where it had no chips. The effect,
however, is to strengthen the national interest against
the departmental, and this of course works to your ad-
vantage. There is also a cost. The original proposal
put State in the intelligence corral; the DCI has major
interests--Foreign Service reporting, cover, technical
collection bases overseas--for which he needs to do
business with State at the policy level. There is
perhaps still a way to accomplish this. You as Chairman
of FIC should be able to invite anyone you need to sit
in ad hoc. A State "observer" at the policy level
could beused for this purpose.
7. The Defense Position. The great strength of
the proposal is that, through the device of what might
be called collective management, it gives the DCI for
the first time clear lines of authority commensurate
with his responsibilities. For him to have more say
over Defense-managed programs, however, means that DoD
will have less. This will of course be the sticking
point. Mike suggested that at least some in DoD were
still pushing OMB/NSC Option III (See diagram attached).
This is clearly unacceptable in either version. The
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following are some points you might want to make if
Defense objections are raised:
--Defense as well as the DCI stands to gain from
coherent centralized management across programs
and from a reduction in DoD-CIA friction.
--State has, as noted above, been taken out of
the FIC.
--Defense gains a voice it has not previously
had over the CIA program.
--Both Select Committees have been surprised
and concerned by their discovery that the DCI
is considerably less than master in his own
house. The House Committee draft recommenda-
tions, while muddily worded, clearly show an
intent to strengthen the DCI in the resource
field. Several Senators and their staff officers,
in speeches and discussions with us, have indi-
cated similar plans. In other words, if the
Executive does not want to move in this direction
it may be forced actively to oppose a Congressional
initiative.
--There is in fact a pressing need for the Executive
to set its intelligence budget house in order if
it is to cope with a more aggressive Congressional
attitude. The last year's experience with House
Appropriations has demonstrated the need for unified
Executive positions.
--As to Option III, the DCI needs an institutional
base if he is to survive in the bureaucracy.
This applies of course to intelligence production
and to clandestine operations; together they
make him an essential player in all aspects of
NSC activities. But Defense has been looking
hungrily at the R and D and program management
elements of DDS&T. These are equally essential
to the DCI, because they enable him to exploit
advanced technology primarily for intelligence
pay-off; obviously in DoD this has to be secondary
to warfighting. They are an instrument by which
he can force the much larger Defense program to
take account of intelligence needs.
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8. Intelligence Production. Your view of your
responsibilities in this field is absolutely right,
and Duval assured us was incorporated fully in the
proposal. If it turns out not to be clearly stated,
or if it is challenged, here again are some points:
--If anything was clearly the intent of Congress
in 1947, it was the desire to have a single,
independent senior intelligence officer to
"correlate and evaluate" intelligence. .
--There is no indication that the present Congress
feels differently. In fact, we have had plentiful
indications, not only from the Select Committees
but from the standing oversight Committees, that
they would take an exceedingly dim view of a
reduction of your authority in this area.
--It would be most improper for policy officers,
such as the other members of the FIC, to have
a hand in intelligence judgments. (It is
entirely proper, however, and most desirable
for these to have responsibility for and
authority over intelligence policy and re-
sources. This distinction was clearly made
in Mr. Colby's proposal and should be maintained).
--Although it is not explicit in the proposal,
you would envisage an interagency body, advisory
to you, with responsibilities in the estimates
field comparable to those now exercised by
USIB. The right of dissent would of course
be maintained.
9. Problems not addressed. There are at least
three important issues in the general discussion of
intelligence organization that are probably not addressed
in the President's package, but that may well come up.
a. The DDO and covert action. This is not
an issue within the Executive, but there are
strong feelings in the Senate Select Committee
that the DDO should be moved out of CIA..
Interestingly, this is looked on as part of a
package; it is argued that the only politically
acceptable way to give the DCI stronger powers
over the Community is to relieve him of the
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DDO "albatross" around his neck. The albatross
is of course covert action. The Committee is
convinced there must be such a capability, and
realizes it can't be separated from clandestine
collection. Ergo, move the whole thing. We
believe, however, the Committee will come to
realize there is no practical place to move it
to, and that it would be much more difficult to
control and oversee out from under the DCI's
wing.
b. The NIO's and National Estimates. The
present arrangements have been challenged by the
Senate Select Committee. The Committee professes
to believe the abolition of the Board of National
Estimates was an effort by President Nixon and
Henry Kissinger to force us to turn out more
palatable estimates. Whatever the wisdom of
the move, there was no such motivation. The
estimates issue has not been raised in the
Executive, but, as you are aware, there are
mixed feelings about it. I would suggest that
you punt if this problem is raised today: you
need time to figure out a system that suits
your own requirements. (But you may have to
face it with SSC in a few weeks.)
c. Consolidation of all SIGINT in NSA and
all clandestine collection in CIA. This is a
'superficially attractive idea for tidying up
the structure that was raised in the NSC/OMB
Study. In fact it is an exceedingly complicated
matter and should in no case be lightly undertaken.
Bill Colby strongly opposed it. I recommend you
do the same.
10. In addition to the diagrams, I have attached
Colby's original proposal, an OMB/NSC critique of it,
and our critique of their critique.
r.
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