SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA: A GROWING SOVIET MILITARY PRESENCE

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• Collection: NGA Records (Formerly NIMA)
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• Document Creation Date: December 28, 2016
• Document Release Date: December 1, 2010
• Sequence Number: 2
• Publication Date: January 1, 1985
• Content Type: REPORT

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Central Intelligence Agency
Washington.0 C 20505
Directorate of Intelligence
January 1985
Sub-Saharan Africa: A Growing Soviet Military
Presence (U)
Summary
We estimate that there are approximately 4,900 Soviet
civilian and military advisers, instructors, and
technicians located in 15 countries in Sub-Saharan
Africa. There has been a steady increase since 1975,
when there were less than 1,000 Soviets in the
region. Nearly 85 percent of the Soviets are in
Angola, Ethiopia, and wlozambique. Also, an estimated
610 military logistics, maintenance, and security
personnel--an increase of at least 200 since late
1981--support Soviet naval and aircraft deployments and
raise the total Soviet military presence to 5,510. In
one instance, a Soviet naval infantry company provides
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security at a Soviet installation in Ethiopia. (S 25X1
Reasons for the growth in the Soviet presence are:
? The delivery of more sophisticated weaponry.
Information available as of 12 January 1985 was used in this
report. (U)
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? Increases in total arms deliveries to Sub-Saharan
Africa.
? Increases in the number of Soviet-manned aircraft de-
ployed in Africa.
? Construction of signals intercept facilities in
Madagascar and Mozambique in 1983. (S
the Soviets have
suffered some setbacks in the past two years due to
several factors: dissatisfaction with the quality of
weapons delivered, the difficulty in obtaining spare
parts, the quality of instruction, a need for economic
aid in addition to military aid, and the ceasefires
signed by Angola and Mozambique with South Africa.
Various sources report that the Soviet military
advisory presence has either been reduced, or probably
will be reduced, in Tanzania and Zambia. Several other
countries, including Congo, Guinea, Guinea Bissau, and
Mali, are turning to the West for economic and, in some
cases, military aid. The ceasefire agreements with
South Africa may eventually serve to reduce the
dependence of Angola and Mozambique on Moscow if South
Africa adheres to agreements to stop providing support
to insurgencies in those countries. (S
Despite the recent setbacks, the Soviets will continue
to have a strong interest in Sub-Saharan Africa because
of past commitments and the political image they have
at stake. However, it will be more difficult for them
to protect and foster their interests than it has been
in the past. They will probably have to increase
deliveries of advanced and complex equipment--the
traditional Soviet method of gaining and maintaining
influence. If this occurs, there will be a
corresponding rise in the number of Soviet personnel
needed to assemble the new equipment and to train
operators and maintenance personnel. We also expect
the Soviets to put a high priority on expanding their
presence in the Indian Ocean, especially in Seychelles
and Madagascar, in response to the US presence in the
region. The Soviets will also continue efforts to
regain basing rights in western Africa. The most
likely prospect is Guinea, where they lost basing
rights in 1977. (S
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Introduction
The Soviet Union's influence in Sub-Saharan Africa has its roots
in the support the Soviets gave to the anticolonialist and pro-
socialist factions that sprang up in the decade between the mid-
1960s and mid-1970s. Several of the factions--such as those in
Angola and Mozambique--eventually came to power, lending the
Soviets a measure of prestige in the Third World. The Soviets
have traditionally used their aid programs--especially military--
as a means of establishing relationships with these countries as
well as other African nations. The Soviet military presence
developed from these relationships. As many as 4,900 Soviet
military advisers and technicians have been introduced into
Africa's military establishments, and in Angola and Ethiopia the
Soviets have acquired rights to use military bases for their own
aircraft and ships. (C
The establishment of a Soviet military presence in an African
nation generally follows a pattern. Initially the Soviets sell
arms--often at concessionary rates--to a nation to help it
counter a real or perceived threat. Soviet military advisers
accompany the weapons systems in order to teach Africans to
operate and maintain the new equipment. Moreover, the usually
low level of technical proficiency of the Africans requires that
Soviet maintenance and technical personnel remain on hand to
ensure that the equipment is operational. Delivery of the
equipment and personnel is made by special Soviet ship or
aircraft visits that over time may evolve into regularly
scheduled Aeroflot or military aviation (VTA) flights and
merchant ship visits.1 (S 25X1
The first part of this memorandum examines the current status of
the Soviet military presence in Sub-Saharan Africa--its size,
location, and function--and looks at how that presence has
changed, primarily since early 1982. It also examines possible
future trends in the Soviet military posture in Sub-Saharan
Africa. The second part describes the Soviet military presence
on a country-by-country basis. This section concentrates on
Angola, Ethiopia, and Mozambique, where 85 percent of all Soviet
military personnel in Sub-Saharan Africa are located. Other
countries discussed are: Benin, Burundi, Congo, Guinea, Guinea
Bissau, Madagascar, Mali, Nigeria, Sao Tome and Principe,
Seychelles, Tanzania, and Zambia. (S 25X1
lA byproduct of this pattern may be the permanent stationing of
Soviet combat troops in a country. A Soviet combat unit is
stationed at Dehalak Island, Ethiopia; it is the only known
Soviet naval infantry unit permanently deployed overseas. (S F 25X1
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The Soviet Status in Sub-Saharan Africa
Current Military Posture
A Soviet military presence exists in 15 of the 41 countries in
Sub-Saharan Africa (figure 1). We estimate that as of December
1984 the Soviet Union had established a military advisory
presence of about 4,900 men in Sub-Saharan Africa (see table).
This figure does not include the additional Soviet personnel
needed to support Soviet naval and aircraft deployments. A close
examination of the number of Soviet ships and aircraft that use
Sub-Saharan facilities and of the frequency and length of their
visits indicates that about 610 Soviet military personnel are
present in addition to the advisers. These additional personnel
raise the estimated total Soviet military presence in Sub-Saharan
Africa to about 5,510. Facilities for some of the Soviet naval
and air support personnel have been identified. Descriptions of
these facilities and the estimated number of Soviets present at
them are included in the second part of this memorandum. (S F 25X1
Soviet military advisory personnel function in the following
capacities:
? Training African military personnel in the use of equipment and
for combat and support duties.
? Directing and advising Africans on combat operations.
? Teaching military and political theory classes.
? Overseeing arms deliveries.
? Assembling equipment, such as aircraft and helicopters.
? Maintaining the more sophisticated technical equipment provided
by the Soviet Union.
? Supporting signals intelligence collection operations as advi-
sers, technicians, or equipment operators.
? Commanding radar, communications, and surface-to-air missile
(SAM) sites.
Soviet military support personnel sustain Soviet deployments in
Sub-Saharan Africa. They engage in the following activities:
? Supporting Soviet aircraft deployments, both temporary and
long- term.
? Supporting Soviet naval deployments, both temporary and long-
term.
? Performing security duties at facilities which support Soviet
naval and aircraft deployments. (S F_~ 25X1
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Figure 1
Soviet Military Presence in Sub-Saharan Africa
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Mediterranean Sea
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TANZANIA
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South
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Scale 1:48.000.000
0 500 1000 Kilometers
0 660
LAND
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Indian
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Soviet Military Personnel Estimated to be in Sub-Saharan Africa,
December 1984
Country
Angola
Benin
Burundi
Congo
Ethiopia
Guinea
Guinea Bissau
Madagascar
Mali
Mozambique
Nigeria
Sao Tome and Principe
Seychelles
Tanzania
Zambia
Military Personnel
Military Advisory Supporting Soviet
Personnel Activities
4,905 610
1,500
20
20
200
1,700
50
50
150
150
800
5
100
18
92
50
280a
aThis number may have been temporarily, and possibly permanently,
reduced after an insurgent attack on two Soviet IL-38 May naval
reconnaissance aircraft at Asmara, Ethiopia, in May 1984.
This table is Secret
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Recent Trends
Prior to 1975, there were less than 1,000 Soviet military
advisers in Sub-Saharan Africa. In that year the Soviets began
providing large quantities of equipment to Angola and to Cuban
units fighting in Angola. Since then, the Soviet presence has
steadily increased to its current level throughout Sub-Saharan
Africa. This increase has included both military advisers and
the personnel supporting aircraft and ship deployments, and is
largely due to the growing number of newer and more sophisticated
Soviet weapons delivered to Africa. Additional advisory
personnel have been needed to assemble and maintain the
equipment, as well as to train the Africans to operate it. More
personnel have been needed to carry out advisory functions within
newly equipped African military units. Other personnel have
deployed with aircraft Moscow has recently stationed in Africa.
Examples of recent activities that have required additional
personnel include:
? The deployment of 10 Soviet-manned AN-12 Cubs to Luanda,
Angola, since October 1983, increasing the total to 12
aircraft; the deployment of two Cubs to Maputo, Mozambique,
since January 1983; and the deployment of two Cubs to
Antananarivo, Madagascar, in 1978. Each aircraft has deployed
with an aircrew, including extra pilots, of about six men; and
a ground support crew of about six. In addition to the 12 air
and ground crew per aircraft, the unit deployed to Angola
probably has about 60 command, intelligence, and unit support
personnel with it.
? Increased deliveries of advanced equipment, including MIG-23
Fioggers to Angola (January 1984), SU-17 Fitters to Angola,
(September 1984), SA-2 SAMs to Angola (November 1984), SA-9
SAMs to Ethiopia (June 1984), MI-24 Hind attack helicopters to
Angola (July 1983 and September 1984) and Mozambique (November
1983), MIG-21 Fishbeds to Mozambique (April 1983), and MI-14
Haze helicopters to Ethiopia (December 1983). The exact
numbers of Soviets required to assemble this equipment are not
available. However, special intelligence indicates that some
Soviet equipment assembly teams range between five and eight
personnel for MI-8 and MI-14 helicopters and MIG-21s.
? The construction of as many as five signals intercept
facilities in Madagascar and two in Mozambique in 1983. Each
site is normally manned by 12 men, at least some of whom are
Soviets. (TS
Although the overall Soviet military presence in Africa has
increased since 1975--primarily because of the infusion of
advisers to Angola, Ethiopia, and Mozambique--the Soviets have
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suffered setbacks and a decline of prestige in several Sub-
Saharan African nations within the last two years.
the Soviet military advisory presence
has either seen reduced, or probably will be reduced, in Tanzania
and Zambia. Congo, Guinea, Guinea Bissau, Mali, and Nigeria are
now looking to the West for economic and, in some cases, military
aid which the Soviets have not been inclined to provide. The
Soviets may have decided that the prospects for increasing their
presence in these countries or for receiving payment for services
rendered and equipment delivered are poor, and are therefore
limiting their aid. (S
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7F,)(1
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most African countries 25X1
receiving Soviet arms, including the USSR's three largest African
clients--Angola, Ethiopia, and Mozambique--have expressed
dissatisfaction with the quality of weapons delivered, the
difficulty in obtaining spare parts, and the quality of
instruction for their use. Angola and Mozambique also have
reached some form of ceasefire or security accord with South
Africa that requires South Africa to stop supporting insurgent
activities in these countries. Should these arrangements prove
effective and lead to some sort of political solution, the might
lessen the need for Soviet support and equipment. (S the
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Despite continuing efforts, the Soviets have been unable to
regain basing rights for TU-95 Bear reconnaissance aircraft in
Conakry, Guinea, which they lost in 1977. They have also been
unsuccessful in efforts to gain airfield access for
reconnaissance ircraft in any country other than Angola or
Ethiopia. (S
Future Prospects
Multibillion-dollar investments have been made by the Soviets in
Angola, Ethiopia, and Mozambique. We believe that the Soviets
would take strong measures to prevent a change in leadership or
political leaning in these countries if the result would be a
loss of access or outright expulsion. It is conceivable that the
Soviets would either organize or support a coup among Soviet-
trained loyalists within the armed forces, such as occurred in
Afghanistan, to ensure a leadership sympathetic to the Soviet
Union in Angola or Ethiopia. However, such a Soviet move is less
likely in Mozambique because the investment is smaller there. (S
2For specific information on problems the Soviets are
encountering in African countries, see the individual country
discussions in the second part of this memorandum. (U)
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Basing Rights. The Soviets continue to have important military
and political interests in Sub-Saharan Africa. Although Angola,
Ethiopia, and, to a lesser extent, Mozambique will continue to be
the focal points of their interest, the Soviets will seek
increased naval and aircraft access rights in countries where
they have some military relationship. They probably are willing
to invest additional arms and personnel in any country where
there is a good possibility of gaining regular access or basing
rights for aircraft or ships, or where significant political
payoffs could be gained. (S 25X1
Moscow's first priority will most likely be the Indian Ocean
nations, especially Seychelles, where they currently possess
restricted access rights, or Madagascar. Increased access
allowing regular naval visits or deployment of IL-38 May or TU-95
Bear reconnaissance aircraft would greatly enhance Soviet
intelligence capabilities against US, French, and South African
operations in the central and southwestern Indian Ocean. Both
Seychelles and Madagascar are well situated for intelli ence
collection efforts against the US base on Diego Garcia. (S 25X1
We believe that the Soviets will continue to focus on gaining
increased access rights in Seychelles. The Soviets have
traditionally supported President Rene and have provided both
military and economic support to the government. They have also
deployed naval units to the region during periods of tension.
Greater access in the future would likely develop, primarily
through the promise of protection from outside political and
military threats, such as the attempted coup in Seychelles by
South African mercenaries in 1981. In addition, the Soviets will
probably use increased military aid to expand their presence in
Seychelles. To date, they have furnished rad r multiple rocket
launchers, armored cars, and small arms. (S 25X1
The Soviets have coveted the port of Diego Suarez in Madagascar
and its adjacent airfield since the late 1970s. However, in
spite of arms sales to Madagascar totaling nearly $40 million
since 1980, they have been unable to secure basing rights for
ships or reconnaissance aircraft. A November 1984 assistance
agreement of $10 million, to include armored cars and multiple
rocket launchers, may be intended to increase the pressure on
President Ratsiraka to open up Diego Suarez. Ratsiraka, who has
had good success at playing off Soviet and Western interests in
the past, will probably be able to resist Soviet overtures in the
near future. (S
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In western Africa, the Soviets have demonstrated that they would
like to either regain landing rights for TU-95 Bear aircraft in
Guinea or gain such access in another country. By doing so they
would be closer to the mid-Atlantic shipping routes than they are
now from their current base in Angola. A west African base would
also give the Soviets a permanent forward support facility for
aircraft en route to Angola. Soviet chances of gaining basing
rights in a west African country are not as good as they are in
the Indian Ocean because Western influence and interests,
especially French, are still strong in the region. However,
Guinea is the most likely candidate because Bears used the
Conakry airfield in the 1970s, Soviet transport aircraft continue
to stop en route to Angola, and Soviet naval vessels continue to
visit Conakry. It is possible that the Soviets will attempt to
regain some form of increased access rights there through
political pressure, lucrative arm , or economic incentives
within the next several years. (S
Arms Deliveries. If arms deliveries to Africa follow current
trends, the volume will increase and deliveries of advanced
equipment such as MIG-23 Floggers aid MI-24 Hinds, especially to
Angola and Ethiopia, will continue. Even after the Mozambican-
South African accord of March 1984, the Soviet Union delivered
MIG-21 Fishbeds and continued to deploy AN-12 Cubs to
Mozambique. However, should Mozambique's need for arms decrease
in the future due to the ceasefire with South Africa, the Soviet
Union's leverage there, influenced by arms sales, would also
decrease. Because the transfer of arms is the most effective form
of aid the Soviets possess, the will continue to use it as much
as possible in the future. (S
The Military Advisory Presence. The Soviet advisory presence
will also increase as additional technical and maintenance
personnel arrive with the advanced equipment and as instructors
arrive to train African personnel on the equipment. These
advisers will ensure a Soviet presence at many levels in African
military establishments and will enhance Soviet influence in
African political and strategic decision-making processes. (C)
3Because Soviet equipment is less expensive and payment plans are
more flexible than those of Western countries, many African
countries will continue to buy Soviet military equipment despite
some dissatisfactions with it. (S
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The Soviet Presence by Country
Angola
Soviet military personnel have been present in Angola since 1975,
when the Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola (MPLA)
came to power. Massive Soviet support--and Cuban combat troops--
arrived quickly as Western-backed guerrillas and South African
troops attempted to overthrow the MPLA in 1975 and 1976. Since
then, the Soviet presence has expanded and penetrated every
aspect of the Angolan military, largely through the presence of
military advisers. We estimate that as of December 1984, Soviet
military advisers in Angola currently number at least 1,500.
This is based on a September 1984 estimate4 of 1,200, with
additional personnel included to support helicopter, aircraft,
electronics, missile, and ground force equipment deliveries made
within the last year which were not accounted for in the
September estimate. As in Ethiopia and Mozambique, Soviet
advisers are organized into a Military Advisory Group (MAG). In
spite of intensive Soviet training and infusions of Soviet
equipment, we believe the Angolan Army is still only a marginally
capable fighting force and could not survive against any military
threat--internal or ex -without Soviet backing and a Cuban
military presence. (Sergi 25X1
The MAG headquarters, identified through the analysis of
photography, is located two kilometers southwest of Luanda
Airfield. This double fence-secured facility consists of
administration, electronics, storage, and housing areas and a
volleyball court (figure 2). The capacity of the housing is
probably not more than 125 personnel. The MAG headquarters may
have been located at this facility as early as October 1978, when
a Tall Rods radio direction finding set, sometimes associated
with a Soviet presence, was installed. In May 1979 a Park Drive
set was installed. The Park Drive is a mobile military command
and contol satellite communications system used exclusively by
the Soviets. (The other Third World countries where the Soviets
have deployed Park Drives are Afghanistan, Cuba, Ethiopia, Syria,
and Vietnam.) (S 25X1
Soviet military advisory personnel in Angola are assigned
training and advisory positions at military schools, military
area headquarters, and brigade headquarters. In 1981 Soviet
advisers were captured and killed by South Africans at an Angolan
4NIE No. 11-10/2-84 S
the Third World. (SL
19 September 1984, The USSR and 25X1
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brigade headquarters that was within 50 kilometers of the
Namibian border. Open-press photography has shown Soviets
instructing Angolan enlisted personnel in vehicle maintenance and
in tactics at military installations, indicating Soviet
involvement extends even to lower levels within the Angolan
Army. (S
The Soviet Union has provided arms to the MPLA since 1974.
Intelligence Community estimates indicate that deliveries in the
last two years have increased markedly--from an estimated $189
million in 1982 to over $843 million in the first half of 1983.
Deliveries in the second half of 1983 and in 1984 have apparently
continued at the same level. There was also a corresponding
qualitative increase in weapons complexity and capability.
arms shipments in 1983 included Angola's
first Sid-6 and SA-8 SAMs, MI-24 Hind attack helicopters, and MIG-
23 Flogger fighter aircraft. Deliveries in 1984 have included
additional Hinds, the first SU-17 Fitter fighters delivered to
Sub-Saharan Africa, and Angola's first SA-2 SAMs. (S
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Much of the newer and more sophisticated equipment requires
assembly on arrival. Soviet and Cuban military technicians are
probably responsible for this assembly. In addition, Soviet
personnel probably maintain the more complex equipment at
Angola's 20 radar sites, 11 SAM sites, and four SAM support
facilities, as well as complex equipment for several squadrons of
jet fighters and helicopters. This equipment is scattered
throughout the country, and Soviet maintenance personnel must
travel widely to service it. The majority of these maintenance
personnel probably are stationed in Luanda and Lubango, where
Angola's most advanced aircraft are located. A Soviet housing
arm been identified at Luanda, but not at Lubango. (SI 25X1
At Luanda Airfield, where aircraft delivered to Angola are
assembled, a barracks building probably used to house Soviet
technicians, maintenance personnel, and pilots has been
identified (figure 3). The barracks, distinct from others at the
airfield by virtue of an air conditioning unit, a radio antenna,
security fences, volleyball court, well-kept appearance, and the
continued presence of aircraft ground support equipment, probably
can accommodate 40 to 60 personnel. It has been occupied at
least since April 1979 when the antenna and air conditioning unit
were first noted on the roof. (S
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Since 1977, when landing rights for the TU-95 Bears in Conakry,
Guinea, were lost, these reconnaissance aircraft have
periodically deployed to Luanda Airfield. An IL-62 Classic
carrying maintenance and other support personnel normally deploys
with the Bears. Some ground support equipment, notably an
avionics cooling unit used in Angola only by Bears, is
permanently stored at the airfield (figure 4). (S
In addition to the Bear and Classic deployments, at least two
Soviet AN-12 Cub transport aircraft have been permanently
stationed in Luanda since May 1977. These aircraft provide
logistic support for Cuban and Angolan combat units. In October
1983 the Angolan internal situation deteriorated due to increased
guerrilla and South African military activity. As a result the
Soviets increased the number of Cubs to 12 (figure 5), the
largest permanent out-of-country Soviet aircraft deployment
outside the Warsaw Pact, Afghanistan, and Vietnam. An AN-12
squadron in the Soviet Union numbers around 400 men. For
overseas deployment, allowing that only limited aircraft
maintenance would normally be performed overseas, the number of
personnel would be much lower, probably around 200. This number
includes air and ground crews and unit intelligence, command,
and support personnel. (S
Soviet naval visits to Angola began in 1976. Naval visits and
seaborne military equipment deliveries have occurred at three
ports: Luanda, Lobito, and Namibe (formerly called Mocamedes).
Luanda Naval Base is the primary naval installation used by the
Soviet West African Flotilla. A Soviet naval shore station in
Luanda has been noted in special intelligence since 1979. it
uses a separate communications channel from the Soviet MAG,
indicating that it does not support Angolan activity. We believe
that there may be a permanent Soviet naval personnel presence of
as many as 70 men ashore at Luanda. This figure is based on a
November 1984 estimate of seven Soviet naval vessels in the
flotilla--about one-third the size of the 22-ship Soviet Indian
Ocean Squadron. Therefore, the Soviet presence ashore at Luanda
would probably be no more than a third of the size of the 220-man
unit at Dehalak Island, Ethiopia--about 70 men. (TS
At least one Soviet naval vessel, usually a minesweeper, is
permanently stationed at Luanda, and a repair ship is often
moored there as well. Major combatants which are not part of the
West African Flotilla also regularly visit Luanda. These have
included Victor I- and Victor II-class nuclear-powered attack
submarines, a Kara-class guided missile cruiser, and a Kiev-class
aircraft carrier. There was a continuous Soviet naval combatant
presence (including Alligator-class tank landing ships) at Luanda
in 1983, while there were only five short periods in 1982 when
Soviet combatants were not present. (S
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Little is known about the degree of Soviet involvement at major
electronics facilities in Angola. There are currently three
active Full House High/Medium Frequency Direction Finding sets in
the country, and all three are near the Cuban-Angolan defensive
line north of the Namibian border. These three facilities were
constructed in 1984; the Menongue site was established in
January, the Matala site in March, and the Huambo site in June.
Special intelligence reports that Soviet personnel operate or
assist in operating identical sets in Madagascar and
Mozambique. It is quite likely, therefore, that some Soviet
involvement exists at Full House sites in Angola as well. (TSF
Ethiopia
Soviet military personnel have been in Ethiopia since 1977, when
Moscow sided with Ethiopia against Somalia in the conflict over
the Ogaden. Soviet-provided military equipment used by Cuban
combat brigades and Ethiopian units forced the Somali Army out of
the Ogaden in 1977 and 1978. By siding with Ethiopia, the USSR
lost its air, naval, and signals collection facilities in
Berbera, Somalia. These facilities were subsequently
reestablished in South Yemen and Ethiopia, although on a smaller
scale. (S
We estimate that in September 1984, 1,700 Sovviet military
personnel, organized into a MAG, were in Ethiopia. As no major
influxes of arms occurred between September and December 1984,
this number is probably still accurate. According to special
intelligence, Soviet advisers have been integrated into all
elements of the Ethiopian Army from army down through brigade
level. Since 1977 the Soviet MAG has trained and equipped the
Ethiopian Army, building a force capable of defeating any of its
neighbors in a conventional war, but not yet capable of putting
down the insurgencies in Ethiopia's northern provinces of Tigre
and Eritrea. The depth of Soviet involvement in operational
planning is evidenced by the visits of Soviet Ground Forces
Commander in Chief General V. I. Petrov, who has reviewed and
advised on recent operations against insurgents in Tigre and
Eritrea in 1982, 1983, and 1984. (S
Since March 1979, the MAG headquarters has been at Liddetta
Airfield in Addis Ababa, on the old Imperial Golf Course
grounds. It had previously been at a location two kilometers to
the south as early as December 1977. The headquarters is fence-
secured and consists of administrative, housing, electronics, and
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5NIE 11-10/2-84 (S 19 September 1984, The USSR and the 25X1
Third World. (S)
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recreational (including volleyball) areas (figure 6). The
housing area has four monitor-roofed barracks with unique door
overhangs, each housing 50 to 70 men. These barracks, which were
built in 1980 and 1981, are found only at Soviet and Cuban
facilities in Ethiopia and South Yemen. A Park Drive set has
been associated with the MAG headquarters since December 1977
(figure 7); and, for a period in 1979, a second set was
present. (Its current location is not known.) (S
Ethiopia has been the largest recipient of Soviet arms in Sub-
Saharan Africa. Deliveries for the period 1980-82 totalled $1.8
billion, more than triple the value of deliveries to Angola
during the same period. Deliveries of Soviet equipment continued
at a steady rate through 1983 and 1984. In 1983, however, the
Ethiopians purchased a substantial amount of equipment from other
nations, particularly jet trainers from Czechoslovakia, possibly
an indication of dissatisfaction with Soviet equipment. (SF---]
a Soviet unit of up to 350 personnel may be
shipped through the port of Aseb.
stationed in Aseb. They are housed in a wall-secured camp that
has five of the unique monitor-roofed barracks.6 There is also a
volleyball court within the camp. (S
after delivery to Aseb, most equipment is
moved to the Addis Ababa area or to the Ogaden. Most aircraft
and helicopters, which require assembly, are transported to Harar
Meda Airfield near Addis Ababa. The presence of five of the
monitor-roofed barracks at the airfield, plus reporting from a
generally reliable source, indicates both a Soviet and Cuban
presence. Additional Soviet and Cuban personnel are probably at
Dire Dawa assembling MIG-23 Floggers which were delivered there
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in early 1984. (S 25X1
Soviet personnel reportedly assist in the maintenance of the
equipment at the nine radar sites, eight SAM sites and three SAM
support facilities, and several jet fighter and helicopter
squadron bases in Ethiopia. Because these assets are deployed
6Technicians assembling equipment at the port, such as MI-14 Haze
helicopters, as well as personnel maintaining electronics and SAM
sites at Aseb, may be housed in these barracks. In addition,
there is a large rest and recreation facility just north of Aseb
that appears too sophisticated to be Ethiopian or Cuban. This
facility, completes in April 1983, may be Soviet-associated. (S
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throughout the country, Soviet technicans must travel widely.
However, most personnel are probably stationed at the Soviet
housing areas identified in Addis Ababa, Aseb, Asmara, and Hara
Meda. (S
A pair of Soviet IL-38 May naval reconnaissance aircraft,
supported by two AN-12 Cub transports, have deployed to Yohannes
IV Airfield at Asmara, Ethiopia, several times a year since
February 1980. Additional AN-12 deployments have been observed
at Asmara at least since January 1978. These Cub aircraft
probably have been carrying arms and personnel in support of
Ethiopian operations in the region. In addition to the May and
Cub deployments to Asmara, Cubs were occasionally deployed to
Harar Meda Airfield to provide logistic support for the
Ethiopians in 1978 and 1979. By late 1979 the Ethiopian Air
Force had received its own Cubs and those of the Soviets were
withdrawn from Ethiopia. (S
The AN-12s that deploy with the May aircraft carry support
equipment. Most of the major ground support equipment, however,
such as the cooling units used for the May's avionics and
electronics, is kept in a secured vehicle park at a barracks
(with a volleyball court) on the edge of the airfield (figure
8). This support equipment--which arrived at the same time as
the May aircraft--and the barracks probably are reserved for
Soviet use. The barracks buildings have a capacity of 150 to 200
personnel. Sixty persons probably support the Cub and May (which
has a crew of 12) activity; the others are probably Soviet
personnel associated with Ethiopian Air Force units at the
air-field G personnel assigned to army units in the area.
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In May 1984, Eritrean rebels infiltrated Yohannes IV Airfield and
destroyed one May and damaged the second. It is possible that
future May deployments will use a mo~~ qpnurp R hiopian airfield,
such as Harar Meda or Dire Dawa. (S 25X1
Soviet naval assets have been stationed at Dehalak Island since
April 1978, shortly after they were expelled from bases in
Berbera, Somalia. The total Soviet military presence on Dehalak
is estimated by DIA to be about 220 men. The base itself
consists of a floating drydock, two piers, 25 buldings, an
electric power plant, and material and POL storage areas. (S n 25X1
Support ships of the 22-vessel Indian Ocean Squadron are
permanently stationed at Dehalak, and a Soviet naval infantry
company, the only one permanently stationed on foreign soil,
guards the facility. Other Soviet combatants using Dehalak have
included Echo-class nuclear-powered cruise missile submarines,
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Kara-class guided missile cruisers, and Alligator-class tank
landing ships. In addition, Ethiopian and North Yemeni naval
craft are occasionally repaired at Dehalak. No seaborne
equipment deliveries occur at Dehalak; they are made to Aseb and
Mitsiwa. (S
There are two known active Full House High/Medium Frequency
Direction Finding sets in Ethiopia--one in the north at Agordat,
the other in the south at Gode. The Agordat site was established
in may 1983; the site at Gode in March 1984.
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Mozambique
Mozambique gained it independence from Portugal in 1975.
According to DIA, Soviet military personnel have been there since
1976. We estimate that as of November 1984, about 800 Soviet
military advisory personnel are in the MAG in Mozambique. The
primary responsibilities of these advisers are to train
Mozambican armed forces personnel and to fulfill planning and
operational duties down to the brigade level. Although the
7NIE 11-6-84 (S
Reach. (S)
November 1984, Soviet Global Military
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location of the Soviet MAG and its headquarters have not been
identified on photography, a source of undetermined reliability
reports tha Soviet r) sonnel are living in the Matola suburb of
Maputo. (S ~: :7 25X1
Unlike events in Angola and Ethiopia, there was no massive influx
of arms and the attendant advisers and technicians to Mozambique
early in the relationship. The Soviet presence has expanded
gradually and to a lesser degree than in Angola and Ethiopia.
Despite Soviet training and substantial shipments of Soviet
equipment in the last eight years, Mozambique's armed forces are
still judged to be incapable of either controlling internal
guerrilla groups such as RENAMO or defending the country's
borders. (S 25X1
As in other countries in Sub-Saharan Africa, Soviet technicians
attached to the MAG in Mozambique probably assist with the
assembly and maintenance of equipment. Before 1982, the arms
delivered to Mozambique were largely obsolete equipment, such as
MIG-17 Fresco fighters and T-34 tanks. Since then, however,
Mozambique has been receiving T-54 tanks, BMP infantry fighting
vehicles, MIG-21 Fishbed fighters, and MI-24 Hind attack
helicopters. Nevertheless, Mozambique is far behind both Angola
and Ethiopia in the amount and value of arms delivered from the
USSR. Mozambique received about $295 million worth of equipment
during the period 1976 through 1982--Angola received about $775
million worth and Ethiopia received $2.3 billion worth during
this same period. (S 25X1
Equipment is shipped to three ports: Maputo, Beira, and
Nacala. The fighter aircraft are being assembled at Nacala
Airfield and the Hind helicopters at Maputo Airfield. Unlike
facilities in Angola or Ethiopia, no Soviet barracks have been
observed on photography at any of these facilities. (S ~~ 25X1
Soviet military transport aircraft have temporarily deployed to
Maputo Airfield at least since 1977. Since May 1983, two AN-12
Cubs have been permanently deployed to Maputo to provide
counterinsurgency support by carrying personnel and equipment to
and from combat areas (figure 9). About 30 Soviet personnel are
needed to maintain and fly these aircraft. (S [ 25X1
Soviet naval vessels have visited Maputo, Beira, and Nacala
regularly since 1977. A December 1983 visit included a Kiev-
class carrier, and earlier visits have included a Sverdlov-class
cruiser and a Kashin-class guided missile destroyer. In contrast
to Dehalak and Luanda, however, there is no continuous Soviet
naval presence. It is unlikely, therefore, that there are any
Soviet naval personnel permanently stationed in Mozambique to
support these visits. (S
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Two Full House High/Medium Frequency Direction Finding sets are
operational in Mozambique--one at Beira and the second at the
Villa Pery Army Barracks. Both are directed against guerrilla
activity and, according to special intelligence, both have Soviet
personnel involved in their operation. There are six radar
sites, four SAM sites, and one missile support facility as well
as three fighter, one transport, and several helicopter squadrons
in Mozambique. Most of this equipment is located in and around
Maputo, Beira, and Nacala. Soviet MAG personnel, with Cuban
assistance, probably maintain most of this equipment. (TS
Benin
We estimate that there are 20 Soviet military advisers in
Benin. Soviet naval vessels regularly visit the port of Cotonou,
and Moscow has begun building a naval base for the Beninese Navy
as part of a 1978 agreement. It has not been determined whether
the Soviets will have access rights to the base when it is
completed. Soviet military advisers and technicians probably
train Beninese military personnel a_n_d maintain equipment they
have provided over the years. (S
Burundi
According to our latest information, 20 Soviet military advisers
are in Burundi. They are involved in training Burundian military
personnel and in maintaining ground force and air defense
equipment supplied by Moscow in the last eight years. (S
Congo
There are an estimated 200 Soviet military advisers in Congo.
They maintain one squadron of MIG-21 Fishbeds, one of MIG-17
Fresco fighters, and one of MI-8 Hip helicopters, as well as
radar and electronics equipment. (S
A general coolness has developed in Soviet-Congolese relations in
the last several years, due in part to disappointment with the
quality of military equipment delivered as well as a perceived
lack of meaningful economic aid from the Soviets. Because of
these shortcomings, Congo has turned to the West and the People's
Republic of China for economic assistance, while continuing to
purchase some military hardware from Moscow. (S
Guinea
Until the mid-1970s, the Sub-Saharan country where Soviet
influence was greatest was Guinea. In 1977, however, Guinean
President Sekou Toure revoked Soviet reconnaissance aircraft
landing rights and reduced Soviet naval access at the port of
Conakry. Soviet naval vessels still visit Conakry, and transport
aircraft en route to Angola refuel at Conakry Airfield. (S
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About 50 Soviet military advisers remain in Guinea. They
maintain the single Guinean fighter squadron, which is equipped
with several types of MIGs. Analysis of photography indicates
that the advisers may also assist the transshipment of arms
through Conakry to Mali. (S
Guinea Bissau
There are 50 Soviet advisers in Guinea Bissau. The Soviets
historically have been the major arms supplier to this country.
However, Bissaun officials have recently stated that they are
dissatisfied with the level and quality of Soviet military
assistance, and the government has begun receiving military
assistance from France and the United States. (S
Madagascar
The Soviet military presence in Madagascar is currently limited
by the Malagasy government to 150 men. The Soviets' main
functions are to maintain Malagasy MIG-21 Fishbed jets and air
warning radars and to man and maintain as many as five signals
intercept sets around the island. As many as 30 additional
Soviet military personnel maintain and fly two VTA AN-12 Cubs,
which have been stationed at Antananarivo since 1978. These two
aircraft perform military support and commercial transport
functions for the Malagasy government. (S
Relations between the Soviet Union and Madagascar run hot and
cold. Military attache reporting indicates that in early 1984
the Soviet military presence may have been reduced to 100
personnel. In addition, a Malagasy military delegation to the
Soviet Union in May 1984 cut short a visit after being snubbed by
the Soviet government. The snubbing may have been a result of
Soviet frustration at its inability to gain naval visitation or
aircraft basing rights in Madagascar, or the failure of
Madagascar to keep up payments on equipment purchased from the
Soviets. However, in November 1984 Madagascar agreed to purchase
$10 million worth of armored cars and multiple rocket, launchers,
an indication that relations may be warming. (S
As many as five Full House High/Medium Frequency Direction
Finding sets operated, reportedly with Soviet personnel, between
December 1983 and late 1984. US Embassy protests to President
Ratsiraka about the Full House sets may have been responsible for
their being removed by December 1984. However, it is possible
that sets have been reassembled at new locations, or are being
stored for future use. (S
Mali
We estimate that there are currently 150 Soviet military advisory
personnel in Mali. They are engaged in training Malian military
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personnel, providing technical assistance, and maintaining SA-3
missile units and Mali's single MIG fighter squadron, equipped
primarily with MIG-17 Frescos. (S
The Soviets are carrying out a program to upgrade six Malian
airfields, and although the Soviets do not have access rights to
these airfields, the improvements made thus far on the two
completed airfields far exceed Malian needs. Airfields in Mali
were used by the Soviets during the 1975 Angolan airlift. (S
Although the Soviets continue to provide military assistance,
there has recently been some tension in relations. Despite
Soviet invitations, Malian President Traore has delayed
scheduling an official visit to Moscow. The Malian Army is
reportedly unhappy with the quality of Soviet equipment and
technical training and, possibly because of this, has not made
payments on equipment delivered. The Soviets have refused to
authorize delivery of further arms and equipment until payment is
resumed. (S
Nigeria
We believe there are only five Soviet military advisers in
Nigeria. They reportedly maintain the Nigerian Air Force's two
squadrons of MIG-21 Fishbeds, delivered in the 1970s.
Sao Tome and Principe
One hundred Soviet military advisers are estimated to be in Sao
Tome and Principe. They carry out training for Sao Tome's
military forces and maintain that country's Soviet-supplied
military equipment. (S
Seychelles
There are estimated to be 18 Soviet military advisory personnel
in Seychelles. They maintain and operate two coastal
surveillance radars and assist in training Seychelles military
personnel. (S
The Soviets have been staunch supporters of President Rene since
he came to power in a coup in 1977. They have sent some military
equipment--$6 million worth in 1983--and have provided naval
support during times of crisis. Recent examples of this support
occurred in March 1983, when Rene suspected a mercenary-backed
effort to overthrow him was under way, and in September of the
same year, when Rene made a trip to Paris. In both cases, Soviet
landing ships with naval infantry aboard visited the islands to
guarantee Rene's position of power. (S
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Since 1983, the Soviets have had stopover rights in Seychelles
for VTA aircraft en route to Mozambique and Madagascar. They may
also be helping Seychelles refurbish fuel storage tanks on St.
Anne Island. Although the Soviets probably will not have
immediate access to the tanks- be allowed to use them at
some point in the future. (S
Tanzania
A source whose reporting has generally been substantiated
indicated that Tanzania intended to reduce the Soviet military
advisory presence from 92 to 64 by the beginning of 1985. The
Soviets are primarily engaged in systems maintenance on equipment
they have provided in the last 10 years. Even though their
advisory team has been reduced this year, the Soviets sold a
substantial amount of hardware to Tanzania in 1984 and even
granted a loan to the Tanzanian People's Defense Force for the
purchase of additional equipment. The Tanzanians would
reportedly like to further reduce the Soviet presence in their
country, down to as few as 55; however, it is likely that they
will allow some Soviets to stay, due to their inability to keep
the more sophisticated equipment operational without Soviet
help. (S
Zambia
We believe there are not more than 50 Soviet advisory personnel
in Zambia. The majority of this contingent probably trains the
Zambians to operate the MIG-21 Fishbed fighters, MI-8 Hip
helicopters, SA-3 SAMs, and various types of air warning radar
delivered since the late 1970s. The Soviets also play a major
role in maintaining this equipment. (S
Zambia's position as a landlocked country limits its usefulness
as a base for reconnaissance aircraft, and its economic problems
make it a poor target for additional arms sales. Therefore, the
Soviets' military presence in Zambia, which began when Moscow
provided aid to African nationalists fighting against the white
minority regime in Rhodesia, may decrease in the future. (S
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