INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY EXPERIMENT IN COMPETETIVE ANALYSIS SOVIET STRATEGIC OBJECTIVES AND ALTERNATIVE VIEW REPORT OF TEAM 'B'

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP91M00696R001000110006-8
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 56
• Document Creation Date: December 20, 2016
• Document Release Date: November 7, 2006
• Sequence Number: 6
• Publication Date: December 1, 1976
• Content Type: REPORT

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INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY
EXPERIMENT IN
COMPETITIVE ANALYSIS
SOVIET STRATEGIC OBJECTIVES
AN ALTERNATIVE VIEW
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REPORT OF TEAM "B"
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SOVIET STRATEGIC OBJECTIVES:
AN ALTERNATIVE VIEW
REPORT OF TEAM B
NOTE
This document is one part of an experiment in competitive analysis
undertaken by the DCI on behalf of the President's Foreign
Intelligence Advisory Board. The views expressed are those of the
authors and do not represent either coordinated National Intelligence
or the views of the Director of Central Intelligence.
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INTRODUCTORY REMARKS
The mandate of Team "B" was to take an independent look at the
data that go into the preparation of NIE 11-3/8, and on that basis
determine whether a good case could be made that Soviet strategic
objectives are, in fact, more ambitious and therefore implicitly more
threatening to U.S. security than they appear to the authors of the
NIEs. If the answer to this question was positive, they were further to
indicate what accounts for the NIEs unsatisfactory assessments.
Members of Team "B" were deliberately selected from among
experienced political and military analysts of Soviet affairs known to
take a more somber view of the Soviet strategic threat than that
accepted as the intelligence community's consensus. However, the
Team made every endeavor to look objectively at the available
evidence and to provide a responsible, non-partisan evaluation.
No attempt has been made in this Report to arrive at anything like
a net assessment: U.S. capabilities are not touched upon except to give
perspective to certain Soviet programs. The Report concentrates on
what it is that the Russians are striving for, without trying to assess their
chances of success. Nor has Team "B" sought to produce a full-fledged
counterpart to NIE 11-3/8, covering the same range of topics: its
contents are selective, as befits the experimental nature of the Team's
assignment. Failure of the Team to address itself to any given subject
should not be taken to mean that it necessarily concurs with the NIEs'
treatment of it.
A certain amount of attention is given to the "track record" of the
NIEs' in dealing with Soviet strategic objectives, in some cases going
back to the early 1960's. The purpose of these historical analyses is not
recrimination, which, given the Team's advantage of hindsight, would
be pointless as well as unfair; rather, Team "B" found certain persistent
flaws in the NIEs that do not disappear with the change of the teams
responsible for drafting them. It concluded, therefore, that only by
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tracking over a period of time NIE assessments on any given subject is
it possible fully and convincingly to determine what methodological
misconceptions cause their most serious errors of judgment.
The Report consists of Three parts. Part One seeks to clarify the
assumptions and judgments that underpin NIE evaluations of Soviet
strategic objectives. Part Two is a collection of ten papers which
analyze critically specific Soviet efforts in the field of offensive and
defensive forces covered in NIE 11-3/8. Part Three is a. summary
overview of current Soviet strategic objectives, as perceived by Team
"B". An Annex traces the NIE treatments between 1962 and 1975 of
Soviet strategic nuclear forces. The Report is preceded by a Summary.
It needs stressing that the present Report was prepared in some
haste, members of Team "B" being allotted twelve weeks (and in the
case of some of them, less than that) in which to digest a vast amount
of material and prepare a finished draft. Given the complexity of the
subject, this time clearly was insufficient and the resultant product
suffers from flaws. Even so, Team "B" feels confident that its criticisms,
analyses, and recommendations ought to contribute to the improve-
ment of the treatment of Soviet strategic objectives in future National
Intelligence Estimates.
In the preparation of this Report, Team " B" heard briefings by the
following experts to whom it wishes to express its gratitude: Mr. Fritz
Ermarth, Mr. Richard B. Foster, Maj. General George Keegan, Dr.
Sherman Kent, Dr. Andrew Marshall, and Mr. Gordon Negus. Capt.
John P. Prisley (USN, Ret.) contributed to the preparation of the
analysis of Soviet ASW efforts in Part Two.
Team leader : Professor Richard Pipes
Associates : Professor William Van Cleave
Lt. Gen. Daniel Graham, USA, (Ret.)
Dr. Thomas Wolfe, RAND Corporation
General John Vogt, USAF, (Ret.)
Advisory Panel : Ambassador Foy Kohler
The Honorable Paul Nitze
Ambassador Seymour Weiss
Maj. General Jasper Welch, USAF
Dr. Paul Wolfowitz, Arms Control and Disarma-
ment Agency
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CONTENTS
Page
NOTE ............................................................
INTRODUCTORY REMARKS ....................................... iii
SUMMARY ........................................................ 1
PART ONE: JUDGMENTS OF SOVIET STRATEGIC OBJECTIVES
UNDERLYING NIEs AND THE SHORTCOMINGS OF
THESE JUDGMENTS .......................................... 9
1. Influence of intelligence gathering techniques ................... 9
2. Implicit judgments about Soviet international behavior ........... 10
A. NIE conception of Soviet strategy .......................... 10
B. NIE judgments about Soviet strategic objectives .............. 11
3. Critique of these judgments ................................... 13
4. Conclusion ................................................... 16
PART TWO: A CRITIQUE OF NIE INTERPRETATIONS OF
CERTAIN SOVIET STRATEGIC DEVELOPMENTS ............... 19
FOREWORD ................................................... 19
1.
Soviet Central Strategic Attack Systems .......................
20
2.
Economic Restraints on Soviet Strategic Forces ................
21
3.
Soviet Civil Defense .........................................
23
4.
Military Hardening ..........................................
25
5.
Mobile Missiles .............................................
26
6.
Backfire .....................................................
27
7.
Soviet Anti-Satellite Testing ..................................
29
8.
Soviet Strategic ASW ........................................
31
9.
ABM and Directed Energy R&D .............................
33
10.
Soviet Non-Central Nuclear Systems ..........................
34
PART THREE: SOVIET STRATEGIC OBJECTIVES ................... 41
1.
Political Objectives ...........................................
41
2.
Military Objectives ...........................................
44
3.
Conclusion ...................................................
46
ANNEX: SOVIET STRATEGIC NUCLEAR FORCES AS PERCEIVED
BY THE NIEs, 1962-1975 ....................................... 51
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SUMMARY
Team "B" found that the NIE 11-3/8 series through 1975 has
substantially misperceived the motivations behind Soviet strategic
programs, and thereby tended consistently to underestimate their
intensity, scope, and implicit threat.
This misperception has been due in considerable measure to
concentration on the so-called hard data, that is data collected by
technical means, and the resultant tendency to interpret these data in a
manner reflecting basic U.S. concepts while slighting or misinterpreting
the large body of "soft" data concerning Soviet strategic concepts. The
failure to take into account or accurately to assess such soft data sources
has resulted in the NIEs not addressing themselves systematically to the
broader political purposes which underlie and explain Soviet strategic
objectives. Since, however, the political context cannot be altogether
avoided, the drafters of the NIEs have fallen into the habit of injecting
into key judgments of the executive summaries impressionistic
assessments based on "mirror-imaging," i.e., the attribution to Soviet
decision-makers of such forms of behavior as might be expected from
their U. S. counterparts under analogous circumstances. This conceptual
flaw is perhaps the single gravest cause of the misunderstanding of
Soviet strategic objectives found in past and current NIEs.
A fundamental methodological flaw is the imposition on Soviet
strategic thinking of a framework of conflicting dichotomies which may
make sense in the U.S. context but does not correspond to either
Russian doctrine or Russian practice: for example, war vs. peace,
confrontations vs. detente, offense vs. defense, strategic vs. peripheral,
nuclear vs. conventional, arms limitations vs. arms buildup, and so on.
In Soviet thinking, these are complementary or mutually supporting
concepts, and they by no means exclude one another.
One effect of "mirror-imaging" is that the NIEs have ignored the
fact that Soviet thinking is Clausewitzian in character, that is, that it
conceives in terms of "grand strategy" for which military weapons,
strategic ones included, represent only one element in a varied arsenal
of means of persuasion and coercion, many of them non-military in
nature.
Another effect of "mirror-imaging" has been the tendency to
misconstrue the manner in which Soviet leaders perceive the utility of
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those strategic weapons (i.e., strategic nuclear forces) to which the NIEs
do specifically address themselves. The drafters of NIE 11-3/8 seem to
believe that the Soviet leaders view strategic nuclear weapons much as
do their U. S. analogues. Since in the United States nuclear war is
generally regarded as an act of mutual suicide that can be rational only
as a deterrent threat, it is assumed that the USSR looks at the matter in
the same way. The primary concern of Soviet leaders is seen to be the
securing of an effective deterrent to protect the Soviet Union from U.S.
attack and in accord with the Western concept of deterrence. The NIEs
focus on the threat of massive nuclear war with the attendant
destruction and ignore the political utility of nuclear forces in assuring
compliance with Soviet will; they ignore the fact that by eliminating
the political credibility of the U. S. strategic deterrent, the Soviets seek
to create an environment in which other instruments of their grand
strategy, including overwhelming regional dominance in conventional
arms, can better be brought to bear; they fail to acknowledge that the
Soviets believe that the best way to paralyze U. S. strategic capabilities
is by assuring that the outcome of any nuclear exchange will be as
favorable to the Soviet Union as possible; and, finally they ignore the
possibility that the Russians seriously believe that if, for whatever
reason, deterrence were to fail, they could resort to the use of nuclear
weapons to fight and win a war. The NIEs tendency to view deterrence
as an alternative to a war fighting capability rather than as
complementary to it, is in the opinion of Team "B", a grave and
dangerous flaw in their evaluations of Soviet strategic objectives.
Other manifestations of "mirror-imaging" are the belief that the
Russians are anxious to shift the competition with the United States to
other than military arenas so as to be able to transfer more resources to
the civilian sector; that they entertain only defensive not offensive
plans; that their prudence and concern over U. S. reactions are
overriding; that their military programs are essentially a reaction to U. S.
programs and not self-generated. The NIEs concede that strategic
superiority is something the Soviet Union would not spurn if it were
attainable; but they also feel (without providing evidence for this
critical conclusion) that Russia's leaders regard such superiority as an
unrealistic goal and do not actively pursue it.
Analysis of Soviet past and present behavior, combined with what
is known of Soviet political and military doctrines, indicates that these
judgments are seriously flawed. The evidence suggests that the Soviet
leaders are first and foremost offensively rather than defensively
minded. They think not in terms of nuclear stability, mutual assured
destruction, or strategic sufficiency, but of an effective nuclear war-
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fighting capability. They believe t at the probability of a general
nuclear war can be reduced by building up one's own strategic forces,
but that it cannot be altogether eliminated, and that therefore one has
to be prepared for such a war as if it were unavoidable and be ready to
strike first if it appears imminent. There is no evidence that the Soviet
leadership is ready, let alone eager, to reduce the military budget in
order to raise the country's standard of living. Soviet Russia's habitual
caution and sensitivity to U. S. reactions are due less to an inherent
prudence than to a realistic assessment of the existing global
"correlation of forces;" should this correlation (or the Soviet leaders'
perception of it) change in their favor, they could be expected to act
with greater confidence and less concern for U.S. sensitivities. In fact,
there are disturbing signs that the latter development is already taking
place. Recent evidence of a Soviet willingness to take increased risks
(e.g., by threatening unilateral military intervention in the Middle East
in October 1973, and supporting the Angola adventure) may well
represent harbingers of what lies ahead.
Soviet doctrine, confirmed by the actions of its leadership over
many decades has emphasized-and continues to emphasize-two
important points: the first is unflagging persistence and patience in
using the available means favorably to mold all aspects of the
correlation of forces (social, psychological, political, economic and
military) so as to strengthen themselves and to weaken any prospective
challengers to their power; the second is closely to evaluate the evolving
correlation of forces and to act in accordance with that evaluation.
When the correlation is unfavorable, the Party should act with great
caution and confuse the enemy in order to gain time to take actions
necessary to reverse trends in the correlation of forces. When the
correlation of forces is favorable, the Party is under positive obligation
to take those actions necessary to realize and nail down potential gains,
lest the correlation of forces subsequently change to a less favorable
position. (It is noteworthy that in recent months one of the major
themes emphasized in statements by the Soviet leadership to internal
audiences urges the "realization" of the advances brought about by the
favorable evolution of forces resulting from detente and the positive
shift in the military balance.)
We are impressed by the scope and intensity of Soviet military and
related programs (e.g., proliferation and hardening of its command,
control and communications network and civil defense). The size and
nature of the Soviet effort which involves considerable economic and
political costs and risks, if long continued in the face of frustrated
economic expectations within their own bloc and the possibility that
the West may come to perceive the necessity of reversing current trends
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before they become irreversible, lead to the possibility of a. relatively
short term threat cresting, say, in 1980 to 1983, as well as the more
obvious long range threat.
The draft NIE's do not appear to take any such shorter range threat
seriously and do not indicate that the threat itself, or its possible timing,
have been examined with the care which we believe the subject
deserves.
Although in the past two years the NIEs have taken a more realistic
view of the Soviet military buildup, and even conceded the possibility
that its ultimate objective may well exceed the requirements of
deterrence, they still incline to play down the Soviet commitment to a
war-winning capability. Three additional factors (beside those men-
tioned above) may account for this attitude:
1. Political pressures and considerations. On some occasions the
drafters of NIE display an evident inclination to minimize the
Soviet strategic buildup because of its implications for detente, SAL
negotiations, congressional sentiments as well as for certain U. S.
forces. This is not to say that any of the judgments which seem to
reflect policy support are demonstrably directed judgments: rather
they appear to derive mainly from a strong and understandable
awareness on the part of the NIE authors of the policy issues at
stake.
2. Inter-agency rivalry. Some members of Team "B" feel that
the inclination of the NIEs to downplay military threats is in
significant measure due to bureaucratic rivalry between the
military and civilian intelligence agencies; the latter, being in
control of the NIE language, have a reputation for tempering the
pessimistic views of military intelligence with more optimistic
judgments.
3. The habit of viewing each Soviet weapons' program, or other
development, in isolation from the others. The NIEs tend to assess
each Soviet development as in and of itself, even when it is evident
that the Russians are pursuing a variety of means to attain the same
objective. As a result, with each individual development minimized
or dismissed as being in itself of no decisive importance, the
cumulative effect of the buildup is missed.
Analyses carried out by members of Team "B" (and presented in
Part Two of this Report) of NIE treatments of certain key features of
the Soviet strategic effort indicate the extent to which faulty method
and biases of an institutional nature affect its evaluations. This holds
true of the NIE treatment of Soviet strategic offensive forces (ICBMs
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and SLBMs); of its views of the alleged economic constraints on Soviet
strategic forces; of its assessment of Soviet civil defense and military
hardening programs; of its interpretation of the strategic implications of
Soviet mobile missiles and the Backfire bomber; of its evaluation of
Soviet R&D in the fields of anti-submarine, anti-satellite, and anti-
ballistic missile defenses; and of its perception of Soviet non-central
nuclear systems. In each instance it was found that through NIE
11-3/8-75, the NIEs have tended (though not in the same degree) to
minimize the seriousness and success of the respective Soviet efforts,
and (by the injection of de facto net assessments) to downgrade the
threat which they pose to U. S. security.
In formulating its own estimate of Soviet strategic objectives,
Team "B" divided it into two aspects: objectives in the broad,
"grand strategic" sense, as they are perceived by the Soviet
leader-ship; and objectives in the more narrow, military sense, as
defined by NIE 11-3/8.
As concerns the first, Team " B" agreed that all the evidence points
to an undeviating Soviet commitment to what is euphemistically called
"the worldwide triumph of socialism" but in fact connotes global
Soviet hegemony. Soviet actions give no grounds on which to dismiss
this objective as rhetorical exhortation, devoid of operative meaning.
The risks consequent to the existence of strategic nuclear weapons have
not altered this ultimate objective, although they have influenced the
strategy employed to pursue it. "Peaceful coexistence" (better known in
the West as detente) is a grand strategy adapted to the age of nuclear
weapons. It entails a twin thrust: (1) stress on all sorts of political,
economic, ideological, and other non-military instrumentalities to
penetrate and weaken the "capitalist" zone, while at the same time
strengthening Russia's hold on the "socialist" camp; and (2) an intense
military buildup in nuclear as well as conventional forces of all sorts,
not moderated either by the West's self-imposed restraints or by SALT.
In its relations with the United States, which it views as the central
bastion of the enemy camp, the Soviet leadership has had as its main
intermediate goals America's isolation from its allies as well as the
separation of the OECD nations from the Third World, which, it
believes, will severely undermine "capitalism's" political, economic,
and ultimately, military might.
With regard to China, while the spectre of a two-front war and
intense ideological competition have to an inportant degree limited the
Soviet Union's freedom of action in pursuance of their goals against the
West, it has not proved an unlimited or insuperable limitation. Further,
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given current trends in the growth of Soviet military power, the U. S.
cannot confidently anticipate that concern with China will. deter the
USSR from increasingly aggressive policies toward the West.
As concerns the more narrowly defined military strategic objectives,
Team "B" feels the USSR strives for effective strategic superiority in all
the branches of the military, nuclear forces included. For historic
reasons, as well as for reasons inherent in the Soviet system, the Soviet
leadership places unusual reliance on coercion as a regular instrument
of policy at home as well as abroad. It likes to have a great deal of
coercive capability at its disposal at all times, and it likes for it to come
in a rich mix so that it can be optimally structured for any contingency
that may arise. After some apparent division of opinion intermittently
in the 1960's, the Soviet leadership seems to have concluded that
nuclear war could be fought and won. The scope and vigor of Soviet
strategic programs leave little reasonable doubt that Soviet leaders are
indeed determined to achieve the maximum possible measure of
strategic superiority over the U.S. Their military doctrine is measured
not in Western terms of assured destruction but in those of a war-
fighting and war-winning capability; it also posits a clear and
substantial Soviet predominance following a general nuclear conflict.
We believe that the Russians place a high priority on the attainment of
such a capability and that they may feel that it is within their grasp. If,
however, that capability should not prove attainable, they intend to
secure so substantial a nuclear war-fighting advantage that, as a last
resort, they would be less deterred than we from initiating the use of
nuclear weapons. In this context, both detente and SALT are seen by
Soviet leaders not as cooperative efforts to ensure global peace, but as
means more effectively to compete with the United States.
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PART ONE
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JUDGMENTS ABOUT SOVIET STRATEGIC OBJECTIVES
UNDERLYING NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE ESTIMATES
AND THE SHORTCOMINGS OF THESE JUDGMENTS
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PART ONE
JUDGMENTS ABOUT SOVIET STRATEGIC OBJECTIVES
UNDERLYING NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE ESTIMATES
AND THE SHORTCOMINGS OF THESE JUDGMENTS
1. Influence of Intelligence Gathering Tech-
niques on the Perception of Soviet Objectives
The National Intelligence Estimates concerning the
USSR are essentially assessments of Soviet military
capabilities which, in the main, are based on data
gathered by means of highly sophisticated optical and
listening devices. Because the Soviet Union remains a
uniquely closed society, human contacts, traditionally
the principal source of foreign intelligence, play a
distinctly subordinate role in the preparation of these
documents: not only is such information exceedingly
scarce, but it is always suspect of being the product of
a deliberate disinformation effort in which the Soviet
government engages on a massive scale. Furthermore,
information obtained from sensitive human sources
often has such limited distribution that it does not
play a significant part in the preparation of NIEs.
Thus it happens that the hard evidence on which the
NIEs are based relates primarily to the adversary's
capabilities rather than his intentions, his weapons
rather than his ideas, motives, and aspirations.
The particular nature of the intelligence-gathering
process exerts an important influence on the manner
in which Soviet strategic objectives are assessed in the
NIEs: we have here an instance of technology turning
from tool into master. Because the hard evidence is so
overwhelmingly physical (material) in nature, the
tendency of the intelligence community is to focus on
questions of what rather than why or what for.
Problems of capabilities overshadow those of Soviet
purpose. As a consequence, the NIEs either gloss over
in silence the question of Soviet strategic objectives, or
else treat the matter in a perfunctory manner. Judging
by the available evidence, it seems that the intelli-
gence community has spent more effort and produced
more literature on each and every Soviet ICBM
system than on the whole overriding question of why
it is that the USSR develops such a strategic nulcear
posture in the first place.
To gloss over Soviet purpose, however, does not
mean to be rid of the issue: excluded from the front
entrance, it has a way of slipping through the back
door. The point is that whether one wants to or not, in
assessing the enemy's capabilities one must of
necessity make some kind of judgments about his
objectives, or else the raw data are of no use. Facts of
themselves are mute: they are like the scattered letters
of an alphabet that the reader must arrange in
sequence according to some system. The difference is
only whether one arrives at one's judgments about an
adversary's objectives consciously and openly, i.e.,
spells them out, or unconsciously. As a rule, whenever
the latter course is taken, one's judgments tend to be
drawn from simplistic "projections" of one's own
values and aspirations. For unless we are prepared to
acknowledge that our adversary is "different" and
unless we are willing to make the mental effort
required to understand him on his own terms, we have
no choice but to fall back on the only alternate
position available, namely the postulate that his basic
motivation resembles ours. The result is that well-
known phenomenon, "mirror-imaging", the persistent
flaw of the NIEs bearing on the USSR, a flaw which
may be said to constitute the principal source of their
unsatisfactory assessments of Soviet objectives. In
other words, the disinclination, in no small part
induced by the scientific-technical character of
intelligence gathering about the USSR, to face
squarely the issue of objectives (which does not lend
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itself to conventional scientific or technical analysis)
encourages the authors of the NIEs to adopt a set of
questionable assumptions about Russian intentions.
These assumptions, in turn, lead to the formulation of
judgments about Soviet intentions which are not
supported by the available evidence, and, indeed,
sometimes stand in stark contradiction to it. Thus,
overemphasis on "hard" data and the failure to draw
on other sources of information with the same degree
of conviction all too often causes the information
supplied by the "hard" data to be misinterpreted. In
the opinion of Team "B", the NIEs are filled with
unsupported and questionable judgments about what
it is that the Soviet government wants and intends. It
is this practice, rather than the absence of solid
information, that has caused in the past (and in
considerable measure does so in the present) recurrent
underestimations of the intensity, scope, and implicit
threat of the Soviet strategic buildup.
2. Implicit NIE Assumptions and Judgments
About Soviet International Behavior
The unspoken assumptions of the U.S. intelligence
community (and, one may add, much of the U.S.
political, intellectual, and business communities as
well) about Soviet international behavior derive from
several sources, which can be briefly identified as
follows:
a. The U.S. commercial tradition and the
business culture which permeates U.S. society;
among their components are the beliefs that (1)
peace and the pursuit of profit are "normal"
whereas war is always an aberration; (2) in relations
between parties both should enjoy a share of the
profits; and, (3) human nature everywhere is the
same, by and large corresponding to the rationalist,
utilitarian model devised by Jeremy Bentham and
his followers.
b. A democratic tradition which regards social
equality as "natural" and elitism of any sort as
aberrant.
c. An insular tradition derived from the fact that
until two decades ago, when the Russians deployed
their first ICBMs, the USA had enjoyed total
immunity from a strategic threat to its territory.
These three traditions-commercial, democratic,
and insular-have imbued the United States with a
unique outlook on the world, an outlook that is shared
by no other nation, least of all by the Russians whose
historic background is vastly different. It is a world
outlook sui generis and yet nevertheless one which
deeply colors the intelligence community's percep-
tions of the motives and aspirations of the USSR.
As one reads the NIEs issued over the past fifteen
years, one finds underlying their assessments a whole
set of unspoken assumptions about Russian national
character and goals that in all essential respects
corresponds to the idealized image the United States
has of itself but bears very little resemblance to
anything that actually relates to Soviet Russia.
A. NIE Conception of Soviet Strategy
To begin with, the key word, the adjective
"strategic," The Soviet conception of "strategic," is
much broader than that covered by NIE 11-3/8.
Russia is a continental power not an insular one, and
it happens to have the longest external frontier of any
country in the world. In contrast to the United States,
it has never enjoyed the luxury of isolation, having
always been engaged in conflict along its frontier,
sometimes suffering devastating invasions, sometimes
being the aggressor who absorbed entire countries
lying along its borders. For a country with this kind of
a historic background it would make little sense to
separate any category of military weapons, no matter
how destructive, from the rest of the arsenal of the
means of persuasion and coercion.* The strategic
threat to the homeland (i.e., the ability of an enemy
to inflict "unacceptable" human and material losses)
is for the Soviet Union nothing new, and the danger
presented by strategic nuclear weapons, grave though
it may be, does not call for a qualitative departure
from the norms of traditional military thinking.
There is also a further factor which militates against
the Russians' thinking of strategic weapons in the
same way as do the Americans. In the United States,
the military are not considered an active factor in the
political life of the country, war itself is viewed as
abnormal, and the employment of weapons of mass
destruction as something entirely outside the norms of
policy. The Soviet Union, by contrast, functions as a
giant conglomerate in which military, political, and
* It is true, of course, that the Russians have created a separate
branch of the armed forces, the Strategic Rocket Forces. This is an
administrative device, however, which does not signify that they
regard such forces as unique and fundamentally different from the
army, navy, or air force.
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economic institutions-and the instruments appropri-
ate to each of them-are seen as part of a diversified
arsenal of power, all administered by the same body
of men and all usable for purposes of persuasion and
coercion. The distinction between the civilian and the
military sectors of society and economy, appropriate
to capitalist societies, is not very meaningful in the
Soviet environment. All of which means, that in the
USSR military weapons in general, and strategic
nuclear weapons in particular, are treated not as
unique instruments to be used as a very last resort, but
as elements of a whole range of mutually supporting
means of persuasion and coercion available to the
state in pursuit of its interests.
The Soviet conception of strategy resembles that
which in Western literature is sometimes referred to as
"grand strategy": it entails the application of all the
available resources in the pursuit of national objec-
tives. Soviet military theory is decidedly Clausewit-
zian in orientation. In Soviet strategic writings, the
point is made with monotonous emphasis that
military actions are subordinate to politics, and have
no function outside of politics. The following passage
is a fair example of this kind of argument:
The organic unity of military strategy and policy
with the determining role of the latter signifies
that military strategy proceeds from policy, is
determined by policy, is totally dependent on
policy, and accomplishes its specific tasks only
within the framework of policy ...*
The distinction between the American and Soviet
conceptions of strategic force is well reflected in the
criteria which the two sides employ in assessing the
power relationship between potential adversaries. The
American concept of "strategic balance" concentrates
almost exclusively on military forces, whereas the
Soviet concept of "correlation of forces" (sootnoshenie
sil) includes in the equation also such non-military
factors as political power, economic capacity, social
cohesion, morale, and so forth.
By adopting in its estimates of Soviet strategic
objectives the narrow American definition of what
constitutes strategy and a strategic threat instead of
the broad Clausewitzian one, the NIEs 11-3/8 have
no choice but to ignore weapons other than nuclear
ones in the Soviet strategic arsenal.* They grossly
underemphasize the connections between the politi-
cal, military, economic, and ideological elements in
Soviet foreign policy. By singling out for near
exclusive treatment the three components of the
Triad, they not only leave out of consideration other
nuclear and non-nuclear military means but also a
whole range of strategic weapons of a non-military
kind which the Soviet leadership sees as available to it
in the pursuit of world politics. And yet in Soviet eyes
such actions as the interdiction of the Western flow of
oil supplies or the disruption of the democratic
processes by Communist parties may well be per-
ceived as "strategic" moves equal in importance to
the deployment of the latest series of ICBMs.
B. NIE Assumptions and Judgments About
Soviet Strategic Objectives
Much the same "mirror-imaging" holds true when
we turn from the NIEs' perception of what constitutes
a "strategic threat" to their view of Soviet "strategic
objectives." Here we find a rather mechanistic
projection onto Soviet society of the sentiments and
aspirations of a society which sees war as an
unmitigated evil and the military as a social overhead
to be curtailed whenever possible, a society which
conceives the purpose of organized life to be the
steady improvement of the citizen's living standards.
These views are never spelled out in so many words:
nevertheless, they unmistakably underpin the NIEs
evaluations of what it is that the Russians aim at.
Much of U.S. analysis of Soviet military programs
and actions is based on granting excessive legitimacy
to an alleged Russian obsession with national security
derived of experience with foreign invasions and
interventions. * * Soviet Russia's relentless drive to
enlarge and improve its military power, its impulsive
reaction to any moves that threaten its territory, its
overriding concern with obtaining international recog-
* This tendency is aggravated by the compartmentalization of
the analysis of enemy capabilities by the intelligence community
which originally separated strategic offensive weapons from
strategic defensive weapons, and both from theatre tactical
capabilities. This compartmentalization persists in various forms up
to this day.
** See e.g., General George S. Brown's United States Military
Posture for FY 1977 where the following phrase occurs: "The Soviet
historical experience of war, invasion, revolution, foreign interven-
tion and hostility has produced strong anxiety concerning national
security." (p. 8)
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nition of its post-world War II conquests-all of this is
attributed to historically-induced national insecurities.
This basic assumption, strongly (though indirectly)
reflected in the NIEs, has a number of important
corollaries:
(1) That Soviet military policy is first and
foremost defensive in character. This view is explicitly
conveyed in NIE 11-4-72 (Issues and Options in
Soviet Military Policy), one of the few intelligence
publications which addresses itself seriously to Soviet
strategic objectives in the context of "grand strategy":
"Certain broad aims of Soviet foreign policy
can ... be described today in much the same
way as a decade or more ago: (a) security of the
homeland and of the world communist "center";
(b) protection of the "gains of socialism" and
more specifically maintenance of loyal Commu-
nist regimes in eastern Europe; (c) fostering
awareness everywhere of Soviet military strength
and readiness so as to support a strong foreign
policy aimed at expanding Soviet influence". (p.
5; emphasis supplied).*
The possibility that the Russians may be pursuing not
a defensive but an offensive strategy is not entertained
in the NIEs: the spread of Soviet "influence" (which
can also mean the use of peaceful means) is as far as
they are prepared to go in that direction. Apparently,
the issue is discounted as not meriting serious thought.
In, line with this assumption, the whole immense
Soviet buildup of nuclear strategic weapons is seen as
serving primarily defensive purposes. A document
called Soviet Nuclear Doctrine: Concepts of Intercon-
tinental and Theater War, issued by the Office of
Strategic Research in June 1973, flatly asserts that the
Russians perceive their nuclear forces as serving
essentially defensive aims: "The major effort has been
on programs which ensure the ability of strategic
forces to absorb a U.S. strike and still return a
* A similar view of Soviet military policy, i.e., as inherently
defensive is advanced in NIE 11-3/8-75 Vol. II, Paragraph 40, pp.
10-11, and NIE 11-14-75 (p. 2). The latter, for instance, says: "The
USSR considers its military strength in Europe to be fundamental to
the protection of its national interests, to the maintenance of its
strategic posture vis-a-vis the West, and to its management of
foreign policy" (Emphasis supplied). The National Intelligence
Estimates bearing on the Soviet Navy (e.g., NIE 11-15-74, Soviet
Naval Policy and Programs-Annexes, p. A-4) also tend, on the
whole, to see Soviet naval buildups in defensive rather than
offensive terms.
devastating blow" (p. 3).. Here, too, the possibility of
the Russians using their strategic weapons for offen-
sive purposes is ignored. Indeed, the very possibility of
nuclear war is rejected, for which reason the NIEs
tend to disregard evidence that suggests the Russians
view the matter differently.
(2) Consistently with this perception of Soviet
defensive objectives, the Soviet Union is seen as being
interested primarily in securing an effective deterrence
force: "Deterrence is a key objective."* Moreover,
deterrence is regarded as an end goal and, as in
Western thinking, as something fundamentally dif-
ferent' from war-fighting capability and strategic
superiority. Proceeding from this premise, the NIEs
have notoriously underestimated both the intensity
and scope of the Soviet commitment to a strategic
nuclear buildup. NIE 11-8-64 (p. 2) went on record as
stating that there was no reason to believe that the
USSR desired to match the United States in the
number of ICBMs. By 1967-68 the NIEs conceded
that the Russians might perhaps be aiming at strategic
parity with the United States. Only in 1974-75,
however, was the possibility of the Russians seeking
advantage and superiority over the United States
advanced as a serious contingency. * *
(3) Once the Soviet Union has attained parity
with the United States and assured itself of an
effective deterrent, it will not wish to continue the
arms race. As they gain strength, the Russians will also
acquire self-confidence and therefore cease to feel the
need to flex their muscles to impress potential
enemies: the acquisition of military might will make
the Soviet Union aware that the "contest for
international primacy has become increasingly com-
plicated and less amenable to simple projections of
power." (NIE 11-4-72, p. 1). The Soviet Union will
turn into a stabilizing force in international affairs
and shift an increasing share of its resources from the
military to the civilian sector ("The Soviet leadership
would no doubt prefer to shift some scarce resources
... to the civilian sector," NIE 11-4-72, p. 1).
(4) Because its preoccupation is with defense, in
its military effort the Soviet Union mainly responds to
initiatives of its potential rivals, especially the United
** The NIE record in regard to Soviet strategic objectives is
discussed at greater length in the Annex.
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States. Its strategic moves are reactive in character and
opportunistic rather than self-generated or long term
in conception.
(5) Given the obsession with national security
and the fact that its military arsenal serves primarily
defensive purposes, the United States can watch
without alarm the Soviet effort to attain military
parity. The attainment of such parity will provide the
Russians with the sense of confidence necessary for
them to decelerate the arms buildup.
(6) The Russians would admittedly not be averse
to gaining strategic superiority over the United States
if they thought this goal feasible. However, until very
recently the authors of NIE regarded such an
objective to be unrealistic and they did not allow that
Soviet leaders could seriously entertain it (e.g., "We
believe that the USSR has concluded that the
attainment of clear superiority in strategic weapons
... is not now feasible": NIE 11-72, Soviet Foreign
Policies and the Outlook for Soviet-American Objec-
tives, p. 2; no evidence supporting this contention is
given in this or any other document). Only very
recently has the mass of data which suggests that the
USSR may not be content with mere parity and
mutual deterrence become so compelling as to
force the NIE to concede that the Soviet Union
could indeed possess more ambitious goals: "the
scope and vigor of these [strategic] programs" says
NIE 11-3/8-75 (p. 5), "at a time when the USSR has
achieved a powerful deterrent as well as recognition as
the strategic equal of the U.S., raise the elusive
question of whether the Soviet leaders embrace as an
objective some form of strategic nuclear superiority
over the U.S." This qualified admission, after years of
stress on the purely defensive character of Soviet
strategic objectives, is gratifying, even though the NIE
still tends to disparage the importance of such
superiority and, refuses to acknowledge that it can be
militarily meaningful. The prevailing tone of the NIE
all along has been to view Soviet policy as one of
prudent opportunism. The Russians are seen as
unwilling to take high risks or to make any moves that
might provoke the United States, on whose good will
they are believed to place extremely high value.
(7) Soviet military doctrine and the official
pronouncements of Soviet leaders which seem to
indicate a more aggressive stance, as, for example,
when they speak of "socialist" (read: Soviet) world
hegemony, need not be taken too seriously. While
some intelligence analysts apparently do attach
considerable significance to Soviet doctrinal pro-
nouncements, the consensus reflected in NIEs holds
that Soviet doctrine is primarily exhortative in
character and possesses little if any operative signifi-
cance. Its main function is to serve domestic politics,
for which reason it represents a kind of Soviet
counterpart to U.S. campaign oratory.
It is not difficult to perceive that the picture of
Soviet motivations and intentions as implicitly or (less
frequently) explicitly drawn in the NIEs is one which
in all respects but one-namely, the acknowledge-
ment of an abiding, historically-conditioned and
extreme sense of national insecurity-is like that of the
United States. The Soviet Union is seen as defensive-
minded, concerned with securing merely an effective
deterrence, preferring to shift the competition with the
United States to other than military arenas so as to be
able to transfer resources to the civilian sector, and
lacking in any strategic objectives apart from those
that are forced upon it by the United States and other
potential adversaries. Superiority is something the
Russians would not scorn if the United States were to
allow them to gain it; but by the very nature of
things, it is not an objective they can actively pursue,
the more so that strategic superiority in the nuclear
age is something of a phantom. The Russians indeed
do display opportunistic proclivities but they are
above all prudent, cautious, and conservative.
These assumptions permeate the analyses presented
in the National Intelligence Estimates and often lead
to quite unwarranted assessments. Examples of such
procedures are given in Part Two of this Report which
indicates how, partly by virtue of "mirror-imaging,"
and partly as a result of firmly held convictions about
what it is the Russians must or ought to want, hard
data are interpreted in a manner that closer scrutiny
reveals to be at best questionable and at worst
palpably unsound.
3. Critique of these assumptions
The point is that these assumptions do not stand up
to scrutiny in the light of Soviet history, Soviet
doctrine, and Soviet actions.
(1) To begin with, the tendency to view
"insecurity" as the motor force propelling Soviet
foreign and military policies. Although undoubtedly
the desire to protect the homeland is a factor in
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Russian behavior, it does not lead to a defensive
posture in the ordinary meaning of the word: the
Russians construe their own security in the sense that
it can be assured only at the expense of their
neighbors. This leads to an essentially aggressive
rather than defensive approach to security. And in
fact, Russian, and especially Soviet political and
military theories are distinctly offensive in character:
their ideal is the "science of conquest" (nauka
pobezhdat') formulated by the 18th Century Russian
commander, Field Marshall A. V. Suvorov in a
treatise of the same name, which has been a standard
text of Imperial as well as Soviet military science.
There are valid reasons why Soviet political and
military thinking should be offensive.
A. As a matter of the historical record, it is
untrue that Russia has suffered an exceptional number
of invasions and interventions: it has probably done
more invading itself. The expansion of Russia as a
continental empire is without parallel in world
history: no country has grown so fast and none has
held on so tenaciously to its conquests. It is no
accident that Russia alone of all the belligerents has
emerged from World War II larger than it had entered
it. As concerns the celebrated interventions of the
West in the Russian Revolution, most of what is said
on this subject is myth pure and simple: suffice it to
say that except on rare occasions Western troops did
not actively fight the Red Army; that their interven-
tion was a response to Soviet intervention in western
politics (the call to class war and the overthrow of the
existing governments); and that the net effect of U.S.
intervention in the Russian Civil War has been to save
Eastern Siberia for Russia from certain Japanese
conquest. In other words, the Russian "right" to be
obsessively concerned with security is a misconception
based on a one-sided reading of history; indeed, if
anyone has a right to be obsessed with security it is
Russia's neighbors. It is really not surprising that
"insecurity" plays a far lesser part in Russian thinking
or psychology than is normally attributed to it. The
Russian outlook, where politics and military affairs are
concerned, has traditionally been confident and
aggressive rather than anxious and defensive. Hence
there is no reason to assume that the growth of
military might will assuage the Russian appetite for
expansion: the opposite proposition is far more
plausible-the stronger they are and feel, the more
likely are they to behave aggressively.
B. There are also internal reasons which push
the Soviet leadership toward an offensive stance:
The great importance which Soviet political
theory attaches to the sense of forward move-
ment: the lack of any kind of genuine legitimacy
on the part of the Soviet government compels it
to create its own pseudo-legitimacy which rests
on an alleged "mandate of history" and is said to
manifest itself in a relentless spread of the
"socialist" cause around the globe;
Connected with it, the attitude that in political,
military, and ideological contests it is essential
always to seize and hold the initiative;
Lack of confidence in the loyalty of the
population (a World War II experience), espe-
cially where East Europe is concerned, and the
fear of massive defections to the enemy in the
event of prolonged defensive operations;
The better ability of the regime to exercise control
over military commanders (as well as over the
civilian population) in pre-planned, offensive
operations, than under conditions where the
initiative is left to the opponent;
The traumatic experience of the first few months
of the Russo-German War of 1941-45, when a
sudden Nazi onslaught caused immense Soviet
losses in manpower and territory, and almost cost
the Russians the war; the experiences of war in
the Middle East in 1967 and 1973 have
reinforced the belief of Soviet military in the
value of decisive offensive action;
The conviction that in the nuclear age the
decisive blows will be struck in the first hours of
the conflict, and hence he who waits to strike
second is almost certain to lose.
40
(2) There is no evidence either in their theoretical
writings or in their actions that Soviet leaders have
embraced the U.S. doctrine of mutual assured
destruction or any of its corollaries. Neither nuclear
stability, nor strategic sufficiency, nor "parity," play
any noticeable role in Soviet military thinking. The
Russians seem to have come to regard strategic nuclear
weapons as weapons of unique capacity whose
introduction has indeed profoundly affected military
strategy, but which, in the ultimate analysis, are still
means of persuasion and coercion and as such to be
employed or not employed, as the situation dictates.
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Y
Soviet military seems unchallengeable. Secondly, the
sharp civilian-military duality, basic to our society,
does not exist in the USSR; hence, the Soviet military
budget is not clearly differentiated from the civilian
one. The reduction of Soviet military expenditures by
so many billion rubles would not automatically
release resources for the civilian population. Finally, it
is unwarranted to assume a priori that the Soviet
leadership is eager significantly to raise its popula-
tion's living standards. The ability to mobilize the
population not only physically but also spiritually is
regarded by the Soviet leadership as essential to any
successful war effort. Having had ample opportunity
to observe post-1945 developments in the West, the
Soviet leaders seem to have concluded that a
population addicted to the pursuit of consumer goods
rapidly loses its sense of patriotism, sinking into a
mood of self-indulgence that makes it extremely poor
material for national mobilization. There is every
reason to believe-on the basis of both the historic
record and the very logic of the Soviet system-that
the Soviet regime is essentially uninterested in a
significant rise of its population's living standards, at
any rate in the foreseeable future. Certainly, the
prospect of acquiring additional resources for the
civilian sector is for it no inducement for a reduction
of the arms buildup.
(4) While the Soviet Union obviously, and for
good reasons, keeps a very close watch on U.S.
strategic developments, and, when necessary, adopts
appropriate defensive countermeasures, there is no
evidence that its long-term strategic planning is
primarily influenced by what the United States or any
other power happens to do. The Soviet Union is
pursuing its own long term global objectives, doing all
that is necessary to safeguard the home base, but
without allowing the requirements of defense substan-
tially to alter its offensive objectives. It is striking, for
example, how little attention is paid in Soviet military
literature (both open and classified) to SALT. In
contrast to the United States, where strategic arms
limitation is regarded as a central element in the
development of the U.S.-USSR strategic balance, in
Soviet literature SALT is treated as a minor sideshow
without much influence on the overall strategic
competition. Attention must also be called to the
Soviet Union's response to what it must have
perceived as the greatest threat to its security since the
end of World War II, namely the conflict with China.
Instead of depleting its Warsaw Pact forces to
confront the Chinese threat, the Soviet Union
proceeded in the 1960's to build up a powerful and
substantially new military force on the Far Eastern
front, thereby once again demonstrating that it does
not intend actions by others to interrupt or deflect its
own long term strategic planning.
(5) Since, as we have pointed out, the decisive
motive in Soviet political and military thinking is not
a defensive but an offensive spirit, the assumption
that growing Soviet strength will cause them to
become less aggressive is unwarranted.
(6) It is certainly true that the Russians have been
prudent and generally cautious, and that they have
avoided rash military adventures of the kind that had
characterized nationalist-revolutionary ("fascist") re-
gimes of the 1930's. As the record indicates, whenever
they have been confronted with situations that
threatened to lead to U.S.-USSR military confronta-
tions, they preferred to withdraw, even at the price of
some humiliation. The reason for this cautious
behavior, however, lies not in an innate conservatism,
but rather in military inferiority, for which reason one
cannot count on it recurring as that inferiority
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They regard nuclear war as feasible and (as indicated
below in Parts Two and Three) take many active steps
to attain a capability to wage and win such a war.
The attainment of nuclear parity with the United
States has served only to strengthen their view of the
matter. True, Khrushchev in the early 1960s, and for
several years thereafter various spokesmen from Soviet
institutes, appeared to accept mutual deterrence as a
concrete fact in the face of U. S. strategic superiority
and the then bleak prospects for the USSR to reverse
that situation. These indications of serious internal
consideration of Western concepts of nuclear balance
disappeared as prospects for meaningful Soviet strate-
gic superiority improved, although Soviet spokesmen
continued to suggest to Western audiences that
nuclear war could be mutually destructive. In any
event there is no evidence that Soviet planners have
adopted the essentials of U.S. strategic thinking with
its linchpin, the theory of nuclear sufficiency: indeed,
all the available evidence points to their deliberate
and steadfast rejection of such Western concepts.
(3) There is no reason to assume that the Soviet
leadership, like its U.S. counterpart, regards military
expenditures as a waste and wishes to reduce the
military budget in order to be able to shift resources to
the civilian sector For one the priorit enjoyed by the
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disappears. The Russians have a strongly developed
sense of power relationships, of the equation of total
power between adversaries, which they call the
"correlation of forces." They believe that one's means
should always match one's objectives, and hence that
one should never engage oneself fully (i.e., without
retaining a possibility of timely withdrawal) unless
there is very high certainty that the correlation of
forces is so favorable as to ensure success. (Their
theorists claim, with unconcealed scorn, that "bour-
geois" leaders habitually underestimate the strength
of their opponents, rushing headlong into hopeless
"adventures".) Whenever they feel that the correla-
tion of forces is strongly in their favor, their doctrine
calls on them to act decisively and with vigor. It may,
therefore, be assumed that in proportion as the USSR
gains strength and perceives the global "correlation of
forces" shifting in its favor, it will act in a manner
that in our definition will be less cautious.
(7) The internal pronouncements of Soviet
civilian and military leaders concerning national
objectives should on no account be dismissed as empty
rhetoric. In authoritarian states, the will of individuals
takes (by definition) the place of laws, for which
reason formal pronouncements of the leader or leaders
acquire quite a different significance and fulfill quite
different functions from those they have in countries
where governments are elected popularly and operate
in accord with constitutional mandates. Communist
rulers simply cannot say for internal consumption
things which are significantly different from what
they actually mean, or else they risk disorienting their
subjects and disorganizing their administrations. (To
the extent that they make contrary statements in
private and "off the record" to Westerners, they can
be assumed to have the purpose of influencing foreign
public opinion.) One must bear in mind that the
decisions of the Soviet leadership, as officially
enunciated, are filtered down to the masses by means
of a vast and well-organized agitprop machinery, and
are understood by the population at large to be formal
directives. Nowhere can "rnirror-imaging" be more
deadly than in the treatment of Soviet pronounce-
ments with that cynicism with which we are
accustomed to respond to our own electoral rhetoric.
0
4. Conclusion
If we juxtapose the implicit and explicit assump-
tions of NIEs about the Soviet mentality and Soviet
strategic objectives with what history, the exigencies
of the Soviet system, and the pronouncements of
Soviet leaders indicate, we are not surprised that the
NIEs consistently underestimate the significance of
the Soviet strategic effort. All Soviet actions in this
field tend to be interpreted in the light of a putative
sense of insecurity; aggressive intentions are dismissed
out of hand. It is our belief that the NIEs' tendency to
underestimate the Russian strategic drive stems
ultimately from three causes: (1) an unwillingness to
contemplate Soviet strategic objectives in terms of the
Soviet conception of "strategy" as well as in the light
of Soviet history, the structure of Soviet society, and
the pronouncements of Soviet leaders; (2) an uncon-
scious (and related) tendency to view the USSR as a
country whose basic strategic objectives are limited to
an assured defense of the home country, and (3) the
resultant tendency to ignore or misinterpret evidence
that points to different conclusions. In other words,
such misjudgments as have been committed and to
some extent continue to be committed are due not so
much to the lack of evidence as to the absence of a
realistic overall conception of Soviet motives and
intentions, without which the significance of such
evidence as exists cannot be properly assessed.
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25X1
PART TWO
A CRITIQUE OF NIE INTERPRETATIONS OF CERTAIN
SOVIET STRATEGIC DEVELOPMENTS
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PART TWO
A CRITIQUE OF NIE INTERPRETATIONS OF CERTAIN
SOVIET STRATEGIC DEVELOPMENTS
FOREWORD
This section presents summary analyses of specific
aspects of Soviet strategic force developments which,
in the opinion of Team B, NIEs have underestimated
or treated too lightly in estimating the Soviet threat to
U.S. security. We have not attempted in this section
to cover the sweep of Soviet strategic programs either
comprehensively or in depth. The summary analyses,
are meant to be representative of the Team's review of
developments that have contributed to its conclusions
as to Soviet strategic objectives. The papers make the
following principal points:
1. Soviet ICBM and SLBM programs reflect
strategic objectives and a determination more omi-
nous for U.S. security in both political and military
terms than the NIEs acknowledge.
2. Economic Restraints on Soviet Strategic
Forces: Consistent low estimates of the Soviet defense
burden combined with overestimates of economic
constraints have contributed to the NIE underestima-
tion of Soviet strategic weapon programs and have
tended to offset in the readers' minds concern for the
growth of Soviet military capabilities: Soviet strategic
force developments have yet to reflect any constrain-
ing effects of competition from the civil sector of the
economy.
3. Soviet Civil Defense. Soviet civil defense
efforts have been either downgraded or ignored in the
NIEs, mirror-imaging a U.S. consensus that such
defenses lack strategic utility: in fact, Soviet civil
defense efforts appear to be integrated with all other
military programs to maximize Russia's capabilities to
fight a nuclear war and emerge viable from it.
4. Military Hardening: The extensive hardening
program connected with Soviet command and control
clearly demonstrates Soviet intent to achieve a true
war fighting capability, as opposed to acceptance of a
mutual deterrence concept.
5. Mobile Missiles: The Soviets intend to produce
substantial numbers of SS-20 missiles which use the
same two-stage and ground-handling equipment as
does the SS-16 intercontinental mobile missile; the
NIEs do not address themselves to the Soviet potential
of altering the strategic balance by quickly converting
the SS-20 to ICBM's with the addition of the third
stage.
6. Backfire: The Backfire clearly possesses inter-
continental capability which means that if deployed
in significant numbers it would pose an incremental
threat to the strategic balance.
7. Soviet Anti-Satellite Testing: There is stronger
evidence than suggested by the NIEs of a Soviet
determination to develop anti-satellite systems having
high military value across the spectrum of conflict,
and it is likely that in the foreseeable future the
Russians will couple their anti-satellite system devel-
opment with developments of directed energy weap-
ons.
8. Soviet Strategic ASW: The uncharacteristically
strong negative long-range estimate of the NIEs
disparaging the possibility of successful Soviet devel-
opment of ASW capabilities is challengeable techni-
cally and if wrong, could have profound implications
for U.S. security.
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9. ABM including Directed Energy R&D: The
evidence does not support an indisputable conclusion
that the Soviets have either lost interest in their ABM
effort or downgraded it.
10. Soviet Non-Central Nuclear Systems: The
omission from the Estimates of any treatment of
Soviet non-central systems, and their relegation to
occasional and rather perfunctory treatment in other
estimates on "peripheral" forces, produces a picture of
the strategic balance seriously at variance with the
Soviets' own view and minimizes the extent of their
buildup.
1. Soviet Central Strategic Attack Systems
As broad and diversified as the Soviet strategic drive
has been, the core of the intercontinental attack force
effort has been the amassing and continual improve-
ment of modern ICBM and SSBN/SLBM forces.
Estimating History *
NIE Projections during the 1960s of Soviet ICBM
and SLBM forces consistently underestimated their
growth, the variety of programs, qualitative improve-
ments and force capabilities, and the intensity and
determination of the Soviet effort. In the mid 1960s,
even after the observed start of the SS-11, SS-9, and
Yankee SSBN programs, NIEs did not forecast any
very large scale or determined buildup of ICBM and
SLBM forces. The judgment was simply: "We do not
believe that the USSR aims at matching the United
States" in these intercontinental systems. The Soviets
were depicted as resigned to or even satisfied with a
position of inferiority, and their objectives limited to a
minimal but adequate retaliatory deterrent force. Not
until NIE 11-8-68 was it projected that "the Soviets
will shortly overcome the U.S. lead in numbers of
ICBM launchers" (not SLBM), and by then a U.S.-
style arms control and limitation rationale was
attributed to the Soviets in a way to place presumed
limits on further growth and development.
Later NIEs, at the start of the 1970s, as the number
of fixed ICBM silo launchers was levelling off,
disparaged the Soviet effort to gain ostentatious
superiority and to develop ICBM and SLBM forces
guided by real warfighting criteria. Instead, the goals
* The Annex contains a detailed history of NIE perceptions of
Soviet strategic force developments and objectives since 1962.
of these programs were stressed in terms of "rough
parity" and "equal security." Even after NIE 11-8-73
had acknowledged that Soviet ICBM and SLBM
programs were not "readily explained as merely trying
to keep up with the competition," mutual assured
destruction reasoning dominated the estimates, as did
a conviction that the Soviets would willingly limit
these programs meaningfully in pursuit of SALT,
strategic stability, and detente.
By the 1973-1975 NIEs, the Soviet ICBM and
SLBM efforts in general were more accurately
represented as "a vigorous and costly buildup," with
rapid qualitative improvement, but progress made in
improving ICBM accuracy was underestimated (see B
Team report on Soviet ICBM Accuracy) and the
implications of the enormous Soviet throw weight
advantage were not drawn out. In fact, until very
recently, little point was made of throw weight at all.
Current Analysis
NIE 11-3/8-75 (Volume 1) concludes that the hard
target counterforce capability of the Soviet ICBM
force is growing and could "pose a major threat" to
Minuteman in the early 1980s. Yet, the net assessment
implied in the key judgments remains far more
comfortable than hard evidence warrants-especially
when viewed in the context of broad Soviet strategic
concepts and objectives, as compared with a similar
context of U.S. requirements. This occurs because of a
continuing insistence on treating these strategic forces
solely in a narrow mutual assured destruction frame-
work (buttressed by a relatively optimistic view of
enduring Blue force capability) and on seeing Soviet
strategic motivations in such U.S. terms.
Consequently, even while reporting evidence of far-
reaching physical developments, the NIEs have
resisted conclusions equally logical to those favored by
the introduction of non-physical, soft conceptual
biases; mutual deterrence in an assured destruction
framework, a perspective on strategic force superiority
that greatly limits its utility, and U.S. views on SALT
and detente. The NIEs, then, have been based as
much upon a certain set of conceptual and political
assumptions about Soviet motivations as upon hard
evidence. Even when the cumulative hard evidence
tended to contradict these assumptions, they persisted.
Since the NIE in effect rests its conclusions on a net
assessment, the assessment should reflect a broader
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awareness of strategic force implications and should
explicitly include U.S. and Soviet strategic force
requirements beyond that of maintaining a "devastat-
ing retaliation" capability. Soviet objectives go
beyond that and so do U.S. force requirements, which
recognize an assured destruction capability as a
withhold or reserve force and only one of several
criteria for strategic force sufficiency.
Team B would emphasize far more strongly than
the NIEs the ominous implications of the growth and
developing properties of the Soviet ICBM and SLBM
forces. The full sweep of these programs, and in
particular the great ICBM throw weight, the improve-
ment and multiplication of MIRVed warheads given
that throw weight, and the steady modernization of
the ICBM force-e.g., in accuracy and systems
reliability-support a conclusion that the Soviets seek
clear superiority in the capabilities of these forces,
including the maximum feasible counterforce and
warfighting capability. The thrust of these Soviet
force developments and their potential threat to U.S.
security and strategic objectives, politically and
militarily, have not been adequately reflected in the
NIEs. The threat includes the steady development of
a potential war-winning capability but also encom-
passes-and reflects-a broader Soviet drive for
strategic superiority as discussed in Parts One and
Three. The political implications of these strategic
capabilities and their role in the overall "correlation of
forces"-which we would emphasize-have been
insufficiently recognized in past NIEs.
2. Economic Constraints on Soviet
Strategic Forces
The Estimating History
Consistently low intelligence estimates of the Soviet
military defense burden have had serious broad
warping effects on the estimating process and on the
perceptions of users. Until 1975, estimates of Soviet
military expenditures expressed as a percentage of
GNP were as low or lower than the U.S. percentage,
i.e., 6 to 8 percent. The high-level reader of the
estimates was often reassured by the percent of GNP
figures that the military balance could never get
seriously skewed. These Soviet military "cost" esti-
mates raised implicit or explicit questions in some
quarters of the U.S. Government as to whether the
magnitude of Soviet military efforts was being grossly
exaggerated. Even in the face of a direct challenge of
the basis for the low estimates, there was no
inclination to reconsider. For a good number of years
there was strong resistance to competing analysis
showing higher levels of Soviet military spending.
National estimates on Soviet strategic nuclear
attack forces written since 1962 have without excep-
tion stated that Soviet strategic capabilities have been
constrained by considerations of economy. Estimates
of Soviet strategic defense forces also contain numer-
ous references to economic constraints, but less
forceful ones: the history of massive Soviet expendi-
tures on strategic defense systems seems to have
impressed the drafters of the estimates and made them
more cautious about positing resource limitations.
Much of the argumentation regarding constraints
on force build-ups assumes (there is no documentation
offered) that resource allocation and priorities issues in
the USSR are reasonable facsimiles of such issues in
the United States. This passage from NIE 11-8-62 is
typical: "Moreover, the question of the proper
allocation of total economic resources among compet-
ing demands, and in particular between military and
civilian purposes, has been an active issue at the
highest levels of Soviet politics. These considerations
will continue to influence the scale and pace of Soviet
programs for long range striking forces." Para. 45,
p. 13. (Emphasis added.)
In NIE 11-3-67, a similar judgment is made with
regard to strategic defenses. After noting a general
Soviet disposition to accommodate military programs,
that estimate states: "Nevertheless, Soviet leaders will
continue to face difficult choices in allocating
resources among a variety of claimants, both civilian
and military. Their decision as to whether, and to
what extent, to extend ABM deployment-potentially
the most costly single military program on the
horizon-must be made in the context of these
competing claims." Para. 5, p. 6.
The evolution of NIE judgments about economic
restraints on the Soviet ABM program is interesting. It
suggests either an analytical blind spot or a policy
influenced bias, or both. There is a disturbing
correlation between the changing judgments from
1967 to 1972 and the policy issues affecting ABM
programs for the same period.
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i
In 1968 there was a distinct muting of the 1967
economic restraint argument about the Soviet ABM
program. It was replaced by a rationale which in
essence predicted rather unconstrained resource allo-
cation to the program in the absence of a SALT
agreement on ABM.
"Current pressures may exercise a restraining
influence on the strategic defense effort, but are
unlikely to reduce it. For the near term, at least,
expenditures for strategic defense will probably
be maintained at their present high level, while
military expenditures as a whole continue to rise.
The trend for the longer term will depend heavily
upon Soviet decisions concerning ABM deploy-
ment-potentially the most costly single military
program on the horizon-and the related ques-
tion of strategic arms control, If the Soviets
embark upon any sizable new program of ABM
deployment within the next few years, expendi-
tures for strategic defense will increase and by the
middle 1970's are likely to exceed those for
strategic attack by a substantial margin." Para. 7,
p. 7.
The estimate of 1969 treated the subject essentially
as in 1968 with the addition of some cost estimates. By
1971 (NIE 11-3 was not republished in 1970) the NIE
on strategic defense contains no reference to resource
restraints in the discussion of the Soviet ABM
program. In 1972, the future of the Soviet ABM
program is discussed primarily in terms of ABM
Treaty constraints and the capabilities of the Soviets
to develop and deploy ABMs in the event that treaty
were abrogated. Economic restraints on the ambitious
Soviet ABM programs which are postulated in the
event of abrogation are deemphasized. For instance,
in rationalizing the Illustrative Force Model IV, the
worst abrogated-treaty case postulated, economic
restraint is treated thus:
- "Deployment of strategic defense forces would
increase to the point that, even though achiev-
able without major new increases in productive
capacities, they strain these capacities, and
resources must be diverted to the extent that the
rate of growth of the civilian economy is
threatened." Para. 209, p. 63 (Emphasis added.)
In this 1972 estimate there is a heavy emphasis on
the relationship between future Soviet strategic
defense efforts and successful conclusions of offensive
arms limitation agreements, which reflects the change
of emphasis from ABM to offensive systems in SALT.
When this series of judgments is correlated over
time with the evolution of U.S. policy (and political
controversy) over U.S. ABM programs and arms
limitation efforts, a strong circumstantial case emerges
on the matter of politically influenced intelligence.
This case is strengthened by the lack of any apparent
evidential basis for shifting estimates of the nature of
economic restraints to Soviet ABM programs.
A blind spot in analysis is indicated by the fact that
there is no reference in the Soviet Strategic Attack and
General Purpose Force estimates of the effects on
economic constraints of the ABM Treaty which
supposedly relieved the USSR of the burden of
pursuing "the most expensive military program on the
horizon." Since competition among military claim-
ants has been a persistent part of the NIE argumenta-
tion concerning economic constraints on strategic
attack systems, one would expect Soviet costs saved
from ABM to have been applied to other military
programs. The unspoken assumption of the drafters
appears to have been that the savings effectuated on
future ABM programs would go to the civilian
economy, and not to other military programs.
Serious disagreements over military resource alloca-
0
tions have occurred among Soviet milita claimants
and such disputes are well-documented. 25X1
I evidence reveals 25X
policy disputes between components of the military-
establishment-naval spokesmen versus ground force
spokesmen, missile and rocket enthusiasts versus the
"multimillion man army" traditionalists. These dis-
putes were couched in operational or strategic terms,
but no doubt had some roots in competing resource
demands.
Such documentation is not available to support the
persistent NIE emphasis on military versus civilian
resource competition. There have been in the past
some disputes between heavy industry and medium
and light industry sectors of the Soviet economy. The
heavy industry spokesmen (from time to time referred
to as "metal eaters") include the producers of military
equipment, but this is not convincing evidence of a
civilian economy challenge to military resource
allocation priority paralleling that which occurs in
Western societies.
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One area of evidence which has changed sharply
during the past year is that concerning the Soviet
defense burden. An accumulation of evidence on the
Soviet military budget, topped by the testimony of a
person who had had an opportunity to examine the
budget in detail, has confirmed a gross underestima-
tion of Soviet defense expenditures by U.S. intelli-
gence. The 1970 Soviet military budget to which this
source had had access was 100 percent higher than
U.S. estimates for that year. New estimates by the
intelligence community based on this source and
others indicate that an error of this magnitude was
involved in the economic inputs to national estimates
for the past 10-12 years.
Analysis/Estimate
The primacy of the military priority in Soviet
resource allocation decisions has long been strongly
indicated by the magnitude of Soviet military
programs and forces. This evidence is now reinforced
by evidence of much higher military budgets than
previously estimated. While Soviet military claimants
for resources may compete with one another for
S resources, they face no serious competition from
claimants in the civilian economy sector-nor is this
surprising. Within what is, after all, a large and
expanding GNP, the Soviets have made it absolutely
clear that defense requirements have an almost
absolute first call on available resources. Denial of
consumer needs is not a new or inconsistent pattern of
Soviet behavior-exactly the contrary is the case.
Therefore, Soviet strategic forces have yet to reflect
any constraining effect of civil economy competition,
and are unlikely to do so in the foreseeable future.
Soviet strategic forces will be shaped almost
exclusively by the political leadership's view of
military and political utility of producing the types
and numbers of the systems involved. Constraints on
the growth of strategic attack and defense capabilities
will be technical in nature or due to production
limitations.
Arms limitation agreements will become constrain-
ing factors only to the extent that they do not interfere
with Soviet military-political goals. They may appear
to result in a redirection of expenditures from one
military purpose to another but even here this almost
certainly reflects decisions which might well have
been made in any event in the absence of agreement.
Constraining agreements may be reached provided
the alternative carries high risks to the Soviets of U.S.
action which would endanger the attainment of their
military-political goals.
U.S. Estimating History
The National Estimates series 11-3 dealing with
Soviet Strategic Defenses indicate a general lack of
interest in the subject of Soviet Civil Defense coupled
with doubt on the part of the drafters about the
seriousness or efficacy of Soviet efforts in the civil
defense area and doubt that civil defense would have
any strategic importance even if the Soviets were
serious about it.
Relative lack of interest is indicated by the brief
and generalized treatment afforded the subject.
Between NIE 11-3 of 1966 and that of 1974, Civil
Defense was not even mentioned in the Summary and
Conclusions (or "Key judgments" or "Precis") por-
tions of the estimates, which are normally all that is
read by policy makers. When Civil Defense finally
was mentioned in 1974, it was in one reassuring
sentence: Soviet Civil Defense will be unable "to
prevent massive casualties and the breakdown of the
economic structure." So far as we know, no serious
analytical study supports this conclusion.
Doubt about the seriousness or efficacy of Soviet
civil defense efforts was reflected in the persistent NIE
references to "apathy" toward programs, resource
constraints, and probable Soviet realization of the
basic infeasibility of civil defense in general. Doubt
about the strategic importance of civil defense was
reflected in judgments about the requirement for
several days' warning time for Soviet civil defense
plans to be put into effect, a factor essentially
nullifying the strategic impact of Soviet programs, in
the view of the NIE drafters. It is perhaps not
irrelevant to note that these views attributed to Soviet
authorities are precisely the views held in many
quarters in the U.S. civil defense effort. The possibility
of "mirror-imaging" is therefore one which cannot
readily be rejected.
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?
NIEs duly reported the growing evidence of a
strong Soviet emphasis on civil defense, such as the
elevation of its chief to Deputy Minister of Defense
level, Brezhnev's stress on civil defense at the 23rd
Party Congress, and the large number of people
assigned to the effort (50,000). But the evidence to
date and its implications has not been analyzed in
national estimates in the context of the total Soviet
policy of strategic offense and defense. Rather there
has been a tendency to view Soviet civil defense
efforts in the context of the U.S. concept of Mutual
Assured Destruction. This "mirror-imaging" probably
accounts in large measure for the treatment in the
estimates of civil defense as essentially an "add-on."
This factor was no doubt reinforced by the concentra-
tion of intelligence analysts on the technical aspects of
weaponry and military force structure which charac-
terizes all national intelligence estimates on military
matters.
Satellite photography and information supplied by
recent emigr6s from the USSR have provided a
substantial body of evidence indicating a very heavy
and costly Soviet emphasis on Civil Defense since at
least 1970. Much of the photographic evidence has
been on hand for several years, but until recently it
has not been exploited with a view to measuring
Soviet civil defense efforts.
This evidence points to a much more determined
and effective Soviet civil defense effort than we have
hitherto estimated. Both photographic and human
source evidence strongly indicate that since September
1971, when the function was directly subordinated to
the Ministry of Defense, there has been a sharp
increase of emphasis on Soviet civil defense. Photogra-
phy proves the emphasis of the last several years on
construction of personnel shelters in built-up areas
and the hardening of war-essential industries against
nuclear effects. Human sources report that in the same
period there has been a considerably increased
emphasis on the training of civilian personnel of all
ages in protective measures to include practice
evacuations of heavily populated areas. The goal of
these efforts, as expressed by the Soviets,* is to reduce
* A Soviet manual on civil defense, Grazhdanskaia Oborona
(1969) states that losses can be reduced to 5-8 percent of the Soviet
urban population. Strategic Air Command analyses corroborate the
feasibility of this goal.
casualties in a nuclear exchange to under 10 million
and to ensure the continued viability of essential
industries.
The Soviet civil defense emphasis has been accom-
panied in about the same period by a massive effort to
ensure the survival of the Soviet command and control
Analysis/Estimate
25X
25X
Soviet civil defense efforts appear to be integrated
with all other military programs to maximize the
USSR's capabilities to fight a nuclear war and emerge
from it with a viable society. Survival of key military
and political cadres has priority in the Soviet effort,
but the protection of the civil population as a whole is
receiving increasing attention as the programs for
hardening command and control systems near com-
pletion. The civil sector enjoys sufficient priority for ?
resources to account for an annual expenditure since
1970 the equivalent of about one billion dollars per
year. (Some analysts believe even this figure may
understate the magnitude of the Soviet effort. The key
point is however that no concerted USG effort has
been made to study and assess this effort.)
The increased Soviet emphasis on civil defense
dates from about the time that the Kremlin leadership
could foresee the successful conclusion of an ABM-
limiting treaty with the United States. This correlation
in time was probably not coincidental. Soviet leaders
probably reasoned that they would lose any contest
with the United States in the field of active defenses
against nuclear attack because of U.S. technological
advantage at the time, but that in any contest in the
field of passive defenses the USSR would win because
it had the advantage of centralized control and a
disciplined population. It was only in the context of
U.S. concurrence not to protect its population with
the ABM that the Soviets could pursue a goal of
achieving assured survival for the USSR and assured
destruction for its major adversary.
The circumstantial evidence of a correlation be-
tween the predictability of an ABM agreement and
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the new emphasis on civil defense is strengthened by
the initiation at the same general time (1970-71) of an
unprecedented expansion of Soviet strategic attack
capabilities. Soviet expenditures on strategic attack
forces jumped sharply in 1970, doubling the 1965
outlays.
The great importance attached by the USSR to its
civil defense effort provides an unmistakable clue to
Soviet overall doctrine with regard to general nuclear
war. Such efforts are inconsistent with a view that the
Soviets tacitly accept the concept of Mutual Assured
Destruction as a basis for strategic force structure (or
arms limitations). When viewed in combination with
active strategic defenses and strategic attack forces the
civil defense effort underscores the frankly stated
Soviet adherence to the Clausewitzian concept of war
as an extension of politics-even under nuclear
conditions. These efforts contradict the assumptions
that the Soviets view nuclear exchange as tantamount
to destruction of their society and system or that they
perceive strategic nuclear capabilities primarily as a
deterrent. Rather these efforts point to the structuring
of both defense and offense for war-fighting, with
deterrence being a derivative function.
The Soviet civil defense effort will continue to enjoy
high priority and heavy funding until and unless the
Kremlin leadership becomes convinced that a superior
Soviet nuclear war-fighting capability is either not
achievable or not useful militarily or politically. If
current efforts continue there is no reason to believe
the Soviets will not achieve their civil defense goal of
being able to hold casualties in a nuclear exchange to
an acceptable level as well as preserving intact their
political system.
4. Military Hardening
NIE Estimating Record
The Soviet program of dispersal, hardening and
redundancy of its command and control system is
unmatched in the Western world. The significance of
this fact, and particularly the great disparity between
U.S. and Soviet hardening efforts with its implications
for the strategic balance, has barely been touched on
in past NIE's. The treatment was so brief in fact in
NIE 11-3/8-75, that the reader was left with the
impression that the subject was of limited military
significance.
U.S. intelligence has identified over 700 facilities
hardened for nuclear warfare, about half of which are
utilized by the Soviet high command, General Staff or
Major Command Headquarters. The remainder are
related to subordinate command levels.
The programs are continuing at a measured pace.
Over 20 naval aviation airfield command and control
facilities have already been hardened and the
remainder is clearly programmed. All Strategic Rocket
Force C & C facilities are already hardened with the
major headquarters (i.e., 6 strategic army headquar-
ters) hardened to 1000 PSI.
Command Centers at Theatre, Air Defense and
Moscow NCA levels are believed to be hardened from
300 to 1000 PSI.
with over 700 buried antennas hardened-to 10 00 PSI
already identified.
It is apparent that the Soviet C & C program is
designed to provide a much higher level of surviv-
ability than that planned by the Western world. It
represents clear evidence of the Soviet desire to
achieve a nuclear war fighting capability in contradis-
tinction to the mutual deterrence concepts of the
West.
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Evidence is now coming to light of an extensive
program of providing protection for personnel of
certain industrial facilities. While the analysis has
only scratched the surface, an interagency working
group has already identified several hundred such
facilities hardened to perhaps between 70 and 100
PSI. This program has been in effect since the late
1960's and construction is ongoing.
This is further evidence of the Soviet objective to
survive a nuclear attack and reconstitute its industrial
capability through a protected skilled working force.
It offers the Soviets high assurances that its vital
command and control structure will continue to
function in a nuclear exchange while serious doubts
exist as to U.S. and Free World's capability under
similar circumstances. This matter needs far more
detailed consideration than it has received in the past
NIEs.
We believe the Soviet hardening program will
continue at a deliberate pace until all vital military
command and control facilities have been treated. It
will provide increasingly clear evidence of Soviet
intent to be prepared for general nuclear war rather
than to achieve mutual deterrence.
NIE Estimating Record
The Soviets have developed two mobile missile
systems which could have a significant impact on the
strategic balance. The SS-X-16 is a solid fuel
intercontinental range (5000 NM) missile, almost
certainly tested in both a silo and mobile TEL
(transporter/erector/launcher) mode. The program
has had a high degree of cover and concealment
associated with it.
The SS-20 is an IRBM version of the same missile
using identical first and second stages. We have firm
evidence of a large scale program planned for the SS-20
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Although the intelligence community is debating
the range and intended use of the SS-20, the
prevailing view is that it is in fact a replacement for
the SS-4 and SS-5 intermediate range missiles. The
numbers of missiles (with 3 MIRV's on each) will cover
the present peripheral target system now handled by
the SS-4 & 5's as well as perhaps 300 SS-11's diverted to
that use. (Thus there is a good possibility that as many
as 300 intercontinental capable missiles will be
released for use against U.S. targets with no SALT
penalty when the SS-20 is deployed.)
Past NIEs (including 11-3/8-75) have estimated the
SS-X-16 to be a replacement for the 60 SS-13 silos,
with indications that once started the conversion
could be completed within a year. These same
estimates state the Soviets have probably decided to
forego deployment of the mobile version of the SS-X-16
should a SALT TWO agreement be reached. Thus we
are left with the impression that the SS-16 program
will remain small and probably restricted to the silo
mode, even though new versions are under develop-
ment and the mobile version is, in all probability, an
operational missile. These estimates further conclude
that the mobile SS-X-16 will provide a hedge against
increased silo vulnerability with the Soviets perhaps
substituting some mobile missiles for silo missiles if
mobile ICBM's are not banned in SALT TWO.
A serious problem of concern to Team " B" arises,
however, in connection with the fact that the SS-X-16
intercontinental missile, according to best available
evidence, almost certainly uses launch and ground
handling equipment identical to that of the SS-20.
This gives the Soviets a real potential in a breakout
situation to add the 3rd stage to the SS-20 (whose first
two stages are identical with the SS-X-16) thereby
giving the entire force an intercontinental capability.
There is no dispute within the intelligence community
as to the feasibility of this move, yet no discussion of
this matter can be found in current NIEs. A covered
TEL could contain an SS-16 as easily as an SS-20, as
could the covered storage sheds now being con-
structed.
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Analysis/Estimate
We are concerned, therefore, with both the ease of
conversion of the SS-20 to SS-X-16 missiles and the
numbers of SS-X-16 components now being produced.
The ease of producing and storing in concealed areas
an ICBM such as the SS-X-16 which can be launched
from mobile launchers poses a serious potential threat
to the strategic balance. In addition, the verification
problem associated with deployment of a mobile
ICBM like the SS-X-16, already in production and
indistinguishable from an SS-20 when on covered
launchers, is sobering. This matter needs full coverage
and evaluation in NIE 11-3/8-76.
Forecast
We believe the SS-X-16 program will continue
apace with improvements and modifications made to
give the missile a MIRV capability as well as
improved accuracy. We also believe the Soviets will
continue to conceal the number of components
produced which will permit the conversion of SS-20's
to intercontinental missiles. We also believe the
Soviets will retain this conversion capability to
provide another option which could help upset the
strategic balance, should international developments
warrant such an exploitation.
NIE Estimating Record
Previous NIEs, including 11-3/8-75, have generally
concluded that Soviet Long Range Aviation (LRA)
will continue to retain a relatively small interconti-
nental bomber force to complement Soviet Russia's
ICBM and SLBM, forces. Backfire, while part of this
force and credited with capabilities for operations
against the continental U.S., has usually been
characterized as an aircraft whose first priority will be
peripheral missions (i.e., against NATO and China).
Recently, the CIA has tended to stress the
peripheral role of the aircraft while at the same time
minimizing its potential for strategic operations. For
example, a memorandum prepared by the Office of
Strategic Research, dated 6 May 1976, which updates
the Backfire Program, concerns itself solely with the
use of the aircraft in peripheral missions and its role as
a replacement aircraft for the aging Badgers. No
mention is made of any capability for using the
bombers in the intercontinental role.
This pre-occupation with the case for a peripheral
use of the aircraft has recently been extended to a
reexamination of the unrefueled range of the aircraft
with a new study purport- 25X
ing to show a ac ire o e a relatively short range
vehicle with half the payload previously ascribed to it
and thus not as well suited to the strategic mission.
Emphasis is also being placed in CIA memos on
recent statements by Soviet SAL talk participants who
repeatedly assert the aircraft to be designed and
intended only to carry out peripheral strike missions,
especially against NATO targets. In this connection,
the Soviets have been ambivalent themselves in their
statements on Backfire range, with the chief military
man on the Soviet SAL Delegation, Gen. Trusov,
giving the radius as 2160 nautical miles (and 5000
NM range) while Brezhnev told President Ford the
aircraft had only one half the range of the Bison. Since
we credit the Bison with a radius of 3200 NM, this
would make Backfire only a 1600 NM radius aircraft.
Thus the intelligence community has been engaged
in a vigorous debate over whether or not the Backfire
bomber is a "strategic" bomber or one intended
primarily for peripheral use. The issue of range has
occupied a great deal of the analysts' time, with the
view prevailing in some quarters that any unrefueled
radius of action figures falling much below 3000 miles
would severely limit the aircraft's use in the strategic
role. A majority of the community has credited the
aircraft with an unrefueled radius of about 2800 miles
(5200 mile range), while the recent CIA analysis
mentioned above
25
I I reduces ese figures substantially. is 25
anniynas sed on twelve Backfire missions describes
an aircraft of about 236,000 pounds with a radius of
action of approximately 1850 to 2100 nautical
miles-and a payload of about 10,000 pounds.
All these estimates have an inherent range analysis
and assumptions sensitivity which could substantially
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reduce the high estimates or increase the low
Recent evidence, however, permits a different view
of the Backfire's intended role. As indicated above, all
radius becomes more academic.
Backfires have been observed to be equipped for
refueling. With this capability the issue of unrefueled
A more significant point however is that categoriz-
ing a bomber as "strategic" is more than a matter of
unrefueled range. The Russians have proposed defini-
tions during SALT discussions which use terms like
"anything comparable to existing strategic aircraft,
(i.e., the Bison)." They suggest we look at all
parameters of the aircraft including intended use and
characterize an aircraft accordingly. We consider our
FB-111 a strategic bomber and plan its use against
Soviet targets even though its unrefueled radius falls
short of even the lowest estimates of Backfire
performance. Our strategic air command plans multi-
ple refueling of the aircraft which gives it, on a typical
mission a range (with 2 refuelings) of about 6400
nautical miles. All Backfires we have seen to date have
been equipped with refueling probes. We have
monitored refueling missions. There is no question
therefore that the aircraft has the inherent capability
for strategic missions, should the Soviets chose to use it
this way.
The U.S., despite its planned use of the FB-111 in a
strategic role, has sought to keep it out of SALT
restrictions. The Soviets so far have preferred not to
raise this issue, in the expectation that we would not
insist on including Backfire in the "strategic" cate-
gory.
The fact remains however that both aircraft have
immense value in a strategic role if either side intends
to use them that way.
A case can be made tha
the Soviets intend to use the Backfire only
agains peripheral targets such as NATO and China
(and of course in its well established Naval role). The
evidence for this lies in the absence of a sizeable
tanker fleet, the very limited refueling seen to date,
suggesting a low level of operational training in this
mode, the relatively short missions we have seen, and
the current basing pattern, (including no staging to
advanced bases such as Anadyr). And as the CIA
studies so frequently point out there are many targets
in NATO and China that can be covered well by the
Backfire.
to es t e view
that the current tan er orce is insufficient to support
a sizeable intercontinental bomber force and as late as
November 1975 felt that the available evidence
indicated the Soviets were not developing a new
tanker aircraft.
New evidence indicates the Soviets are in fact
working with the IL-76 as a possible tanker. The use
of the "Classic" transport could provide a sizeable
tanker force in relatively short time periods with one
refueling from such an aircraft extending the range
from 1500 to 2000 miles. Two refuelings would make
even the minimum performance version of the
Backfire a 3000 NM plus radius aircraft clearly giving
125X
it intercontinental ca abilit . In fact using wartime
safety rules analysts see the
aircraft achieving a range we in excess of 7000 miles
with two refuelings.
Analysis/Estimate
A reasonable view of Soviet intent could very well
be that the aircraft has been designed to provide the
flexibility to accomplish both the peripheral and
intercontinental missions with the aircraft actually
being used in the role which the developing tactical
scenario dictates. This view is enhanced by the fact
that the Soviets are now deploying an aircraft slightly
smaller but very similar to the U.S. F-111 for use
against NATO targets now probably covered by the
Backfire. The "Fencer," in many respects is a better
aircraft for use against NATO as it is optimized for
low altitude penetration, has a more accurate all-
weather bomb/nav system than Backfire and with its
small radar cross section is more difficult to detect,
track and destroy than the Backfire. One might well
ask why the Soviets felt it necessary to produce such
an aircraft in large numbers (production is now about
5 per month) if Backfires were to be the primary
peripheral vehicle. Most NATO vital targets (airfields,
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nuclear storage sites, command and control facilities,
etc.) are within easy range of the Fencer now
deployed just beyond the Polish border in Western
Russia.
One must also consider the fact that the Backfire
program is still in its infancy and that the real
intended use of the aircraft may not become apparent
until it appears in some numbers in LRA operational
units. At present the force consists of 20 plus planes
located at two operational bases. We have good
evidence that it probably will be produced in
substantial numbers, with perhaps 500 aircraft off the
line by early 1984. At that point the numbers of
Fencers and Backfires combined would appear exces-
sive for the peripheral mission alone. In this connec-
tion, recent photographic evidence of substantial
plant expansion raises the possibility of even higher
production rates for Backfire.
Estimating History
In 1968, the Soviets initiated actual non-nuclear
ASAT testing, a fact which was reflected in the 1969
NIE. By 1971 (Feb), NIE 11-3 noted that a non-
nuclear ASAT capability had been demonstrated, but
that "a fully operational system would require greater
flexibility than was displayed in the Soviet tests."* It
was believed that the same constraints on ASAT use
discussed in earlier years would continue to prevail,
and would, in fact, be reinforced by the increasing
dependence of the Soviets upon their own satellite
systems as well as the effects of the SAL negotiations.
In an August 1971 supplement, the NIE noted that
the Soviets were in a period of frequent ASAT testing,
and questioned why they did not employ a non-
nuclear ASAT variant of the Galosh ABM, which
would be capable of direct ascent intercepts and
therefore highly effective against US reconnaissance
satellites. This reasoning led to the view that the
ASAT system was a long range program ultimately
directed against the full range of US space systems,
which could have originated in response to hypotheti-
cal systems (e.g., orbital bombardment) widely dis-
cussed in the early 1960's, but not introduced.
The hiatus in ASAT testing from 1971 to 1976 has
led to the publication of essentially unchanged
estimates concerning the Soviet ASAT system, al-
though Soviet laser capabilities have been given
increasing emphasis as they have advanced. In
addition, in 1974 the NIE noted that the Soviets had
demonstrated a capability to place satellites in
geostationary orbit, thus potentially extending their
ASAT capabilities to that altitude.
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number of satellites, which cannot be rapidly re-
placed, on orbit, a militarily effective attack upon
planned systems (such as GPS) would seem to require
development of an ASAT vehicle with a multiple
engagement capability.
0
Analysis/Estimate
As it currently exists, the Soviet ASAT system has
several operational limitations which must be consid-
ered in assessing its potential utility to the USSR.
(1) Altitude Limitation. This was noted above,
and is primarily a function of the launch vehicle. It
could be alleviated by use of a larger launch vehicle
such as the SL-12, although Soviet views regarding the
necessity of testing at higher altitudes prior to
operational use remain unknown.
(3) Target Capacity. As noted, each target
satellite requires a separate ASAT launch. Although
US reconnaissance systems maintain only a small
While Soviet intentions for the current system
cannot be determined, consideration of its characteris-
tics and limitations does permit attribution of several
potential applications:
(1) Political Use. Demonstration of intent, politi-
cal "shock" effects, etc.
(2) Crisis Management. One time denial of
information during a high intensity crisis situation.
(3) Extended Conventional War. Denial of
tactical information over an extended period of time,
possibly preceded by or coupled with lower level anti-
satellite operations, such as laser blinding, ECM, etc.
Physical satellite destruction may be more likely as the
nuclear threshold is approached.
is
would be fully in consonance with Soviet emp oyment
of other space systems, such as their radar ocean
surveillance satellite, in tactical operations.
(4) Strategic Research and Development. Provide
test and operational data for use in development of
more capable ASAT systems.
It is worth noting that the second series of Soviet
ASAT tests began about a year after the ABM treaty,
which had significantly constrained the number of
ABM launchers that the Soviets could possess. Since
this ASAT system is totally ineffective in an ABM role,
its development may reflect a Soviet desire to avoid
diverting any of their ABM system to an anti-satellite
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role, while at the same time acquiring an ASAT
system that could in no way be construed as a
violation of the ABM Treaty.
8. Soviet Strategic ASW
U.S. Estimating History
The subject of Soviet strategic ASW was first raised
in NIE 11-3-71. At that time, evidence of a large-
scale, aggressive effort to develop a variety of new
ASW sensors, weapons, and platforms, some of them
employing techniques which are not used by the U.S.
was first formally acknowledged by the community.
In like manner, this estimate reached the judgment
that at the time, some 3% of the total Soviet military
and space budget was spent on ASW. However, this
did not count research and development and the
estimate noted "we cannot quantify [this], but
[outlays] are very substantial, and are especially
significant-."*
The key judgment in each of the estimates from
1971 to the present has been that the Soviets will be
unable to solve the problems of initial detection of
U.S. SSBNs in the open ocean on a scale which the
estimators believe would be required to counter this
force within the period of the estimates. The most
recent estimate (NIE 11-3/8-75) is worded "we
conclude that the Soviets have little potential for
achieving success in either of these areas [detectors
and tracking in the open ocean] in the next ten
years."* *
On the other hand, every estimate recounted a
unanimous impression of an aggressive, extensive,
well-founded, vigorous, and broadly based research
program with high priority in naval planning.
Likewise, every estimate distinctly made the point
that our information on the direction of Soviet basic
research, the specific applications of broad technical
programs, and the potential should one or more
succeed, is significantly deficient. Each paper further
stated in equivalent terms, that U.S. work on non-
acoustic detection means was not extensive.
* NIE 11-3-71, p. 15, paragraph 7.
** NIE 11-75, Vol. I, p. 41, paragraph 83.
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The estimates from 1971 to 1975 which deal with
Soviet ASW, and the interagency memorandums
supporting them, provide only the briefest tutorial of
many acoustic and non-acoustic detection principles
with a short reference to some Soviet work in these
fields. The impression left on a non-technical reader is
one of Soviet dabbling in arcane arts which are
disdained by U.S. technology, and considered some-
thing of a wild goose chase, with little motivation for
us to follow, given the small chance of success opined
by the authors.
While the evidence is less than complete, there is in
fact a substantial body of intelligence on Soviet ASW
R&D accumulated since about the mid-1960's when
evidence of a major thrust in non-acoustic research
could be identified.
There are a number of analyses of these activities
some performed in CIA, more in the Navy.F__
judge Soviet intentions and progress has been smaller
and more limited than is desirable.
Analysis/Estimate
Even without access to the body of intelligence
available since 1974, or the opportunity to trace U.S.
intelligence progress in collection and analysis since
lone can make some rational 25X
assumptions an ju gments based on a general
background and the references in the NIE's since
1971:
1. Neutralizing U.S. (and all non-Soviet) SSBNs
is one of the highest priority national objectives of
strategic defensive planning and policy of the Soviet
Union. It would be totally uncharacteristic of the
Soviets and contrary to evidence to find otherwise.
2. The problem has been addressed since the late
1950's when our determination to proceed with Polaris
and our success in mating weapon and platform
became evident.
was the first extensive, in-depth, i-
technically broad examination of all aspects of Soviet
ASW. It was done under Navy auspices and published
in early 1974. This report should be required reading
for anyone seriously interested in the depth and
breadth of Soviet work and the scope of their
involvement and dedication to the solution of the
strategic ASW problem.
A study on Soviet work in internal waves and
surface wake phenomena of submarines was published
in July 1976 by DIA. The work details the extent of
Soviet resource commitment to this work and gives an
overview (at a low classification level) of the
technology involved. There are undoubtedly similar
studies which relate to Soviet work on magnetics,
radar, electro-optics (including lasers), and nuclear
ener
. There is a body
of evidence in these areas
sum,
there
is not the dearth
of
information
w ich the
estimates tend to indicate; rather there has been a
limited capability in the U.S. intelligence community
to understand, analyze, and assess it. Non-acoustic
ASW has suffered for the appellation of "unsound
3. A major Soviet commitment to non-acoustic
research was made in the mid-1960's.
4. The Soviets probably recognized their lag in
acoustic technology for low-frequency surveillance,
quieting, and mobile sensors by at least the early to
mid-1960's, and certainly by the late 1960's. This
reinforced a decision to place greatest emphasis for
research on non-acoustic methods, and to continue
acoustic system development at a slower pace. In
addition, the Soviets have so far avoided a major
commitment to ASW systems based on LOFAR
technology per se.
5. Soviet investment in ASW R&D has increased
significantly over the past ten years, and together with
other spending for strategic ASW, represents a
substantial portion of the strategic defensive budget.
Given this extensive commitment of resources and
the incomplete appreciation in the U.S. of the full
implications of many of the technologies involved, the
absence of a deployed system by this time is difficult
to understand. The implication could be that the
Soviets have, in fact, deployed some operational non-
acoustic systems and will deploy more in the next few
years.
Following this step in logic, it is both unprudent
and illogical to estimate no success over the next ten
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years in programs of which we have so incomplete an
understanding. Technical break-throughs, such as a
doubling of detection ranges achievable by using
airborne magnetic anomaly detection to a mile or
more, (by means of an adaptation of a commercial
magnetic radiometer, already achieved here) tend to
make the sweeping optimism of NIE 11-3/8-75 very
difficult to justify.
The very firm negative 10-year forecasts of Soviet
ASW capabilities are uncharacteristic of national
intelligence estimates, which normally tend to hedge
bets over the longer term. This is especially true of
estimates of defensive capabilities which are perforce
net assessments. The firm negative judgment could
well raise doubts among consumers whether it is not
affected by policy considerations, such as the desire to
protect the U.S. SLBM program; the less obvious
consideration being support for the general proposi-
tion that the Soviets could never hope for militarily
meaningful strategic nuclear superiority because they
would always have to absorb a full SLBM strike.
These doubts are reinforced rather than dispelled by
the more detailed treatment of Soviet ASW efforts in
the text of the estimates.
A more definitive forecast of Soviet ASW capabili-
ties requires a very thorough review of a mass of
pertinent evidence, much of which the Navy (for valid
operational reasons) strictly controls. Such a review
should be carried out under national authority using
scientific expertise of indisputable neutrality as con-
cerns the outcome.
Until such a thoroughgoing review has been
accomplished we cannot with any assurance whatever
forecast the probability or extent of success of Soviet
ASW efforts. However, we are certain that these
probabilities are not zero, as the current NIE implies.
9. ABM and Directed Energy Weapon R&D
Estimating History
The history of Soviet ABM estimates* has generally
been characterized by:
- appreciation of a high level of Soviet interest
and effort, especially when seen as a component
of the overall strategic air defense program;
* These estimates were part of a separate NIE (11-3) on Soviet
Strategic Defenses until combined in 1974 into NIE 11-3/8 reports.
- projection during mid-late 1960s of the possible
deployment of large numbers of ABMs;
- continuing assessment of greatly limited actual
achievements and prospects for success (except
for the early warning radar network);
- controversy, somewhat muted in most recent
years, over the potential and inherent ABM
capability of SAM, with a general NIE dis-
counting of such capabilities.
The conclusion of the SALT ABM Treaty rein-
forced the subjective community disbelief in conven-
tional ABM effectiveness to lead to a general
conclusion that the Soviets had become "dissatisfied
with the effectiveness of conventional ABM systems"
and downgraded their programs' goals. Continuing
Soviet ABM R&D became seen largely as "a hedge
against treaty abrogation" (by whom?) and a prudent
exploration of alternative technologies.
Until recently there has been no estimating record
on directed energy programs. Recently Soviet R&D
programs in these areas have been included in
Strategic Defense estimates or in one case as a fairly
thorough special report (Interagency Intelligence
Report on Soviet Capabilities to Develop Strategic
Laser Systems, February 1975).
The ABM capability of those presently deployed
systems treated as ABM by the NIE seems to be as
strategically limited as concluded. That conclusion,
however, does not extend to the overall impact of:
(1) ABM potential in systems treated as "non-
ABM" or "tactical-ABM";
(2) The R&D effort and prospects for improvement
in ABM capabilities, both conventional and exotic;
(3) ABM as one integral part of a combined
damage limiting strategic defense.
NIE 11-3/8-75 touches upon all three areas, and
gives considerable treatment and weight to the
second, but reaches conclusions from the evidence
available that unnecessarily discount or downgrade
the Soviet effort, without emphasizing what it has
accomplished-especially since 1971-72-relative to
U.S. ABM efforts. The effectiveness of ABM, of
course, cannot be assessed without direct comparison
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with offensive ballistic missile capabilities, and it is
clear that the judgments made are implicit net
assessments based upon high confidence in the
enduring penetrability of U.S. MIRVs.
The NIE conclusion that current Soviet SAMS "are
not suitable" for ABM defense is explicitly rejected as
regards the SA-5 in a note by the Air Force Assistant
Chief of Staff for Intelligence. It is also not a
conclusion accepted by many other SAM-ABM
experts, even though the NIE conclusion rests on
currently deployed SAMs instead of improved or new
generation SAM components. We know that SAM
systems do inherently have ABM capability. The
judgmental question is how significant or extensive is
this capability]
The ABM
capability, when related to other defensive means,
may therefore be considerable. This is especially
possible when Soviet advances in what is referred to as
"tactical ABM" and in mobile radar components are
taken into consideration. Mobile ABM system compo-
nents combined with the deployed SAM system could
produce a significant ABM capability.
ABM R&D Prospects
The NIE ambivalently concludes in one place that
the Soviets continue their ABM R&D "at a pace not
significantly reduced from that which existed prior to
the ABM Treaty" and in another at a "relatively slow
pace". However one sorts out these conclusions,
neither gives adequate weight to the vigorous and
multi-faceted Soviet R&D program covering both
conventional and possible future ABM means. In the
conventional ABM area, the SAL Treaty can be taken
as evidence of Soviet appreciation of the potential of
(U.S.) ABM rather than as loss of interest in ABM. In
fact, the continuing effort at SSMTC, the Emba
"tactical" system, the emergence of new and im-
proved radars and interceptor missiles, all strongly
indicate continuing interest and progress. The magni-
tude of the effort is in stark contrast to that of the U.S.
In the more exotic areas of technology applicable to
ABM it is more difficult to evaluate progress, in no
small part because U.S. understanding of the state of
the art and near term prospects of directed energy is
far from complete and possibly not as advanced as
that of the Soviets, who, it is clear, have been
conducting far more ambitious research in these areas.
Understanding that there are differing evaluations of
the potentialities of laser and CPB for ABM, it is still
clear that the Soviets have mounted ABM efforts in
both areas of a magnitude that it is difficult to
overestimate. At least, it seems a reasonable conclu-
sion based upon the expense and vigor of Soviet R&D
in these areas that the Soviets attach greater probabil-
ity to eventual success over a shorter period of time
than does the U.S.
The scale and scope of Soviet ABM R&D are too
considerable to conclude loss of interest or to write
them off as mere components of a more dynamic and
high risk R&D philosophy (although they are that
also).
Strategic Defense
One of the problems with the NIE approach is that
even though the subject is Strategic Defense it is
broken down into separate areas (ABM, Air Defense,
ASW, ASAT, Civil Defense and Hardening), each
treated separately and in isolation from the others.
What is then omitted is an assessment of present and
potential Strategic Defense capabilities combining all
efforts. While it may be possible (though often
erroneously, in our view) to disparage the effectiveness
of each component of Strategic Defense taken
separately, the combined and cumulative efforts may
possess considerable strategic significance.
10. Soviet Non-Central Nuclear Systems
Estimating History
Coverage of the Estimates. Throughout the 1960's,
discussion of most Soviet non-central systems was
included in the NIE's on Strategic Attack Forces.* In
* Soviet Naval Aviation Forces have never been discussed, despite
the fact that these include upwards of 500 Badger and Blinder
medium bombers; these are principally directed against U.S. Naval
forces, although some elements could be shifted to attacks on land
targets, should the need arise. The estimate on peripheral forces in
fact-notes that Naval Aviation forces may be intended for use in the
large-scale non-nuclear attack on NATO's nuclear forces that is part
of Soviet planning for the early stages of a conventional war in
Europe.
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the 1969 estimate, medium bombers and MR/IRBM
forces were relegated to a separate section on
"Peripheral Forces," foreshadowing their disappear-
ance from the 11-8 series of the following year.
The 1969 NIE also relegated its discussion of the
roughly 60 Soviet cruise missile submarines equipped
with SS-N-3 launchers to a footnote. These systems
had been included in earlier estimates, which had
noted that one variant of the SS-N-3 had been tested
against land targets to ranges of 450 nm: the 1965 and
1966 NIE's even had a map showing coverage of the
U.S. from the 100 fathom line using a missile of this
range. The 1968 NIE stated, however, that the use of
this system in a strategic attack role was unlikely,
considering the size of the Soviet ICBM force and the
appearance of a new SLBM (the implied assumption
being that this meant the Soviet Union had reached
some level of "sufficiency").
By the 1970 NIE, peripheral attack systems had
been dropped entirely from the 11-3/8 series, and
their treatment relegated to other estimates (the bulk
of them coming under 11-14). Very little discussion
was given of this change, which obscured from view a
very large number of Soviet delivery vehicles, albeit
older and less capable ones. Such reasoning as was
given to support the initial distinction between
"peripheral" and "intercontinental" attack, in the
1969 NIE, represented unabashed mirror-imaging:
"This method of treating Soviet forces is basically the
same as that being used by DoD in U.S. military
planning."
The change of coverage that began with the 1970
estimate may have been intended to fit categories that
would be more relevant to the SALT process then
beginning. If so, however, the approach would have
to be faulted for prejudging a fundamental SALT
issue, unresolved to this day, namely the question
which systems are to be considered "strategic" in the
SALT sense.
By failing to present the Soviet view of their own
peripheral attack systems in the context of discussions
of strategic forces, the NIE's during the SALT period
may have influenced U.S. perceptions of the FBS issue
in a misleading fashion. The strong impression
reportedly made on American negotiators when
confronted by Brezhnev with maps showing the
potential of peripheral U.S. systems for attacking the
Soviet Union, might have been different had the
NIE's regularly contained maps showing the numbers
and capabilities of Soviet peripheral systems.
Projections of numbers. The NIEs downgrading of
Soviet peripheral attack systems had been fore-
shadowed in earlier years by projections of a sharp
decline in numbers of these systems. The 1964
Estimate projected a rapid decline in LRA medium
bombers/tankers from almost 900 to 290-510 by 1970
and continued reduction thereafter. (Actual mid-1976
numbers are 650 in LRA, in addition to more than 500
Badgers and Blinders in SNAF, 374 of which are
configured as bombers or ASM carriers.)
The projections in the Estimates of the mid-1960's
of relatively flat MR/IRBM numbers did not project
the deactivation of some 60 launchers in the Far East.
However, the 1965 projection of a force of 350-700
MR/IRBM's in the 1970-75 period, included a long-
term reduction on the low side which did not
materialize (current force is almost 600).
New Systems. The Estimates of the 1960's tended to
overestimate the rate of introduction of new medium
range missiles. The 1966 NIE anticipated a new
IRBM, possibly mobile, as early as 1968 (but did not
predict the capabilities of the SS-X-20-a MIRVed,
large-throw-weight IRBM-which appeared in 1974).
The SS-14 MRBM was never deployed in the
"substantial numbers" predicted in the 1969 NIE (p.
30). Frequent dissents by AF Intelligence projecting
the appearance of a follow-on medium bomber or a
new ASM for the Badger as early as 1970 were
fundamentally more accurate than the NIE projec-
tions that no new medium bomber would appear.
Doctrine and Missions of Medium Systems. The
estimates of the late 1960's display some embarrass-
ment over the difficulty of explaining the objectives of
such a massive peripheral attack force, which had
earlier been expected to decline as the intercontinental
forces grew. The previous theory that a "hostage
Europe" was a poor man's substitute for the Assured
Destruction capability the Soviet Union had earlier
lacked, lost plausibility as the ICBM and SLBM
forces expanded. Growing concerns about China
began to be mentioned, even though most of the
forces in question are deployed against Europe and
the one notable drawdown of peripheral forces was in
the Far East. A third explanation offered was to refer
to earlier Khrushchev statements about the need to
have a multiplicity of systems to ensure survivability.
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The value of large numbers for war fighting, or as a
strategic reserve in an extended nuclear conflict, was
apparently not considered, although to do so would
have raised some interesting questions about the
objectives of Soviet longer-range systems as well.
Instead, consideration of the close connections be-
tween medium-range forces and longer-range ones
simply ceased with the 1970 restructuring of the NIE.
There was much discussion in the early NIE's of the
question whether Soviet medium bombers had the
capability and/or mission for attacks on the United
States. The majority (with the Air Force dissenting)
generally concluded that there was insufficient evi-
dence of the training in refueling or preparation for
use of Arctic Bases such as were deemed necessary for
missions against most U.S. targets. However, the
majority which held the view that medium bombers
were intended for peripheral missions rarely elabo-
rated on what those missions were. * In general, there
was no mention of a possible role for medium-range
bombers as a reserve force in a protracted nuclear
conflict.
Evidence/Analysis
Artificiality of Peripheral/Intercontinental Separa-
tion. Despite the evident importance of systems
clearly designed to attack the United States, the
emphasis on these systems, and their abstraction from
others, contributes to a misunderstanding of the Soviet
view of strategic forces. It places the analysis in a
strait-jacket that does not fit the Russians' own
organization of strategic forces, distributed among
SRF, LRA, and the Navy, not between intercontinen-
tal and peripheral.
The orientation of a significant portion of the Soviet
ICBM force so that it can attack targets in Europe
and China as well as the United States reflects their
basic view that the continuum of available forces
should be used in a flexible and coordinated fashion
to achieve unified strategic objectives.**
* The omission is most striking in the discussion of Backfire,
which say very little about the need for so substantial an increase in
the payload or range of Soviet peripheral bombers, and fail entirely
to discuss the role of shorter-range aircraft (like FENCER) in
performing the peripheral mission. In fact, there is only one
sentence on the Backfire in the text of NIE 11-14-75 on Warsaw
Pact Forces Opposite NATO. See also above, pp. 29.
** Further evidence of an organizational nature pointing to a
Soviet emphasis on the unity of nuclear strike forces comes from
such things as the commonality of IRBM and ICBM development
programs.
The impression derived from Soviet organization is
reinforced by doctrinal writings which emphasize,
indeed in tiresome detail, the importance of integra-
tion of all military arms.
The evidence is clear that the strategic balance, in
the Soviet view, includes much more than those
systems labeled "strategic" in the U.S. defense
budget. On the Western side, they include most U.S.
and allied nuclear delivery systems (beyond very short
range ones). This half of the equation has been
pressed by the Soviets at SALT. At the same time,
however, the Russians have attempted to reject the
relevance of their own massive non-central force
capabilities by insisting that they could not strike the
United States and were therefore not "strategic." This
claim is factually inaccurate, since many of these
systems, such as medium bombers and long-range
SLCM's can reach the United States. More impor-
tant, it is at variance with the actual Soviet view of
nuclear forces as a continuum of capabilities which, if
used, would have a single strategic objective, i.e., the
political acquiescence or military defeat of the
Western Alliance.
Current Soviet Buildup. While the decline in
medium range forces projected by the NIE's in the
late 1960's failed to materialize, there was in fact no
large buildup of these forces during that time. This no
longer holds true of the 1970s when a major buildup
has been underway. While much of this buildup
comes under the heading of "modernization," the
term is misleading for it suggests simple, maintenance
of aging or obsolescent forces. In fact, developments
now underway will substantially increase Soviet
capabilities by:
- Increasing nuclear ground attack capabilities,
through the introduction of new tactical aircraft,
particularly FENCER but also FITTER, FLOG-
GER and late model FISHBEDS. The SU-19
FENCER, (very similar to the US-F-111) can
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carry four ASM's (4,000 lbs.) to a radius of 1,000
nm., and has substantially improved capabilities
for penetrating NATO air defenses. The large
current production of these aircraft as replace-
ments for much less capable tactical aircraft will
greatly increase the number of systems available
to the Soviets for attacking theater targets near
the front. It will also add to their flexibility,
including their capability for destroying western
nuclear forces during a non-nuclear phase of
combat.
- Substantially extending the range of peripheral
attack systems with Backfire and the SS-20 to
cover larger surrounding land and ocean areas
beyond the Eurasian land-mass.
- Introducing qualitative improvements which
have the effect of increasing quantitative cana-
bilities.
ac ire has a substantially
arger payload than the Badgers and Blinders,
? and will be significantly less vulnerable to air
defenses.
Conclusions
deterrence, is measured by their potential contribution
to fighting and winning a war against a Western
coalition. Capabilities to attack U.S. allies and U.S.
forces overseas are as important as capabilities to
attack the United States itself. In this framework,
greater numbers are always better, not merely to
enhance survivability but for offensive use, to hedge
against inevitable uncertainties of warfare and to
provide reserves for an extended conflict.
Current Soviet developments in peripheral attack
capabilities indicate an intention to weaken the
second leg of the NATO triad of conventional, theater
nuclear and strategic nuclear forces. With clear
superiority in conventional forces and parity or better
in intercontinental forces, the Soviets may now be
seeking to eliminate whatever remaining advantage
NATO may possess in theater nuclear forces. Given
the political importance of the "coupling" with U.S.
long-range nuclear forces provided by NATO's theater
nuclear capabilities, the Soviets must believe that
important political benefits in Europe would flow
from achievement of demonstrable regional nuclear
preponderance. If this is so, we may now be
witnessing an evolution of theater nuclear forces that
has close parallels to the evolution of intercontinental
forces in the late 1960's.
Nuclear operations on the periphery of the Soviet
Union have a crucial importance in Soviet military-
political doctrine. Singling out forces capable of
damaging the U.S., for separate and primary atten-
tion, gives a misleading impression of Soviet strategic
objectives. Soviet writings stress, for example, that "in
the final analysis, the area and direction of the main
attack and operations . . . should ensure achieving
operation objectives pertaining to crushing the en-
emy's armed forces and removing individual countries
or coalitions from the war."
Soviet non-central forces fit into an overall strategic
framework in which the value of forces, even for
An additional concern arises from the development
by the Soviets of forces they describe as peripheral
which have either the inherent capability for intercon-
tinental operations (as in the case of Backfire) or the
capability to be easily and quickly converted to
intercontinental use (as in the case of the SS-20). This
gives them the flexibility to pose the threat that the
strategic situation demands at any given time. The
beginning of SS-X-20 development as a spin- 25
off from the SS-16 program just as SALT was getting
serious, suggests a possible deliberate Soviet conclu-
sion that while SALT may limit slightly the rate of
growth of their intercontinental capability, the effect
of the limitations can be reduced by development of
non-limited systems.
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25X1
PART THREE
SOVIET STRATEGIC OBJECTIVES
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PART THREE
SOVIET STRATEGIC OBJECTIVES
To be properly understood, the strategic objectives
of the Soviet Union require, in addition to a realistic
analysis of strategic nuclear force capabilities, con-
tinuous, careful monitoring of Soviet global activities:
theoretical pronouncements of Communist leaders
must be observed concurrently with Soviet actions in
the military, political, and economic spheres in the
various regions of the globe; the evidence thus
obtained needs to be juxtaposed and synthesized.
Such monitoring and synthesizing is not effectively
realized at the present time in the U.S. Government,
and there exists no document that provides an
? overview of Soviet "grand strategy". Given the
absence of a study of this kind within the U.S.
Government, the best that can be done here is to
provide an outline of some of the outstanding features
of Soviet global strategy, especially as it bears on the
United States.
1. Political Objectives
The ultimate Soviet objective is (as it has been since
October 1917) the worldwide triumph of "socialism",
by which is meant the establishment of a system
which can be best characterized as a regime of state
capitalism administered exclusively by a self-perpet-
uating elite on the model of the Soviet Communist
Party. Soviet leaders still strive for such a new global
system, wholly integrated with the Soviet Union and
directed from Moscow. Judging by pronouncements
of leading Soviet theorists, this ideal continues to
remain a long-range objective. However, the realities
of an expanding Communist realm have induced the
Soviet leaders to accept (at any rate, for the time
being) a more limited and flexible formulation in
which the USSR remains the authority of last resort
and the principal protector but no longer the model
which all Communist countries must undeviatingly
emulate. The East Berlin meeting of Communist
parties held in June 1976 ratified this formulation; but
only time will tell how willing the Soviet elite is to
grant non-Soviet Communists a measure of political
freedom.
It is adherence to the historic ideal of a worldwide
Communist state and the steady growth of military
confidence that lends Soviet policies that offensive
character which is stressed in Part One of the present
Report. Not the fear that "capitalism" will engage in
an unprovoked assault against "socialism" but the
desire steadily to reduce the "capitalist" realm and
still to be able to deal with any possible backlash
when it is in its death throes motivates Soviet political
behavior.
The emergence of a worldwide "socialist" order is
seen by the Soviet leadership as a continuous process,
inexorable in nature but not without its pitfalls and
temporary reverses. The ultimate triumph of the cause
is seen as the result of economic, political and military
processes which will bring about a series of convul-
sions in the structures of the Western world and end in
their destruction. Once these conditions occur, West-
ern Communist parties, leading the disaffected ele-
ments and backed by Soviet power, are expected to be
able to assume control.
As noted, this historic process is perceived as
occurring concurrently (though not necessarily in a
synchronized manner) at all levels. Given this view,
Communist "grand strategy" requires that a variety of
weapons be utilized to stimulate the process of
Western decline and to seize such opportunities as
may present themselves while it is in progress. Thus,
for example, the establishment of close Soviet eco-
nomic ties with Third World countries or Soviet direct
or indirect involvement in these countries can help to
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weaken the links connecting "capitalist" economies
with their essential sources of raw materials and cheap
labor, and thereby help to accelerate "capitalism's"
economic decline. Communist parties operating in the
"capitalist" world can help organize disaffected
groups of all kinds and with their assistance under-
mine orderly democratic processes; or else, where they
are too weak to undertake such ambitious attempts,
they can seek to have their members or sympathizers
occupy key positions in the trade unions, government
or academic centers so as to be in a position to
paralyze industrial economies and democratic insti-
tutes at the appropriate time. Violently discontented
ethnic groups, such as the Palestinians, can be taken
under Soviet wings and encouraged to promote
conditions of permanent turmoil over large geographic
areas.
In other words, strategic weapons-defined as
weapons capable of destroying an enemy's capacity to
resist-embrace in the Soviet understanding a greater
range of instrumentalities of persuasion and coercion
than is commonly dealt with in Western strategic
analyses. The Soviet objective is an international
system totally responsive to a Soviet mandate. In such
a system an antagonist's military capabilities must be
effectively neutralized so that they cannot be used to
resist Soviet aspirations. If necessary, ultimately the
Soviet Union should be able to destory those
capabilities if the antagonist refuses to acquiesce. But
this is not all. Because the Soviet Union ultimately
wishes to destroy not merely its opponents' fighting
capacity but their very capacity to function as
organized political, social, and economic entities, its
strategic arsenal includes a great choice of political,
social, and economic weapons beside the obvious
military ones. For this reason, Soviet strategic objec-
tives cannot be accurately ascertained and appreci-
ated by an examination of the USSR's strategic
nuclear or general purpose forces alone. Indeed, even
an understanding of these military forces requires an
appreciation of the leverage they can provide to attain
economic and political objectives. "Power" in the
Soviet strategic understanding is perceived not merely
as serving specific objectives (for example, "deter-
rence"), but as negating the enemy's ability to
survive. The grasp of this fact is fundamental for the
understanding of Soviet strategy and Soviet strategic
objectives.
In the dualism "socialist-capitalist" which under-
pins Soviet thinking much as the dualism "good-evil"
did that of Manicheanism, the United States occupies
a special place. It is seen by Russia as the "citadel" of
the enemy camp, the main redoubt without the final
reduction of which the historic struggle cannot be won
no matter how many victories are gained on
peripheral fronts. By virtue of its immense productive
capacity (and the resultant military potential), its
wealth, prestige, its example and moral leadership,
and-last but not least-its stockpile of strategic
nuclear weapons, the United States is perceived as the
keystone of the whole system whose demise is a
precondition to the attainment of Communism's
ultimate goal.
As seen from Moscow, the United States is
something of a paradox in that it is at one and the
same time both exceedingly strong and exceedingly
weak. Its strength derives primarily from its unique
productive capacity and the technological leadership
which give it the capacity to sustain a military
capability of great sophistication, dangerous to Soviet
global ambitions. But the United States is also seen as
presently lacking in political will and discipline,
unable to mobilize its population and resources for a
sustained struggle for world leadership, and devoid of
clear national objectives. This assessment has led the
Soviet Union to develop a particular strategy vis-a-vis
the United States which, under the name first of
"peaceful coexistence" and then "detente", has
dominated its relations with the United States (except
when overshadowed by immediate crisis situations as,
e.g., Cuba in 1962 and Czechoslovakia in 1968) over
the past two decades.
America's strategic nuclear capacity calls for a
cautious Soviet external policy, wherever the U.S.
enjoys an advantage or may resolutely resist, at any
rate until such a time as the Soviet Union will have
attained a decisive military edge. Not only do direct
military confrontations raise a threat to the Soviet
homeland, but they also tend to feed America's
anxieties about the Soviet Union and thus to
encourage a high level of military preparedness. An
intelligent political Soviet posture toward the United
States requires the allaying of the latter's fears of a
Soviet threat. (Which does not mean, however, that
USSR will hesitate to engage in direct confrontation if
they deem it essential to achieve important national
objectives). Economic relations ought to be utilized so
as to create within the American business community
influential sources of support for collaboration with
the USSR. Cultural and scientific ties ought to be
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exploited so as to neutralize anti-Communist senti-
ments in the intellectual community. Encouragement
ought to be extended to those American political
groupings and to those office-holders and office-
seekers who favor better relations with the Soviet
Union. The effect of such a policy of "detente" is
expected to be a reduction in the influence of those
elements in U.S. society which desire greater military
preparedness and military R&D, resulting in a
weakening of the United States precisely in that
sphere where lies its particular strength. Such a policy,
furthermore, may bring the Soviet Union valuable
additional benefits. As a result of closer economic and
scientific links with the United States, the Soviet
Union can expect to acquire capital and technology
with which to modernize its economy, and in this
manner to improve the quality of its military
industries.
Soviet motivations for Strategic Arms Limitation
Talks should be seen in the same way: They are means
to further unilateral advantages instrumental to the
continued shift of the strategic balance and to the
realization of political gains from the shifting correla-
tion of forces. SALT and the limitations it produces
are seen as means of inhibiting U.S. political and
military responses to the changing balance of forces.
Agreements inconsistent with these ends or agreements
that would restrict Soviet ability to further them are
unacceptable. The perception that there is any tension
between Soviet interest in SALT and Soviet strategic
programs reflects a fundamental misunderstanding of
the Soviet approach to SALT, and of the types of
"restrictions" that can be expected from SALT
agreements at the present time.
At the same time, however, as provocations of the
United States are avoided and economic, cultural,
and political contacts with it exploited, nothing must
be done that might slacken the global advance against
the "capitalist" order of which the same United States
is the principal protagonist. It appears that the
intermediate Soviet strategic objective is to the
greatest extent possible to isolate the United States
from both its allies and the neutral countries of the
Third World. This objective can be attained in several
ways:
(1) As concerns America's allies: The most
important of these are the countries of Western
Europe combined in NATO followed by Japan, in the
Far East. In respect to these countries, a primary
Soviet objective is to drive a wedge between them and
the United States. The separation of Europe from the
United States can be attempted by a variety of means:
establishing on Europe's eastern frontier a military
force of such overwhelming preponderance that
resistance to it will appear futile and the continuation
of NATO not only pointless but dangerous; making
Western Europe increasingly dependent economically
on the USSR by incurring heavy debts there, entering
with it into all sorts of long-term cooperative
arrangements, and supplying an increasing share of
Western Europe's energy needs; insisting on the
participation of Communist parties in national gov-
ernments; arousing doubts in Western Europe about
the U.S. commitments to its defense; and so forth.
This objective undoubtedly enjoys very high priority
in Russia's strategic thinking. Severance of Western
Europe from the United States would reduce any
military threat or opposition from that area as well as
deprive the U.S. of its European forward bases,
eventually bringing Europe's immense productive
capacities within the Soviet orbit, thus making the
"socialist" camp equal if not superior to the U.S. in
economic (and, by implication, military) productive
capacities.
(2) As concerns the Third World: Here the stress
is on political and economic measures, backed with
military means. The Soviet Union strives to sever the
links connecting the Third World with the "capita-
list" camp, and especially the United States, by:
(a) supporting those political groupings and
bureaucracies which tend to identify themselves with
policies of nationalizing private enterprises and which
broadly back Soviet international policies;
(b) working to undercut such private eco-
nomic sectors as exist in the underdeveloped countries,
and eliminating the influence of multi-national
corporations;
(c) reorienting these economies to the maxi-
mum extent possible toward the Soviet Union by
means of military assistance programs, economic aid,
loans, etc;
(d) building interlocking networks of base,
overflight, military and logistic agreements etc. which
permit the use of surrogate forces (e.g. North Koreans
or Cubans) for the purpose of conducting military
operations so as to outflank positions important to the
West;
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(e) through the creation of voting blocs of
Third World countries in the United Nations and its
agencies to isolate the United States from them.
(3) In its relations with China, the Soviet
leadership has as its main immediate goal access to
Chinese internal political developments with a view to
influencing long range Chinese orientation in a
direction consistent with its view of "Communist
internationalism". To support such an evolution and
as a hedge against failure in achieving such a future
orientation, they intend to be able to face China with
preponderant military force even in the contingency
of military confrontation with the U.S., and if possible
and necessary, with political and military encircle-
ment.
While seeking to isolate the United States, disinte-
grate the Western camp, and contain China, the
Soviet Union is concurrently striving to maintain and
strengthen the grip on its own camp. Three principal
policies have been initiated toward that end:
(1) Economic integration through the so-called
"complex plan" adopted by Comecon under strong
Soviet pressure in 1971 and now in the process of
implementation. The "complex plan" is a long-term
undertaking which strives to transform the separate
"socialist" economies into a single supra-national
economic system with an internal "division of labor."
Investments, labor, research and development are to
be shared in common. Given the Soviet Union's
economic preponderance, not to speak of its political
and military hegemony within the Communist Bloc,
there can be little doubt that if it is ever fully carried
out, the "complex plan" will give the USSR decisive
control over the other "socialist" economies as well as
over those countries which, through Soviet aid, are
being drawn within the orbit of Comecon.
(2) Political and military integration, both of
which the USSR is pressing on the other "socialist"
countries. Examples of such pressures are attempts to
amend the. constitutions of the "Peoples' Republics"
so as to assign the Soviet Union special status in their
internal and external relations; hints of the need to
bring about a closer political union between the
"Peoples' Democracies" and the USSR; the Soviet
effort to compel these republics to accept the principle
that in case of a war between the USSR and China,
they will be obliged to come to the aid of the Soviet
Union; and recent decisions (made mainly for military
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reasons) to integrate the East European highway and
railway networks with those of the Soviet Union.
(3) The enunciation of a doctrine, called the
"Brezhnev Doctrine" in the West and "proletarian
internationalism" in the Soviet Union, which makes it
both a right and a duty of the "socialist camp" to see
to it (by military means, if necessary) that no country
which had once made the transition from "capita-
lism" to "socialism" ever slides back and opts out of
the "socialist bloc."
At this point, stress must be laid once again (as had
been done in the Foreword to this Report) that we are
making no attempt to assess the probability of the
Soviet Union attaining its strategic objectives. There
is, in fact, a great deal of evidence that the USSR is
running into many difficulties with the implementa-
tion of its policies, and that the record of its grand
strategy is often spotty. The evidence, however,
supports the contention that the above are, indeed,
Soviet objectives.
2. Military Objectives
In this global strategy, military power, including
strategic nuclear weapons, have a distinct role to play.
The Soviet Union, to an extent inconceivable to the
average Westerner, relies on force as a standard
instrument of policy. It is through force that the
Communist regime first came to power, dispersed all
opponents of its dictatorship, deprived the peasantry
of its land, and established near-total control of the
country. It is through military power that it defeated
the Nazi attempt to subjugate Russia, and it is
through the same means that it subsequently con-
quered half of Europe and compelled the world to
acknowledge it as a "super-power." It is through sheer
force that it maintains in the USSR its monopoly on
authority and wealth. One may say that power in all
its forms, but especially in its military aspect, has been
the single most successful instrument of Communist
policy, supplanting both ideology and economic
planning on which the Soviet regime had originally
expected to rely for the spread of its influence. * Thus,
* It is perfectly true, of course, that the use of force as a means of
attaining and consolidating political power is not confined to Soviet
Russia, being common in other parts of the world as well, including
the West. However, what is rather unique to Soviet Russia is that
here no serious attempt has been made in the nearly six decades that
have elapsed since the coup d'etat of October 1917 to ground
political power on a more stable foundation in which law and
popular consent would play some significant role.
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the regime has a natural predisposition to look to
power, particularly in its most visible and readily
applicable modes, as an instrument of policy, whether
internal or external. This is the arena where it enjoys
some decisive advantages over free societies, in that it
can spend money on armaments without worrying
about public opinion and mobilize at will its human
and material resources. Militarism is deeply ingrained
in the Soviet system and plays a central role in the
mentality of its elite.
One of the outstanding qualities of Soviet military
theory and practice is stress on the need for a great
choice of options. This characteristic is to be seen in
the broad spectrum of weapons in the arsenal of
Soviet "grand strategy" as well as in the variety of
military weapons which Russia produces. It would be
quite contrary to ingrained habits for the Soviet elite
to place reliance on any single weapon, even a
weapon as potent as the strategic nuclear one. Its
natural inclination is to secure the maximum possible
variety of military options for any contingencies that
may arise, all based on a real war-fighting capability,
and thus both to produce at a high rate a broad range
of arms and to accumulate stockpiles of weapons, old
and new. This tendency alone militates against the
USSR adopting a strategic policy that would place
ultimate reliance on a single deterrent or on a
"deterrence only" strategic posture. One of the
fundamental differences between U.S. and Soviet
strategic thought has been the rejection in Soviet
doctrine and strategy of such concepts as mutual
assured destruction, the underlying logic of which is
that if deterrence fails neither side can hope to win a
nuclear war. Rather, the main thrust of Soviet
doctrine has been that in the event of a failure of
deterrence, war-winning and national survival pros-
pects can be improved by having in readiness
balanced forces superior to those of the adversary,
together with an effective civil defense system.
The USSR can be expected to continue pressing
forward with large-scale diverse military programs on
a broad front, any one of which might be regarded as
containable by the West, but the cumulative effects of
which may well be far more significant.
We do know that during Khrushchev's premiership
there occurred a debate about the fundamentals of
Soviet military doctrine, and in particular about the
impact of nuclear weapons on doctrine. Khrushchev
himself apparently encouraged a pragmatic examina-
tion of the prevalent Western view that the destruc-
tiveness of nuclear weapons had altered the nature of
war to the extent that deterrence of war rather than
war-fighting capabilities should determine military
policy. This view challenged the fundamental Marx-
ist-Leninist tenet drawn from Clausewitz that "war is
an extension of politics by other means." Acceptance
of the Western deterrence theory would have chal-
lenged the basic Marxist-Communist view that the
capitalist world in its "death throes" is certain to lash
out in war at the Communist camp.
This flirtation with Western concepts of deterrence
was born in an era of obvious U.S. strategic superiority
over the USSR. Eventually, the debate, which seems
to have lasted until at least the mid-1960's, was settled
in favor of the adherents of Clausewitz. The notion
that strategic nuclear weapons had made general war
mutually suicidal came to be denounced as heretical:
the new doctrine declared that a nuclear war could be
waged and won. The view which prevailed holds that
in a general war "victory" will mean the triumph of
Soviet military and political control over the world
that emerges from the devastating conflict. (Within
this framework, limiting civilian damage to the USSR
is important not only as an end in itself but in relation
to preserving the post-war political-economic power of
the Soviet Union: hence, protection of the key cadres
is of particular importance.) General nuclear war was
still to be avoided if at all possible, which meant that
other weapons in the Soviet arsenal-conventional
military, political economic, etc.-were preferable
instruments to support policy goals, with Soviet
strategic nuclear weapons inhibiting Western counter-
actions.
The key decision adopted sometime in the 1960's
seems to have had as one of its consequences the effort
to build up all the branches of the military
forces-strategic, conventional, naval-to the point
where the Soviet Union could both confidently
confront any possible hostile coalition raised against it
(including a Sino-American alliance) and project its
power in any region of the world where suitable
opportunities might arise.
Since that time an intensified military effort has
been under way designed to provide the Soviet Union
with nuclear as well as conventional superiority both
in strategic forces for intercontinental conflict and
theater or regional forces. While hoping to crush the
"capitalist" realm by other than military means, the
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Soviet Union is nevertheless preparing for a Third
World War as if it were unavoidable. The pace of the
Soviet armament effort in all fields is staggering; it
certainly exceeds any requirement for mutual deter-
rence. The continuing buildup of the Warsaw Pact
forces bears no visible relationship to any plausible
NATO threat; it can better be interpreted in terms of
intimidation or conquest. The rapid growth of the
Soviet Navy also seems to be connected more with the
desire to pose a threat than merely to defend the
Soviet homeland. Intensive research and/or testing in
the fields of Anti-Submarine Warfare, Anti-Ballistic
Missiles, Anti-Satellite weapons, as described in Part
Two of this report, all point in the same direction. So
do the massive Soviet civil defense and hardening
programs. And so does the high proportion of the
national budget devoted to direct military expendi-
tures. The intensity and scope of the current Soviet
military effort in peacetime is without parallel in
twentieth century history, its only counterpart being
Nazi remilitarization of the 1930's.
Short of war, the utility of an overwhelming
military power for Moscow may be described as
follows:
(1) It enables the USSR to forestall a United
States (and potentially a Chinese or combined U.S.-
Chinese) effort to compel the Soviet Union to alter
any of its policies under the threat of a nuclear attack;
(2) It accords the Soviet Union "super-power"
status which it interprets to mean that no significant
decisions can be taken in any part of the world
without its participation and consent;
(3) It intimidates smaller powers, especially those
located adjacent to the USSR, making them more
pliant to Soviet wishes. Judging by their pronounce-
ments, it appears that some highly placed Soviet
leaders believe that even the U.S. acceptance of
detente ultimately resulted from a recognition of the
Soviet capacity to intimidate.
(4) It will in time give the Soviet Union the
capacity to project its power to those parts of the
world where pro-Soviet forces have an opportunity to
seize power but are unable to do so without outside
military help;
(5) It is a source of influence on countries which
purchase or receive surplus Soviet arms, as well as of
hard currency earnings;
(6) It is an instrument by means of which, in the
decisive moment in the struggle for world hegemony,
the retaliatory power of the United States can be
preventively neutralized, or, if necessary, actively
broken.
Military power has for the Soviet Union so many
uses and it is so essential to its global strategy that the
intensity and scope of its military buildup should not
be in the least surprising.
3. Conclusion
The principal Soviet strategic objectives in the
broadest sense may be defined as follows: Break up
the "capitalist" camp by isolating the United States,
its backbone, from NATO and the Third World;
undermine further the disintegrating "capitalist"
realm by promoting and exploiting such economic,
political, and social crises as may occur in it over time;
solidify the "socialist" camp and Russia's control over
it; contain China; and all the time continue building
up a military force of such overwhelming might that it
can in due time carry out any global missions required
of it by Soviet policies,
In the more narrow sense of strategic objectives used
by NIE 11-3/8, the scope and vigor of Soviet
programs, supported by identifiable doctrinal impera-
tives, leave little reasonable doubt that Soviet leaders
are determined to achieve the maximum attainable
measure of strategic superiority over the U.S., a
superiority which provides conservative hedges against
unpredictable wartime contingencies; which is unre-
strained by concepts of "how much is enough?"; and
which is measured not in Western assured destruction
terms but rather in terms of war-fighting objectives of
achieving post-war dominance and limiting damage
to the maximum extent possible. We believe that
Soviet leaders, supported by internal political factors
that assign the highest resource priority to the
military, place a high priority on the attainment of a
superiority that would deny the U.S. effective
retaliatory options against a nuclear attack. Short of
that, the Soviets intend to have a substantial enough
strategic nuclear-warfighting advantage to be able to
bring their local military advantages in both conven-
tional and nuclear forces to bear without fear of a
U.S.-initiated escalation.
The question of the extent to which such goals
remain mere long term aspirations or have become
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conclude that in Soviet perceptions the gap between
long-term aspirations and short-term objectives is
closing. This probably means that the Soviet leaders
believe that their ultimate objectives are closer to
realization today than they have ever been before.
Within the ten year period of the National Estimate
the Soviets may well expect to achieve a degree of
military superiority which would permit a dramati-
cally more aggressive pursuit of their hegemonial
objectives, including direct military challenges to
Western vital interests, in the belief that such superior
military force can pressure the West to acquiesce or, if
not, can be used to win a military contest at any level.
The actions taken by the West to develop its political
cohesion and military strength will be critical in
determining whether, how, and when the Soviets press
to such conclusion.
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practical and current objectives, as well as the
question of timing, inevitably arise. It was pointed out
in the Introduction that Team "B" focused on Soviet
strategic objectives without trying to evaluate their
chances for success, since the latter would require a
net assessment which exceeds the scope of this effort.
However, the team recognizes the overwhelming
gravity of this question. Even without a net assess-
ment, the team believes that it is possible, relying on
the evidence available in Soviet pronouncements and
in the physical data, to reach some judgments as to
how the Russian leaders assess their chances of success.
The breadth and intensity of Soviet military
programs, statements by Soviet leaders to internal
audiences, available Soviet literature, and the growing
confidence of Soviet global behavior, all lead us to
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ANNEX
SOVIET STRATEGIC NUCLEAR FORCES AS
PERCEIVED BY NIE'S, 1962-1975
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SOVIET STRATEGIC NUCLEAR FORCES AS
PERCEIVED BY NIE'S, 1962-1975
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National estimates on Soviet strategic nuclear forces
since 1962 have been based not only on observed
Soviet programs but also on assessments of Soviet
strategic policy, motivations, and objectives. While
proper, and certainly necessary at least to mid-to-long
range projections, these assessments have characteristi-
cally been ethnocentric, "mirror-image", and reflec-
tive more of U.S. policies and motives than of Soviet.
As such they seem to have been fundamentally
responsible for consistent understatements of Soviet
strategic goals. These basically political assessments
have been far more optimistic than subsequent
developments proved and-since there were more
pessimistic interpretations occasionally contained in
footnotes-it can be argued that they were more
optimistic than warranted by available contemporary
evidence. Frequently, the political assessments appear
to have been little more than articles of faith and
statements of preference, which tended to persist even
in the face of developments that should have
invalidated them (e.g., the attribution to the
Soviets of American arms control and assured destruc-
tion logic and objectives, which first appeared in NIE
11-8-63, can be found mutatis mutandis, through the
1960s and even up to NIE 11-3/8-75.)
NIE 11-8-63 conjectured that the Soviets were
guided by "no well-defined strategic concept," were
"willing to tolerate a condition of limited intercontin-
ental capabilities and considerable vulnerability over
a long period of time," and were not "seeking to
match the United States in numbers of delivery
vehicles" or contemplating forces to neutralize U.S.
strategic forces.* In addition, for the first time,
apparently American strategic arms control thinking
infiltrated the Estimate. It was suggested that the
Soviets might be interested in "international agree-
ments to limit or reverse the arms race," while "in the
absence of an arms limitation agreement''-but only
in the absence of one-"the Soviets will continue
improving their capabilities, but at a moderate
pace."*
NIE 11-8-64 reiterated: "We do not believe that the
USSR aims atmatching the United States in numbers
of intercontinental delivery vehicles." In fact, the
Estimate actually "ruled out this option,"** on the
basis of economic constraints, concern over provoking
the U.S. to new efforts, and lack of firm strategic
objectives in the direction of parity with the U.S. As a
consequence, the Estimate, even though noting that a
third generation of Soviet ICBMs had been flight
tested since December 1963 and a new SSBN under
construction had appeared at Severodvinsk, did not
forecast any very large scale or determined buildup of
Soviet strategic forces.
These conclusions prevailed in the next two annual
Estimates, as did a remarkable conviction that the
Soviets had no mid-to-long range force goals:
"The Soviet planners themselves may not yet
have set clear force goals for the 1970-1975
period."***
"The major difference (from the Khrushchev era)
in the coming period may be the inability of a
collective leadership to chart a new course."****
Even as it was necessary to revise force level
projections upward in the face of continuing Soviet
* IBID., p. 6, Paragraph 22.
** NIE 11-8-64, pp. 1-2, Paragraph B.
*** NIE 11-8-65, p. I.
??** Ibid., p. 5.
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construction programs, the estimators "mirror-imag-
ing" of U.S. assured destruction and arms race-arms
control logic combined with insistence upon social-
economic constraints on military programs to bias the
Estimates. Whatever the strengthening of Soviet
forces, it was consistently maintained that the Soviets
would "continue to adhere to the concept of a
deterrent force," and Soviet objectives were cast in the
Western terms of a retaliatory assured destruction
force: the Soviets were building a retaliatory capabi-
lity to "assure the destruction of a significant portion
of U.S. industrial resources and population."* "Arms
race" logic popular within the U.S. Administration at
that time governed the Estimates: The Soviets were at
the same time reactionally motivated by U.S. forces
("the large U.S. ICBM force almost certainly influ-
ences the USSR to increase its force, and U.S.
deployment of ballistic missile defenses might incline
them toward even higher numbers." ), * * and con-
strained by fear of an arms race (the Soviets "would
probably judge that if they appeared to be acquiring
as many ICBMs as the U.S. they would simply
stimulate a further arms race").*** The net outcome
of that inconsistency was the judgement that the
Soviets were seeking neither superiority nor parity.
Only an Air Force footnote forecast "Soviet dissatis-
faction with a posture of strategic inferiority vis-a-vis
the U.S. and a determination to eliminate such
inferiority."*
By 11-8-67, after the numbers of operational Soviet
ICBM launchers had tripled in only two years and the
production of the Yankee SSBN was clear, the
estimators revised Soviet goals somewhat and attri-
buted to the Soviets the objective of "narrowing the
lead that the U.S. has held" in strategic offensive
forces.***** The Soviets might seek an advantage
over the U.S. in strategic forces, if they believed it
were possible, but-now following mutual assured
destruction and mutual deterrence logic-this was
clearly not believed likely.
NIEs 11-8-68 and 11-8-69 were the first Estimates
strongly influenced by U.S. SALT rationale and
aspirations, to the point of becoming rationalizations
for SALT. With Soviet ICBM launchers approaching
* NIE 11-8-66, p. 6, Paragraph 2.
** NIE 11-8-65, p. 5, Paragraph 4.
*** Ibid., p. 13, Paragraph 30.
**** NIE 11-S-66, p. 1, Footnote.
***** NIE 11-8-67, p. 1, Paragraph A.
U.S. numerical levels, 11-8-68 predicted that "the
Soviets will shortly overcome the U.S. lead in numbers
of ICBM launchers"* (not SLBM), but concern over
an uncertain future and continued arms competition
would lead the Soviet Union to arms limitation
agreements, as would their reasoning "that further
increments to their strategic forces would have little
effect on the relationship between the U.S. and the
USSR".** The Estimate openly constructed a case for
Soviet interest in arms limitation agreements designed
to end the "arms race," concluding that "they are
evidently interested in strategic arms control as an
option that could conserve economic resources."***
Only failing such an agreement would the Soviets
continue to build up strategically: "In the absence of
an arms control agreement, we believe that they will
continue the arms competition with the U.S."**'
Even in that event, however, Soviet strategic goals
would be limited by (Mutual Assured Destruction)
MAD realities. The estimators considered it "highly
unlikely" that the Soviets would "try for strategic
superiority of such an order that it could be translated
into significant political gain."***** Such an at-
tempt, the Soviets would recognize, would be ineffec-
tual, would involve unacceptable economic sacrifices,
and "would almost certainly provoke a strong U.S.
reaction."******
Only the possibility of superiority for political
advantage was considered by the Estimates (and
rejected); the possibility of superiority for military
advantage, and particularly a capability to limit U.S.
retaliation to "tolerable levels," was dismissed out of
hand as absolutely "not feasible."
Now, however, by 11-8-69,******* mutual deter-
rence parity became the reality, the ultimate Soviet
goal, and not undesirable state-to be legitimized and
preserved through SALT. Soviet willingness to enter
* NIE 11-8-68, p. 1, Paragraph A.
** Ibid., pp. 4-5, Paragraph 4.
*** Ibid., p. 1, Paragraph B.
**** Ibid., p. 1, Paragraph A.
***** Ibid., p. 5, Paragraph 6.
****** Ibid., p. 5, Paragraph 6.
******* One other feature of 11-8-69, which was motivated by
anticipation of SALT and SALT limitations, was that it was the first
NIE on strategic forces to drop MR/IRBMs and Badgers-Blinders
from Strategic Attack Forces, limiting Forces for Intercontinental
Attack to ICBM, SLBM, and heavy bombers, a turn around from
earlier estimates in this series which defined the subject forces as
those of 700 nm range or more.
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SALT was taken as evidence of SALT interests similar
to those of the U.S. That the Soviets might view SALT
differently was not even given serious consideration:
"Moscow's willingness to discuss strategic arms
control probably reflects the view that it has
attained or is in the process of attaining an
acceptable strategic relationship with the U.S.
Moreover, Moscow may believe that even if an
agreement could not be reached, negotiations
would have the effect of damping down the arms
race, perhaps for a considerable time."
"If forces on both sides could be maintained at
something like present levels, such a policy might
be attractive to the Soviets."**
BUT: "In the absence of an arms control
agreement, Moscow will almost certainly con-
tinue to strengthen its strategic forces."***
This sentiment was reinforced in 11-8-70, and
11-8-71, both of which argued that the Soviets wanted
merely to have "a sense of equal security with the
U.S.," which would be satisfied with "rough parity,"
the objective of their recent strategic force buildup,
now at hand. Evidence ("much of it from the SALT")
indicates that "the Soviet leaders think they have now
achieved that position, or are about to achieve it,"
and are consequently "seriously interested" in a SALT
agreement to preserve it.
"It has been evident for some time (sic) that an
important Soviet objective has been the achieve-
ment of a position of acknowledged strategic
parity with the U.S. Soviet acceptance of
strategic arms limitation talks (SALT) was in-
tended in part to secure U. S. recognition of this
parity."****
The Estimates were so confident in the assignation of
this goal that they stated that the reasons for the
Soviet buildup are "neither complex nor ob-
scure:"***** parity with the U.S. Not to make war, or
to secure objectives through pressure backed by
theater levels of nuclear force, but to be equal and to
deter. Even so, 11-8-71 suggested that that objective
may have come about willy-nilly through pluralistic
* NIE 11-8-69, p. 7, Paragraph 6.
** Ibid., p. 8, Paragraph 11.
*** Ibid., p. 7, Paragraph 7.
**** NIE 11-8-70, pp. 15-16, Paragraph 11.
***** Ibid., p. 5, Paragraph M.
bureaucratic happenstance: "We think it unlikely
that observed Soviet programs are the product of a
carefully thought out strategy or rationale."* That-the
Soviet leaders might be determined to achieve
strategic superiority over the U.S. or might even
consider it a feasible objective, was explicitly pooh-
poohed. Constraints, including economic constraints
and fear of an arms race, were again emphasized.
NIE 11-8-72 was the first SALT-Agreement-NIE:
The agreements, it announced, "have profound
implications ... they create a new milieu." After
repeating verbatim the statements of the preceding
NIE, noted above, and emphasizing again the
putative constraints on the USSR, the SALT agree-
ments were cited as constraints as well as faithful
reflections of Soviet limited strategic objectives:
"In the context of arms control, other pressures
for moderation will be at work.
The SAL agreements have been hailed in the
USSR as a successful manifestation of the current
Soviet policy of detente; consequently there will
be incentives to avoid actions which, though not
actually violating the agreements, might jeopar-
dize them." (Emphasis added.)**
"Any step which might constitute a threat to the
agreements," the NIE confidently asserted, would
disturb the personal stake that Soviet leaders "most
notably Brezhnev" have in the agreements.
By NIE 11-8-73, in contrast to earlier suggestions
that Soviet strategic offensive force programs lacked
coherent direction, other than perhaps to attain rough
parity in retaliatory capability, the breadth and
intensity of effort-" unprecedented" -led to an as-
sessment that "the present Soviet effort involves more
than can be readily explained as merely trying to keep
up with the competition."*** In the SALT frame-
work, moreover, it was pointed out that the new
families of programs were "conceived long before the
Interim Agreement was signed in May 1972."****
The Soviets were clearly not exercising the care not to
disturb the agreements formerly predicted. Nonethe-
less, the continuation of mutual deterrence, detente,
and SALT thinking in the Estimate produced
* NIE 11-8-71, p. 7, Paragraph P.
* NIE 11-8-72, p. 8, Paragraph U.
** NIE 11-8-73, p. 3.
***Ibid., p. 1.
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ambivalence: On the one hand, hope: The continued
Soviet buildup "is not yet irreversible, and the Soviets
may prove willing to accept some curbs on it within
the broader context of their detente policy."* On the
other hand, concern: "they have shown little disposi-
tion to exercise voluntary restraint."**
As to Soviet strategic goals, despite explicit recogni-
tion of pursuit of greater throw weight, numbers of
RVs, and counter-force capabilities, assured destruc-
tion logic continued to prevail. Not only was it judged
(Red/Blue implicit net assessment) that "under no
foreseeable circumstances in the next 10 years" * * *
(emphasis added) could the Soviets develop the ability
to reduce damage to themselves to acceptable levels,
but Soviet programs were also explained largely in the
framework of retaliatory assured destruction (e.g.,
increased concern for retaliatory force survivability)
and equal security objectives. Soviet incentives to
press on broadly with improved weapons systems
derived from "competing drives" of internal politics,
from "concern with being accepted as at least the
strategic equal of the U.S.,"**** and from "genuine
concern that the USSR could fall behind strate-
gically."***** Even if the Soviet leaders felt that they
could obtain a lead in static measures of strategic
power this would convey an image of marginal
superiority only to "those who ascribe high signifi-
cance to these measures."* * * * * * (Not very important,
by implication.)
That the Soviets might have entirely different
strategic goals and concepts was not seriously consid-
ered despite doctrinal and program evidence strongly
supporting such a proposition.
By this point of time the breadth of the Soviet
ICBM and SLBM effort was well recognized-"a
vigorous and costly buildup of the various elements of
their forces for intercontinental attack"'-as
was the rapid qualitative improvement of these
forces-with the exception of continued underestima-
tion of the progress made in improving the accuracies
of these missiles. (For the SS-18 and SS-19 see "B"
Team report Soviet ICBM Accuracy: An Alternative
*Ihid., p. 4
**Ihid., p. 4.
'Ibid., p. 5.
****Ibid., p. 20, Paragraph 68.
*****Ibid., pp. 20-21, Paragraph 71,
"""Ibid., p. 5.
******* NIE 11-8-72, p. 2. Paragraph B.
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Assessment.) NIE 11-8-72 :first noted the appearance
of follow-on ICBMs to the SS-9 and SS-11, and the
appearance of the Delta SSBN carrying the SS-N-8,
but placed the development of MIRVs at least 2-3
years away.
What is noteworthy is the continued absence of
recognition of Soviet strategic counterforce emphasis
and aspirations. It is curious that, despite all of the
emphasis placed on throw weight in the context of
SALT preparations and by the Department of Defense
(even in unclassified SEC DEF statements), no point
is made of Soviet throw weight even through 1972;
and no relation is made between that capability and
the direction of qualitative improvements to draw
counterforce implications. While the estimated RV
weights are noted, and the possible throw weight of
the new large missile is suggested in supporting
analysis, no emphasis whatsoever is given to throw
weight or to counterforce aims.
NIE 11-8-73 (January 1974) noted the throw
weights estimated for the new ICBMs and observes
that each has substantially more throw weight than
the missile it will replace but no particular emphasis is
given to this. Although a probable Soviet desire to
improve hard target counterforce capabilities is noted,
barely, in passing, in no sense is that registered as
among major objectives. Soviet programs continue to
be presented in Western "mirror-image" terms, such
as "increased concern for the survivability" of
retaliatory forces. The major reasons given for the
Soviets pressing ahead simultaneously across a broad
front of strategic force programs are:
"to accommodate competing drives within the
party leadership and military and defense pro-
duction ministries and to overcome reservations
about arms control"*
"genuine concern that the USSR could fall
behind strategically or lose some of its own
bargaining leverage if it failed fully to hold up its
side of the strategic competition"**
That the Soviets might have strategic objectives
more sinister than "comprehensive equality with the
U.S." and perhaps "some degree of strategic advan-
tage if U.S. behavior permits" is not in the slightest
* Ibid., p. 20, Paragraph 70.
** Ibid., pp. 20-21, Paragraph 71.
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degree considered.* In fact it is suggested that "the
need to maintain the present level of economic
commitment to strategic forces may appear less
pressing in the future." And: "How far the Soviets
will go in carrying out these lines of development will
depend in the first instance on the SALT II
negotiations."**
For the first time, the NIE 11-3/8-75 (Volume I)
raises more ominous possible directions for the Soviet
strategic attack force program (not, however, for the
strategic defensive program): Soviet forces have
moved and the "well beyond the minimum require-
ments of deterrence"*** capability of the Soviet
ICBM force to destroy U.S. Minuteman "is growing.
It will probably pose a major threat in the early
1980s."**** Despite that, the net assessment, both
politically and militarily, remains a comfortable
one-far more comfortable than the hard evidence
contained in the NIE warrants. Part of the reason for
this lies in implicit assessments of Blue capabilities,
part in treating the matter in an assured-destruction-
only framework (and discounting civil defense in that
framework), and part in continuing to see basic Soviet
motivations, objectives, and logic in American terms.
(For specific examples, see the supporting "B" Team
topical papers.
The Soviets would try to achieve strategic domi-
nance, including a first strike capability, "if they
thought they could achieve it," but "we do not
believe" they believe it. While some measure of
* Ibid.
** Ibid., p. 21, Paragraph 74.
*** NIE 11-3/8-75, Volume 1, p. 11, Paragraph 2.
**** Ibid., p. 2.
strategic superiority, "which has some visible and
therefore politically useful advantages" (emphasis
added-first acknowledgement of such advantage
from a strategic force balance), and which might even
give the Soviets "better capabilities than the U.S. to
fight a nuclear war," Soviet objectives-and pros-
pects-are in fact comparatively modest, and heavily
influenced by SALT.* The NIE makes the judgement
that these objectives will remain "if a SALT TWO
agreement is not achieved."** (At this point the NIE
becomes as much a superficial apologia for SALT II as
an intelligence estimate on Soviet forces. The forces
the Soviets would regard as adequate under a SALT II
agreement are treated as much different from, and are
contrasted with, those they would pursue in absence
of an agreement.)
Finally, in any case, the Soviets could not expect
that during the next ten years they could launch an
attack on the U.S. and prevent (escape?) "devastating
retaliation" because:
- a considerable number of Minuteman would
survive
- all but a few US SSBNs would survive
- confidence in ability to defend against bombers
would be low
- defenses, including ABM ("insignificant") and
civil defense would not be effective.
That there are other applications and consequences
of their strategic forces is submerged in this final
assured destruction rationale.
* Ibid., p. 5.
** Ibid., pp. 5-6.
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