PAPER PRESENTED BY THE DCI ON INTELLIGENCE REORGANIZATION

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP91M00696R001000070001-8
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 22
• Document Creation Date: December 16, 2016
• Document Release Date: December 15, 2004
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: March 10, 1976
• Content Type: PAPER

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I. Background
A. Congress created the present national intelligence system
by the National Security Act of 1947. It had in mind
primarily the avoidance of any future Pearl Harbors by
setting up the DCI, with a modest staff, to make sure that
all the information available to the US government was
assessed in one place.
B. A great deal has happened since 1947 that Congress could
not have foreseen and did not provide for.
1. The Cold War and its requirement for
a greatly increased intelligence effort.
2. The central role of intelligence in
making national security policy de-
cisions in peace time (buying weapons
systems).
3. The development of major technical
collection systems that require
centralized control.
4. The expenditure of a substantial
slice of the peace-time budget on
intelligence.
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A number of these developments combine to.place the
DCI and the Department of Defense in adversary roles.
C 1. The DoD controls 80% of the national
intelligence budget.
C 2. The practical needs of the DoD for
intelligence both in fighting wars
and in preparing for them often
compete with the needs defined by
the DCI at the national level for
intelligence in peace time and,yrr
preventing crises from reaching the
hostility stage.
3. In particular, the national authorities.
and the field commanders are coming
to compete for the product of major
technical collection systems.
The result of almost 30 years of evliyertion and bureau-
cratic struggle under these pressures has been a com-
plicated structure of interlocking
committees that has grown more by accretion than by
design. Moreover, it has become increasingly resist-
ant to change. The DCI has acquired greatly increased
responsibilities but has not been given the authorities
to go with them. Moreover, as the complexity and ex-
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pense of national systems have grown,.he has increasingly
been placed in a position where his objectivity in deal-
ing with communit4r~esource matters has been compromised
by y the fact that he also represents CIA.
II. The President's Solution As Embodied in E.O. 11905
-7,.-_ 7C
A. The President made a clean sweep of the entire Community
and committee structure. His intent was to give the DCI
greatly increased authority and give him a relatively free
hand to modernize, discard and retain.
B. Resource management for the Community was centralized in
the Committee on Foreign Intelligence.
1. The DCI is the Chairman, with the Deputy
Secretary of Defense for Intelligence and
the Deputy Assistant to the President for
National Security. Affairs as members.
The Committee thus contains the officers
responsible for managing virtually all
of the nation's intelligence assets.
2. It will be responsible for the budget
of the national foreign intelligence
program and for larger policy and manage-
ment decisions for the Community as a
whole. How the budget.process will be
worked out to meet the requirements of
-3-
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program managers, the DoD, OMB, and
Congress is an exceedingly difficult
question, one we are just beginning
to address.
3. Since the Committee is intended to bal-
ance the national interest with the
departmental interest of DoD, it is
not advisory to the DCI. Rather,
the DCI is first among equals, with
any member having the right to
appeal to the President through the
NSC. Nevertheless, the DCI's role
in management of defense intelligence
resources has been very substantially
increased.
C. In the production of national intelligence, the DCI's
prima 0 role has been reaffirmed. His increased
authority in resource management, moreover, should give
him greater freedom of action in improving the quality
of intelligence.
1. The DCI has not yet decided what
changes he will make in the
present structure for intelligence
production, and has requested that
the present machinery be maintained
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until he can do so. 1_-
2. 1lmost certainly,\there will be some
.?~ mac r
sot f
C u successor board to USIB, i m--
advisory to the DCI, and the right
of dissent will Ccertainl~ be main-
tained. D. To lessen t
he DCI's conflict of interest problem, he will
be provided with two deputies.
1. A deputy for the Community will
handle greatly increased resource
n
responsibilities and will provide
the staffing for the CFI.
2. A deputy for the Agency will relieve
the DCI of the need to provide day-
to-day management attention to the
Agency and leave him more time for
his broader responsibilities. At
the same time, this deputy can serve
as the Agency spokesman on Community
resource issues placed before the DCI.
This will relieve him of the necessity
for being both plaintiff and judge.
III. Remainder of Provisions in the Executive Order
A. The National Security Council Intelligence Committee was
set up in 1971 to provide a critique of intelligence by
-5-
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its senior customers. It never got off the ground.
It has now been replaced by a requirement that the NSC
itself conduct semi-annual reviews of intelligence per-
formance.i(RL Note: I have little faith that this
will be much better.) The DCI is also authorized to
create his own mechanisms for this purpose, and these
are likely to work better than NSCIC because the initiative
is with him and not with the consumer.
B. The 40 Committee, responsible for approval of overt
action and certain technical collectiogoperations, has
been replaced by an Operations Advisory Group.
.1. In effect, the membership is that of
the 40 Committee raised to the principal
level, with the Attorney General and
the Director, OMB added as observers.
2. The Executive Order also calls for more
formal approval procedures and provides
for dissents.
C. The President has also created an Intelligence Oversight
Board within the Executive Branch.
1. "Oversight" here means the pre-
vention of improprieties and illegal
acts.
2. The Board will be appointed by the
President and consist of three
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members from outside the govern-.
ment. Its membership may overlap
with that of the President's Foreign
Intelligence Advisory Board.
3. There are elaborate provisions for
reporting to the Board by Inspector
Generals and General Counsels of
the various agencies of the Community.
IV. All in all, the reorganization provides:
A. A streamline structure, with clearer lines of responsi-
bility and accountability.
B. A DCI with greater authority in the Community management
field.
C. The maintenance and strengthening of a national intelligence
analysis capability under the President, and independent
of the major policy departments.
D. Stronger mechanisms for control, review, and oversight
of intelligence activities.
-7-
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I. Background
A. Congress created the present national intelligence
system by the National Security Act of 1947. It
had in mind primarily the avoidance of any future
Pearl Harbors by setting up the DCI, with a modest
staff, to make sure that all the information avail-
able to the US government was assessed in one place.
B. A great deal has happened since 1947 that Congress
could not have foreseen and did not provide for.
1. The Cold War and its requirement
for a greatly increased intel-
ligence effort.
2. The central role of intelligence in
making national security policy
decisions in peace time (buying
weapons systems).
3. The development of major technical
collection systems that require
centralized control.
4. The expenditure of a substantial
slice of the peace time budget on
intelligence.
C. A number of these developments combine to place the
DCI and the Department of Defense in adversary roles.
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The practical needs of the DoD for intelligence
both in fighting wars and in preparing for them
often compete with the needs defined by the DCI
at the national level for intelligence in peace
time and for preventing crises from reaching the
hostility stage.
D. The result of almost 30 years of evolution and
bureaucratic struggle under these pressures has
been a complicated structure of interlocking
committees that has grown more by accretion than
by design. Moreover, it has become increasingly
resistant to change. The DCI has acquired greatly
increased responsibilities but has not been given
the authorities to go with them. Moreover, as
the complexity and expense of national systems
have grown, he has increasingly been placed in a
position where his objectivity in dealing with
community resource matters has been compromised in
the eyes of others by the fact that he also represents
CIA.
II. The President's Solution As Embodied in E.O. 11905
A. The President made a clean sweep of the entire
Community and committee structure. His intent
was to give the DCI greatly increased authority
and give him a relatively free hand to modernize,
discard and retain.
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B. Resource management for the Community was cen-
tralized in the Committee on Foreign Intelligence.
1. The DCI is the Chairman, with the
Deputy Secretary of Defense for
Intelligence and the Deputy Assis-
tant to the President for National
Security Affairs as members. The
Committee thus contains the officers
responsible for managing virtually
all of the nation's intelligence
assets.
2. It will be responsible for the budget
of the national foreign intelligence
program and for larger policy and
management decisions for the Com-
munity as a whole. How the budget
process will be worked out to meet
the requirements of program managers,
the DoD, OMB, and Congress is an ex-
ceedingly difficult question, one we
are just beginning to address.
3. Since the Committee is intended to
balance the national interest with
the departmental interest of DoD, it
is not advisory to the DCI. Rather,
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the DCI is first among equals, with
any member having the right to
appeal to the President through the
NSC. Nevertheless, the DCI's role
in management of defense intelligence
resources has been very substantially
increased.
C. In the production of national intelligence, the DCI's
primary role has been reaffirmed. His increased
authority in resource management, moreover, should
give him greater freedom of action in improving the
quality of intelligence.
1. The DCI has not yet decided what
changes he will make in the
present structure for intelligence
production, and has requested that
the present machinery be maintained
until he can do so.
2. There will be a National Foreign
Intelligence Board to replace USIB.
It will be advisory to the DCI, and
the right of dissent will be main-
tained.
D. To lessen the DCI's conflict of interest problem, he
will be provided with two deputies.
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1. A deputy for the Community will
handle his greatly increased re-
source responsibilities and will
provide the staffing for the CFI.
2. A deputy for the Agency will relieve
the DCI of the need to provide day-
to-day management attention to the
Agency and leave him more time for
his broader responsibilities. At
the same time, this deputy can
serve as the Agency spokesman on
Community resource issues placed
before the DCI. This will relieve
him of the necessity for being both
plaintiff and judge.
III. Remainder of Provisions in the Executive Order
A. The National Security Council Intelligence Committee
was set up in 1971 to provide a critique of intel-
ligence by its senior customers. It never got off
the ground. It has not been replaced by a require-
ment that the NSC itself conduct semi-annual reviews
of intelligence performance. The DCI is also authorized
to create his own mechanisms for this purpose, and
these are likely to work better than NSCID because the
initiative is with him and not with the consumer.
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B. The 40 Committee, responsible for approval of oper-
ations, has been replaced by an Operations Advisory
Group.
1. In effect, the membership is that
of the 40 Committee raised to the
principal level, with the Attorney
General and the Director, OMB, added
as observers.
2. The Executive Order also calls for
more formal approval procedures and
provides for dissents.
C. The President has also created an Intelligence Over-
sight Board within the Executive Branch.
1. "Oversight" here means the pre-
vention of improprieties and
illegal acts.
2. The Board will be appointed by
the President and consist of
three members from outside the
government. Its membership may
overlap with that of the Presi-
dent's Foreign Intelligence
Advisory Board.
3. There are elaborate provisions for
reporting to the Board by Inspector
Generals and General Counsels of
the various agencies of the Community.
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IV. All in all, the reorganization provides:
A. A streamlined structure, with clearer lines of
responsibility and accountability.
B. A DCI with greater authority in the Community
management field.
C. The maintenance and strengthening of a national
intelligence analysis capability under the Presi-
dent, and independent of the major policy depart-
ments.
D. Stronger mechanisms for control, review, and
oversight of intelligence activities.
-7-
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Progress on E.O. 11905
I. Reorganization of the Community
A. Committee on Foreign Intelligence has been organized. It has
worked out budget procedures, etc. and will start work on FY 78
budget this week. This is a complex problem and the first cycle
or two will not be easy.
B. USIB will be reconstituted as NFIB. There is general agreement
that such a forum is essential.
C. The IC Staff has been reorganized to support CFI. Admiral Murphy
has been appointed Deputy for the Community. He and his staff
will move from Langley
during the summer and fall.
D. Mr. Knoche has been nominated as Agency Deputy.
II. Other Provisions
A. The Operations Advisory Group has been organized and is functioning.
B. The Oversight Board has been organized and has requested basic
information from Community Inspectors General and General Counsels.
C. CIA regulations have been rewritten to conform to the restric-
tions on intelligence activities imposed by the Executive Order.
D. Progress is being made toward issuance by the DCI of guidelines
for government secrecy oaths.
25!
25
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01001FR 1-5 4
Ccliective Management.
Option X
RATIONALE
This Option starts from the premise that stronger
management of the Intelligence Community is highly de-
.sirable, but that the balance of interests reflected
in the present structure is a realistic one and should
be maintained. It presents a concept for achieving a
-degree of collective management while preserving
present organizational relationships. It requires a
minimum of legislative change.
SUMMARY DESCRIPTION
The DCI would continue to be advisor to the
President, coordinator of the Community, and Director
of CIA. The. present structure of Committees and Boards
would be consolidated into two, both chaired by the DCI:
an Executive Committee of the NSC for Intelligence at
the deputy secretary level, responsible for all Community
management and policy matters, and a National Intelligence
Board at the.present USIB Principals level, responsible
for substantive production. To enable the DCI to give
more attention to his Community responsibilities he would
be provided with a second deputy.
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PRIMARY CHANCES AND EFFECTS
The DCIAs Responsibilities
The DCI would be the President's chief intelligence
advisor, would be 'a non-voting member of the NSC, and
would remain Director of CIA. He would be responsible,
under the NSC, for the coordination of national intelli-
gence polciy and for the production of national intelli-
gence. A clear'distinction would be made, however,
between his Community and CIA roles.
To this end, he would be provided with an additional
Deputy, appointed by the President and confirmed by
Congress. The present Deputy would be specifically re-
sponsible for managing the Agency under the DCI; the
other Deputy would be responsible under the DCI for coor-
dination of the Community. The DCI would have an Agency
office at Langley and a Community office downtown, where
his Community Deputy would.be located.
Coordination of National Intelligence Policy
The present structure of boards and committees
would be rationalized, on the basic principle that
policy and resource matters requiring a balancing of
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t J N 1' 1 U[ 1'l 1 ? 1R L
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departmental interests would be considered collectively
by,the senior officers controlling the assets and re-
sources concerned. A separate forum would be provided
for substantive intelligence issues, on the grounds
that these are inappropriate for policy officers to
adjudicate and that departmental interests are pro-
tected by the right of dissent.
For the first of these purposes the DCI would
chair an NSC Executive Committee for Intelligence,
with Deputy Secretaries of State and Defense as
members. The Committee would have under control of
its members all important intelligence assets,* and
would act as a board of directors for national
intelligence. EXCOM(I) would absorb the functions of
NSCIC, EXCOM (NRO plus equivalent responsibilities for
NSA), IRAC, and USIB (except national intelligence
production). It would in addition coordinate policy
matters affecting State and the Community, such as
cover, technical collection bases overseas, and intelli-
gence agreements' with foreign countries.
*This assumes that under the new arrangement in Defense
the second Deputy Secretary will control DIA, NSA & NRO.
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JJ'' i'
~a (fe' a ESL
The DCI's "Community" Deputy would be his alternate
in EXCOM(I) but would not serve as Chairman in his absence.
The IC Staff would be the secretariat of EXCOM(I). The
DCI would carry out his existing responsibilities for the
NFIP (less its tactical and departmental components)
with the assistance of the Committee. EXCOM(I) would
have approval authority for the NFIP (CIA, NRO, NSA,
and some elements of the GDIP) and its decisions would
be binding. The DCI would have administrative authority
only over CIA. Present administrative arrangements for
the NRP and NSA would be preserved.
Production of_'National Intelligence
USIB would be reconstituted as a National Intelli-
gence Board, limited by charter to substantive matters,
and advisory to the DCI. The NIO's would act as the DCI's
staff for the NIB. The Board would be chaired by the DCI,
with his "Agency " Deputy as CIA member. The latter would
serve as.Chairman in his absence. Such a board might
even be thought of as a Board of National Estimates.
Covert Action
The DCI would be a member of the 40 Committee, but
not its Chairman, with his Agency Deputy as alternate.
Clandestine collection and covert action would remain
assigned to CIA, without change in present arrangements.
-4-
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CONrIuLhI-rt~
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Overs~ht
Without administrative authority over the Community,
it would be inappropriate for the DCI to have an IG
responsibility except over CIA.. This option assumes
an Executive oversight mechanism at the NSC or White
House level.
Congress
The DCI would continue to be the Community spokesman
to Congress.
National/Tactical Problems
EXCOM(I) would handle matters relating to the
relationship between tactical and national intelligence.
The DCI would have no responsibility for the tactical
intelligence budgets of the military services, or for
the service cryptologic agencies.
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Summary
Cleaner structure
Greater budgetary authority for DCI
Independent analysis
Stronger oversight
Other Provisions of E.O.
Oversight Board
Restrictions
Security provisions
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Background
Act of 47
Cold War
Technical systems
Big money
Defense Problems
National-tactical
Budget
No machinery
Pres'ident's Approach
Investigations provided opportunity
E.O. made clean sweep
CFI balances interests
DCI's independence preserved in
production
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