VIETNAM: ARMY MODERNIZATION, TACTICS, AND DOCTRINE

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: NGA Records (Formerly NIMA)
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP91T01115R000100280002-3
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 33
• Document Creation Date: December 28, 2016
• Document Release Date: December 13, 2010
• Sequence Number: 2
• Publication Date: September 1, 1984
• Content Type: REPORT

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(P'~'c'p LII GL IVI AIG UI
V n Intelligence
Vietnam: Army
Modernization, Tactics,
and Doctrine (u)
Secret
Secret
IA 84J0065C
September 1984
Copy 29
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Directorate of
Intelligence
Vietnam: Army
Modernization, Tactics,
and Doctrine (u)
Secret
IA
September 1984
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Secret
Summary
Information available as
of August 1984 was
used in this report.
Vietnam : Army
Modernization, Tactics,
and Doctrine (U)
Since 1978, the People's Army of Vietnam (PAVN) has been engaged in
a major reorganization, modernization, and expansion program. This
program accelerated following the 1979 Sino-Vietnamese border war,
and has resulted in the streamlining of the command and control sys-
tem, the creation of new combat and combat-support units, and the
organization of the PAVN's elite forces along Soviet lines.
With Soviet assistance, Vietnam has carried out widespread changes
within its Army, including:
?Reequipping many main force divisions with newer weaponry.
?Upgrading the separate ground combat arms of the PAVN.
?Developing mechanized infantry forces.
These developments have enabled Hanoi to improve its offensive com-
bat capability, emphasizing the use df heavily armed mobile army corps
and regional forces in combined arms tactics.
While most of the modernization has involved PAVN forces located
along the Chinese border, we have noted the upgrading of some
Kampuchean-based forces since 1981. We expect that the
modernization program will continue for at least several more years
and that eventually all of the PAVN's main force strategic army corps
will include some mechanized infantry divisions. These anticipated
modernization efforts should enable the Vietnamese to maintain a
strong deterrent force along their northern border with China, while
continuing to maintain military domination over both Kampuchea
and Laos.
IA 84-10065C
September 1984
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Contents
Summary
Changes in Command and Control Procedures 1
Mobilization for Kampuchean Operations 2
The April 1979 Party Directive 5
Growth of the Military Commands in Northern Vietnam 7
Upgrading of the Strategic Army Corps 8
Creation of New Binh Doan Commands 9
Effects of Modernization on Ground Combat Capability 1
1
Development of Combined Arms Tactics 1
1
Development of Combined Arms Combat Doctrine 1
3
Organizational Trends
Soviet Influence on PAVN Organization and Training 1
4
Infantry Forces 1
5
Artillery Forces
Armor Forces 1
7
Engineering Forces 1
7
Air Defense Forces 1
7
Laotian-Based Forces 1
9
Appendixes
A. Soviet Influence on PAVN TO&E 2
1
B. Estimated Organization of a PAVN Infantry Division in Vietnam 2
5
C. Estimated Organization of a PAVN Infantry Division in Kampuchea 2
7
D. Estimated Organization of a PAVN Armored Brigade/Regiment; Estimated 2
Organization of a PAVN Divisional Armored Battalion
9
E. Estimated Organization of a PAVN Artillery Brigade 3
1
F. Estimated Organization of a PAVN Engineering Brigade
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Vietnam : Army
Modernization, Tactics,
and Doctrine (U)
Following its 1975 victory over South Vietnam, and
the subsequent reunification of the country, the
People's Army of Vietnam (PAVN) was assigned a
new mission of rebuilding war-damaged areas of
the country. With this new emphasis on essentially
non-military tasks, there was little need to modern-
ize Vietnamese ground forces. Aside from supple-
menting their existing equipment inventory with
some of the substantial US equipment left behind
in 1975, the PAVN initiated no major equipment
replacement program. In the immediate post-war
period there was no urgent need to accelerate train-
ing, develop new tactics or reexamine national de-
fense doctrine. By the late 1970s, regional develop-
ments in Indochina, particularly Vietnam's 1978 in-
vasion and occupation of Kampuchea and the 1979
Sino-Vietnamese border war, demonstrated to
Hanoi the need for ground force improvements.
Although Hanoi has initiated a modernization
program for the entire armed forces, including
naval and air forces, this study addresses command,
organization, and equipment upgrading changes
which have been under way in the Vietnamese
ground forces since 1978, and the effect these
trends have had on the PAVN's ground combat
capability and doctrine. While this study does
not address the status of the PAVN's extensive
military logistics apparatus, DIA analysis
completed in January 1983 indicates that the
PAVN Rear Services General Department has
generally kept pace with modernization efforts
within the ground forces, and that it is
capable of providing logistical support to the army
in both peacetime and combat situations. Informa-
tion available as of August 1984 has been included.
A key element in the PAVN's overall moderniza-
tion program has been its efforts to streamline the
command and control system. We believe that
changes in command and control after 1978 were
initiated to tailor the ground forces to an opera-
tional doctrine better suited to the national defense
priorities of post-reunification Vietnam, and to
meet the tactical operational needs of PAVN occu-
Changes in Command and Control Structure 25X1
By late 1979, the PAVN was engaged in a major
expansion and modernization effort. With renewed
Soviet military assistance and expertise, Hanoi
began upgrading its ground force command and
control system, integrating newer Soviet-supplied
weaponry into its ground forces inventory, and
creating new combat and combat-support units.
Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) order of battle
analysis indicates that the PAVN has grown from
an estimated main force of 21 divisions and 86
independent regiments in January 1975 to an
estimated 88 combat and combat-support
divisions by February 1984, with an estimated
1.2 million personnel under arms. The PAVN is
now the third largest standing army in the
world, behind China and the Soviet Union.
The modernization and expansion of
Vietnamese ground forces has enabled Hanoi
to defend itself against China along its northern
border, while enforcing its military domination
over Kampuchea and Laos.
pation forces in Kampuchea.
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The army is currently organized into five command
echelons: strategic army corps (SAC) commands;
Binh Doan commands; military region (MR) com-
mands; provincial unit commands; and district mili-
tia commands. Of these, the SAC commands, the
Binh Doan commands, the MR commands, and
some elements of the provincial unit commands are
made up of full-time, regular soldiers. While not
considered main force, the provincial unit com-
mands maintain at least one infantry regiment com- Ocvi
posed of full-time soldiers in each of Vietnam's 39 25X1
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provinces. All command echelons are subordinate
to the High Command General Staff under the
Ministry of National Defense in Hanoi (figure 1).
In 1980, the Vietnamese Communist Party created
a "one-man command" system for the PAVN,
eliminating political cadres within military units
and placing the responsibility for both command
and political decisions into the hands of the senior
military commander of each unit. This sweeping
change in the command system promotes better
coordination between commanders at all echelons,
eliminates the clumsy and time-consuming process
of coordination with political cadres on all day-to-
day decisions, and encourages greater initiative
within the military leadership. Vietnamese military
essays over the past four years point directly to
the new military threat from China and a need for
army modernization as the principal reasons for the
new command procedure. (U)
The present command and control system reflects a
shift in Vietnam's military priorities following reun-
ification. These objectives call for ensuring home-
land defense against Vietnam's principal enemy,
China, and for maintaining military domination
over Vietnam's Indochinese neighbors, Laos and
Kampuchea. Prior to reunification, the army was
organized into both independent divisions-often
referred to as national forces by the North Viet-
namese-and other regionally organized indepen-
dent regiments, with a primary strategy of conduct-
ing a war of national liberation.
The present command and control system has its
origins in the PAVN High Command's prepara-
tions for the 1975 spring offensive against South
Vietnam. In developing their strategy, the High
Command found it necessary to build five larger
combined-arms strategic army corps (SACs)-re-
ferred to as Quan Doans by the Vietnamese-to
ensure greater speed, mobility, and firepower.'
These SACS, supported by other independent regi-
ments which remained under the command and
control of North Vietnam's MR commands, spear-
headed the PAVN offensive into the South. Follow-
ing reunification, the High Command retained four
of the five SACS in active service and redrew the
boundaries of the national MR commands, incor-
porating the newly acquired territory of southern
Vietnam, the addition of which roughly doubled
the size of the country. By 1978, eight new national
MR commands had been created (figure 2). By the
time Vietnam invaded and occupied Kampuchea in
late 1978, therefore, the High Command had al-
ready instituted some permanent changes in their
command and control system. SACS serve as the
major mobile strategic strike force of the PAVN.
Geographically organized MR commands operate
exclusively within specific regions or in support of
forward combat fronts.
Mobilization for Kampuchean Operations
Vietnam invaded Kampuchea in December 1978.
The deployment of PAVN combat units to
Kampuchea prompted the first expansion of
Vietnamese ground forces since 1975. In
preparation for the invasion, the PAVN High
Command mobilized eight infantry divisions.
As the fighting intensified, the High Command
committed at least five additional divisions to the
invasion, including at least one division each from
the 2nd and 4th SAC Commands. Additionally, the
High Command began to build six new infantry
divisions under MR authority for Kampuchean
service.
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One of these corps was formed as early as October 1973. Following the
PAVN's failure to achieve a breakthrough during its 1972 offensive
against South Vietnam, the Party Central Committee adopted the con-
cept of combined-arms armies. The High Command continued to devel-
op the remaining four corps in preparation for the final push of 1975. (C)
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Figure 1
Command Organization, People's Army of Vietnam, 1980-Present
Ministry
of
National Defense
High Command
General Staff
1 st
Strategic
Army Corps
Capital
Military
111
Military
Region II
Region
Binh
Doan 5
Binh
Doan 26
Binh
Doan 6
2nd
Strategic
Army Corps
Military
Region III
Binh
Doan 8
Task Force
678
(Laos)
Provincial
Unit
Commands
District
Militia
Commands
Provincial
Unit
Commands
District
Militia
Commands
Full-time regular forces
Part-time reserve forces
Full-time regular forces and part-time reserve forces
Note: Dashed lines indicate command relationship which is unclear.
District
Militia
Commands
3rd
Strategic
Army Corps
Military
Region IV
District
v a,tia
Conn,inris
Binh
Doan 9
4th
Strategic
Army Corps
Military
Region V
Binh
Doan 7
District
Mil itra
Commands
Military
Region VII
District
Militia
Co in in a rids
Military
Region IX
Pmvnxi!
Unit
District
Militia
Command,
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Secret
Figure 2
Vietnam's Military Regions and Out-of-Country Commands
of
South
of ong Than
Thailand chhnarlg ++ _ MR VII i1 China
Sea
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Those infantry divisions subordinate to MR com-
mands which were deployed to Kampuchea re-
mained under MR operational control initially,
while those subordinate to SAC commands were
under the control of the High Command General
Staff in Hanoi. The High Command subsequently
created four MR forward commands in
Kampuchea, later designated as fronts.' These
fronts were given the responsibility for military
The April 1979 Party Directive
operations in specific regions of Kampuchea.
A second High
Is directive was a
Command forward headquarters was established in
Phnom Penh during mid-1979. Although the fronts
continued to maintain a command relationship with
their parent MR commands in Vietnam and de-
pended on them for logistical support, operational
control over all maneuver units in Kampuchea was
assumed by these High Command forward staffs
(figure 3).
Post-1978 Force Modernization
In response to Hanoi's invasion and occupation of
Kampuchea, China launched a major military in-
cursion into Vietnam's northern border provinces
in February 1979. At the time of the incursion, we
estimated that Vietnam had only four main force
infantry divisions deployed in its five northernmost
2The PAVN has used the term 'front' in connection with combat opera-
tions since the 1960s. The term refers both to a theater of operations as
well as to a military command echelon. The initial numbers of each front
designation indicates its parent military region. The Kampuchean front
designations are: Front 479, located in northwestern Kampuchea; Front
579, located in northeastern Kampuchea; Front 779, located in south-
eastern Kampuchea; and Front 979, located in southwestern Kampuchea
(figure 1).
major factor in determining the scope and direction
of military modernization efforts in Vietnam.
Besides increasing the overall size of the army,
the directive led to further refinements in the
organizational structure of PAVN main forces.
The resumption of large-scale Soviet military
assistance and equipment deliveries resulted in
significant changes to the tables of organization
and equipment (TO&E) of PAVN ground force
units. All of these developments were key factors
in the establishment of a new ground force
operational doctrine, and resulted in a major
upgrading of the PAVN's tactical ground combat
capability after 1979.
'A PAVN Economic Construction Division is a division comprised of
from two to I I subordinate regiments manned by construction workers
and laborers. It has a primary mission of rebuilding war-damaged areas,
although the personnel receive infantry training and are capable of sup-
porting main force infantry. Since 1976, we estimate that Vietnam has
created at least 22 of these divisions, but as of April 1983, only 12 re-
mained active. Vietnam's reaction to the Chinese incursion and subse-
quent border developments were examined in depth in CIA. EA EAJ 82-
OOIC, (Secret Codeword), 6 January 1982, "Vietnam: Massive Force Ex-
pansion in the North," East Asian Journal (supplement), and in CIA. IS-
10137J. December 1981, Vietnamese Ground Forces
Opposite China: Organization, Deployment, and Defensive Preparations.
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Tactical Command Channels, PAVN Ground Forces
PAVN
High Command
Hanoi
1 st
Strategic
Army Corps
Binh
Doan 5
Binh
Doan 26
J
Task Force
678
All PAVN Forces Lao
Military
Region V
Binh
Doan 7
High Command
Forward
Ho Chi Minh City
Military
Region VII
Military
Region IX
Military
Region II
Binh
Doan 6
Military
Region III
Binh
Doan 8
Front
479
2nd
Strategic
Army Corps
Military
Region IV
Binh
Doan 9
High Command
Forward
Phnom Penh a
Front
579
3rd
Strategic
Army Corps
Front
779
4th
Strategic
Army Corps b
Front
979
a Also known as "Front 719"
b Elements of this corps relocated to MR VII in May 1983
Note: Dashed lines indicate subordination which is unclear.
Military
Region I
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Growth of the Military Commands in Northern
Vietnam
Within months of the April 1979 directive, the size
of the PAVN began to increase. To accomplish this
growth, the main force commands of MRs I, II,
and III in northern Vietnam were augmented with
additional infantry divisions. Other new divisions
subordinate to new corps-like entities-referred to
as Binh Doans by the Vietnamese-were identified
sources (figure 4). At least six of these new infantry
divisions were created by converting economic con-
struction divisions into infantry divisions. We
believe that manpower for other new divisions may
have been drawn from the provincial reserve forces.
Imagery analysis shows that at least nine of
the new divisions deployed along the border re-
equipped with armored battalions. There is no evi-
dence that the High Command further expanded
either the number of infantry divisions or the MR-
subordinate combat-support units in Military
Regions IV, V, VII, or IX, which had already
undergone expansion as early as 1978 in
preparation for the Kampuchean operation,
and which had largely been committed to that
theater.
Figure 4
Organization of a PAVN Military Region Command, 1979-1984
Military
Region
Command
Artillery
Regiment
Antiaircraft Artillery
Regiment
Motor
Transport
Regiment
Armored
Regiment
District
Militia
Commands
Binh Doan
Command
Engineer
Regiment
Infantry
Division
Signal
Regiment
Full-time main forces
Part-time regional reserve forces
Full-time main fords and part-'ime regional reserve forces
Note: Dashed lines indicate command channel we believe
exists, but which is unconfirmed.
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Upgrading of the Strategic Army Corps
The structure of these corps was
standardized to include three subordinate infantry
divisions and as many as seven subordinate com-
bat-support brigades and regiments (figure 5). Ad-
ditionally, analysis of PAVN command and control
exercises conducted in Vietnam since 1981, analysis
of PAVN command and control practices during
the invasion of Kampuchea, imagery analysis of the
SACS are independent from MR authority and are
Figure 5
Organization of a PAVN Strategic Army Corps Command
Strategic
Army Corps
Artillery
Brigade
Antiaircraft Artillery
Brigade
Armored
Brigade
Signal
Regiment
Motor
Transport
Regiment
Engineer
Brigade
Reconnaissance
Regiment a
Infantry
Division
under the direct operational control of the High
Command General Staff.
Vietnamese military media reports since 1980 indi-
cate that these corps have been in the process of
developing mechanized infantry forces mounted in
armored personnel carriers (APCs) within some of
their subordinate infantry divisions, and that other
corps-subordinate combat-support units have
received Soviet-built, truck-mounted multiple
rocket launchers (MRLs), self-propelled field
artillery, and engineering equipment.' We have
not been able to identify a fully-equipped
mechanized infantry regiment or infantry
division within the SACs because of infrequent
photographic coverage, but we have
confirmed that these types of equipment have been
delivered to selected units of the 1st SAC in Mili-
tary Region III and the 2nd and 3rd SACs in
Military Region I since late 1980. Additionally, we
have confirmed that all three of these SACS have
been augmented with additional cargo trucks and
artillery prime movers since that time. Although
this equipment has been confirmed in only selected
units within these corps, we believe that the
mechanization process is well under way within the
SACs. While less is known about the status of the
4th SAC, which presently has combat elements in
both Kampuchea and southern Vietnam, imagery
suggests that 4th SAC units in Vietnam are receiv-
ing mechanized infantry training. These develop-
ments suggest that the High Command intends to
equip each of the SACs with enough armored
vehicles, artillery, and motor transport assets to
give them significantly more firepower and mobility
than any other group of PAVN forces.
'The Vietnamese Government routinely disseminates information regard-
ing the activities of specific military units, military doctrine, and tactics-
in radio broadcasts; in the official party theoretical journal, Tap Chi
Cong San; and in the Army's daily newspaper, Quan Doi Nhan Dan.
Methodical examination of this open-source information against existing
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Creation of New Binh Doan Commands
Since the April 1979 directive, at least six new
corps-type entities-called Binh Doans by the
in Vietnamese military media
reports. According to these sources, each of these
Binh Doans serves as the controlling authority for
one or more subordinate infantry divisions and a
varying number of combat-support brigades and
regiments. Two of the Binh Doans-the 5th in MR
I, and the 6th in MR II-control six and seven
subordinate infantry divisions, respectively
(figure 6). Five of these new entities are located
in the northernmost MRs of Vietnam, near the
Chinese border. We believe that another Binh
Doan-the 8th, headquartered in MR IV-is the
controlling authority for Task Force 678, which
comprises all PAVN forces in Laos.
mand and control system is still unclear.
however, that they are
more likely to be specially constituted regional task
forces or frontline corps which operate either under
the direct operational control of the MR com-
mands, or in concert with them.
To date, we have no evidence indicating that any of
these new Binh Doan commands share a combat
mission similar to the SACs. In addition, our anal-
ysis of the TO&E of the 5th and 6th Binh Doans
shows they lack the motor transport assets, and
thus the mobility, of the SACs. Moreover, while we
have observed newer Soviet-built APCs, MRLs,
and engineering equipment in selected units subor-
dinate to the SACs since late 1980, to date we have
not observed this equipment with the newly formed
Binh Doan Commands.
Because the new Binh Doans lack the organiza-
tional uniformity of the SACs, as well as their mo-
bility and firepower, we believe they may be inde-
pendent from the MR command, and like the
SACs, directly subordinate to the High Command.
Alternately, they may be under the direct opera-
tional control of MRs 1, 11, III, and IV in northern
Vietnam, and of MR V, in central Vietnam. In ei-
ther case, we believe that, in the event of future
hostilities in the northern border area, Binh Doans
would form the first echelon of combat forces of
the MR defense plan. The role played by five of the
six Binh Doans during an October 1983 command
and control exercise in northern Vietnam supports
this first-echelon hypothesis. During that exercise,
Figure 6
Estimated Organization of a PAVN
Binh Doan Command
Binh
Doan
Command a
Artillery
Regiment
or
Brigade
L
Antiaircraft Artillery
Regiment
L---J
L
Signal
Regiment
Armored
Brigade
Transport
L Regiment
Binh I ram
Logistics
Unit
Infantry
Division
a Binh Doan Commands are estimated to be specially
constituted regional corps or regional task forces either
under military region authority or under direct control
of the High Command.
Note: Dashed boxes indicate units not present in all
Binh Doan commands.
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Vietnam's ground force modernization and expansion
program after 1978 would not have been possible
without Soviet assistance. During the immediate post-
reunification period, Soviet military aid to Vietnam
was gradually reduced; by 1977, according to De-
fense Intelligence Agency (DIA) estimates, shipments
of Soviet military equipment to Vietnam had reached
their lowest level in 10 years, with only an estimated
$10 million worth of material delivered. The aid was
increased to an estimated $90 million during 1978,
probably in response to the PA VN's mobilization for
Kampuchea. Following the February 1979 Chinese in-
cursion, the Soviets increased their military aid sub-
stantially. The DIA estimates that $1.8 billion worth
of Soviet materiel was provided to Vietnam during
that year. Although the level of military aid
apparently peaked during 1979, Soviet military
equipment deliveries to Vietnam have continued
since then.
Estimate of Soviet Military Aid to Vietnam, 1967-1983
Soviet ground force equipment deliveries have in-
cluded tanks, A PCs, artillery, air defense weapons,
river crossing and engineering equipment, and cargo
trucks. Although most of the equipment deliveries
have not included the latest models of Soviet weapons
and vehicles, the equipment has been generally newer
and better than equipment held in PA VN inventories
prior to 1979, and it is generally superior to equip-
ment in either the Chinese or Thai armies. The
Soviet equipment has included 122-mm D-74 and
130-mm M-46 long-range field artillery guns;
122-mm D-30 howitzers; BM-14/16 and BM-14/17
truck-mounted MRLs; BMP, BTR-60 and BRDM-2
APCs; PT-76 light amphibious, T-55, and medium
tanks; and GSP, PMP, and PTS engineering and
river crossing vehicles. Since 1982, the PA VN has
upgraded its long-range artillery assets opposite
China with the deployment of two brigades of Soviet-
Note: These estimates are based on shipborne deliveries of metric
tons of military equipment.
Source: Defense Intelligence Agency
in MR I.
In addition to equipment, the Soviets are providing
military advisors to assist the PA VN in its modern-
ization effort. According to PA VN defectors of
unestablished reliability, since 1979 Soviet advisors
have helped the Vietnamese build modern ground
force training facilities. We have identified Soviet-
style infantry and armor training ranges on imagery
at PA VN ground force training bases in MR II, MR
III, MR V, and in MR VII. Other PA VN defectors
have stated that Soviet advisors have been assigned to
Vietnam-based units down to the regimental level
since 1981, while Soviet advisors reportedly joined
some PA VN regiments in Kampuchea in mid-1982.
Estimate of Major Soviet Ground Force Equipment
Delivered to Vietnam, 1979-March 1984 a
Tanks APCs Artillery
aThese estimates are based on photographic confirmation of
weapons delivered to Vietnamese ports and therefore are
considered to be the minimum levels.
b At least eight additional arms shipments which included at least
53 tanks and 16 armored vehicles departed Vladivostok, USSR
between September 1983, and January 1984. The destination of
these ships is unknown, but we believe they went to Vietnam.
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Additionally, a 15 July 1983 PAVN High Com-
mand doctrinal essay published in the Vietnamese
military newspaper specifically outlined the mission
of the 6th Binh Doan (also known as the Song
Thao Group) as that of providing for defense of
the northern border in an area of difficult terrain.
Two of the largest Binh Doan commands in north-
ern Vietnam-the 5th and 6th-are deployed in de-
fensive positions covering extensive areas of rugged
terrain along the Sino-Vietnamese border, while all
three of the SAC commands in the northernmost
MRs are deployed in rear area garrisons surround-
ing Hanoi; this positioning further suggests that the
new Binh Doans serve a regional defense mission
either under the authority of the MRs in which
they are deployed, or under the direct authority of
the High Command.
Effects of Modernization on Ground Combat
Capability
We believe that the reorganization and upgrading
efforts within the PAVN since 1978, in addition to
Soviet influences, have improved the army's ground
combat capability. The PAVN High Command has
recognized the need for mobility and a combined
arms capability since the creation of the first SACs
in preparation for the 1975 spring offensive. The
acquisition of more modern equipment, coupled
with Soviet assistance, has enabled Hanoi to
develop the army from a predominantly infantry
force into a more conventional ground combat
arms team, incorporating separate infantry,
artillery, armor, engineering, and air defense
branches. This combined-arms development,
in addition to the reorganization of the main
force SACs and MR commands and the estab-
lishment of the Binh Doan Commands after
1979, has contributed to the establishment of
a conventional ground combat doctrine within
Development of Combined Arms Tactics
The PAVN executed its first successful large-scale
combined arms offensive against South Vietnam in
spring 1975. Since then, the High Command has
emphasized further combined arms training; this
emphasis has intensified since the end of the 1979
Sino-Vietnamese border war.
combined infantry/armor assault training ranges
were identified for the first time from imagery at a
PAVN ground force training base at Long Than, in
MR VII. November 1983 imagery shows that a
combined infantry/armor assault range had been
newly constructed at the PAVN's Infantry Officer's
School at Son Dong, in the Capital MR. Further-
more,
In Kampuchea, the PAVN began to employ more
effective combined arms operations against Khmer
resistance forces during their annual 1982/83 dry
season offensive. Although the PAVN has em-
ployed combined infantry, armor, and artillery
tactics in Kampuchea since 1979, these earlier
operations frequently depended upon mass infantry
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assaults against well-defended resistance strong-
holds, supported by a few armored vehicles and
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the PAVN.
frequently deficient artillery fire support.
During the 1982/83 dry season, and
again during the 1983/84 dry season, the PAVN
conducted more effective combined arms assaults
than previously against several large Khmer
resistance bases along the Thai-Kampuchea
border. PAVN commanders maneuvered full
infantry regiments, supported by one or more
artillery regiments and armored battalions, to
attack and overrun these bases. PAVN com-
manders pre-positioned their artillery and
armored forces during both dry season
campaigns to better support multiregimental
infantry sweep operations, and they better
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coordinated artillery fire support with infantry
maneuvers.
Although Khmer resistance forces are poorly
equipped and incapable of withstanding PAVN
frontal assaults against their bases, the PAVN's
more effective combined arms tactics against these
fixed targets during the 1982/83 and 1983/84 dry
seasons resulted in PAVN forces quickly seizing
their objectives with fewer equipment losses than in
previous dry season border campaigns. They may
agery analysis indicates that these tactical successes
resulted from combined arms training exercises
which took place prior to the initiation of opera-
tions. In our judgment these successes reflect an im-
proved combined arms capability, a direct result of
modernization efforts over the past few years.
The PAVN's concentration on conventional com-
bined arms operations in Kampuchea, however,
particularly since mid-1982, may have left them less
flexible, and therefore more vulnerable to increas-
ingly effective hit-and-run tactics of the Khmer re-
sistance forces. Since late 1983, as these Khmer
forces have acquired better arms and effectively
penetrated into Kampuchea's interior, PAVN com-
bat fronts have had a difficult time countering these
growing attacks. In March 1984, the Vietnamese
began for the first time to use tactical aircraft in
support of ground forces operations designed to
suppress resistance concentrations in the interior,
Imagery analysis
also showed that beginning in mid-1983, the Viet-
namese took extraordinary defensive measures-in-
eluding the construction of large earthen berms and
fences-to protect strategic logistics depots and
base camps deep inside the country.
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Development of Combined Arms Combat Doctrine
The establishment of the SAC commands after
1975, the improvements in command and control
practices, the establishment of Binh Doan com-
mands after 1979, and the emphasis on combined
arms tactics have all paralleled the evolution of a
new conventional ground combat doctrine for Viet-
namese ground forces. This doctrine has its origin
in the High Command's strategy for the 1975
spring offensive, and it has been refined and modi-
fied since then to meet Vietnam's current military
challenge from China. The doctrine currently calls
for a counteroffensive strategy involving employ-
ment of mobile, heavily armed groups of divisions
to seize the initiative and develop offensive opera-
tions against an invading enemy force. The objec-
tives of this strategy are the defense of Vietnamese
territory and the annihilation of the invading
enemy forces. This is a prevailing theme in
contemporary Vietnamese military media essays.
The differences in organization and firepower re-
flected in the TO&E of the SACs and the MR
commands since 1978, in addition to the procedures
developed to control these forces, indicates that the
High Command has tailored each of them to carry
out distinctly different combat missions to imple-
ment this strategy.
Analysis of PAVN national command and control
exercises conducted regularly since 1980 provides
additional evidence of two distinct combat missions
for the SAC commands and the MR commands.
During a large-scale exercise conducted in Novem-
ber 1980, for example, the participating SAC com-
mands remained mobile and were ordered to attack
various notional objectives at the direction of the
High Command General Staff. The MR commands
provided the forces necessary to create several com-
bat fronts. These fronts were commanded by the
General Staff, although they continued to report to
their parent MR Commands, which controlled sup-
porting forces in the rear areas of the fronts. This
command and control practice indicates that in
wartime, the MR commands are responsible for de-
veloping fronts, or the first echelon of combat
forces, and for committing additional forces to the
battle areas as those fronts are developed. The mo-
bile, more heavily armed SACs remain independent
from MR front operations. They would not be
committed during the initial stages of battle, but
held in reserve until additional forces and firepower
are needed. Once that decisive point in the battle is
reached, the SACs would be committed either sin-
gly or in groups to contain an enemy breakthrough,
or to exploit the enemy's weaknesses by executing
counteroffensive strikes capitalizing on the tactical
success of the fronts to assure overall operational
success.
exercise in northern Vietnam
Although the exact role of the new PAVN Binh
Doan commands in the command and control
structure is unclear, their apparent lack of mobility,
their non-standard organizational structures, and
their peacetime deployment along the Sino-
Vietnamese and Sino-Lao borders suggest that they
are designed as regional task forces assigned to
reinforce the five northernmost MR commands. As
such, we postulate that their wartime mission is to
serve as frontline forces for each MR front com-
mand as those fronts are developed. During an
October 1983 national command and control
at least five of the six Binh Doans
deploying to the immediate Sino-Vietnamese border
area to assume first line defensive positions.
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Organizational Trends
occurred in domestically-based forces, especially
those opposite China. Until recently, PAVN forces
Imagery analysis
indicates that although Kampuchean-based units
have received some newer equipment and better
training in the past two years, they still lag behind
Vietnam-based forces in numbers of transport ve-
hicles, artillery, and heavy engineering vehicles.
PAVN forces in Laos appear to operate with severe
equipment shortages. We believe the buildup of
forces in northern Vietnam is largely completed,
which has allowed the High Command to begin up-
grading out-of-country forces.
portant trends since 1979 have been an increase in
Soviet influence on the PAVN TO&E, and efforts
of the PAVN High Command to standardize unit
organization.
Soviet Influence on PAVN Organization and
Training
In addition to the influx of newer Soviet-built weap-
ons and equipment we have observed with Viet-
namese ground forces since 1979,
Vietnamese military
media reports have also provided increasing
evidence of Soviet influence over PAVN unit
while imagery analysis shows Soviet-
style TO&Es emerging in selected PAVN artillery
and engineering units over the past five years,
particularly among PAVN forces deployed opposite
China. Perhaps more significant has been the emer-
gence of mechanized infantry forces within the
SACs. While we have not yet identified a fully
equipped and operational mechanized infantry
regiment, there is strong evidence indicating that
development of mechanized infantry forces is well
under way within all four PAVN SAC commands.
This has included equipping some PAVN infantry
units with Soviet-built APCs. Additionally, the
development and employment of mechanized
infantry has become a recurring theme in PAVN
doctrinal essays published in the Vietnamese
military media since 1982 (appendix A).
Equally significant has been the identification from
imagery of at least seven Soviet-style training facili-
ties at PAVN bases throughout Vietnam since 1980.
Soviet-style infantry antiarmor ranges have been
noted at PAVN training bases at Long Than in
MR VII and Vinh Yen in MR II since 1981, for
example. Moreover, we have identified new tank
live-firing ranges-identical to those used by Soviet
and Warsaw Pact tank forces-at four armor in-
stallations in northern Vietnam and one armor base
in MR VII since 1982.
Another important development underscoring
Soviet involvement on PAVN organization and
training was the identification in early 1984 of
a PAVN airborne commando regiment modeled
after Soviet spetznaz, or special-purpose forces.
This regiment-designated the 76th Airborne
Special Purpose Regiment-is headquartered at
Tong Airfield, near Son Tay, 39 kilometers west
mid-1982, at least six Soviet GRU advisors
were reportedly serving the regiment as
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instructors in parachuting, weapons, and logistics.
Imagery analysis shows that the regiment's training
area contains Soviet-designed parachute rigging and
jump training apparatus, as well as a Soviet-style
special purpose forces-type obstacle course and a
special training area for martial arts practice.
While it is clear from imagery analysis that only
selected PAVN ground force branches and units are
benefiting from Soviet advisory expertise, the mod-
est but growing number of Soviet-style training fa-
cilities observed at PAVN garrisons over the past
five years suggests that Soviet-Vietnamese military
cooperation is well established, and we expect to
see further evidence of Soviet advisory involvement
during the next several years.
Infantry Forces
The organization of most PAVN infantry divisions
based in Vietnam has been standardized since 1979,
although equipment holdings may still vary. Based
on our analysis of 15 SAC- , Binh Doan- , and
MR-subordinate infantry divisions in Vietnam since
1980, we have determined that they each consist of
three subordinate infantry regiments and an artil-
lery regiment. These divisions also have their own
organic antiaircraft artillery (AAA) and transport
battalions, as well as engineering battalions or com-
Since 1979, at least nine of the 15 PAVN infantry
divisions identified on imagery in northern Vietnam
have been expanded to include armor battalions,
consisting of both tanks and APCs. While the num-
ber and types of equipment in these armored bat-
talions is not uniform, all nine battalions consist of
from 25 to 35 armored vehicles of mixed type.
Most of the vehicles are medium tanks, while the
remainder of the battalion is composed of light am-
phibious tanks, armored reconnaissance vehicles or
Our analysis of
the SAC and MR headquarters garrison areas in
the four northernmost MR shows that some of
them lack armored vehicles,
that those armor battalions which have been
identified with infantry divisions are actually
subordinate to the SAC and MR commands, and
that they have been assigned to support selected
divisions in key areas along the Chinese border.
The 10 PAVN infantry divisions stationed in
Kampuchea are less rigidly organized than the
Vietnam-based infantry divisions, although they
have some common characteristics. Divisions in
Kampuchea. are primarily organized and equipped
to carry out specific combat missions within their
own areas of operation. Consequently, while the
Vietnam-based infantry divisions contain three
subordinate infantry regiments, analysis of imagery
andF- shows
that three of the Kampuchean-based infantry
divisions have four subordinate infantry regiments,
including a border security regiment which is
reinforced by an artillery or AAA battery. One
division-the 5th, operating with Front 479 in
northwestern Kampuchea-contains five
subordinate infantry regiments, including two
reinforced border security regiments. These
additional border security regiments are believed
to be temporarily detached from Vietnam's Border
Guard Command, and have been assigned to
support those divisions operating near the Thai-
Kampuchea border. At least seven of the 10
Kampuchean-based infantry divisions also have
organic reconnaissance battalions, equipped with
if these battalions are organic to those divisions,
or if they are front-level assets assigned to
reinforce these divisions (appendixes C, D).
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Artillery Forces
Since 1979, the PAVN High Command has gradu-
ally standardized divisional artillery regiments as
well as SAC-subordinate artillery brigades and
MR-subordinate artillery regiments in Vietnam-
based forces. Through imagery analysis we have
determined that divisional artillery regiments have
been standardized to include three firing battalions
equipped with Soviet-built weapons: a 122-mm
howitzer battalion; a gun battalion equipped with
either 85-mm or 100-mm antitank guns; and a field
artillery battalion equipped with either 122-mm
D-74 or 130-mm M-46 long-range field guns. MR-
subordinate artillery regiments are organized and
equipped similarly. Two of the four SAC-subordi-
nate artillery brigades identified through imagery
analysis consist of four firing battalions. 0
Prior to 1983, the artillery brigades of the 1st and
2nd SAC included a howitzer battalion, a gun bat-
talion, and two long-range field artillery battalions.
Since April 1983, we have identified truck-mounted
BM-14/17, BM-14/16 and BM-21 MRLs with both
of these brigades. In November 1983 we identified
the first fully operational battalion of MRLs with
the 1st SAC's 45th Artillery Brigade, based at Xuan
Mai. At the same time we observed that two howit-
zer battalions had replaced the antitank guns in the
45th Brigade, providing it with more indirect-fire
capability. These MRLs probably are replacing one
of the long-range field artillery battalions within
SAC-subordinate bridgades. Their deployment will
increase the firepower and versatility of the main
force SACs.
Since 1979, there have been references in the
Vietnamese military media to the equipping of
some PAVN forces with Soviet-built 122-mm self-
propelled field artillery guns. Although we have
not confirmed these press reports from imagery,
we believe that the acquisition of newer Soviet-built
self-propelled artillery would be consistent with the
High Command's current effort to mechanize its
SAC commands. The Vietnamese have retained
some older SU-76 self-propelled assault guns in
their inventory, but we have not observed any of
these weapons in operational units. And, while the
PAVN is known to have captured US-built self-
propelled artillery models in 1975, less than 10 have
been observed throughout Vietnam; a few are on
display as museum pieces at PAVN ground force
training centers and at least four 175-mm models
are in open storage at a PAVN depot near Danang.
To date, none of these former US guns has been
observed with operational PAVN units, probably
because the PAVN lacks ammunition and spare
parts for them.
Despite recent upgrading efforts, most of the
divisional artillery regiments which we have
identified from imagery in Kampuchea remain
underequipped. Our analysis of the divisional
artillery regiments of those located close to the
Thai border in the area of heaviest fighting-the
307th, 302nd, 5th, 309th, 339th, and 4th
Divisions-shows that they contain only enough
guns to constitute two firing battalions, rather
than the three typically observed with artillery
regiments in Vietnam. Imagery analysis
indicates that during the 1982/83 and
1983/84 dry season campaigns along the Thai-
Kampuchea border, two divisional artillery
regiments had to be reinforced with guns and
troops from those divisions' front-level artillery
regiments in order to complete their missions. We
believe that the understrength artillery regiments
within Kampuchean-based divisions may be due
either to lack of trained gunners or equipment, or
because typical PAVN artillery fire support mis-
sions against the resistance forces do not require a
larger TO&E. When more firepower is required-
during frontal assaults against border camps, for
example-divisional commanders can call upon
front-level artillery assets for additional support.
The artillery regiments subordinate to
Kampuchean-based divisions are equipped with a
mixture of older US, Chinese, and Soviet-built
guns, including 105-mm (M-101 and M-102 models)
and 155-mm howitzers, 122-mm M-1938 howitzers,
152-mm howtizers, 107-mm towed rocket launchers,
and 85-mm antitank guns. It is common to observe
37-mm AAA guns colocated with Kampuchean-
based artillery regiments, and we believe that the
PAVN employ these in a direct-fire, field artillery
role as well as in an air defense role (appendixes C,
E).
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Armor Forces
SAC-subordinate armor brigades and MR-subordi-
nate armor regiments in Vietnam are organized into
three tank battalions, an APC-equipped reconnais-
sance company, an AAA battalion, an engineering
company, and a transport battalion. The tank bat-
talions are equipped with Soviet-built PT-76 light
amphibious and T-55 medium tanks. The PAVN
also continues to use older Chinese-supplied Type
63 light amphibious and Type 59 medium tanks. At
present the PAVN's main battle tank is the Soviet-
built T-55. Reconnaissance companies within
PAVN armored brigades contain a variety of So-
viet-supplied APCs, including the BTR-50, BTR-60,
BMP, and BRDM-I and -2 armored reconnais-
sance vehicles. Additionally, the PAVN has re-
tained a variety of older US-built and Soviet-built
armor vehicles in their inventory. For example, we
have identified Soviet-built T-34/85 medium tanks
in storage at the Vinh Yen armor training depot in
MR II and since 1977, the PAVN has been refur-
bishing captured US-built tanks and APCs at a for-
mer US armor maintenance facility in Ho Chi
Minh City. These refurbished vehicles have been
deployed with PAVN units in Kampuchea since
1978, and in November 1983 we identified platoon-
sized M-I 13 APC units at two locations in MRs III
and IV.
At least two combat fronts in Kampuchea-Front
479 and Front 979- have organic armor regiments.
Imagery analysis shows that from 1979 through
1980, these regiments were equipped with a mixture
of US- and Chinese-built medium and light tanks
and APCs. Since 1981 we have observed none of
the light tanks with either regiment, although the
US-built M-113 APC remains the standard ar-
mored reconnaissance vehicle with Kampuchean-
based forces, and the PAVN continues to use older
Chinese Type 59 medium tanks in Kampuchea.
Since 1981 we have identified the Soviet-built T-55
in the country. In 1981, Soviet-produced BRDM-2
armored reconnaissance vehicles made their first
appearance with Front 479 forces operating near
the Thai-Kampchea border, although to date we
have identified less than 12 of these at any one time
in the country (appendixes B, C, and D). F_
Engineering Forces
Divisional engineeering battalions and companies in
Vietnam have been equipped with Soviet-built engi-
neering and river crossing equipment since late
1979. This equipment includes GSP heavy amphibi-
ous ferries, PMP and TMM bridging vehicles, and
BTM and BAT-M trenching vehicles. Since late
1980, we have observed PAVN SAC-subordinate
engineering brigades and regiments adopting Soviet
organization practices, including the creation of
assault river crossing and bridging companies
(figure 8).
we have identified heavy
combat engineering equipment with two divisions-
the 5th and the 339th-and with two fronts-Front
479 and Front 579. Moreover, each of these units
had less engineering and river crossing vehicles than
battalions and regiments observed in Vietnam-
based forces. Because of this apparent lack of
equipment, we believe that most of the PAVN
divisional engineering battalions and front-level
engineering regiments in Kampuchea do not have
any heavy combat engineering equpment, but
rather comprise primarily laborers who may be
equipped with trucks and occasionally graders
and bulldozers. Since 1979 we have noted
numerous instances in the open press and in
of PAVN forces conscripting
Kampuchean civilians for work on military
engineering projects, such as road repair and
base construction (appendixes B, C, and F).
Air Defense Forces
Since 1979, divisional AAA battalions have been
standardized to include either four or five firing
batteries of four guns each. At present, the PAVN's
tactical air defense combat arm is largely equipped
with older weapons. The towed 37-mm AAA gun
continues to be the primary divisional and brigade
air defense weapon, although we have identified
some lighter ZSU-23 AAA guns with both
Vietnam-based and Kampuchean-based forces.
Although the Vietnamese do have some ZSU-57/2
and ZSU-23/4 self-propelled AAA guns in their
inventory, we have only observed four of these
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weapons at the PAVN's air defense training school
at Son Tay, in MR III, and none have been
confirmed with operational ground force units since
1975. There has been at least one reference in the
Vietnamese military media since 1983, however,
which reports that the 1st SAC has received the
ZSU-23/4 weapon. This development may indicate
that the SACs' air defense assets will be upgraded,
which would be consistent with mechanization
trends in these corps.
Vietnam-
ese military media reports indicate the PAVN infan-
try units are equipped with heavy machine guns and
the shoulder-fired SA-7 surface-to-air missile for
additional air defense. SA-2 and SA-3 surface-to-air
missile battalions, and AAA regiments containing 57-
mm, 85-mm, and 100-mm AAA-subordinate to air
defense divisions and deployed to protect cities, air-
fields, and industries throughout Vietnam-are under
the operational control of the Vietnamese Air Force,
and are not tactical ground force assets (appendixes
B and Q.
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Laotian-Based Forces
Because of inadequate photographic coverage, a
comprehensive TO&E study of PAVN forces in
Laos is not possible. Our analysis of one PAVN
infantry division and one engineering division
deployed in northern Laos indicates that these
forces are probably the poorest equipped in the
army. For example, we have not identified any
organic armored battalions with PAVN infantry
divisions based in Laos. Also, a divisional artillery
regiment identified in northern Laos in 1981
contained only a single battery of towed 120-mm
mortars and a battalion of mixed field artillery
models, rather than the standard compliment of
three artillery battalions found with most divisional
artillery regiments in Vietnam. Some PAVN engi-
neering units in Laos have received newer Soviet-
supplied river crossing equipment, including GSP
heavy amphibious ferries, however, equipment
levels have not been standardized in these
will emerge as a more modern combat force mod-
eled after the Soviet forces of the late 1960s and
early 1970s.
We believe it is in the USSR's interest to continue
to provide Vietnam with weapons and vehicles to
accomplish these goals. In addition to newer mod-
els of artillery and APCs, we anticipate that the
PAVN may also receive either a modernized ver-
sion of the Soviet T-55 medium tank with improved
armor, more horsepower, and more sophisticated
firing optics, or possibly a newer-model medium
tank from the Soviets, to keep pace with armor im-
provements within Chinese ground forces, most
notably China's deployment in 1983 of a new main
battle tank. The Soviets may also provide the
Vietnamese with additional Scud tactical surface-
to-surface missiles to augment their artillery forces,
and they may also help the PAVN to upgrade its
units.
Based on the organizational and equipment upgrad-
ing trends observed under way in PAVN units since
1978, we believe that all PAVN SAC forces will be
modernized with newer Soviet-supplied weapons
and vehicles by 1990. While the PAVN will con-
tinue to standardize the organization and equip-
ment levels in most units, we expect that
Kampuchean-based infantry divisions will continue
to be organized on a mission-specific basis.
tactical air defense combat arm.
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The modernization of Vietnamese forces along the
Chinese border will continue to take precedence
over the upgrading of other PAVN forces. Hanoi's
efforts to reorganize some of its SAC-subordinate
combat and combat-support units along Soviet
lines, in addition to the development of these army
corps commands as mobile strike forces, suggests
that this echelon of forces is being tailored to serve
as a strong deterrent against China, with the goal
of resisting or repelling an all-out Chinese invasion.
We believe that all of the PAVN's SAC commands
will be at least partially mechanized by 1986 and
that when mechanization is completed, the PAVN
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Appendix A
Soviet Influence on PAVN
TO&E
There has been increasing evidence
PAVN is organizing and equipping selected combat
and combat-support units of their SACs along
Soviet lines.
Imagery analysis of t
304th Division's headquarters garrison near Kep
and two other garrisons in the 304th Division's
area of operation showed that at least nine
Soviet-built BMP APCs had been delivered to
the division by early October 1980. The BMPs
observed at the Kep garrison were parked
near vehicle storage buildings which had an esti-
mated capacity of at least 72 vehicles-large
enough to store sufficient BMPs to equip the major
elements of a mechanized infantry regiment. A new
armored vehicle live-fire training range was also de-
tected at the Kep garrison at that time. Subsequent
imagery, obtained in April 1983, confirmed that the
2nd SAC's subordinate 164th Artillery Brigade, lo-
cated southeast of Kep, had received at least one
battery of four Soviet-produced BM-14/17 MRLs.
Elsewhere in northern Vietnam, imagery analysis
indicates that elements of the Ist SAC may have
begun mechanized infantry training under Soviet
guidance. Imagery of October 1980 confirmed that
25 Soviet-built BRDM-2 armored reconnaissance
vehicles had been delivered to Vinh Yen, the
PAVN's principal armor training base in northern
Vietnam, and one of the PAVN's main armored
vehicle receiving and storage depots. The 1980
imagery also showed that an armored training
regiment, consisting of three mixed battalions of
tanks and APCs, was present at the Vinh Yen
complex. Subsequent imagery of November 1983
indicated that elements of the 1st SAC-head-
quartered at Xuan Mai in MR III-had moved
north to Vinh Yen and were undergoing combined
infantry/armor or mechanized infantry training
there. The 1983 imagery showed that in addition
to the armored training regiment, a reconnais-
sance company of Soviet-built PT-76 light
amphibious tanks and BRDM armored reconnais-
sance vehicles was present. We also observed
a regimental-sized infantry garrison at Vinh
Yen which contained infantry obstacle courses and
several newly constructed infantry/armor assault
ranges; and significantly, we observed the
Vietnamese name for the 1st SAC-Quyet Thang-
painted on a hillside in large, clear letters near
the garrison. The identification of these infantry
signatures at Vinh Yen and the presence of Soviet
APCs indicates that mechanized infantry training
involving PAVN 1st SAC units is under way there.
In addition to the evidence at Vinh Yen,
Vietnamese military media reports have made three
references since 1982 to a mechanized infantry
regiment equipped with Soviet APCs that operates
with the Ist SAC's subordinate 308th Infantry Divi-
sion (figure 9). Imagery obtained in November
1983 showed that a large new garrison area-
including vehicle storage buildings large enough
to accommodate as many as 270 vehicles-had
been constructed at the 1st SAC's headquarters
area at Xuan Mai, southwest of Hanoi in MR III.
The imagery also revealed small numbers of Soviet
and US-built APCs, including BTR-60s, BMPs, and
M-1 13s. Although we have not yet observed
enough APCs to equip a mechanized infantry
regiment, the evidence at Xuan Mai suggests
that one may already exist at that location,
or at least that the PAVN is in the process of
establishing such a unit there. We believe that
the new garrison at Xuan Mai may headquarter
the 308th Infantry Division, heretofore unlocated.
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Figure 9
PAVN 1st Corps Mechanized Infantry Unit Training With a Soviet-Built BMP APC,
15 July 1984
While imagery evidence at Kep, Vihn Yen, and
Xuan Mai strongly suggests that the PAVN's SACs
are building Soviet-style mechanized infantry
During a PAV
ground force training exercise conducted in
northern Vietnam in October 1982,
mm antitank gun battalions; one 122-mm D-74
field artillery battalion; and one 130-mm M-46 field
artillery battalion. November 1983 imagery of the
brigade showed that a battalion of 12 BM-14/17
N and 6 BM-21 MRLs had replaced the 130-mm field
this terminology is most often used to denote mech-
anized infantry within Soviet forces.
artillery battalion, while both antitank gun battal-
ions had been replaced by two battalions of 12
Soviet-built 122-mm D-30 howitzers. This is the
first time we have observed operational PAVN
artillery battalions equipped with the newer Soviet
D-30 howitzer model; the D-30 is superior to older
122-mm M-1938 and to captured US 105-mm how-
itzers, which the PAVN had relied on previously.
Soviet organizational influence has also been Significantly, a photograph published in the
observed in the 1st SAC's 45th Artillery Brigade, Vietnamese Army newspaper on 15 July 1984
headquartered near Xuan Mai in MR III. October shows PAVN gunners training with a new model
1980 imagery revealed that the brigade was 122-mm D-30. This howitzer-designated the
equipped with four firing battalions: two 85/100- 122-mm MD-30 by the Intelligence Community-
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was first identified with Soviet and Warsaw Pact
ground forces in 1980. The weapon has an im-
proved muzzle brake, a pneumatic braking system,
and may have improved firing characteristics and
more range than the standard D-30. This is the
first identification of this howitzer outside of
Soviet and Warsaw Pact forces.
While the new organizational structure of the 45th
Artillery Brigade does not match the TO&E of any
present Soviet artillery unit, it does resemble a
TO&E formerly used in some Soviet army-level ar-
tillery regiments. The replacement of the antitank
guns with howitzers and the addition of MRLs
within the brigade provides greater indirect-fire
capability, more suitable to the mission of a corps-
subordinate artillery brigade. The brigade would
probably be colocated with corps headquarters to
the rear of the immediate combat area during
wartime.
Our analysis of PAVN engineering forces based in
northern Vietnam also reveals Soviet influence. For
example, October 1980 imagery of the 1st SAC's
subordinate 229th Engineering Brigade, headquar-
tered at Dong Lau in MR III, revealed that its
TO&E matched that of a Soviet engineering bri-
gade. Additionally, we have identified a divisional
engineering battalion near Hanoi modeled after a
Soviet engineering battalion. In 1980 this battalion
was equipped with Soviet-built GSP heavy amphib-
ious ferries and PMP bridging vehicles (figure 8).
By September 1983, this battalion had been orga-
nized into three Soviet-style assault crossing and
bridging companies.
PAVN soldiers who have defected from units in
Kampuchea have also stated that infantry divisions
there are scheduled for reorganization along Soviet
lines. While there is no evidence from other sources
to indicate that a widespread reorganization of
Kampuchean-based forces has begun, there are
indications that some units were preparing to
reorganize. In February 1982, for example, a
In May 1983, the 7th Division was identified
were subsequently reported to be in MR VII by
the Vietnamese military media. Since 1981, the
PAVN has developed a major ground force training
base at Long Than in MR VII. Because this facility
contains Soviet-style infantry, armor, and anti-
armor training ranges, we believe that Soviet
advisors are assigned there to assist the PAVN
343rd Training Division. Our analysis of April 1983
imagery showed Soviet-built BTR-60 APCs at Long
Than, indicating that mechanized infantry training
was underway there or about to begin. We believe
this training may involve elements of the 7th
Infantry Division, or other 4th SAC subordinates.
Such training would be consistent with the pattern
of mechanization of the SAC-subordinate infantry
divisions already established in northern Vietnam
since 1980.
Additional PAVN defectors from artillery units sta-
tioned in Kampuchea have stated that these units
are scheduled to receive newer Soviet-built artillery
models to replace older captured US-built guns still
widely used in Kampuchea. We identified newer
Soviet-built models-including 130-mm M-46 field
artillery guns and 152-mm howitzers-with PAVN
artillery forces that took part in the 1982/83 and
1983/84 dry season operations along the Thai-
Kampuchea border. In addition, Soviet-built howit-
zers and at least one truck-mounted MRL have
been seen at a rear area training base and at other
storage depots in Kampuchea since mid-1982. De-
spite these developments, we have no evidence that
a widespread artillery replacement program has
begun in Kampuchea.
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Appendix B
Estimated Organization of a PAVN Infantry Division in Vietnam
Division
Headquarters
Infantry
Regiment
Engineer
Battalion
4-8 GSPs
18 PMPs
2 Powerboats
Infantry
Battalion
Motor
Transport
Battalion
Artillery
Regiment
Medical
Battalion
Signal
Regiment
Armored
LBattalion J
Antiaircraft Artillery
Company
Heavy
Weapons
Company
Antiaircraft Artillery
Company a
2 12,7 Machine Guns
or
2 ZU-23 Light AAA Guns
Infantry
Company
Gun
Battalion
I
Field
Artillery
Battalion
9-12 130-mm
or
a May be organic to army corps or MR antiaircraft artillery brigade or regiment
Note: Dashed boxes indicate units not always present and shaded boxes indicate
units reported to exist, but which have not been confirmed,
Antiaircraft Artillery
Battalion
Antiaircraft Artillery
Company
4 37-mm AAA Guns
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Howitzer
Battalion
12 122-mm Howitzers
or
12 105-mm Howitzers
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Appendix C
Estimated Organization of a PAVN Infantry Division in Kampuchea
Division
Headquarters
Infantry
Regiment
Infantry
Battalion
Infantry
Company
Heavy'
Weapons
Company
Reconnaissance
Battalion
5-10 M-113 APCs
1 75-mm Recoilless Rifle
1-2 82-mm/60-mm Mortars
aSpecial operations battalions may be organic to fronts.
b May be organic to division's antiaircraft artillery battalion,
Note: Dashed boxes indicate units not always present and
shaded boxes indicate units reported to exist,
but which are unconfirmed,
r- Special 7
I Operations
Battalion a
L---J
Artillery
Regiment
Motor
Transport
Battalion
Engineer
Battalion
Assorted Cargo Trucks Assorted Engineering
and Busses and
River Crossing Equipment
Border
Security
Regiment
I
Antiaircraft Artillery
Company b
L_--J
Howitzer
Battalion
Antiaircraft Artillery
Battalion
Antiaircraft Artillery
Company
Medical
Battalion
Signal
Battalion
.,cyl
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Appendix D
Estimated Organization of a PAVN Armored Brigade/Regiment;
Organization of a PAVN Divisional Armored Battalion
Brigade or Regiment
Headquarters
Light Amphibious
Tank Battalion
Medium
Tank
Battalion
Reconnaissance
Battalion
Motor
Transport
Battalion
Engineer
Battalion
15-20 APCs of Mixed 150 Cargo Trucks 3 TMMs
Type 15 MAZ 537 1 BAT-M
15 Trailers 1 BTM
1 Truck-Mounted Crane
Antiaircraft Artillery
Battalion
Antiaircraft Artillery
Company
Infantry
Division
Infantry
Regiment
Armored
Battalion
5-10 APCs
20-25 Tanks
Antiaircraft Artillery
Company
Antiaircraft Artillery
Battalion
Motor
Transport
Company
Artillery
Regiment
Engineer
Battalion
Motor
Transport
Battalion
Signal
Regiment
Note: Dashed line indicates armored battalions operating with infantry divisions
are reportedly not organic to those divisions, and probably belong to
corps-subordinate armored brigades or MR-subordinate armored regiments.
Shaded boxes indicate units reported to exist, but which have not been confirmed.
Medical
Battalion
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Appendix E
Estimated Organization of a PAVN Artillery Brigade
Brigade
Headquarters
Howitzer
Battalion
Howitzer
Company
Gun
Battalion
Field
Artillery
Battalion
Field
Artillery
Battalion
Gun
Company
or
4 122-mm M-1938
Howitzers
or
4 122-mm MD-30
Howitzers
Howitzer
Battalion
Howitzer
Company
Field
Artillery
Company
Field
Artillery
Company
4 122-mm D-74 Field 4 130-mm M-46 Field
Artillery Guns Artillery Guns a
4 122-mm D-30
Howitzers
or
4 122-mm MD-30
Howitzers
a Imagery acquired in 1983 indicates the antitank gun battalion is being replaced
by a second howitzer battalion and the field artillery battalions are being replaced
by an MRL battalion.
MRL
Battalion
MRL
Company
6 BM-14/16 MRLs
or
6 BM-14/17 MRLs
or
6 BM-21 MRLs
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Appendix F
Brigade
Headquarters
Artillery
Battalion a
8 37-mm AAA Guns
8 Antitank Guns
Bridging
Battalion
Bridging
Company
18 PMPs
2 Powerboats
Bridging
Company
18 PMPs/TPPs
2 Powerboats
Maintenance and
Service Battalion
Assault
Crossing
Company
(Tracked Amphibian)
10 PTSs
6 K-61s
4 TMMs
Assault
Crossing
Battalion
Assault
Crossing
Company
(Tracked Ferry)
22 GSPs
4 TMMs
6 Trucks
a Probably not organic to brigade, may be army corps asset assigned to provide combat support.
Note: Shaded boxes indicate units reported to exist, but which have not been confirmed.
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Signal
Battalion
Combat
Engineer
Company
Combat
Engineer
Company
(Heavy Construction) (Light Construction)
10 Bulldozers 28-30 Cargo Trucks
10 Tractors
4 BAT-Ms
4 Truck-mounted Cranes
2 Road Graders
2 PMR-3
Combat
Engineer
Battalion
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