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Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/12/01 : CIA-RDP91TO1115R000100390002-1 ROUTING TO: NAME AND ADDRESS DATE INITIALS 1 2 3 4 ACTION [IPEC? REPLY PREPARE REPLY APPROVAL DISPATCH RE LO MMEN[TAT1ON COMMENT TIE RETURN CONCURRENCE INFORMATION SIGNATURE REMARKS: TOP SECRET 4 2 25X1 Access to this document will be restricted to those approved for the following specific activities: NATIONAL SECURITY INFORMATION Unauthorized Disclosure Subject to Criminal Sanctions TOP SECRET (Security Classification) Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/12/01 : CIA-RDP91TO1115R000100390002-1 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/12/01 : CIA-RDP91TO1115R000100390002-1 NOFORN- Not Releasable to Foreign Nationals NOCONTRACT- Not Releasable to Contractors or Contractor/Consultants PROPIN- Caution-Proprietary Information Involved ORCON- Dissemination and Extraction of Information Controlled by Originator REL. . .- This Information has been Authorized for Release to ... Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/12/01 : CIA-RDP91TO1115R000100390002-1 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/12/01 : CIA-RDP91TO1115R000100390002-1 Central Intelligence Agency Washington.0 C 20505 Directorate of Intelligence January 1985 Sub-Saharan Africa: A Growing Soviet Military Presence (U) Summary We estimate that there are approximately 4,900 Soviet civilian and military advisers, instructors, and technicians located in 15 countries in Sub-Saharan Africa. There has been a steady increase since 1975, when there were less than 1,000 Soviets in the region. Nearly 85 percent of the Soviets are in Angola, Ethiopia, and wlozambique. Also, an estimated 610 military logistics, maintenance, and security personnel--an increase of at least 200 since late 1981--support Soviet naval and aircraft deployments and raise the total Soviet military presence to 5,510. In one instance, a Soviet naval infantry company provides 25X1 25X1 security at a Soviet installation in Ethiopia. (S 25X1 Reasons for the growth in the Soviet presence are: ? The delivery of more sophisticated weaponry. Information available as of 12 January 1985 was used in this report. (U) 25X1 25X1 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/12/01 : CIA-RDP91TO1115R000100390002-1 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/12/01 : CIA-RDP91T01115R000100390002-1 ? Increases in total arms deliveries to Sub-Saharan Africa. ? Increases in the number of Soviet-manned aircraft de- ployed in Africa. ? Construction of signals intercept facilities in Madagascar and Mozambique in 1983. (S the Soviets have suffered some setbacks in the past two years due to several factors: dissatisfaction with the quality of weapons delivered, the difficulty in obtaining spare parts, the quality of instruction, a need for economic aid in addition to military aid, and the ceasefires signed by Angola and Mozambique with South Africa. Various sources report that the Soviet military advisory presence has either been reduced, or probably will be reduced, in Tanzania and Zambia. Several other countries, including Congo, Guinea, Guinea Bissau, and Mali, are turning to the West for economic and, in some cases, military aid. The ceasefire agreements with South Africa may eventually serve to reduce the dependence of Angola and Mozambique on Moscow if South Africa adheres to agreements to stop providing support to insurgencies in those countries. (S Despite the recent setbacks, the Soviets will continue to have a strong interest in Sub-Saharan Africa because of past commitments and the political image they have at stake. However, it will be more difficult for them to protect and foster their interests than it has been in the past. They will probably have to increase deliveries of advanced and complex equipment--the traditional Soviet method of gaining and maintaining influence. If this occurs, there will be a corresponding rise in the number of Soviet personnel needed to assemble the new equipment and to train operators and maintenance personnel. We also expect the Soviets to put a high priority on expanding their presence in the Indian Ocean, especially in Seychelles and Madagascar, in response to the US presence in the region. The Soviets will also continue efforts to regain basing rights in western Africa. The most likely prospect is Guinea, where they lost basing rights in 1977. (S 25X1 25X1 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/12/01 : CIA-RDP91T01115R000100390002-1 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/12/01 : CIA-RDP91T01115R000100390002-1 Introduction The Soviet Union's influence in Sub-Saharan Africa has its roots in the support the Soviets gave to the anticolonialist and pro- socialist factions that sprang up in the decade between the mid- 1960s and mid-1970s. Several of the factions--such as those in Angola and Mozambique--eventually came to power, lending the Soviets a measure of prestige in the Third World. The Soviets have traditionally used their aid programs--especially military-- as a means of establishing relationships with these countries as well as other African nations. The Soviet military presence developed from these relationships. As many as 4,900 Soviet military advisers and technicians have been introduced into Africa's military establishments, and in Angola and Ethiopia the Soviets have acquired rights to use military bases for their own aircraft and ships. (C The establishment of a Soviet military presence in an African nation generally follows a pattern. Initially the Soviets sell arms--often at concessionary rates--to a nation to help it counter a real or perceived threat. Soviet military advisers accompany the weapons systems in order to teach Africans to operate and maintain the new equipment. Moreover, the usually low level of technical proficiency of the Africans requires that Soviet maintenance and technical personnel remain on hand to ensure that the equipment is operational. Delivery of the equipment and personnel is made by special Soviet ship or aircraft visits that over time may evolve into regularly scheduled Aeroflot or military aviation (VTA) flights and merchant ship visits.1 (S 25X1 The first part of this memorandum examines the current status of the Soviet military presence in Sub-Saharan Africa--its size, location, and function--and looks at how that presence has changed, primarily since early 1982. It also examines possible future trends in the Soviet military posture in Sub-Saharan Africa. The second part describes the Soviet military presence on a country-by-country basis. This section concentrates on Angola, Ethiopia, and Mozambique, where 85 percent of all Soviet military personnel in Sub-Saharan Africa are located. Other countries discussed are: Benin, Burundi, Congo, Guinea, Guinea Bissau, Madagascar, Mali, Nigeria, Sao Tome and Principe, Seychelles, Tanzania, and Zambia. (S 25X1 lA byproduct of this pattern may be the permanent stationing of Soviet combat troops in a country. A Soviet combat unit is stationed at Dehalak Island, Ethiopia; it is the only known Soviet naval infantry unit permanently deployed overseas. (S F 25X1 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/12/01 : CIA-RDP91T01115R000100390002-1 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/12/01 : CIA-RDP91T01115R000100390002-1 Top Secret 0 25X1 The Soviet Status in Sub-Saharan Africa Current Military Posture A Soviet military presence exists in 15 of the 41 countries in Sub-Saharan Africa (figure 1). We estimate that as of December 1984 the Soviet Union had established a military advisory presence of about 4,900 men in Sub-Saharan Africa (see table). This figure does not include the additional Soviet personnel needed to support Soviet naval and aircraft deployments. A close examination of the number of Soviet ships and aircraft that use Sub-Saharan facilities and of the frequency and length of their visits indicates that about 610 Soviet military personnel are present in addition to the advisers. These additional personnel raise the estimated total Soviet military presence in Sub-Saharan Africa to about 5,510. Facilities for some of the Soviet naval and air support personnel have been identified. Descriptions of these facilities and the estimated number of Soviets present at them are included in the second part of this memorandum. (S F 25X1 Soviet military advisory personnel function in the following capacities: ? Training African military personnel in the use of equipment and for combat and support duties. ? Directing and advising Africans on combat operations. ? Teaching military and political theory classes. ? Overseeing arms deliveries. ? Assembling equipment, such as aircraft and helicopters. ? Maintaining the more sophisticated technical equipment provided by the Soviet Union. ? Supporting signals intelligence collection operations as advi- sers, technicians, or equipment operators. ? Commanding radar, communications, and surface-to-air missile (SAM) sites. Soviet military support personnel sustain Soviet deployments in Sub-Saharan Africa. They engage in the following activities: ? Supporting Soviet aircraft deployments, both temporary and long- term. ? Supporting Soviet naval deployments, both temporary and long- term. ? Performing security duties at facilities which support Soviet naval and aircraft deployments. (S F_~ 25X1 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/12/01 : CIA-RDP91T01115R000100390002-1 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/12/01 : CIA-RDP91TO1115R000100390002-1 Figure 1 Soviet Military Presence in Sub-Saharan Africa e5 Bill 8fe MAURITANIA Gat a7w., GUINEA NIGERIA 414441-1 ~MAlta Cry CYRRU6J' Mediterranean Sea Lake Langany,ka TANZANIA SAUDI ARABIA " U l Aseb ??n ~~ A., South Atlantic Ocean Scale 1:48.000.000 0 500 1000 Kilometers 0 660 LAND THO A Indian Ocean Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/12/01 : CIA-RDP91TO1115R000100390002-1 25X1 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/12/01 : CIA-RDP91TO1115R000100390002-1 Top Secret 25X1 Soviet Military Personnel Estimated to be in Sub-Saharan Africa, December 1984 Country Angola Benin Burundi Congo Ethiopia Guinea Guinea Bissau Madagascar Mali Mozambique Nigeria Sao Tome and Principe Seychelles Tanzania Zambia Military Personnel Military Advisory Supporting Soviet Personnel Activities 4,905 610 1,500 20 20 200 1,700 50 50 150 150 800 5 100 18 92 50 280a aThis number may have been temporarily, and possibly permanently, reduced after an insurgent attack on two Soviet IL-38 May naval reconnaissance aircraft at Asmara, Ethiopia, in May 1984. This table is Secret Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/12/01 : CIA-RDP91TO1115R000100390002-1 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/12/01 : CIA-RDP91T01115R000100390002-1 Top Secret) 25X1 Recent Trends Prior to 1975, there were less than 1,000 Soviet military advisers in Sub-Saharan Africa. In that year the Soviets began providing large quantities of equipment to Angola and to Cuban units fighting in Angola. Since then, the Soviet presence has steadily increased to its current level throughout Sub-Saharan Africa. This increase has included both military advisers and the personnel supporting aircraft and ship deployments, and is largely due to the growing number of newer and more sophisticated Soviet weapons delivered to Africa. Additional advisory personnel have been needed to assemble and maintain the equipment, as well as to train the Africans to operate it. More personnel have been needed to carry out advisory functions within newly equipped African military units. Other personnel have deployed with aircraft Moscow has recently stationed in Africa. Examples of recent activities that have required additional personnel include: ? The deployment of 10 Soviet-manned AN-12 Cubs to Luanda, Angola, since October 1983, increasing the total to 12 aircraft; the deployment of two Cubs to Maputo, Mozambique, since January 1983; and the deployment of two Cubs to Antananarivo, Madagascar, in 1978. Each aircraft has deployed with an aircrew, including extra pilots, of about six men; and a ground support crew of about six. In addition to the 12 air and ground crew per aircraft, the unit deployed to Angola probably has about 60 command, intelligence, and unit support personnel with it. ? Increased deliveries of advanced equipment, including MIG-23 Fioggers to Angola (January 1984), SU-17 Fitters to Angola, (September 1984), SA-2 SAMs to Angola (November 1984), SA-9 SAMs to Ethiopia (June 1984), MI-24 Hind attack helicopters to Angola (July 1983 and September 1984) and Mozambique (November 1983), MIG-21 Fishbeds to Mozambique (April 1983), and MI-14 Haze helicopters to Ethiopia (December 1983). The exact numbers of Soviets required to assemble this equipment are not available. However, special intelligence indicates that some Soviet equipment assembly teams range between five and eight personnel for MI-8 and MI-14 helicopters and MIG-21s. ? The construction of as many as five signals intercept facilities in Madagascar and two in Mozambique in 1983. Each site is normally manned by 12 men, at least some of whom are Soviets. (TS Although the overall Soviet military presence in Africa has increased since 1975--primarily because of the infusion of advisers to Angola, Ethiopia, and Mozambique--the Soviets have Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/12/01 : CIA-RDP91T01115R000100390002-1 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/12/01 : CIA-RDP91TO1115R000100390002-1 suffered setbacks and a decline of prestige in several Sub- Saharan African nations within the last two years. the Soviet military advisory presence has either seen reduced, or probably will be reduced, in Tanzania and Zambia. Congo, Guinea, Guinea Bissau, Mali, and Nigeria are now looking to the West for economic and, in some cases, military aid which the Soviets have not been inclined to provide. The Soviets may have decided that the prospects for increasing their presence in these countries or for receiving payment for services rendered and equipment delivered are poor, and are therefore limiting their aid. (S 25X1 7F,)(1 25X1 most African countries 25X1 receiving Soviet arms, including the USSR's three largest African clients--Angola, Ethiopia, and Mozambique--have expressed dissatisfaction with the quality of weapons delivered, the difficulty in obtaining spare parts, and the quality of instruction for their use. Angola and Mozambique also have reached some form of ceasefire or security accord with South Africa that requires South Africa to stop supporting insurgent activities in these countries. Should these arrangements prove effective and lead to some sort of political solution, the might lessen the need for Soviet support and equipment. (S the 25X1 Despite continuing efforts, the Soviets have been unable to regain basing rights for TU-95 Bear reconnaissance aircraft in Conakry, Guinea, which they lost in 1977. They have also been unsuccessful in efforts to gain airfield access for reconnaissance ircraft in any country other than Angola or Ethiopia. (S Future Prospects Multibillion-dollar investments have been made by the Soviets in Angola, Ethiopia, and Mozambique. We believe that the Soviets would take strong measures to prevent a change in leadership or political leaning in these countries if the result would be a loss of access or outright expulsion. It is conceivable that the Soviets would either organize or support a coup among Soviet- trained loyalists within the armed forces, such as occurred in Afghanistan, to ensure a leadership sympathetic to the Soviet Union in Angola or Ethiopia. However, such a Soviet move is less likely in Mozambique because the investment is smaller there. (S 2For specific information on problems the Soviets are encountering in African countries, see the individual country discussions in the second part of this memorandum. (U) Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/12/01 : CIA-RDP91TO1115R000100390002-1 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/12/01 : CIA-RDP91T01115R000100390002-1 Basing Rights. The Soviets continue to have important military and political interests in Sub-Saharan Africa. Although Angola, Ethiopia, and, to a lesser extent, Mozambique will continue to be the focal points of their interest, the Soviets will seek increased naval and aircraft access rights in countries where they have some military relationship. They probably are willing to invest additional arms and personnel in any country where there is a good possibility of gaining regular access or basing rights for aircraft or ships, or where significant political payoffs could be gained. (S 25X1 Moscow's first priority will most likely be the Indian Ocean nations, especially Seychelles, where they currently possess restricted access rights, or Madagascar. Increased access allowing regular naval visits or deployment of IL-38 May or TU-95 Bear reconnaissance aircraft would greatly enhance Soviet intelligence capabilities against US, French, and South African operations in the central and southwestern Indian Ocean. Both Seychelles and Madagascar are well situated for intelli ence collection efforts against the US base on Diego Garcia. (S 25X1 We believe that the Soviets will continue to focus on gaining increased access rights in Seychelles. The Soviets have traditionally supported President Rene and have provided both military and economic support to the government. They have also deployed naval units to the region during periods of tension. Greater access in the future would likely develop, primarily through the promise of protection from outside political and military threats, such as the attempted coup in Seychelles by South African mercenaries in 1981. In addition, the Soviets will probably use increased military aid to expand their presence in Seychelles. To date, they have furnished rad r multiple rocket launchers, armored cars, and small arms. (S 25X1 The Soviets have coveted the port of Diego Suarez in Madagascar and its adjacent airfield since the late 1970s. However, in spite of arms sales to Madagascar totaling nearly $40 million since 1980, they have been unable to secure basing rights for ships or reconnaissance aircraft. A November 1984 assistance agreement of $10 million, to include armored cars and multiple rocket launchers, may be intended to increase the pressure on President Ratsiraka to open up Diego Suarez. Ratsiraka, who has had good success at playing off Soviet and Western interests in the past, will probably be able to resist Soviet overtures in the near future. (S Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/12/01 : CIA-RDP91T01115R000100390002-1 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/12/01 : CIA-RDP91T01115R000100390002-1 In western Africa, the Soviets have demonstrated that they would like to either regain landing rights for TU-95 Bear aircraft in Guinea or gain such access in another country. By doing so they would be closer to the mid-Atlantic shipping routes than they are now from their current base in Angola. A west African base would also give the Soviets a permanent forward support facility for aircraft en route to Angola. Soviet chances of gaining basing rights in a west African country are not as good as they are in the Indian Ocean because Western influence and interests, especially French, are still strong in the region. However, Guinea is the most likely candidate because Bears used the Conakry airfield in the 1970s, Soviet transport aircraft continue to stop en route to Angola, and Soviet naval vessels continue to visit Conakry. It is possible that the Soviets will attempt to regain some form of increased access rights there through political pressure, lucrative arm , or economic incentives within the next several years. (S Arms Deliveries. If arms deliveries to Africa follow current trends, the volume will increase and deliveries of advanced equipment such as MIG-23 Floggers aid MI-24 Hinds, especially to Angola and Ethiopia, will continue. Even after the Mozambican- South African accord of March 1984, the Soviet Union delivered MIG-21 Fishbeds and continued to deploy AN-12 Cubs to Mozambique. However, should Mozambique's need for arms decrease in the future due to the ceasefire with South Africa, the Soviet Union's leverage there, influenced by arms sales, would also decrease. Because the transfer of arms is the most effective form of aid the Soviets possess, the will continue to use it as much as possible in the future. (S The Military Advisory Presence. The Soviet advisory presence will also increase as additional technical and maintenance personnel arrive with the advanced equipment and as instructors arrive to train African personnel on the equipment. These advisers will ensure a Soviet presence at many levels in African military establishments and will enhance Soviet influence in African political and strategic decision-making processes. (C) 3Because Soviet equipment is less expensive and payment plans are more flexible than those of Western countries, many African countries will continue to buy Soviet military equipment despite some dissatisfactions with it. (S 25X1' Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/12/01 : CIA-RDP91T01115R000100390002-1 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/12/01 : CIA-RDP91T01115R000100390002-1 The Soviet Presence by Country Angola Soviet military personnel have been present in Angola since 1975, when the Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola (MPLA) came to power. Massive Soviet support--and Cuban combat troops-- arrived quickly as Western-backed guerrillas and South African troops attempted to overthrow the MPLA in 1975 and 1976. Since then, the Soviet presence has expanded and penetrated every aspect of the Angolan military, largely through the presence of military advisers. We estimate that as of December 1984, Soviet military advisers in Angola currently number at least 1,500. This is based on a September 1984 estimate4 of 1,200, with additional personnel included to support helicopter, aircraft, electronics, missile, and ground force equipment deliveries made within the last year which were not accounted for in the September estimate. As in Ethiopia and Mozambique, Soviet advisers are organized into a Military Advisory Group (MAG). In spite of intensive Soviet training and infusions of Soviet equipment, we believe the Angolan Army is still only a marginally capable fighting force and could not survive against any military threat--internal or ex -without Soviet backing and a Cuban military presence. (Sergi 25X1 The MAG headquarters, identified through the analysis of photography, is located two kilometers southwest of Luanda Airfield. This double fence-secured facility consists of administration, electronics, storage, and housing areas and a volleyball court (figure 2). The capacity of the housing is probably not more than 125 personnel. The MAG headquarters may have been located at this facility as early as October 1978, when a Tall Rods radio direction finding set, sometimes associated with a Soviet presence, was installed. In May 1979 a Park Drive set was installed. The Park Drive is a mobile military command and contol satellite communications system used exclusively by the Soviets. (The other Third World countries where the Soviets have deployed Park Drives are Afghanistan, Cuba, Ethiopia, Syria, and Vietnam.) (S 25X1 Soviet military advisory personnel in Angola are assigned training and advisory positions at military schools, military area headquarters, and brigade headquarters. In 1981 Soviet advisers were captured and killed by South Africans at an Angolan 4NIE No. 11-10/2-84 S the Third World. (SL 19 September 1984, The USSR and 25X1 25X1 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/12/01 : CIA-RDP91T01115R000100390002-1 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/12/01 : CIA-RDP91T01115R000100390002-1 brigade headquarters that was within 50 kilometers of the Namibian border. Open-press photography has shown Soviets instructing Angolan enlisted personnel in vehicle maintenance and in tactics at military installations, indicating Soviet involvement extends even to lower levels within the Angolan Army. (S The Soviet Union has provided arms to the MPLA since 1974. Intelligence Community estimates indicate that deliveries in the last two years have increased markedly--from an estimated $189 million in 1982 to over $843 million in the first half of 1983. Deliveries in the second half of 1983 and in 1984 have apparently continued at the same level. There was also a corresponding qualitative increase in weapons complexity and capability. arms shipments in 1983 included Angola's first Sid-6 and SA-8 SAMs, MI-24 Hind attack helicopters, and MIG- 23 Flogger fighter aircraft. Deliveries in 1984 have included additional Hinds, the first SU-17 Fitter fighters delivered to Sub-Saharan Africa, and Angola's first SA-2 SAMs. (S Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/12/01 : CIA-RDP91T01115R000100390002-1 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/12/01 : CIA-RDP91TO1115R000100390002-1 Much of the newer and more sophisticated equipment requires assembly on arrival. Soviet and Cuban military technicians are probably responsible for this assembly. In addition, Soviet personnel probably maintain the more complex equipment at Angola's 20 radar sites, 11 SAM sites, and four SAM support facilities, as well as complex equipment for several squadrons of jet fighters and helicopters. This equipment is scattered throughout the country, and Soviet maintenance personnel must travel widely to service it. The majority of these maintenance personnel probably are stationed in Luanda and Lubango, where Angola's most advanced aircraft are located. A Soviet housing arm been identified at Luanda, but not at Lubango. (SI 25X1 At Luanda Airfield, where aircraft delivered to Angola are assembled, a barracks building probably used to house Soviet technicians, maintenance personnel, and pilots has been identified (figure 3). The barracks, distinct from others at the airfield by virtue of an air conditioning unit, a radio antenna, security fences, volleyball court, well-kept appearance, and the continued presence of aircraft ground support equipment, probably can accommodate 40 to 60 personnel. It has been occupied at least since April 1979 when the antenna and air conditioning unit were first noted on the roof. (S 25X1 25X1 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/12/01 : CIA-RDP91TO1115R000100390002-1 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/12/01 : CIA-RDP91T01115R000100390002-1 Since 1977, when landing rights for the TU-95 Bears in Conakry, Guinea, were lost, these reconnaissance aircraft have periodically deployed to Luanda Airfield. An IL-62 Classic carrying maintenance and other support personnel normally deploys with the Bears. Some ground support equipment, notably an avionics cooling unit used in Angola only by Bears, is permanently stored at the airfield (figure 4). (S In addition to the Bear and Classic deployments, at least two Soviet AN-12 Cub transport aircraft have been permanently stationed in Luanda since May 1977. These aircraft provide logistic support for Cuban and Angolan combat units. In October 1983 the Angolan internal situation deteriorated due to increased guerrilla and South African military activity. As a result the Soviets increased the number of Cubs to 12 (figure 5), the largest permanent out-of-country Soviet aircraft deployment outside the Warsaw Pact, Afghanistan, and Vietnam. An AN-12 squadron in the Soviet Union numbers around 400 men. For overseas deployment, allowing that only limited aircraft maintenance would normally be performed overseas, the number of personnel would be much lower, probably around 200. This number includes air and ground crews and unit intelligence, command, and support personnel. (S Soviet naval visits to Angola began in 1976. Naval visits and seaborne military equipment deliveries have occurred at three ports: Luanda, Lobito, and Namibe (formerly called Mocamedes). Luanda Naval Base is the primary naval installation used by the Soviet West African Flotilla. A Soviet naval shore station in Luanda has been noted in special intelligence since 1979. it uses a separate communications channel from the Soviet MAG, indicating that it does not support Angolan activity. We believe that there may be a permanent Soviet naval personnel presence of as many as 70 men ashore at Luanda. This figure is based on a November 1984 estimate of seven Soviet naval vessels in the flotilla--about one-third the size of the 22-ship Soviet Indian Ocean Squadron. Therefore, the Soviet presence ashore at Luanda would probably be no more than a third of the size of the 220-man unit at Dehalak Island, Ethiopia--about 70 men. (TS At least one Soviet naval vessel, usually a minesweeper, is permanently stationed at Luanda, and a repair ship is often moored there as well. Major combatants which are not part of the West African Flotilla also regularly visit Luanda. These have included Victor I- and Victor II-class nuclear-powered attack submarines, a Kara-class guided missile cruiser, and a Kiev-class aircraft carrier. There was a continuous Soviet naval combatant presence (including Alligator-class tank landing ships) at Luanda in 1983, while there were only five short periods in 1982 when Soviet combatants were not present. (S 25X1 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/12/01 : CIA-RDP91T01115R000100390002-1 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/12/01 : CIA-RDP91TO1115R000100390002-1 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/12/01 : CIA-RDP91TO1115R000100390002-1 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/12/01 : CIA-RDP91T01115R000100390002-1 Top Secret F__1 25X1 Little is known about the degree of Soviet involvement at major electronics facilities in Angola. There are currently three active Full House High/Medium Frequency Direction Finding sets in the country, and all three are near the Cuban-Angolan defensive line north of the Namibian border. These three facilities were constructed in 1984; the Menongue site was established in January, the Matala site in March, and the Huambo site in June. Special intelligence reports that Soviet personnel operate or assist in operating identical sets in Madagascar and Mozambique. It is quite likely, therefore, that some Soviet involvement exists at Full House sites in Angola as well. (TSF Ethiopia Soviet military personnel have been in Ethiopia since 1977, when Moscow sided with Ethiopia against Somalia in the conflict over the Ogaden. Soviet-provided military equipment used by Cuban combat brigades and Ethiopian units forced the Somali Army out of the Ogaden in 1977 and 1978. By siding with Ethiopia, the USSR lost its air, naval, and signals collection facilities in Berbera, Somalia. These facilities were subsequently reestablished in South Yemen and Ethiopia, although on a smaller scale. (S We estimate that in September 1984, 1,700 Sovviet military personnel, organized into a MAG, were in Ethiopia. As no major influxes of arms occurred between September and December 1984, this number is probably still accurate. According to special intelligence, Soviet advisers have been integrated into all elements of the Ethiopian Army from army down through brigade level. Since 1977 the Soviet MAG has trained and equipped the Ethiopian Army, building a force capable of defeating any of its neighbors in a conventional war, but not yet capable of putting down the insurgencies in Ethiopia's northern provinces of Tigre and Eritrea. The depth of Soviet involvement in operational planning is evidenced by the visits of Soviet Ground Forces Commander in Chief General V. I. Petrov, who has reviewed and advised on recent operations against insurgents in Tigre and Eritrea in 1982, 1983, and 1984. (S Since March 1979, the MAG headquarters has been at Liddetta Airfield in Addis Ababa, on the old Imperial Golf Course grounds. It had previously been at a location two kilometers to the south as early as December 1977. The headquarters is fence- secured and consists of administrative, housing, electronics, and 25X1 25X1 5NIE 11-10/2-84 (S 19 September 1984, The USSR and the 25X1 Third World. (S) Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/12/01 : CIA-RDP91T01115R000100390002-1 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/12/01 : CIA-RDP91T01115R000100390002-1 recreational (including volleyball) areas (figure 6). The housing area has four monitor-roofed barracks with unique door overhangs, each housing 50 to 70 men. These barracks, which were built in 1980 and 1981, are found only at Soviet and Cuban facilities in Ethiopia and South Yemen. A Park Drive set has been associated with the MAG headquarters since December 1977 (figure 7); and, for a period in 1979, a second set was present. (Its current location is not known.) (S Ethiopia has been the largest recipient of Soviet arms in Sub- Saharan Africa. Deliveries for the period 1980-82 totalled $1.8 billion, more than triple the value of deliveries to Angola during the same period. Deliveries of Soviet equipment continued at a steady rate through 1983 and 1984. In 1983, however, the Ethiopians purchased a substantial amount of equipment from other nations, particularly jet trainers from Czechoslovakia, possibly an indication of dissatisfaction with Soviet equipment. (SF---] a Soviet unit of up to 350 personnel may be shipped through the port of Aseb. stationed in Aseb. They are housed in a wall-secured camp that has five of the unique monitor-roofed barracks.6 There is also a volleyball court within the camp. (S after delivery to Aseb, most equipment is moved to the Addis Ababa area or to the Ogaden. Most aircraft and helicopters, which require assembly, are transported to Harar Meda Airfield near Addis Ababa. The presence of five of the monitor-roofed barracks at the airfield, plus reporting from a generally reliable source, indicates both a Soviet and Cuban presence. Additional Soviet and Cuban personnel are probably at Dire Dawa assembling MIG-23 Floggers which were delivered there 25X1 25X1 25X1 25X1 25X1 in early 1984. (S 25X1 Soviet personnel reportedly assist in the maintenance of the equipment at the nine radar sites, eight SAM sites and three SAM support facilities, and several jet fighter and helicopter squadron bases in Ethiopia. Because these assets are deployed 6Technicians assembling equipment at the port, such as MI-14 Haze helicopters, as well as personnel maintaining electronics and SAM sites at Aseb, may be housed in these barracks. In addition, there is a large rest and recreation facility just north of Aseb that appears too sophisticated to be Ethiopian or Cuban. This facility, completes in April 1983, may be Soviet-associated. (S 25X1 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/12/01 : CIA-RDP91T01115R000100390002-1 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/12/01 : CIA-RDP91TO1115R000100390002-1 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/12/01 : CIA-RDP91TO1115R000100390002-1 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/12/01 : CIA-RDP91T01115R000100390002-1 throughout the country, Soviet technicans must travel widely. However, most personnel are probably stationed at the Soviet housing areas identified in Addis Ababa, Aseb, Asmara, and Hara Meda. (S A pair of Soviet IL-38 May naval reconnaissance aircraft, supported by two AN-12 Cub transports, have deployed to Yohannes IV Airfield at Asmara, Ethiopia, several times a year since February 1980. Additional AN-12 deployments have been observed at Asmara at least since January 1978. These Cub aircraft probably have been carrying arms and personnel in support of Ethiopian operations in the region. In addition to the May and Cub deployments to Asmara, Cubs were occasionally deployed to Harar Meda Airfield to provide logistic support for the Ethiopians in 1978 and 1979. By late 1979 the Ethiopian Air Force had received its own Cubs and those of the Soviets were withdrawn from Ethiopia. (S The AN-12s that deploy with the May aircraft carry support equipment. Most of the major ground support equipment, however, such as the cooling units used for the May's avionics and electronics, is kept in a secured vehicle park at a barracks (with a volleyball court) on the edge of the airfield (figure 8). This support equipment--which arrived at the same time as the May aircraft--and the barracks probably are reserved for Soviet use. The barracks buildings have a capacity of 150 to 200 personnel. Sixty persons probably support the Cub and May (which has a crew of 12) activity; the others are probably Soviet personnel associated with Ethiopian Air Force units at the air-field G personnel assigned to army units in the area. (S 25X1 In May 1984, Eritrean rebels infiltrated Yohannes IV Airfield and destroyed one May and damaged the second. It is possible that future May deployments will use a mo~~ qpnurp R hiopian airfield, such as Harar Meda or Dire Dawa. (S 25X1 Soviet naval assets have been stationed at Dehalak Island since April 1978, shortly after they were expelled from bases in Berbera, Somalia. The total Soviet military presence on Dehalak is estimated by DIA to be about 220 men. The base itself consists of a floating drydock, two piers, 25 buldings, an electric power plant, and material and POL storage areas. (S n 25X1 Support ships of the 22-vessel Indian Ocean Squadron are permanently stationed at Dehalak, and a Soviet naval infantry company, the only one permanently stationed on foreign soil, guards the facility. Other Soviet combatants using Dehalak have included Echo-class nuclear-powered cruise missile submarines, Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/12/01 : CIA-RDP91T01115R000100390002-1 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/12/01 : CIA-RDP91TO1115R000100390002-1 Kara-class guided missile cruisers, and Alligator-class tank landing ships. In addition, Ethiopian and North Yemeni naval craft are occasionally repaired at Dehalak. No seaborne equipment deliveries occur at Dehalak; they are made to Aseb and Mitsiwa. (S There are two known active Full House High/Medium Frequency Direction Finding sets in Ethiopia--one in the north at Agordat, the other in the south at Gode. The Agordat site was established in may 1983; the site at Gode in March 1984. 25X1 25X1 25X1 Mozambique Mozambique gained it independence from Portugal in 1975. According to DIA, Soviet military personnel have been there since 1976. We estimate that as of November 1984, about 800 Soviet military advisory personnel are in the MAG in Mozambique. The primary responsibilities of these advisers are to train Mozambican armed forces personnel and to fulfill planning and operational duties down to the brigade level. Although the 7NIE 11-6-84 (S Reach. (S) November 1984, Soviet Global Military Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/12/01 : CIA-RDP91TO1115R000100390002-1 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/12/01 : CIA-RDP91T01115R000100390002-1 location of the Soviet MAG and its headquarters have not been identified on photography, a source of undetermined reliability reports tha Soviet r) sonnel are living in the Matola suburb of Maputo. (S ~: :7 25X1 Unlike events in Angola and Ethiopia, there was no massive influx of arms and the attendant advisers and technicians to Mozambique early in the relationship. The Soviet presence has expanded gradually and to a lesser degree than in Angola and Ethiopia. Despite Soviet training and substantial shipments of Soviet equipment in the last eight years, Mozambique's armed forces are still judged to be incapable of either controlling internal guerrilla groups such as RENAMO or defending the country's borders. (S 25X1 As in other countries in Sub-Saharan Africa, Soviet technicians attached to the MAG in Mozambique probably assist with the assembly and maintenance of equipment. Before 1982, the arms delivered to Mozambique were largely obsolete equipment, such as MIG-17 Fresco fighters and T-34 tanks. Since then, however, Mozambique has been receiving T-54 tanks, BMP infantry fighting vehicles, MIG-21 Fishbed fighters, and MI-24 Hind attack helicopters. Nevertheless, Mozambique is far behind both Angola and Ethiopia in the amount and value of arms delivered from the USSR. Mozambique received about $295 million worth of equipment during the period 1976 through 1982--Angola received about $775 million worth and Ethiopia received $2.3 billion worth during this same period. (S 25X1 Equipment is shipped to three ports: Maputo, Beira, and Nacala. The fighter aircraft are being assembled at Nacala Airfield and the Hind helicopters at Maputo Airfield. Unlike facilities in Angola or Ethiopia, no Soviet barracks have been observed on photography at any of these facilities. (S ~~ 25X1 Soviet military transport aircraft have temporarily deployed to Maputo Airfield at least since 1977. Since May 1983, two AN-12 Cubs have been permanently deployed to Maputo to provide counterinsurgency support by carrying personnel and equipment to and from combat areas (figure 9). About 30 Soviet personnel are needed to maintain and fly these aircraft. (S [ 25X1 Soviet naval vessels have visited Maputo, Beira, and Nacala regularly since 1977. A December 1983 visit included a Kiev- class carrier, and earlier visits have included a Sverdlov-class cruiser and a Kashin-class guided missile destroyer. In contrast to Dehalak and Luanda, however, there is no continuous Soviet naval presence. It is unlikely, therefore, that there are any Soviet naval personnel permanently stationed in Mozambique to support these visits. (S Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/12/01 : CIA-RDP91T01115R000100390002-1 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/12/01 : CIA-RDP91TO1115R000100390002-1 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/12/01 : CIA-RDP91TO1115R000100390002-1 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/12/01 : CIA-RDP91TO1115R000100390002-1 Top Secret I 25X1 Two Full House High/Medium Frequency Direction Finding sets are operational in Mozambique--one at Beira and the second at the Villa Pery Army Barracks. Both are directed against guerrilla activity and, according to special intelligence, both have Soviet personnel involved in their operation. There are six radar sites, four SAM sites, and one missile support facility as well as three fighter, one transport, and several helicopter squadrons in Mozambique. Most of this equipment is located in and around Maputo, Beira, and Nacala. Soviet MAG personnel, with Cuban assistance, probably maintain most of this equipment. (TS Benin We estimate that there are 20 Soviet military advisers in Benin. Soviet naval vessels regularly visit the port of Cotonou, and Moscow has begun building a naval base for the Beninese Navy as part of a 1978 agreement. It has not been determined whether the Soviets will have access rights to the base when it is completed. Soviet military advisers and technicians probably train Beninese military personnel a_n_d maintain equipment they have provided over the years. (S Burundi According to our latest information, 20 Soviet military advisers are in Burundi. They are involved in training Burundian military personnel and in maintaining ground force and air defense equipment supplied by Moscow in the last eight years. (S Congo There are an estimated 200 Soviet military advisers in Congo. They maintain one squadron of MIG-21 Fishbeds, one of MIG-17 Fresco fighters, and one of MI-8 Hip helicopters, as well as radar and electronics equipment. (S A general coolness has developed in Soviet-Congolese relations in the last several years, due in part to disappointment with the quality of military equipment delivered as well as a perceived lack of meaningful economic aid from the Soviets. Because of these shortcomings, Congo has turned to the West and the People's Republic of China for economic assistance, while continuing to purchase some military hardware from Moscow. (S Guinea Until the mid-1970s, the Sub-Saharan country where Soviet influence was greatest was Guinea. In 1977, however, Guinean President Sekou Toure revoked Soviet reconnaissance aircraft landing rights and reduced Soviet naval access at the port of Conakry. Soviet naval vessels still visit Conakry, and transport aircraft en route to Angola refuel at Conakry Airfield. (S Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/12/01 : CIA-RDP91TO1115R000100390002-1 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/12/01 : CIA-RDP91TO1115R000100390002-1 Top Secret F-~ 25X1 About 50 Soviet military advisers remain in Guinea. They maintain the single Guinean fighter squadron, which is equipped with several types of MIGs. Analysis of photography indicates that the advisers may also assist the transshipment of arms through Conakry to Mali. (S Guinea Bissau There are 50 Soviet advisers in Guinea Bissau. The Soviets historically have been the major arms supplier to this country. However, Bissaun officials have recently stated that they are dissatisfied with the level and quality of Soviet military assistance, and the government has begun receiving military assistance from France and the United States. (S Madagascar The Soviet military presence in Madagascar is currently limited by the Malagasy government to 150 men. The Soviets' main functions are to maintain Malagasy MIG-21 Fishbed jets and air warning radars and to man and maintain as many as five signals intercept sets around the island. As many as 30 additional Soviet military personnel maintain and fly two VTA AN-12 Cubs, which have been stationed at Antananarivo since 1978. These two aircraft perform military support and commercial transport functions for the Malagasy government. (S Relations between the Soviet Union and Madagascar run hot and cold. Military attache reporting indicates that in early 1984 the Soviet military presence may have been reduced to 100 personnel. In addition, a Malagasy military delegation to the Soviet Union in May 1984 cut short a visit after being snubbed by the Soviet government. The snubbing may have been a result of Soviet frustration at its inability to gain naval visitation or aircraft basing rights in Madagascar, or the failure of Madagascar to keep up payments on equipment purchased from the Soviets. However, in November 1984 Madagascar agreed to purchase $10 million worth of armored cars and multiple rocket, launchers, an indication that relations may be warming. (S As many as five Full House High/Medium Frequency Direction Finding sets operated, reportedly with Soviet personnel, between December 1983 and late 1984. US Embassy protests to President Ratsiraka about the Full House sets may have been responsible for their being removed by December 1984. However, it is possible that sets have been reassembled at new locations, or are being stored for future use. (S Mali We estimate that there are currently 150 Soviet military advisory personnel in Mali. They are engaged in training Malian military Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/12/01 : CIA-RDP91TO1115R000100390002-1 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/12/01 : CIA-RDP91T01115R000100390002-1 personnel, providing technical assistance, and maintaining SA-3 missile units and Mali's single MIG fighter squadron, equipped primarily with MIG-17 Frescos. (S The Soviets are carrying out a program to upgrade six Malian airfields, and although the Soviets do not have access rights to these airfields, the improvements made thus far on the two completed airfields far exceed Malian needs. Airfields in Mali were used by the Soviets during the 1975 Angolan airlift. (S Although the Soviets continue to provide military assistance, there has recently been some tension in relations. Despite Soviet invitations, Malian President Traore has delayed scheduling an official visit to Moscow. The Malian Army is reportedly unhappy with the quality of Soviet equipment and technical training and, possibly because of this, has not made payments on equipment delivered. The Soviets have refused to authorize delivery of further arms and equipment until payment is resumed. (S Nigeria We believe there are only five Soviet military advisers in Nigeria. They reportedly maintain the Nigerian Air Force's two squadrons of MIG-21 Fishbeds, delivered in the 1970s. Sao Tome and Principe One hundred Soviet military advisers are estimated to be in Sao Tome and Principe. They carry out training for Sao Tome's military forces and maintain that country's Soviet-supplied military equipment. (S Seychelles There are estimated to be 18 Soviet military advisory personnel in Seychelles. They maintain and operate two coastal surveillance radars and assist in training Seychelles military personnel. (S The Soviets have been staunch supporters of President Rene since he came to power in a coup in 1977. They have sent some military equipment--$6 million worth in 1983--and have provided naval support during times of crisis. Recent examples of this support occurred in March 1983, when Rene suspected a mercenary-backed effort to overthrow him was under way, and in September of the same year, when Rene made a trip to Paris. In both cases, Soviet landing ships with naval infantry aboard visited the islands to guarantee Rene's position of power. (S 25X1 25X1 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/12/01 : CIA-RDP91T01115R000100390002-1 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/12/01 : CIA-RDP91TO1115R000100390002-1 Top Secre~ 25X1 Since 1983, the Soviets have had stopover rights in Seychelles for VTA aircraft en route to Mozambique and Madagascar. They may also be helping Seychelles refurbish fuel storage tanks on St. Anne Island. Although the Soviets probably will not have immediate access to the tanks- be allowed to use them at some point in the future. (S Tanzania A source whose reporting has generally been substantiated indicated that Tanzania intended to reduce the Soviet military advisory presence from 92 to 64 by the beginning of 1985. The Soviets are primarily engaged in systems maintenance on equipment they have provided in the last 10 years. Even though their advisory team has been reduced this year, the Soviets sold a substantial amount of hardware to Tanzania in 1984 and even granted a loan to the Tanzanian People's Defense Force for the purchase of additional equipment. The Tanzanians would reportedly like to further reduce the Soviet presence in their country, down to as few as 55; however, it is likely that they will allow some Soviets to stay, due to their inability to keep the more sophisticated equipment operational without Soviet help. (S Zambia We believe there are not more than 50 Soviet advisory personnel in Zambia. The majority of this contingent probably trains the Zambians to operate the MIG-21 Fishbed fighters, MI-8 Hip helicopters, SA-3 SAMs, and various types of air warning radar delivered since the late 1970s. The Soviets also play a major role in maintaining this equipment. (S Zambia's position as a landlocked country limits its usefulness as a base for reconnaissance aircraft, and its economic problems make it a poor target for additional arms sales. Therefore, the Soviets' military presence in Zambia, which began when Moscow provided aid to African nationalists fighting against the white minority regime in Rhodesia, may decrease in the future. (S Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/12/01 : CIA-RDP91TO1115R000100390002-1 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/12/01 : CIA-RDP91TO1115R000100390002-1 Iq Next 1 Page(s) In Document Denied Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/12/01 : CIA-RDP91TO1115R000100390002-1