COMMENT ON IOG PAPERS

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP91M00696R000900090002-7
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 5
• Document Creation Date: December 15, 2016
• Document Release Date: August 6, 2004
• Sequence Number: 2
• Publication Date: December 5, 1975
• Content Type: MF

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All
MEMORANDUM FOR:
SUBJECT Comment on IOG Papers
1. The following are personal comments on the
papers you gave me yesterday. The have not been
staffed in CIA.
2. The papers are, as you noted, uneven. There
are a number of disconnects and inconsistencies within
and among them, most of which I assume you will be
able to clean up in later drafts.
3. As I told you yesterday, the organization
into problem papers and the bland language of some
of them mask the importance of the DCI-SecDef relation-
ship. A non-intelligence reader would never know that
the present situation makes these two officers adver-
saries, and that their rivalry is the common denomi-
nator for a number of your problems. PP21-33 of our
paper do the job.
4. A second problem is the attempt to treat
NIE's, current intelligence, intelligence research,
"warning" (whatever that is), and crisis management
as separate production functions that can be separately
assigned. They are all aspects of intelligence anal-
ysis and involve the same people and organizations.
Within CIA, for instance., OCI plays a key role in all
but research, OSR-in all five, OER in all but "warning".
I submit that a single organization responsible for
all five on the national level is by far the most
efficient route to go, whether directly under a DCI
or under a subordinate organization (with the product
evaluated by the DCI).
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5. In this connection there is a repeated treat-
ment of NIE's'as if they were something extra-special
at the apex of the pyramid. This is 1950's thinking..
In fact, CIA's current intelligence, OER's economic
research, and CIA's and DIA's support of SALT
have more impact on national policy than any NIE.
And none of them are produced through the formal
interagency estimates machinery. Indeed, one of
your papers notes that the major military estimates
are well received but most others carry little weight.
It is high time to recognize that the national esti-
mates mystique is an emperor who has no clothes.
6. Some specifics on the "problem papers".
--#3 does not even mention the DCA's
problems in dealing with
ST
--#4 in its first 18 pages is far too up-beat.
It conveys the impression of well-oiled machines
working beautifully together. The sections on
INR and Treasury are particularly Pollyanna-ish.
The "problem area" section is much better.
--#6,?I-think, dismisses the problem
posed by FOl and the Privacy Act too lightly.
What is meant by "properly classified" under
FOI has not yet been tested in the courts.
--#8 is a dangerous paper. Lip service is
given to the DCA's reponsibilities on P. 4,
but on P3 and P5, DOD's primary role in
crisis management and in collection tasking
is asserted and by implication approved.
,.The NCA-NSC problem is not addressed. The
,paper ought 'to note that an effort by the
IC Staff to experiment with Community crisis
sitreps was torpedoed by DIA's insistence
that it have sole responsibility for military
inputs. (See last para on p8 . )
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--#9 does not analyze the effect of tran-
sition uncertainties on DCI-Defense relation-
ships in peace-time. Note also (P3) that
the CRA, although still nominally in effect,
presupposes the existence of World War II-
style CIA "forces". These no longer exist.
7. Comments on the Options.
--#1. This has the virtue of strength and
honesty. I would add as a "Con" under Tasking
(P3) "Perhaps less responsive to Defense needs".
Also on P3, I think a cabinet-level officer could
better protect the objectivity of intelligence
On P5.under Efficiency add as a Con a reference
to the broad span of DCI responsibilities. Delete
the last Con; I think this would work the other
way. Under Assessment,-as a Pro add "one manager
is clearly responsible for performance."
AT
--#2. There isn't a chance in hell that
Congress will buy this, but you ought to list
it.
--#3. This looks pretty good. One would
have to
A so, beware of any arrangemerl
with the technical collectors. it
is a processor and should be linked as tightly
as possible with the analysts. Putting it along-
side NRO runs the__risk of creating another self-
contained monster like NSA. This option handles
the production function well.
ST
--#4 would be OK if it didn't break up
production (see para 4 above). Also, my comment
on-NPIC applies here as well.
--#5 looks quite familiar. In your rework,
however', the question of production and who
does what has somehow gotten obscured.
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--#6 I would drop forthwith. The DCI,
without resource authority, would have much
less clout vis-a-vis Defense then he now has.
Congress would never buy the last point in
Para 4, which would apparently put CIA out-of
forces and weapons analysis. There are a'great
many other things in here I simply don't under-
stand.
--#7. I don't understand what "activating"
means (third sentence on p. 1). Otherwise this
would do little good, but little harm.
--#8. This is obviously a wet paper bag.
Who is the NSC? Who would task NSA and NRO?
How would NSC and OMB coordinate US intelligence
without creating someone (a DCI?) to do it? You
are now in position to say you"ve done it, and
forget it.
--#9. Does not suggest where CIA production
is to go or what it is to do. Nor does it
suggest how the DCI's staff is to produce those
sacrosanct national estimates. Otherwise good.
--#10 is another loser. Here we go with
the NIE's again. CIA does "current production."
In what fields? And who does the supporting research
for estimates and current? Does DoD get national
military production? (The Pro that the DCI will
now be able to "tailor NIE's to Presidential policy
needs" is one of the more ludicrous notions put
forth lately).
8. One final general comment. Of all these only
#1 and #3 as presented provide the DCI with the substan-
tive staffing in depth he needs to carry out his other
functions. And none of the papers really addresses
this as a problem. The NIO's.by themselves can't do
it, especially if organizationally and/or physically
separated from the'production.organizations. This and
the estimates business virtually ensures that two
competing production organizations at the national level
will emerge.
RICHARD LEHMAN
-4-
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