THE BALANCE OF POWER

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP91T01172R000200200001-8
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 21
• Document Creation Date: December 16, 2016
• Document Release Date: March 16, 2005
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: August 5, 1953
• Content Type: REPORT

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THE BALANCE OF POWER
August 1948 to October .1950
Office of Current Intelligence
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
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THE BALANCE OF POWER: AUGUST 1948 TO OCTOBER 1950
Following the death of Andrei Zhdanov, Malenkov rapidly re-
occupied a prominent position in the Soviet hierarchy and apparently
was allowed to re-establish control over the Party apparatus by
carrying out a purge of important Zhdanov adherents. In this process
Nikolai Voznesensky, Chairman of Gosplan and a piember of the Polit-
buro since only February 1947, disappeared. There was no subsequent
reference to him until December 1952, when an article published by
M. A. Suslov attacked the so-called Voznesensky deviation.
Concurrently with the Party purge in February and March 1949,
several changes we?e made in governmental appointments. Voznesen-
sky's case has already been mentioned. In March 1949, Molotov,
Bulganin and Mikoyan all surrendered their respective ministerial
portfolios of Foreign Affairs, Armed Forces, and Foreign Trade.
Through this period - August 1948 to October 1950 - there were
two significant changes in the order of listing of the Politburo
members. First, Malenkov moved up to fourth position in Politburo
listings in mid-1948 (after Molotov and Beria) and then moved to
thrill position (after Molotov) in mid-1949. Second, Bulganin rose
markedly in Politburo listings in late 1949, and A. A. Andreev
dropped markedly at the same time. However, neither Andreev nor
Bulganin were at that time - 1948 to 1950 - among the Big Five.
Despite the Party purge and the ministerial changes, however,
the basic balance in the distribution of power among the top five
members of the Politburo probably remained substantially unchanged.
Molotov, even though he experienced some reduction in
prominence, held his post as First Deputy Chairman of the
Council of Ministers and presumably remained largely re-
sponsible for foreign affairs.
Malenkov,
(maintained his previous interest in agriculture.
Beria remained in charge of the security function forced
labor, atomic energy, and trans ort.
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Kaganovich remained responsible for building materials,
and also was Chief of the State Committee for Material-
Technical Supply (Gossnab). This committee was responsible
for the planning and allocation of material for the Soviet
economy.
Mikoyan was in charge of the fish, meat, dairy and food
industries, and presumably also retained responsibility for
internal and foreign trade. He was identified in foreign trade
matters in February 1950.
On the second level of the Politburo, however, a number of
changes took place in the distribution of power:
Andreev retained his interest in agriculture and his
post as Chairman of the Council for Collective Farm Affairs,
but was publicly rebuked in a Pravda article of 19 February
1950 for pursuing an incorrect line on agricultural labor
questions.
Voznesensky disappeared in March 1949, and was replaced
as Chairman of Gosplan by M. Z. Saburov, a reported Malenkov
adherent.
Khrushchev was transferred from the Ukrainian Party
organization to replace G. M. Popov as All-Union Secretary
and as Secretary of the important Moscow Oblast Committee.
Khrushchev also became the Politburo spokesman on agricul-
tural policy, following Andreev's humiliation.
Bulganin and Kos gin both apparently retained their
responsibilities for national defense and light industry
respectively; Suslov, not a Politburo member, became the
leading Soviet functionary who most often represented the
USSR at Satellite political ceremonies. Other newcomers
to sub-Politburo level were Ponomarenko and Shkiryatov.
Aside from the political events mentioned in the above
paragraphs, the chief events and developments of the period under
review were the following:
1. The adoption by the USSR, sometime in late 1948, of
a rearmaments program. This program was apparently scheduled
for completion by 1952.
2. The withdrawal of the USSR from its exposed position
in Europe, i.e., the liquidation of the Berlin blockade
and the Greek Civil War.
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3. The internal consolidation of the East European
Satellites, and the initiation of programs calculated to
integrate their economies with that of the USSR.
4. The triumph of the Chinese Communists on the main-
land, and the proclamation of the Peoples Republic of China
in October 1949.
5. The attack on South Korea by the North Korean Gov-
ernment on 25 June 1950, the subsequent intervention of the
UN, and the commitment of the Chinese Communist armies in
October 1950.
MALENKOV'S RISE
The clearest indication of Malenkov's rise to prominence is
found in the official listings of the Politburo members published
from time to time. Prior to Zhdanov's death, Malenkov had usually
occupied a position in the Politburo varying from fifth to ninth.
In late 1948, however, he moved to the number four position, fol-
'lowing Molotov (number two) and Beria (number three). Malenkov
then changed places with Beria in early 1949, but shortly there-
after dropped again to number four position. He moved back to
third position in mid-1949 and held it until the time of Stalin's
death.
On 7 November 1949, Malenkov delivered the speech on the an-
niversary of the Revolution, which in previous years had been
given by Molotov. In December 1949, in a series of articles
written by the various Politburo members on the occasion of
Stalin's seventieth birthday, Malenkov's article preceded all
others, including even Molotov's, in both the Pravda and Bolshe-
vik versions.
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The same trend was also evident in the propaganda treatment
^ccorded Malenkov. On the occasion of Malenkov's 50th birthday
in January 1952, for example, a propaganda statement was made
that Malenkov had been "a faithful pupil of Lenin,"an outright
fabrication, of course. All this culminated in the selection of
Malenkov as the person to give the keynote speech on behalf of
the Central Committee at the long overdue Nineteenth Party Congress
in October 1952.
COMMUNIST PARTY CHANGES OF 1949
A summary review of key Communist Party appointments between
1944 and 1952 demonstrates conclusively that a shift of some
magnitude in the control of the Party took place in 1949. This
apparently involved the removal of the so-called Zhdanov clique.
Important changes took place in the All-Union Secretariat, the
secretarial appointments in the Moscow and Leningrad City and
Oblast organizations and in the Ukrainian organization, and in the
Chief Political Administration of the Soviet Army.
Prior to 1949 there was a certain pattern of continuity in
the appointments of First Secretaries in the Moscow and Leningrad
Party organizations. In each case when a First Secretary was
promoted to a position of greater,i,nfluence (or, as in the case
of Shcherbakov, who died in 1945)x, the second ranking man in the
organization took over. When these shifts took place, there
were no known significant upsets in the staffing of these Party
organs. This clearly indicates continuity and stability in the
political power structure through these changes.
In 1949, however, there was an abrupt change in this pattern
and an abrupt end to the careers of A. A. Kuznetsov, All-Union
Secretary, G. M. Popov, All-Union Secretary and Secretary of the
Moscow City and Oblast organizations, and P. S. Popkov, Leningrad
Shcherbakov had held, at the time of his death, the Moscow City
and Oblast Secretaryship. He was also the Chief of the Army
Political Administration, a Secretary of the Central Committee
and an alternate member of the Politburo. Shcherbakov was
Zhdanov's son-in law.
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Oblast Secretary. Both A.. Kuznetsov and P. S. Popkov utterly
disappeared in early 19+9.1/ Beginning in December 1949,
G. M. Popov was demoted to a s}N cession of third-order posi-
tions; he disappeared in 1951 N. S. Khrushchev moved up
from the Ukraine to replace G. M. Popov as Secretary of the
Moscow Oblast organization and as a member of the All-Union
Secretariat.! The pattern which had previously applied to
Moscow and Leningrad held true.in the Ukraine following
Khrushchev's departure: the Second Secretary in the Ukraine,
L. G. Melnikov, stepped into Khrushchev's former position,
and thus'continuity of political leadership was maintained there.
In Leningrad, the City and Oblast First Secretary positions were
taken by a newcomer to Leningrad, V. N. Andrianov. Andrianov held
both positions until June 1950, when he surrendered the City Secre-
taryship to F. R. Kozlov, following the precedent established in
Moscow when Khrushchev was moved in there. Both the Moscow and
Leningrad Party organizations were completely shaken up following
the displacement of the incumbent Secretaries and the introduction
of the "outsiders" to directing positions.
The Chief Political Administration of the Army had been held
during the war by Shcherbakov. Upon his death in May 1945, the
position was taken by Colonel General Shikin, who held it until
early 1949. In 1949, Colonel General F. F. Kuznetsov, who had
been the Chief of the Military Intelligence Directorate since 1945,
took over this position and held it, so far as is known, through 1952.
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He was last identified in this position in September 1952.2
The coincidence of all these changes occurring in 1949 arouses
interest in the political careers and connections of the persons
affected. Of the persons concerned --- A. A. IKuznetsov, P. S.
Popkov, Col. Gen. Shikin and G. M. Popov --- all have direct or
secondary connections with Andrei Zhdanov:
A. A. Kuznetsov succeeded Zhdanov as Secretary in the
Leningrad Oblast organization, 'having held positions in
Leningrad since at least 19140. (For example, he was Secretary
of the City Committee in 1940 and 1943.)
P. S. Popkov succeeded Kuznetsov in both the City and
Oblast positions, after having been Chairman of the Leningrad
Executive Committee since 1911.1.
Colonel General Shikin bad been Political Officer on the
Leningrad Front during the war and succeeded Shcherbakov in
the Army Political Administration.
G. M. Popov, who succeeded Shcherbakov in the Moscow
Party positions, was, along with Molotov, A. A. Kuznetsov
and Marshal Govorov, a speaker at Zhdanov's funeral in
September 1948.
G. M. Popov and A. A. Kuznetsov both became members of
the Orgburo and All-Union Secretariat in March of 1946, and
remained there throughout Zhdanov's tenure as First Secretary.
N. A. Voznesensky, who disappeared in March 1949, was also
associated with Zhdanov. He first attained a prominent position
in 1935 as Chairman of the Leningrad City Planning Commission, and
later moved up to become the Chief of Gosplan. He was made a member
of the Politburo in February 1947, at the height of Zhdanov's eminence.
Further aspects of the Voznesensky case will be discussed in connection
with the governmental changes of March 1949.
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GOVERNMENT CHANGES IN 19+9
In March, Minister of Foreign Affairs Molotov, Minister of Foreign
Trade Mikoyan and Minister of War Bulganin relinquished their direct
control of ministries. They remained as Deputy Chairmen of the Council
of Ministers, which still left them in the governmental picture, and, of
course, they retained their Politburo positions. Voznesensky, however,
was relieved of his positions as Chairman of Gosplan and Deputy Chairman
of the Council of Ministers at this time. Subsequently, he was not
present at the various appearances of the Politburo, and he was not
thereafter listed among the Politburo members. Of the various
changes that took place in 1949, those affecting Molotov and
Voznesensky are the most important and interesting.
Molotov had been Stalin's chief lieutenant in the Soviet
governmental apparatus since the late twenties. He had been
Prime Minister, i.e., Chairman of the Council of People's
Commissariats, in the'1930's. In 1939, Stalin took over leadership
of the Government as Prime Minister, and Molotov became Minister of
Foreign Affairs, a position he held through and after the war.
Molotov may have been involved in a conflict concerning Soviet
policy toward the Marshall Plan. There is information indicating
disparate views in Moscow regarding the Marshall Plan.and suggesting
that Molotov may have been instrumental in the Soviet decision to
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Mikoyan and Kaganovich viewed the Marshall Plan proposals favorably
prior to the Soviet decision not to participate. It is worth noting
that both Poland and Czechoslovakia initially accepted invitations
to attend the July conference on the Marshall Plan, and later
suddenly withdrew their acceptances. According to the published
transcript of the Moscow discussions which culminated in order to
Czechoslovakia to withdraw from the July conference, Stalin stated
that it had become evident, upon receipt of information from Paris,
that the purpose of the Marshall Plan was to aid the formation of a
Western bloc and to isolate the Soviet Union. Stalin then told
the Czechs that their country's participation inthe Marshall Plan
would be an unfriendly act against the USSR. Molotov had been the
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Soviet representative at the preliminary discussion on the Marshall
Plan, held in Paris in June 1947.
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convinced o otov s reports From Faris e o e ov a decision
to stay out of the Marshall Plan. Ex-Ambassador Harriman believes
that Molotov suffered in influence due to the consequences of Soviet
refusal to cooperate in the Marshall Plan.
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Molotov's failure to deliver the annual 7 November anniversary
speech in 1949 may be one indication that he had lost some degree of
influence. At the end of the war, Molotov took over from Stalin the
honor of delivering this speech; he gave it in 1945, 1947 and 1948.1:/
Thereafter the honor was rot4ted among younger Politburo members,
Malenkov giving it in 1913.9.) It is quite possible, of course, that
Molotov was no
longer capable of handling this speech. Nevertheless, his with-
drawal from public prominence was evident
However, in spite of having relinquished direct control of For-
eign Affairs, Molotov remained as First Deputy Chairman to Stalin on
the Council of Ministers. Furthermore, he also appeared to have suf-
fered no change in formal political status, since he was listed first
after Stalin in all Politburo listings up until Stalin's death. A
possible explanation of this is suggested by speculation current in
1949 to the effect that Molotov was being relieved of the day-to-day
administration of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs so that he could
concentrate on broad policy-planning functions -- in particular, re-
lations with the Chinese Communists, who at that time were beginning
to show signs that they would take over the mainland that year.
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J Zhdanov delivered the speech in 1946.
J At the 7 November 1949 parade, Molotov was present on the review-
ing stand, but departed some two-and-a-half hours before the dem-
onstrations weIe over. Malenkov stood next to Molotov, but, ac-
cording to the US Military Attache, noticeably shunned and turned
his back on him.
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Furthermore, Molotov was identified in matters related to for-
eign policy after his release from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.
Even though no longer Foreign Minister of the USSR, he attended a
conference of Foreign Ministers of the East European Satellites
held in Prague in late October 1950.
THE VOZNESENSKY CASE
The problem of explaining Voznesensky's disappearance in 19+9
has been complicated further by the appearance of his name in Decem-
ber 1952 and in January-February 1953 in connection with the so-
called "Voznesensky deviation," i.e., his alleged deviation from
Stalin's views on Marxism and the economic laws of socialism. Vozne-
sensky, as we have already had occasion to note, first achieved prom-
inence as Chairman of the City Planning Commission in Leningrad in
1935. Subsequently, he went to Moscow to head the State Planning
Commission and during the war he served on the State Defense Commit-
tee, the all-powerful "war cabinet". He was not one of the original
members of the committee, having joined it on 4 February 1943. In
March 1949, he disappeared from sight and his name was not mentioned
in the Soviet press until the December 1952 attack on his views by
M. A. Suslov in Pravda.
Three principal hypotheses have been advanced to explain Vozne-
sensky's political demise. The first hypothesis is that Voznesensky
was associated with the so-called Zhdanov clique in Moscow, in oppo-
sition to Malenkov, and that following Zhdanov's death in 1948 and his
apparent disgrace, Voznesensky was purged. The second hypothesis is
that Voznesensky had made many mistakes in Gosplan and,
had badly advised Stalin and the other leaders in re-
gard to the Soviet economic situation and capabilities. The third
hypothesis is that Voznesensky opposed Stalin either on ideological
questions regarding the nature of the economic problems and the laws
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and policies of a Socialist state or on practical policy matters af-
fecting the Soviet economy and the planning function.
The first hypothesis, that Voznesensky was associated with the
Zhdanov group, is supported by the circumstancial evidence of Vozne-
sensky's career -- and particularly by the fact that his disappear-
ance was concurrent with a series of other important political shifts
of early 1949, which in turn clearly indicated the unseating of a
owerful political group. During the war,
oznesensky was a supporter of Malenkov; later reports stated
nrantrn7 n-f the RnviPt rrjmmiiHgt. Party_
Saburov replaced
Voznesensky as Chairman of Gosplan in March 19k9 and held this posi-
tion until Stalin's death. For many years he had been associated
with Gosplan, moving in and out of it, as a Deputy Chairman, several
times. Not all aspects of Saburov's history are clear and it is im-
possible to say just what his relations with Voznesensky were. At
the most, his history tends to support this first hypothesis.
There is considerable evidence to support the second hypothesis
that Voznesensky had made serious mistakes in Gosplan and had per-
haps presented an incorrectly optimistic picture of the Soviet econ-
the Soviet Government reformulated its economic p ns an g -
ened its plan controls, and that. there had been changes in the Sov-
iet planning structure in late 1948 and early 1949. These changes
affected the organizational aspects of the planning function; certain
of them had actually begun in January 1948. In late 19+8, the State
Statistical Commission was removed from the jurisdiction of Gosplan
and placed under the Council of Ministers. In the beginning of 1949,
the wholesale price structure was reformed: the prices on producers
goods were increased and a movement was begun to abolish subsidies
for these industries. This economy drive was accompanied by the im-
position of stricter controls over enterprises and their costs and
inventories; the plan fulfillment report published in April 1949
stated that "new additional plant capacity has come to light,." re-
sulting in increased plan targets for the first quarter of 1949.
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Voznesensky had been removed because he had attempted to deceive
Stalin regarding the degree of the fulfillment of the Five Year Plan.
Finally, in late 1948 and early 1949, just preceding Voznesensky's
disappearance, Soviet propaganda media embarked on a very short-lived
campaign for the fulfillment of the Five Year Plan in four years.
The "five year plan in four years" theme was first voiced by Molotov
in the 7 November 1948 anniversary speech. This was followed by in-
tensive propaganda on this theme through November, December and up
until the publication of a Gosplan report in mid-January 1949. In
the 21 January 1949 speech on the anniversary of Lenin's death, how-
ever, the theme was not mentioned and, while there were occasional
references to it in subsequent months, for all practical purposes it
had disappeared from Soviet propaganda. The cessation of this propa-
ganda in mid-January, taken with the above-mentioned indications of
organizational and economic readjustment in 1948, tends to support
the hypothesis that there had been serious mistakes in planning and
perhaps a seriously distorted picture of the state of the economy at
the top level of the Government.
The third hypothesis -- that Voznesensky was disgraced because
he opposed Stalin either on theoretical -uestions or on ractical
policy decisions
version of this hypothesis is that Voznesensky opposed the inaugura-
tion of a limited rearmament program by the USSR in the latter half
of 1948 and instead favored the further development of consumer goods
industries. This hypothesis will be discussed in two parts, the
first devoted to its theoretical and ideological aspects, and the
second to the practical policy problem.
The so-called "Voznesensky deviation" is drawn from his book,
The War Economy of the USSR during the Great Patriotic War, which
was published in 1947 and which received a Stalin prize in May 1948.
According to this book, planning is an economic law of socialism and
one of the chief characteristics differentiating the socialist from
the capitalist system. Capitalism, in Communist dogma, is unable to
plan and is characterized by a veritable anarchy of competing monop-
olistic interests,/ - In a sense, the assertion that planning is an
"economic law" of socialism is a natural one for economic planners
to hold; Voznesensky appears to have been the chief exponent of this
point of view. A series of articles by members of Gosplan, published
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in journals, monographs and books, likewise explicitly stated that
"planning is an economic law of Socialism."
This thesis was categorically denounced by Stalin in his Economic
Problems of Socialism, written in February 1952 as commentary on a
conference of economists held in November 1951, but not published un-
til October 1952. Stalin also denounced a number of other views, in-
cluding the view that "the proportional development of the economy"
was an economic law of socialism and the view that the Socialist
state was able "to do anything." Stalin ascribed this latter view
to numerous young and inexperienced Communists who had been "dazzled"
by the accomplishments of the USSR. In an article written in Decem-
ber 1952, Suslov attacked P. Fedoseev for writing articles on
Stalin's Economic Problems without admitting that he, Fedoseev, had
himself been one of the persons who had held the erroneous points of
view. In his article, Suslov quoted the text of a Central Committee
decree issued in July 19+9 which removed several leading figures from
the editorial board of Bolshevik, the theoret,,cal Communist Party
journal, for disseminating Voznesensky's views and for "praising his
book to the skies."
The 19+9 decree also mentioned D. T. Shepilov, who at that time
was Chief of the Department of Agitation and Propaganda of the Cen-
tral Committee apparatus (Agitprop). Shepilov subsequently lost his
job in Agitprop, probably as a result of this decree. He too had
been criticized, among other things, for "praising Voznesensky's
book to the skies" and recommending it to the Party apparatus for
study.
The hypothesis that Voznesensky was removed for ideological de-
viation and heresy and for developing points of view contrary to
Stalin's appears to be unfounded. It is true that Voznesensky had
argued that planning is the economic law of socialism and that the
principle of "the proportional development of the economy" is another
economic law of socialism. There is no evidence, however, to support
the contention that these views were critical theoretical issues in
late 1948 or early 1949. These "heresies" were expounded, for ex-
ample, in a book written in 19+6 by A. Kursky, a prominent economic
theorist of Gosplan. A revised version of Kursky's book published
in 19+9 was changed only to the extent that it was brought up to
date by use of contemporary examples. Kursky's contention that plan-
ning is an economic law of socialism was not expurgated.. As one
study of the development of economic theory in the. USSR has pointed
out. "Voznesensky's personal fortunes do not appear to have af-
fected the general climate of opinion." The study pointed out, for
example, that on 8 October 1949, six months after Voznesensky's fall,
Pravda carried an editorial eulogizing the power of planning and
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minimizing the so-called "objective" factors.in the development of
the Soviet economy. The editorial went on to say that Soviet man
had become master of his fate and that this was the greatest achieve-
ment of the revolution and Socialism.1 The lines of thought which
supposedly represent the Voznesensky deviation continued to appear
in Soviet theoretical journals and in various propaganda articles
through 1951 and into 1952. As late as issue No. 4 of Voprosi Eko-
nomiki (April 1952) the "erroneous" doctrine is expounded.
It. is extremely difficult to believe that if Voznesensky had
been removed for theoretical, ideological deviation in 1949, a direc-
tive would not have ben issued at that time which would have pro-
scribed these views.2 In other words, it appears that the deviation
of which Voznesensky was accused was something manufactured in 1952,
or late 1951, rather than in 1949 or 1948. This itself is a fact of
considerable significance and the. problem will be taken up-subse-
quently.
There is very little evidence to either support or refute the
hypothesis that Voznesensky opposed Stalin. or others on questions of
practical policy regarding the Soviet economy and, in particular, re-
garding rearmament. It is perhaps unreasonable to suppose that Voz-
nesensky would have opposed the necessity for rearmament. There is
no reason to believe that he would have arrogated to himself the
problem of evaluating the intentions of foreign governments, in par-
ticular of the US. Rearmament began in 1948, probably nine months
before Voznesensky disappeared; it is possible that he became in-
volved in controversy regarding the manner in which this program
should be carried out. It is also possible to read into his
book an heretical point of view on agriculture (e.g., praise of the
war-time system), but there is no evidence that Voznesensky was in-
volved in such a controversy. The agriculture controversy did not
Soviet Studies, April 1953, "A Political Economy in the Making",
J. Miller.
The decree of July 1949 reproving Bolshevik and Agitprop does not
meet this test. In this decree, praise of Voznesensky's book was
only one of the many "shortcomings" critized; the reason given
was that this praise was unjustified. The book itself was not de-
nounced. Suslov's article in December 1952, on the other hand,
described Voznesensky's views as "un-Marxist", while discussions
in January 1953 said that they were "anti-Marxist". Thus, the
evolution of a "deviation".
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come into the open until February 1950, in connection with an attack
on Andreev for supporting small-scale collective farm operations.
Thus, it came well after Voznesensky's eclipse, rather than prior to
it. There are some suggestions that Voznesensky may have been linked
in some way with Andreev, but this cannot either be proven or dis--
. proven.
In summary, the third hypothesis, that Voznesensky was involved
in a theoretical or practical policy controversy can probably be dis-
counted. This leaves the first and the second: that Voznesensky's
political fortunes changed with the change in Zhdanov's status, or
that Voznesensky failed professionally in the planning and direction
of the Soviet economy. There is perhaps no necessity to attempt to
decide between these two, for the evidence amply supports both and
it is probable that both played a major role in Voznesensky's eclipse.
Perhaps Voznesensky's mistakes would never have come to light or
would never have occasioned his disgrace if he had not had powerful
political enemies or, conversely, if his own powerful political
friends had remained in favor. They did not, however, and Voznesensky,
along w th a number of other important figures, disappeared from the
scene,l
REAmvmn 1948 TO 1952
The Soviet Government apparently began a rearmament program in
1948, probably in the latter half of the year. A rather large body
of evidence points to the probability that this was to be a three-
and-a-half or four-year program, and that it was to be completed by
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the end of 1951 or early 1952.
This supposition
on the target date of the program is supported.by the completion of
a number of projects and by the appearance of substantial amounts of
new model equipment in 1951 and 1952.
On the other hand, available evidence does not indicate that
the rearmament program was so great that all other aspects of eco-
nomic development were subordinated to it. The major emphasis of
the Soviet economy remained on heavy industrial development, which
was long-range in nature. Thus the possibility exists that the re-
armament program was little more than one for re-equipment of the
Soviet armed forces with modern weapons. Bulganin, speaking on the
thirtieth anniversary of the Red Army on 23 February 1948, said that
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the army had completed its conversion to a peace-time basis, and was
beginning to re-equip itself with the latest weapons.
At any rate, while the exact character and scope of the Soviet
rearmament effort remains an unsolved problem, there is no reason to
presume that it was a highly controversial issue within the Kremlin.
After Voznesensky's ouster, the only striking manifestation of
possible dissension within the Politburo was the criticism levied
against A. A. Andreev, on agricultural matters, by Pravda on 19 Feb-
ruary 1950. It may be recalled that Andreev, Commissar for Agricul-
ture during the war, was made Chairman of the Council for Collective
Farm Affairs in October 1946. He apparently remained the Politburo
spokesman on agricultural matters, even after Malenkov's entry into
agricultural problems in 193+7.
The Pravda article, entitled "Against Distortions in Collective
Farm Labor Organization," was an attack on the so-called "link" or
"team" system of collective farming, as opposed to the "brigade" sys-
tem. The practice denounced was that of parcelling out parts of a.
collective farm to small teams, or sub-groups, of collective farmers.
The team system had been endorsed by the Party since at least 1939,
and had been reaffirmed in decrees of 193+7 and 193+8. The Pravda ar-
ticle took exception to the indiscriminate application of this sys-
tem to grain farming and to areas where the Kolkhozes were supplied
with adequate agricultural machinery. It was argued that the system
precluded the effective utilization of agricultural machinery and
made overall control of the farmers impossible.
The article went on to say that "the incorrect views expressed
in this matter by Comrade A. A. Andreev cannot be overlooked." It
then proceeded to document the history of Andreev's incorrect views
from 1939 to 1949. The author of the, article is unknown.)
Following the attack on Andreev and his subsequent recantation,
which appeared in Pravda on 25 February 1950, a movement was begun
by N. S. Khrushchev, as Chairman of the Moscow Oblast Party Committee,
to enlarge the collective farms in the Moscow Oblast by merging or
Stylistic characteristics of the article tentatively suggest
authorship by Khrushchev.
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amalgamating the small farms. Khrushchev outlined this new policy
in Pravda on 25 April 1950. Although some observers suggested that
this was an experimental program applied only in Moscow Oblast,
Khrushchev revealed in a December 1950 speech that a Central Commit-
tee decree on kolkhioz amalgamation had been issued, and implied that
the policy was being implemented throughout the USSR.
The open censure of A. A. Andreev for his "incorrect" policy
probably represented more than an effort to provide a scapegoat for
a change in policy: such public censures of Politburo figures are
quite rare, and there are numerous cases of dramatic reversals in
Soviet policy with no effort made to provide a scapegoat; such
changes are frequently Justified on the grounds that "new conditions"
require the change, while in many cases there will be complete denial
that any change has been effected at all.
Andreev's humiliation would appear, therefore, to reflect funda-
mental political controversy, and presumably it signalized the tempo-
rary triumph of one political faction over an opposing one. Thus,
after Andreev's censure, Khrushchev became the top-level spokesman
for agriculture, even though Aidreev remained Chairman of the. Council
for Collective Farms Affairs.-!
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SOVIET FOREIGN POLICY AND THE KOREAN WAR
A distinct change in Soviet foreign policy took place in 1949,
involving a shift in Soviet effort and attention from Western Europe
to the Far East. This shift coincided with the victory of the Chi-
nese Communists on the mainland. In Europe, the Berlin blockade
and the Greek Civil War were brought to an end.in 1949, and from
then on, Soviet diplomatic activity in Europe was negligible, entail-
ing only a few sporadic propagandistic gestures. In the East European
I/ Agriculture was not a new field of activity for Khrushchev. He
was assigned to the Ukraine in 1938; in 1939, according to avail-
able records, he began writing on agricultural problems and, sub-
sequently, he became known as an agricultural specialist.
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Satellites the degree of Soviet control was increased, opposition
elements were severely repressed, and efforts were begun to integrate
the Satellite economies with that of the USSR.
Some observers attribute this foreign policy shift to the disap-
pearance of Zhdanov's influence and the rise of Malenkov. Malenkov,
it is said, saw an opportunity for major international successes in
the Far East, whereas Zhdanov and Molotov reportedly had ignored the
Far East and concentrated their attention on Europe.
For example, Dedijer's biography of Tito alleges that Stalin ad-
mitted, at a February 1948 conference, that he and the other Soviet
leaders had underestimated the future prospects of the Chinese Commu-
nist revolution. In the summer of 1948, Stalin signed a condolence
telegram to Togliatti, whereas it was Malenkov who signed a similar
telegram in July 1948 to the Secretary General of the Japanese Commu-
nist Party, Tokuda.
The existence of such a foreign policy controversy is substanti-
ated only by fragmentary indications of this kind. There is no reli-
able intelligence on this question, and the shift in Soviet policy
which did in fact occur was clearly as much a result of circumstances
as of anything else: The Berlin blockade had not only been a failure,
but had also been a strong irritant to the West and had created a pos-
sibly explosive situation. The conclusion of the Greek Civil War was
simply a matter of time after Yugoslavia withdrew its support. The
militant Communist policy in France and Italy had failed. In the Far
East, however, new possibilities appeared as the Chinese Communists
neared final success.
Soviet Politburo members who regularly appeared at Chinese Com-
munist parties and receptions from 1949 on were Molotov, Mikoyan and
Bulganin.
The Soviet Amba sador to China from February 1948 to June 1952
was N. V. Roshchin.2-~ The Soviet Political Representative in Japan,
Roshchin was renamed Ambassador to the Chinese Peoples Republic
after relations with the Nationalist Government were severed in
October 1949. Roshchin was replaced as Ambassador to China in
June 1952 by A. S. Panyushkin, who had formerly been Ambassador
to the United States. Roshchin was identified on 7 October 1952
as Chief of the Southeast Asia Division of the USSR Ministry of
Foreign Affairs.
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Derevyanko, was assigned to this post in 1946 and remained there un-
til May 1950. The Soviet representative in Pyongyang, Colonel Gen-
eral T. F. Shtykov, had been the Chief of the Soviet delegation to
the Joint Commission on Korea and Commander of Soviet Forces in Korea
from 1946 until 1948, at whit time he was designated Ambassador to
the North Korean Government.) Shtykov presumably remained Soviet Am-
bassador to Korea until August 1951; at that time a new Ambassador,
V. N. Razuvaev, was identified.
The above data would appear to establish that there was no change
in the Kremlin in late 1948 or early 1949, in the persons responsible
for Far Eastern affairs. This conclusion tends to discount the hypo-
thesis that there bad been important policy differences relating to
the Far East and that the shift in Soviet attention to the Far East
was a result of Malenkov's rise.
The new expansive policy in the Far East culminated in the North
Korean invasion of South Korea. There is little reason to believe
that the proposal for the invasion would have provoked violent contro-
versy in the Kremlin. There were sound military reasons for the Sov-
iet leaders to desire to control all of Korea. (The same military
considerations apply equally well to the Chinese Communists.) Fur-
thermore, there is convincing circumstantial evidence that the Soviet
leaders did not expect UN intervention in Korea; all evidence would
appear to suggest that they expected the Korean invasion to be a
short, fast campaign which would result in the consolidation of the
entire peninsula under Soviet control.
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concluding that Molotov himself was the primary sponsor of the North
Korean attack. No one person or group of persons can be so identi-
fied. Moreover, despite the obvious reverse suffered by the USSR in
the Korean development, and despite the obvious. possible ramifica-
tions of these developments, no readjustments or other changes were
noted in the Soviet hierarchy. It thus appears that nobody on the
Politburo level was held immediately responsible or made a scapegoat
for the reverses.
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