RECENT DEVELOPMENTS IN POLITICAL STATUS OF SOVIET ARMED FORCES

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP91T01172R000200260001-2
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 55
• Document Creation Date: December 15, 2016
• Document Release Date: July 27, 2004
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: September 20, 1955
• Content Type: STUDY

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SOVIET STAFF STUDY
This study is a working paper prepared by thq
Soviet Staff, OCX, to assist Soviet Staff analysts
in developing a common appreciation of some of the
background factors affecting current intelligence
trends in the Soviet field.
fa? examination o al av a e 1n orma on on Tne
leading members of the Soviet hierarchy, their
political associations, and the policies -ith which
they have bee} identified.
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CUTOFF UAT4: 20 Sept 1955
RECENT DEVELOPMENTS IN POLITICAL., STATUS OF
TABLE OF CONTENTS:
PREFACE: Context and Purpose of Paper
PAGE
I. Apparent Gains of Military Under
Malenkov Premiership . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
A. Security Relaxation in Armed Forces
B. Introduction of New Military Personnel,
Policy
C. Glorification of Armed Forces
D. Military Representation in Government/
Party Positions
E. Rehabilitation of Disgraced Officers
F. Increased Number of Military Promotions
and Reassignments
G. Check on Military Gains
II. Apparent Losses of Military Under Malenkov . . . . 17
III. Role of Military in Light vs. Heavy Industry
Dispute and Fall of Malenkov . . . . . . . . . . 22
A. Probable Dissatisfaction of Military
B. Military Aspects of Dispute
C. Conclusions re Military Role in Malenkov
Fall
(Continued)
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TABLE OF CONTENTS (Contd)
IV. Position of Military Under Khrushchev!
Bulganin Leadership . . . . . . . . . . . 26
A. Review of Important Developments Since
Malenkov's Demotion
B. Party Control in the Armed Forces
C. Security Control in Armed Forces
D. Control of Zhukov
E. Buildup of Konev as CounterweLght to
Zhukov
F. Probable Appearance of Military
Groupings
G. Conclusions re Control of Military
and Military Groupings.
V. Probable Influence of Military on Soviet
Policy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
52
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RECENT DEVELOPMENTS IN POLITICAL STATUS OF SOVIET
AI MKD FORCES
PREFACE: Context and Purpose of Paper:
An examination of the political status of the
Soviet armed forces during the period October 1952
r 1953
-- that the military has in the past re-
vealed a relatively passive attitude to-
ward internal crises with a tendency to-
ward fragmentation and inaction.
-- that military freedom of action is re-
stricted in a number of ways: by inter-
locking networks of political and security
officers operating within the ranks; by
a tendency toward conformity among offi-
cers and men alike; by a growing officer
caste system; and by the presence in the
officer corps of a high percentage of
Communists subject to party discipline.
-- that in the post-Stalin period, the tradi-
tionally passive position of the military
in politics shifted to a more active role,
with the armed forces participating in
the removal and sentencing of Beria.
-- that by the end of 1953, the political
position of the Soviet military leaders
appeared better than it had for several
years previously, and an uneasy alliance
was probably maintained between top pro-
fessional officers and Party leaders.
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the military leadership in the-formulation of the
Soviet governmental policy, there was practically
no evidence of any formal change in the relationship
of the military forces to other branches of the
Soviet government. It was postulated that some
cliques or groups of high-ranking officers had prof-
ited_ more than others by the ' changes in the regime
and hence were more loyal to certain of the new
political leaders, but very little evidence could
be adduced to identify those military leaders who
directly supported or were supported'by one or
another political faction.
It is the purpose of this paper to summarize
all available information which would update the
examination of the role of the Soviet military in
politics and place in perspective the position of
the military within the context of Soviet leader-
ship. Questions concerning the control of the
army, possible groupings within the military leader-
ship, and the probable influence of the military on
Soviet policy will be considered.
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I. Apparent Gains of Military Under Malenkov Premier-
ship:
Certain gains which were to result in the greatly
increased prestige of the military began to appear as
early as July 1953. This may have been partly dye to
the support of the military in the Beria affair, but
may also have been due to the general conciliatory
policy of the Malenkov regime. These gains took vari-
ous forms: a certain relaxation of security within
the armed forces; the introduction of a new military
personnel policy; the granting of honors; a limited
increase in the number of officers in government and
party positions; th6 rehabilitation of disgraced
officers; and the unfreezing of promotions and re-
assignments.
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Security Relaxation Among Military:
The earliest concession, apparent as early as
August 1953, was the relaxation of security regulatioq4
among the Soviet troops in occupied countries. In con-
trast to their former prisonlike existence, troops (both
officer and enlisted) were now permitted to fraternize
with the local population, to purchase liquor, and to
marry local nationals. In addition, officers of the
rank of lieutenant and above were permitted to wear
civilian clothes off duty and to bring their wives and
children, of both preschool and school age, to the
occupied countries. Schools with Soviet teachers were
set up for officers' children. (Previously only high-
ranking officers had been authorized to bring their
wives, accompanied only by children of preschool. age).
Many of the privileges granted the enlisted men were
to be later rescinded in certain areas because of the
resulting misbehavior and crimes. It is not known
who was responsible for this decision to relax security
for the sake of morale. Although the Chief Political
Directorate has the prime responsibility for troop
morale, such a decision seems to go back to Zhukov,
who, as a professional, would be fully aware of the
effect of morale on fighting efficiency.
B. Introduction of New Military Personnel Policy:
The new military personnel policy apparently
introduced about July 1953 aimed primarily at correct-
ing the abuses prevalent under Stalin by stabilizing.
and standardizing induction methods, service, and de-
mobilization measures. There had been gross viola-
tions of the 1939 Universal Military Service Law,
which provided that army privates and junior officers
(NCO's), after serving a two- and three-year term
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respectively, could be held in service only in case
scripts at three years, and the publication since
September 1953 of the Defense Ministry's annual mobili-r
zation order, ordering the release of all persons who
had served the term established by law, seemed designed
to prevent the recurrence of abuses.
MI
Other aspects of the new policy included
greater privileges for re-enlistees and a program to
develop the leadership abilities of NCO's. 25X1
Ian attempt is u
bui up the leadership qualities of NCO's, who are
now to be assigned as platoon leaders. The better
educated conscripts are to be sent to military schools
for three years instead of into military service;
upon graduation, most of them will be placed in a
junior officer (NCO) reserve. 25X1
substantiated by the stress on i.auesa nip of sergeants
which has recently appeared in troop propaganda; and
contrary to the general pattern of not mentioning a
commander's name in broadcasts, the names of ser-
geants showing exemplary leadership qualities are now
being mentioned.
The responsibility for the adoption of this
policy may lie with the military leaders, who probably
recognized its relation to troop morale; however, it
is conceivable that the political leadership, with
its stress on legality in all spheres of Soviet life,
encouraged the adoption of such aprogram.
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Military personnel policies achieved stabili-
zation by about mid-1954, and since that date there
have been no major'shifts, although specific military
requirements have evidently affected the length of
service of certain critical specialties.1
C. Glorification of Military Forces:
A tendency to glorify the military forces has
become increasingly evident during the entire post-
Stalin period. This flattery was undoubtedly intended
to give the armed forces a sense of close identifica-
tion with the regime and its political goals. This
was revealed by Voroshilov, who, while handing out
.awards on one occasion during 1953, stated, "The award-*
ing to you of orders and medals is graphic testimony
of the love and concern with which our people, party
and government surround their armed forces, and a
manifestation of profound confidence in your staunch-
ness and steadfastness." Although efforts were made
by the Malenkov regime to appease other groups by the
granting of awards, their honors were in no way as
spectacular as those heaped upon the military. As
a contrast to the Stalin period of slighting the mili-
tary, this rising prestige took on added significance.
During the Malenkov period, 156 officers were
singled out for honors, including 43 Orders of Lenin
and 11 Orders of the Red Banner; in addition, on at
least three occasions, awards have been made to un-
named "generals, admirals, and officers" of the armed
forces.
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Busts of nine army officers who had twice won
the title of Hero of the Soviet Union, including one
of Marshal Zhukov, were unveiled during the Malenkov
reign. Approximately 40 army officers are entitled
to this honor, according to Soviet press, This was
in marked contrast to the postwar?period'in whidh'
only a few of Stalin's known favorites, such as
Marshal Konev and General Chuikov, were so honored.
In addition, 14 memorials were erected to Soviet/
Russian Military heroes.1
1/ To honor traditional military heroes, a
gigantic equestrian statue of Field Marshal Suvorov
and a 100-foot statue of Admiral Nakhimov with tele-
scope were unveiled; and, apparently as a special
honor to the Ukrainians, a statue to Schors, the
Bolshevist military hero from the Ukraine, was also
dedicated. A total of 11 memorials, honoring the ex-
ploits of Russian and Soviet military heroes, nine of
which were in the Orbit, were dedicated with Soviet
and local dignitaries in attendance. These monuments
were usually of immense size. In Norway and Egypt
two monuments were erected by the USSR Ministry of
Defense to honor Soviet/Russian fallen heroes. Ingi.-
dentally, this number included a statue erected in
honor of the 1939 defeat of the Japanese at Khalkhtn-
Gol, the battle in which Zhukov first won glory.
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Minor military anniversaries received more
than customary publicity. The Soviet navy honored
every possible anniversary, the majority of which
had previously been unheralded.1 Elements of the
navy made much-publicized state visits to Finland,
England, Turkey, and Sweden, as well as to certain
Orbit countries.
In addition, graduations from military
academies received unaccustomed publicity, and book
exhibits and artillery exhibits showing the glorious
history of the Soviet armed forces appeared.
A further manifestation of rising prestige
was the fact that the uniform was made the special
prerogative of the army. An order of August 1954
put civilians back into mufti. Army and air officers
made their appearances in new uniforms of operatic
splendor.
1/ These celebrations included, among others,
the 1700th anniversary of the defense of Sevastopol
against the British and French in the Crimean war;
the 240th anniversary of the Russian naval victory
over Sweden near Gangut Island; the 100th anniver-
sary of the defense of Petropavlovsk against Anglo-
French forces; the 50th anniversary of the sinking
of the Russian cruiser, "Varyag"; the 250th anni-
versary of the Kronstadt fortress; the 50th anni-
versary of the Russian naval commander Admiral
Makarov; the anniversary of the victory over the
Turks at Sinope.
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D. Military Representation in Government/Party
Positions:
In the elections to the Supreme Soviet in
March 1954, a deputy from nearly every important
military position was elected.' Of a total of
1,347 deputies elected in 1954, 70 were military
officers as compared to 59 officers out of a total of
1,316 deputies elected in 1950. This is in contrast
to a drop of approximately 60 percent in MVD repre-
sentation. -
That the electing of more military men to
government positions, like the giving of awards,
was meant to identify the military with the aims of
the regime was indicated by a Pravda statement that
"the elections to the Supreme Soviet have demonstrate4
with new force the boundless devotion of the Soviet
fighters to their government and the Communist Party."
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More officers than formerly were elected mem
bers of commissions of the Supreme Soviet.
-- Army General M. V. Zakharov, Commander
of Leningrad military district, to
the Credentials Commission, Council
of Nationalities.
-- Army General A. S. Zheltov, Chief, Chief
Political Directorate, to Commission on
Draft Bills, Council of Union.
-- Army General A. A. Grechko, Commander
of Group of Soviet Forces, Germany,
to Commission of Foreign Affairs,
Council of Union.
mm
ve to e primarily a prestige position.
In February 1954, at various republic party
congresses (exclusive, of course, of the RSFSR), the
number of military officers elected to the republic
central committees and buros was conspicuously greater
than in the past. From the 10 republics where there
are major troopr'headquarters, 32 military men, includ-
ing the 11 military district commanders involved, were
elected to the party central committees of their re-
spective republics. With a few exceptions, all were
elected full members. Although the actual military
representation increased, the significance is lessene4
somewhat by the fact that the size of the republic
central committees was in general increased; military
representation on the various republic central com-
mittees varies from none (in republics where there
are no troop-concentrations) to five percent (in the
Ukraine)..
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Of the 11 military district commanders involved
in the areas affected by the elections nine were chosen
as members of their republic buros.l
khe
giving oi an increasing numoer ox Important party and
government jobs to the military was an original move
of Malenkov, designed to subject the military to party
discipline in a more fundamental sense by increasing
their responsibility to the Party.
E. Rehabilitation of Disgraced Officers:
The regime's attempt to correct some of the
wrongs suffered under Stalin was probably responsible
for the rehabilitation of a number of military officers,.
some of whom are known to have undergone imprisonment.
Stalin's jealousy of the glory justly earned by the
military during the war led him to degrade, on various
charges, the outstanding leaders of all services. Al-
though Stalin's death brought Zhukov's public re-
appearance in'Moscow2 and restored the naval chief
Kuznetsov to his original rank of fleet admiral, the
most remarkable restoration to favor occurred in the
1/ Mention should be made of the two military
district commanders who were not elected. This
occurred in the Ukraine, which encompasses four mils,
tary districts. Of the four military district com-
manders, two (Konev and Chuikoy) were elected buro
members. To elect all four Ukrainian military dis-
trict commanders to an 11-man body would have given
the military a quite disproportionate representation.
2/ There is reason to believe that Zhukov was
back-in Moscow as early as 1950, possibly taking the
place vacated by Konev as Commander in Chief of
Ground Forces. His return was not publicized.
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case of air officers. At. the end of World War II,
practically all the top commanders of the various
air forces had been sent into obscurity. During
1953 and 1954, various disgraced air officers, with
their original ranks restored, were given awards and
medals "for long years of service." Those honored
included the following who are listed with the posi...
tions held during the last war:
-- Chief Marshal of Aviation A. A. Novikov,
Commander in Chief, Military Air Forces..
-- Marshal of Aviation G. A. Vorozheikin,
lst deputy Commander in Chief, Military
Air Forces.
-- Marshal of Aviation N. S. Skripko, Chief
of Staff, Lone Range Bomber Foreera _
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-- Col. Gen. A. I. Shakurin, head of avia-
tion industry.
-- Co]. ,Gen. A. K. Repin, Chief Engineer of
the Military Air Forces.
-- Col. Gen. N. S. Shimanov, Political deputy,
Military Air Forces.
-- Col. Gen. M. I.'Samokhl.n, Commander,
Baltic Fleet Air Force.
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-- Deputy Commander in Chief of Naval
Forces
-- Chief of Frunze Military Academy
-- CinC of Soviet Forces in Germany
-- CinC of Central Group of Forces
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F. Increased Number of Military Promotions and
T
Reassignments:
The relaxation of the virtual freeze on
office existed under Stalin's
regimel -- _~ including two promo-
tions to the rank of marshal and s~x to army general.
In addition, certain other promotions have been
noted since 1953 and have presumably been accom-
panied by unpublicized promotions in lower ranks.
Among the more interesting have been those of N. I.
Vinogradov to admiral and M. A. Shalin to colonel
general. Vinogradov, a deputy to the Commander in
Chief of the Naval Forces, holds the title of Com-
mander of Submarines of the USSR and his promotion
is presumably related to the increased attention to
the submarine program. Shalin is head of the Intel-
ligence Directorate of the General Staff.
The greater relaxation of security under
Malenkov, so unlike the secrecy of the Stalin regime,
revealed a fluid situation relating to officer re-
assignments. The more important changes, other than
the public return of Zhulcov, affected the following
positions:
Commander in Chief of Administration
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-- Chief of Chief Political Directorate
(with the Air and Navy political
chiefs also undergoing changes)
-- Chief, Airborne Troops
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-- Commanders of four of the five fleetsi
The greatest number of changes has occurred
in the military districts. Of the 24 military dis-
tricts existing at the time of Satlin's death, only
three still have the same commanders. Of these
changing commands, two military district commanders
moved into the Defense Ministry, one (Konev) became
the commander of the Soviet bloc combined command,
three were reassigned as commanders of other mili,
tary districts; one was assigned as chief of Soviet
Forces in Germany, and four lost their jobs when
their military district headquarters were abolished.
Of the commanders affected, only one--Artemyev--is
definitely known to have suffered disgrace.
The significance of these promotions and rer
placements and their possible relation to the Soviet
political situation will be considered later.
G. Check on Military Gains:
In spite of the blandishments, honors and
flattery heaped upon the armed forces under Malenkov,
efforts were made to keep their popularity under con-
trol. Military men were not given significantly
greater access to the public. No speech by a mili-
tary candidate was broadcast over ]Radio Moscow. Bud.-,
ganin, a political marshal, reviewed the parades and
gave the addresses on the most important military
anniversaries in both 1953 and 1954 (1 May and 7
November); it was customary previously to have pro-.
fessional soldiers take these honors. In general, the
voice of the military was heard only in connection
with military anniversaries, with one exception
where propaganda purposes were served--the letters 99
Vasilevski And Zhukov berating Montgomery and Churchil'.
for allegedly ordering the stacking of German arms
after World War II for possible reissue to the Ger-
mans for use against the Soviets.
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II. Apparent Losses suffered by Military under Malenh v:
The most obvious loss was the reduction in funds
available for military purposes as provided under the
1953/1954 budgets. This cut was apparently necessary
to finance Malenkov's consumer goods program. The
1953 budget revealed a leveling off of military ex-
penditures: the announced defense expenditures for
1953 were 110.2 billion rubles as compared to 108.6
billion rubles for 1952. This represented a rate of
increase for military expenditures of less than 2
percent, as compared to increases of well over 10
percent per year since 1950. Under the 1954 Soviet
budget the announced allocation for'military purposes
was 103.3 billion rubles, a decrease of 9 percent
from 1953.
A. Administrative Consolidations in Defense
Ministry:
The Defense Ministry, as all sectors of the
Soviet government, was affected by the reorganization
instituted by the Malenkov government after Stalin's
death. This program attempted to reduce expenditures,
to improve efficiency, and to transfer an estimated
million workers from the administrative to the pro-
ductive sectors of the economy.
The first changes in the military services
took the form of consolidation of certain adminis-
trative headquarters, with resulting reduction of
functions and personnel.' Four of the 24 military
district. 'headquarters, an intermediate echelon
headquarters, and a fleet headquarters were probably
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abolished.1 It is reasonable to assume that some
economy measures took place in all military distrj.ct
headquarters.
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The demobilization of a percentage of the
officer personnel was undertaken for reasons of econ-
omy and efficiency: to reduce the office complement
and to weed out the semiliterate officers who had
been commissioned during the war. An attempt at fair-
ness was made, as efficiency ratinara and Awrarianna
officer morale.
e effect of these retirements on
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There apparently was some reduction in enlisted
personnel, although the extent cannot be determined.
The number of soldiers released in 1953 was probably
greater than usual, for it included not only the regu-
lar class but also those who had previously
in service beyond the term required by law.
the massy noticed soldiers, o v u eleased,
in the harvest fields as early as August. The demobil-
ized soldiers were closely tied in with the new agri-
cultural program and the opening of the new lands. As
early as September 1953, Moscow papers reported that
released soldiers were pledging their support to the
program. There are numerous reports suggesting the
pressure on releasees to go to the new lands. Military
divisions, as units, were assigned as patrons of cer-
tain state farms with the responsibility of keeping
them supplied with manpower.
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D. Effect of Malenkov's Economic Policy on
Military: ._
It cannot definitely be stated how the mili-
tary leadership reacted to the retrenchment policies
of 1953 and early 1954. The evidence on retrenchment
itself shows only the direction of change, without
providing an accurate measure of its extent. It sug-
gests peripheral reductions and economies without
any serious reduction in the combat capabilities of.
the Soviet field forces. This conclusion is supported
by other evidence that programs for re-equipping and
reorganizing Soviet military forces proceeded in
orderly fashion all through the period of changing
political leadership..
The changes in personnel policy and adminis-
trative consolidations came at a time when the Soviet
military leaders apparently had achieved greater
freedom to manage the affairs of their own establish-
ment changes may in large
part reflect the attempt of Soviet military leaders
to. systematize personnel policy and wood out in-
efficient or surplus personnel, especially noncombat-
ants, who had hung on since the end of World War II.
Such a program was undoubtedly favored by the Malenkov
regime in its desire to further its agricultural and
consumer goods programs and to out unnecessary costs
wherever possible. It may also have been in part
the price paid by the military leaders to increase the
effectiveness of their forces despite budgetary
restrictions.
III. Role of Military in Light versus Heavy Industry
Dispute -ana Fall of M Ten ov:
In attempting to determine the role of the mili-
tary leadership in the light versus heavy industry
dispute and the fall of Malenkoy, it is necessary to
consider certain questions: Had the military been
pressuring the leadership for increased military
preparedness? Did Khrushchev and his followers woo
the support of the military for their cause? Or did
the viewpoints of the two groups happen to coincide
on the necessity of increased military strength?
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A. Probable Dissatisfaction of Military:
Despite the gains achieved under Malenkov,
there are reasons to believe that the military
leaders may have been unhappy in 1954. They may
have become convinced that Malenkov was jeopardizing
the safety of the country by his readjustment of the
economy and by what was thought to be the failure
of his foreign policy. They were surely uneasy about
the imminent rearming of Germany; the growing
strength of the West and the diplomatic success of
its position of strength; the possibility of their
Chinese ally becoming involved in new military risks;
the increased military needs of the Satellites and
China, particularly as they related to the proposed
Soviet counterpart to NATO. Such considerations may
have forced the military to desire other leadership.
In contrast to Malenkov, Khrushchev and his
followers, disappointed in a conciliatory foreign
policy and believing through conviction and experience
that military strength as an adjunct to diplomacy
should play a major role in foreign affairs, argued
for the need of increased military preparedness.
There are hints that throughout 1954 there
may have been naing argument on military pre-
tiredness.
conciuaea a mm
into two groups on the question of allocation of
funds to the armed forces: the more militant group
(Bulganin, Khrushchev, Kaganovicb) which consistent.y
emphasized Western aggressiveness in order to keep
military expenditure at a high level; and the non-
aggressive group (Malenkov, Saburov, Pervukhin)
which was inclined to consider the financial needs
of other sectors of the economy at the expense of the
military.
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B. Military Aspects of Dispute:
Three developments point to the fact that
military considerations were closely bound up to the
light versus heavy industry dispute: .
-- the pointed relation in public statements
of heavy industry priority to defense
needs, emphasizing the necessity for
such priority to maintain the defensive
capability of the country;
-- during the height of the dispute, prop-
aganda related to the necessity of
military preparedness was intensified;
-- changes stressing increased military
strength occurred immediately before
and after Malenlcov's fall, both within
the USSR and the bloc.
Although in general during 1954 Soviet leaders
urged the continuing development of heavy industry,
the defense-related aspect did not receive as much
emphasis as later during the dispute. Only Bulganin?
was to refer consistently to the defense aspect; thjs
has led to speculation that he may have been acting
as a bridge for the military viewpoint. In his
election speech of February 1954, he gave particular
attention to heavy industry. "The basis for a
further upsurge of our national economy always has
been and remains heavy industry... heavy industry is
the foundation of the invincible defensive ability qf?
the country and the might of our gallant armed forces."
Phrases such as these were to be much in evidence
during the subsequent argument over heavy versus
light industry.
In the propaganda field, the stress on military
preparedness was exemplified during this period by
two trends:
-- increased references to "surprise
attack" with its connotation of "Be
Prepared" ;
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-- the :reappearance of the theme that
war would destroy only capitalism,
repudiating Malenkov's previous
stand.
Immediately preceding and following Malenkovv'B
removal as premier;, concrete indications of an em-
phasis on increased military strength became evident,
The 1955 Soviet budget, announced in February, re-
vealed that the Soviet government intended to return
to the 1952-53 level of appropriations for defense.
The budget allocated 112.1 billion rubles for ex-
plicit military expenditures, a 12-percent increase
over the 1954 allocation. If the allocation is
completely utilized, these expenditures would be at
a postwar high.
A shift in Soviet economic policy regarding
military preparedness may have been reflected in the
government changes of 28 February 1955. The eleva-
tion of V. A. Malyshev to a supraministerial position
in charge of a group of ministries in the machine
building field may indicate added attention to the
armament field. The appointment of Khrn,nichev, an
individual connected with the aviation industry, to
the rank of deputy chairman of the Council of
Ministers points to increased attention to this side
of the defense picture. The background of P. N.
Goremykin, named 3 April 1955 as head of the newly
created Ministry of General Machine Building, hints
that the new ministry may be dealing with guided
missiles.
Within the bloc, military preparedness was
suggested by the setting up of the much-publicized
combined Soviet-Satellite military command under the
Warsaw Agreement of 14 May 1955. Although the props,
ganda value of such a move, proclaiming the unity
and determination of the "peace camp," was paramount,
military gains were also achieved. The creation of
a permanent staff, composed of representatives of
the staffs of the participating countries, probably
constituted an administrative improvement over the
previous Soviet system of bilateral control over
Satellite military activities. The location of the
headquarters in Moscow and the appointment of a Soviet
officer as commander will provide firm Soviet contrail
over day-to-day operations.
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C. Conclusions on Military Role in Malenkov Fall:
It is believed that the armed forces leaders
contributed to the pressure on Malenkov, probably
because-of their dissatisfaction with his policies
and not because of any desire to seize power or to in-
crease their own power. It is also quite possible
that Khrushchev's followers did seek the support of
the military leaders, but it is extremely doubtful
if the military were the primary power factor in
bringing about the change. It appears most likely
that these two dissatisfied groups (i.e., the mili-
tary and Khrushchev's followers) were brought to-
gether, without the necessity of too much wooing on
either side, by similar viewpoints on the failure of
Malenkov's policy and the necessity of increased
military strength.1
IV. Position of Military under Khrushchev/Bulganin
Leadership :
A. Review of important-developments since
Malenkov's" &9mo' Toh :
The governmental reorganization which followed
the demotion of Malenkov in February 1955 brought
significant changes in the top leadership of the Soviet
armed forces. Marshal Zhukov moved on 9 February into
the position of minister of defense, which had been
vacated by Bulganin's rise to premier. This was the
first time since 1949 that a professional military
officer headed the combined-armed forces of the USSR2.
2/ During the previous period of unification
(19419-1950), Bulganin, a political marshal, was
Minister of Armed Forces from 1946 until March 1949,
when Marshal Vasilevsky, a professional officer, took
over.
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Although the influence of the professional
military leadership in the government rose to a new
high with Zhukov's appointment, the political leaders
took pains to keep the power of the military well
within definite limits. No representative of the
professional military class was promoted in February
or subsequently to the highest policy-making bodies
of the USSR,--the Presidium of the Party Central Com-
mittee or the Presidium of the Council of Ministers.
In the Party Presidium, which presumably'holds the
final voice on policy matters, the armed forces will
continue to be represented by Bulganin, a non-
professional. Although recent events suggest that
some decision-making power may now have been extended
to the Party Central Committee, the percentage of
military figures in the Central Committee does not
give them a decisive voice in that body. Of the 125
full members of the Central Committee, who would have
the voting privilege, only 8 (or 6.4 percent) are
military officers, and this number includes three
who would be considered nonprofessionals--Bulganin,
Voroshilov, and Brezhnev. Only 20 military officers
are included in the list of candidate members of the
Central Committee.
That the new leadership was willing to permit
a further rise in military prestige was shown in a
variety of ways:
-- the continued glorification of the armed
forces through the granting of awards,
dedication of monuments, announced
planned publication of works on mili-
tary subjects, etc.
-- the exploitation of the popularity of
military officers by making greater
use of them as policy spokesmen.
-- the rather obvious efforts of the leader-
ship to show the unity of the party-
government-military leadership, such
as the attendance at Govorov's funeral
in March 1955 and the telecast of
Zhukov-Bulganin-Khrushchev for Armed
Forces Day in February 1955.
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the ostentatious mass promotion of
several officers to the highest
ranks in the USSR in March 1955.
-- the granting of greater latitude of
public expression to military
officers on military subjects--
even problems of grand strategy.
On 11 March 1955, six officers were promoted
to the rank of Marshal of the Soviet Union and five.
to the rank of chief marshal or marshal of a special
arm or service. This was-the largest simultaneous
promotion to these high ranks ever made in the USSR,.
At special ceremonies, Voroshilov presented the
marshal's star and patent to the newly created mar-
shals, plus the two highest-ranking naval officers.'
Certain high military officers in their turn
contributed publicly to enhancing the reputation of
the post-Malenkov political leadership, by acclaiming
a select list of Party leaders who allegedly contrib-
uted most to the Soviet military effort in World
War II. A recent. study has found that during the
weeks immediately following Malenkov's resignation,
six different military leaders paid public tribute
to the part in winning the war played by Khrushchev,
Bulganin and the deceased Zhdanov and Shcherbakov.2
Those military men who spoke out in such fashion in-.
eluded Konev, Bagramyan, Zheltov, Moskovsky (the
editor of Red Star) and several lesser figures. The
use of selecTe'stings of this type had already
played a part in the discrediting of Malenkov,
although military leaders had not been important as
public participants.
The presence o navy
officers reveals an incident of interservice jealousy
in the Soviet armed forces. Shortly after the mass
promotion, it was made public that the highest naval
rank had been changed from "admiral of the fleet" to
"admiral of the fleet of the Soviet Union." This
change was apparently designed to correct any popular
misunderstanding that the highest naval title might
be inferior to the highest army title, although, ac-
cording to Soviet field service regulations, the two
titles had always been of equal rank.
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During 1955 a total of 80 literary works
on military st}bjects will be issued by the Military
Publishing Office, according to a TASS announcement
of 9 May 1955. Of special interest is the fact that
the series is to include a number of books about
outstanding military leaders of the last war. Soviet
writers have been instructed to write more books
for children about the army and to make them as
romantic and inspiring as possible.
At a Moscow conference of the Union of
Soviet Writers held in late May, in which the Defense
Ministry participated, public requests were made for
less censorship of military writing, more accuracy
in reporting, emphasis on better biographies of
prominent military leaders, and, most significantly,
a revision of the Stalinist versions of military
history and strategic military doctrine which had
developed during World War II. A discussion of
basic strategic doctrine this spring revealed a new
practice of public appraisal of world-wide military
developments, in contrast to the practice during
the Stalin era of airing only those opinions which
conformed to the military views of Stalin. Recent
public statements by Soviet military officers have
challenged the military genius of Stalin by calling
for a reappraisal of the traditional emphasis of
those "permanently operating factors" in warfare
which had been stressed by Stalin as being the
decisive elements for victory and by asking for more
consideration of the significance of the element of
"surprise attack.'+1
During the late spring and summer of 1955,
as the extremely active Khrushchev-Bulganin foreign
policy unfolded, Soviet military forces at home and
abroad were used as an important bargaining element
1/ The five "permanently operating factors"
which determine the outcome of war are, according
to Stalinist military science: stability of the
rear, morale of the army, the quantity and quality
of divisions, the armament of the army, and the
organizing ability of the command personnel.
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saw,
in the regime's campaign for relaxation of inter-
national tensions. In contrast to the militancy
of the period around the time of Malenkov's resig-
nation, the Soviet leadership embarked on a pro-
gram of concessions in which military leaders were
prominent instruments.
The rapid series of foreign policy moves
affecting the military establishment began with the
Soviet agreement in May to end the occupation of
Austria. Following final ratification of the
Austrian treaty in July, Soviet forces began to
withdraw in August, and the withdrawal was virtually
completed by early September. Bulganin used this with-
drawal at the Geneva conference as the opening gambit
in a series of moves designed to prove to the West that
the Soviet military threat had evaporated, when he
announced that the total strength of the Soviet
military establishment would be reduced by an amount
equivalent to the strength of the forces withdrawn
from Austria.
This was followed within a month by the
dramatic Soviet announcement that as a result of
the "relaxation of international tensions" follow-
ing Geneva, the Soviet armed forces would be reduced
in size by a total of 640,000,000 men (estimated to
be approximately 16 percent of total military man-
power) by 15 December. All the European Satellites
except East Germany, which has no official military
force, have since followed suit with promises of
military manpower reductions of roughly similar scope.
A continuation of such moves was foreshadowed
by a toast delivered by Khrushchev in Bucharest on
25 August, in which he stated that the announced
Soviet reduction was "not our last word" on the sub-
ject of international accord, and that if Soviet
actions are followed by similar Western actions, the
USSR will "continue to march on this road."
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A further Soviet concession involving mili-
tary forces abroad was made on 17 September, when
the USSR agreed to return its base at Porkkala to
Finland.
The degree of participation by Soviet military
leaders in these decisions is not definitely known,
and there is very little information on which to base
a hypothesis regarding their role. Marshal Zhukov,
as defense minister, logically signed the proclama-
tions regarding the removal of Soviet forces from
Austria and the reduction in over-all military man-
power. Zhukov himself was one of the four leading
Soviet figures at Geneva, despite the fact that his
position in the Soviet governmental structure was
lower than that of many persons not included in the
delegation, although his presence may well be ex-
plained by his previous close association with Presi-
dent Eisenhower. At a private luncheon with the
President at Geneva, Zhukov is reported to have dwelt
at length on the "collegiality" of present-day Soviet
decision-making. Following the announcement of the
intended evacuation of Porkkala, Zhukov took occasion
to inform Western press correspondents that "we
decided that. the time has come to liquidate our bases
in general," and "the sooner the West follows suit
the better." (In this statement,'Zhukov repeated a
theme emphasized by him in an interview with Western
correspondents on 7 February 1955, just prior to his
appointment as defense minister.)
It must-be emphasized that the use of mili-
tary leaders and military forces as instruments of
the present conciliatory Soviet foreign policy does
not imply that the Soviet leadership is in its own
estimation reducing its over-all preparedness effort.
The increased military budget announced in February
apparently remains in force, and the statements of.
last winter regarding the need for a strong defense
have in no way been retracted. The "concessions"
that have been announced refer only to aggregate
manpower and to bases of relatively little military
significance. The Soviet estimate, concurred in by
the military, may well be that the realities of
modern warfare are such that other factors of
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military strength (e.g., nuclear weapons and the
means of delivering them) now outweigh sheer man-
power strength, some of which can be channeled to
economic production. It is too early to tell what
means the USSR will use to implement its announced
troop reduction, but many possibilities are avail-
able which would minimize its significance to over-
all Soviet military capabilities. "' It' is , moreover,
quite possible that the 1955 announcement is in
part an attempt to take belated credit for some of
the reductions which took place in 1953 and 1954.
Thus there is at present little reason to suppose
that the concessions of the summer of 1955 would
have met with serious objections by informed mili-
tary leaders.
B. Party Control in the Armed Forces:
The enormous prestige and improved status
now enjoyed by the military raises the question of
their control in the future. Despite the impressive
gains of the armed forces, the traditional party
and security controls remain, and there are reasons
to believe that the leadership will attempt to keep
them as effective as in the past.
It is possible that Party and Komsomol
membership in the military has increased recently.
Molotov in his 8 February 1954 speech to the Supreme
Soviet said that, for every 100 men in the army,
there were 77 Party or Komsomol members. Earlier,
in October 1952, Marshal Vasilevsky had stated that
86.4 percent of the officers and generals were Party
or Komsomol members. As most of the senior officers
have long been nominal Party members, it is doubtful
if Party membership among the officer class has in-
creased appreciably. Assuming the statements mentioned
above refer only to the army and assuming a 2,500,000-
man army with a 12 percent officer component, this
would indicate that approximately 75 percent of the
enlisted men are either Party or Komsomol members.
On the other hand, if the above statements refer to
the armed forces as a whole and assuming a force of
4,000,000 with the same officer percentage, the num-
ber of Party and Komsomol members among the enlisted
men would be 61 percent of the total.
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Party figures are not available to ascertain
if this represents a substantial increase in Party
and Komsomol membership. It is doubtful if more
than a few percent of the enlisted men are Party
members as most of them are in the age group for
Komsomol membership (26 and under). In view of the
emphasis being placed on NCO leadership, however,
it is possible that more NCO's are now being admitted
to the Party than formerly. In regard to Komsomol
P
heavy pressure is exerted on soldiers to join; an
that as a result practically all the troops have at
least gone through the formality of taking out member-
ship. It It appears that the Komsomol organization in
the armed forces underwent a reorganization in the
fall of 1954, but details are not available. A broad-
cast of the armed forces radio service, in September
1954, spoke of the conversion of the Komsomol organi-
zation to a "new structure" with organizational meet-
ings being held for that purpose in various armed
forces units.
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In the matter of Party control of officers,
a more liberal approach has been noted. 25X1C
bens of a military Party cell, instead of following
prescribed study assignments as in the past, were
permitted to use their initiative in the choice of
studies. The deputies for political matters were to
supervise the courses and to evaluate the work of
the compulsory curricula o
political training were relaxed in 1954, so that mem-
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each member.l Evidence of the truth of this report
has appeared in Soviet military publications. In
Red Star, 22 March 1955, reference was made to the
putting into practice of the principle of volun-
tariness in party enlightenment." The article
pointed out that during the current training year,
many officers have raised their ideological-
political level by "independent" study; but un-
fortunately, the article continues, many of these
officers had had insufficient experience in inde-
pendent study. The article goes on to criticize
political organs and Party bureaus which very
superficially fulfilled their responsibilities for
resolving the difficulties of the officers.
Certain concessions appear to have been made
to improve the position of the commander for the sake
of military discipline; but these gains have been
partially nullified by saddling the commanders with
a greater sense of Party responsibility. 1C
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party cell may not criticize t eir commander, as
such action might undermine military discipline;
official complaints of the military are forwarded
not through political channels but through military
channels; the position of political officer ex-
tended as of 1954 down only to battalion level,
whereas formerly it was found through company level,
with the commander assuming political duties on
lower levels.
1/ The new emphasis on independence in political
activities has its parallel in the tactical field.
Officers are now encouraged to use initiative with
the service regulations only as a guide, whereas
formerly strict obedience to regulations was expected.
Earlier in this paper mention was made of the leader-
ship program among the NCO's. It is tempting to
speculate on the long-range effects of such policy
innovations--whether initiative and leadership can
be localized only in the channels desired by the
Party.
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The numerous references to strengthening
"one-man command" show a continuing sensitivity on
this subject. For example, Red Star in Feburary
1955 spoke of the necessity 'moo explain more
thoroughly the instructions of the Party in the
matter of one-man command." It is not known whether
this refers to some recent instructions or whether
it is an amplification of earlier directives on
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ical officers lost their command powers in 1942.
Nevertheless, their continued interference in command
functions caused a directive to be issued in 1951
limiting their work strictly to the political field.
It would appear that the professional military
officers are particularly watchful for any encroach-
ment in the command field.
There are hints of a more sophisticated
approach to this problem of unity of command. The
political officers are to be kept definitely out
of the command field, which is the acknowledged
bailiwick of the professional soldiers, but the
commander is to be made increasingly aware of the
fact that the final responsibility for the political
education of his troops rests with him. Political
and military training are considered to be of equal
value. There have been a number of references to
this dual responsibility of the commander in the
military and political field, as illustrated by
a rather flattering quotation from an article,
dated-February 1955, by the editor of Red Star:
"One of the most important measures of t1ie-Party
and government introduced into the Soviet armed
forces in recent years is the strengthening of
unity of command. This raised the authority of
commanders still higher and improved discipline
and order in troop units. Our army and navy have
at their disposal the most experienced cadres of
officers and generals, persons who are selflessly
dedicated to the motherland, and who are capable
of training and educating troops in conformity
with present-day requirements. The most valuable
commanders are those who skillfully combine their
combat activity with the political and military
training of their subordinates."
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That greater freedom of expression
on the whole problem of political con-
trol in the armed forces is now per-
mitted is indicated by the appearance in
Red Star in January 1955 of an article
wh tie rather startling title,
"Party Work Should Be Subordinated to
the Interests of the Unit's Battle-
Readiness."
C. Security Control in the Armed
Forces:
The military counterintelligence
apparatus, now controlled by the KGB, is
believed to be as active as formerly in
ferreting out any "subversive" activ-
ities of the military. It is doubtful
that the security police lost much of
their investigative power by the execu-
tion of Beria and the reorganization of
the security apparatus. Public criti-
cism was directed not against the police
system per se, but against the previous
leadersMi and its methods of operations.
Both former deputy MGB minister Ryumin
and former MGB minister Abakumov were
executed for their alleged extralegal
use of police power. The security ap-
paratus has been definitely subordinated
to the Party and limitations have been
imposed on its indiscriminate use, but
the police organs survive with their
voluminous files and vast network of
informers.
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Stalin always maintained control
of the security apparatus and now
Khrushchev appears to be using his
influence to assign his followers
to the KGB. The chairman of the
KGB and his two identified deputies
are known to have had previous as-
sociations with Khrushchev. This
may indicate that Khrushchev now
commands loyalties, in the KGB and
is therefore influential in its
operations. It is unnecessary to
emphasize that Khrushchev and the
KGB, aware of the enormous prestige
of the military, would be particularly
watchful for any evidence of independ-
ent, thinking or acting on the part
of the armed forces or individuals
within it.
D. Control of Zhukov:
In considering the problem of
army control, attention must be paid
to the personality of Zhukov. He is
unique for several reasons: his pro-
fessional competence; his ability to
inspire almost fanatical loyalty
among his followers; his position as
the most popular figure in the USSR,
both with the populace and the armed
forces; and a certain independence of
mind.
There is no reason to question
his loyalty, either to the Party or to
the government. He, like many of the
more prominent Soviet officers, has
long been a member of the Party, which
he joined in 1919. Most of his speeches
have followed the general policy line of the
moment, although with notable moderation of
phraseology. His letter attacking Mont-
gomery and Churchill in December 1954
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was undoubtedly written at the bidding of the Party
and was in terms so vitriolic as to appear to have
been written by someone else. In his speech for
V-E Day, 1955, he duly gave credit to the Party as
the inspirer and organizer of victory. Nevertheless,
certain hints of independent thinking have appeared,
particularly with reference to his concept of atomic
war. There is reason to believe that he may share
a viewpoint as to the effects of a third world war
more nearly in accord with the opinion expressed by
Malenkov in March 1954.
On 9 May 1954, Zhukov in his first Pravda
article after his return to prominence spa ed-that
"war means heavy losses for both sides"; this was
the closest approach by any top Soviet figure to
Malenkov's thesis of destruction-of-world-civili-
zation. In a February 1955 interview with Hearst
reporters, Zhukov again used this theme, stating
that "atomic war is just as dangerous to the
attacker as to the attacked." Although Zhukov, in
his 23 February address on Armed Forces Day, made
no allusion to possible Soviet losses in a new war,
he failed to reassert forcefully the theme that a
new world war would destroy capitalism alone. This
reticence appeared unusual iti'view of the blunt re-
pudiation of Malenkov's thesis by Molotov on 8
February and by Voroshilov on 26 March, as well as
the presence of this theme in the Soviet press at
that time. In his V-E Day 1955 Pravda article,
Zhukov wrote: ."One has to be.surprised at the
fact that big military experts- -- and especially
those of Britain -- have such an irresponsible
attitude toward the problems of atomic and hydrogen
war. We, the military, realize more clearly than
anyone else the extremely devastating nature of
such a war."
Zhukov has been described as an ardent nation-
alist who is intensely interested in the defense of
his country. He may have favored the more concili-
atory foreign policy of Malenkov; however, the
failure of this policy plus the imminent rearmament
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those advocating greater milit of~~reunefis st
thp time of alenkov's removal.
s persona correspondence
with President sen ower and his letter to the Over-
seas Press Club of 20 April were undoubtedly efforts
to reduce tension. In his letter to the Overseas
Press Club, he expressed certainty that the Presi-
dent would do everything in his power to. give practi-
cal aid to the cause of peace, stating that "new
efforts are now needed to avoid further aggravation
of international tension. He also remarked that
while "some politicians would like to instill the
idea that war is inevitable, the common people of
the world do not want bombs dropped on their homes."
In this letter Zhukov referred to the destruction
that a new war might bring to "children, mothers
and wives" in "New York or Moscow, London or Paris."
His appointment as defense minister may well
have been to increase the popularity of the party
and government at a time when a more austere internal
policy was to be reintroduced. Although by his
appointment his prestige has increased significantly,
his power is limited. He was elected a full member
of the Party Central Committee in mid-1953, but he
has not been elevated to the Presidium of the Party
Central Committee, which is considered the final
policy-making body in the USSR. Nor was he elected
to the Presidium of the Council of Ministers, whose
responsibilities presumably include some policy-
making functions. He is one of the more than 50
ministers who form the Council of Ministers.
It was previously mentioned that the KGB would
continue to restrain any ambitions to power on the
part of the military. Mention should be made of the
relations between Zhukov and the man apparently
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handpicked by Khrushchev to be head of the KGB,
I. A. Serov, whose promotion to Army General was
revealed in August 1955. According to reports,
Zhukov and Serov, who were both in East Germany
following World War II, thoroughly disliked each
other. At that time, Serov was purging anti-Soviet
elements in the Soviet Zone of Germany. Reports
indicate that their paths may also have crossed at
a later date. Serov was sent as an MVD officer to
the Ukraine; at that time Zhukov was military dis-
trict commander at Odessa (Ukraine). In 1948,
Zhukov was dispatched into semiobscurity to the
Urals.
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There are also indications that the party
leadership is taking steps to hold Zhukov's prestige
within bounds by building up Marshal Ivan Konev as
a possible counterweight to Zhukov and by belittling
Zhukov's wartime successes.
E. Buildup of Konev as Counterweight to Zhukov:
Marshal Konev, although stationed outside of
Moscow from 1952 to 1955, was at the center of
several major political controversies in recent years.
He was named as a Doctors' Plot victim in January
1953; he reportedly took part with Zhukov and Bul-
ganin in the arrest of Beria in June 1953; and he
served as chairman of the special session of the
Supreme Court which tried Beria and his associates.
On 8 February 1955, he acted as spokesman
for the armed forces at the Supreme Soviet session.
He was also picked to write the Pravda article for
Armed Forces Day, 23 February 1955, in which he
singled out Khrushchev for special attention. In
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doing this, he departed from the customary alpha-
betical listing of wartime political officers to
name Khrushchev ahead of Bulganin, Zhdanov, and
Shcherbakov. His Pravda article was the most
widely broadcast commentary of the anniversary;
in contrast, Zhukov's speech, which had been tele-
vised, was not broadcast and only a brief summary
appeared in Pravda.
Konev was again chosen to give the main
address at the 1955 V-E celebration at the Bolshoi
Theatre, the first time such ceremonies had been
held on this date. His speech, which has been
characterized as being particularly Stalinist, was
given unusual prominence. Again he set Khrushchev
apart from the other political officers by stating,
"Comrade Khrushchev, comrades Bulganin, etc."
It is noteworthy that two other military
figures, Bagramyan and Zheltov, subsequently copied
Konev's technique of listing Khrushchev before
Bulganin, although they did not go so far as to
separate Khrushchev from the others listed.
Konev, described as an ardent Communist
and a devoted friend of Stalin, joined the party
in 1917 and was active in organizational work.
He began his military career as a political com-
missar. He was elected a candidate member of the
Central Committee, CPSU, in 1949, achieving full
membership in October 1952. Since his assignment
in 1952 to the Ukraine, he has been active in
Ukrainian-party affairs. The Germans described
Konev, whom they nicknamed "Butcher" because of
his heavy troop losses, as "more of a politician
than a soldier."
Konev was picked by Khrushchev to accompany
him to Warsaw on two occasions in 1955: the anni-
versary of the Soviet-Polish Treaty of Friendship
and the anniversary of the liberation of Poland.
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Konev was identified in April as a deputy
minister of defense, only to be named in May as the
commander of the Soviet-Satellite combined forces.
Little is known of the personal relation-
ship between Konev and Zhukov. During World War
II, Konev participated in military operations
coordinated by Zhukov, serving in the defense of
Moscow and the reconquest of the Ukraine. Zhukov's
apparent confidence in Konev as a military commander
is indicated by the fact that in the drive from
Warsaw to Berlin, Zhukov, then personally com-
manding a front as well as co-ordinating all
activities in the area, consistently kept Konev
on his left flank. One area of conflict between
the two has been reported: Konev allegedly favored
strengthening the political control system in the
armed forces in contrast to Zhukov's insistence on
strict one-man command of units. There may be
professional jealousy between the two, since Konev
succeeded Zhukov as commander in chief of the
ground forces in 1946 when Zhukovwas reduced to
a military district commander.
In the build-up accompanying Konev's ap-
pointment as commander of the combined Soviet-
Satellite forces, wartime history was distorted
to challenge the pre-eminent position of Zhukov.
Perhaps the most revealing exaggeration of Konev's
position was carried in a Polish newspaper the day
after his appointment: "The figure of Marshal Ivan
Konev, twice Hero of the Soviet Union, commander of
the First Ukrainian Front during the war, conqueror
of Berlin, and liberator of Prague, is growing to
the dimensions of a symbol -- the symbol of the
invincible might of the Soviet army and of our
entire camp." (ZYCIE WARSZAWY, 15 May 1955).
This quotation distorted facts by
ignoring the major role of Zhukov in the conquest
of Berlin; furthermore, the only military figure
in the USSR who could approach the stature of a
symbol is Marshal Zhukov. There were similar-.dis-
tortions in the speeches of various Satellite Party
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and government leaders, which magnified Konev's
wartime role at the expense of Zhukov.
A biography of Konev (Moscow, News, No. 11,
1955) further disparages the military record of
Zhukov. This article stated that Konev's forces
"in coordination with those of Gen. N. F. Vatutin
(deceased), routed and smashed Hitler's Belgorod-
Kharkov grouping. Then followed the sweep across
the Ukraine, during which Vatutin and Konev exe-
cuted the famous Korsun - Shevchenkovskii operation,
the "Second Stalingrad." From May 1944 onward,
Konev's forces inflicted major defeats on the Nazis
in Poland and Czechoslovakia, and it was his troops,
in conjunction with those of the First Belorussian
Front, which took Berlin on 2 May 1945.. The con-
cluding operation of the war, the thrust into the
Ore Mountains of Czechoslovakia, was also the work
of Konev, and it was highly characteristic of his
type of generalship:" In this write-up, it is
completely overlooked that Zhukov as the repre-
sentative of STAVKA (General Headquarters of the
Supreme Commander) co-ordinated all the ground and
air activities of.the operations referred to;
operations such as these usually involved two to
four fronts with a total of ten to twelve armies,
plus air support. In addition, Zhukov had personal
command of the First Belorussian Front.
A Pravda article on 2 May 1955 by General
V. I. Chuikov on the battle of Berlin not only
failed to give Zhukov credit for planning and
co-ordinating all operations, but distorted truth
to give Konev and Rokossovsky equal credit with
Zhukov for the Berlin capture. Rokossovsky's
contribution was, in fact, indirect, as he remained
in northern Poland and northern Germany when Zhukov
and Konev rushed from Warsaw to Berlin.
In a recent broadcast on a military ex-
hibit in Moscow, Zhukov's part in the battle of
Stalingrad was completely ignored, although he
was the STAVKA representative who planned the
operation and-was in the field during the German
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offensive. Lesser individuals were mentioned, in-
cluding Colonel General (now Marshal) Vasilevsky
who, according to the broadcast, was sent "by the
Party.'". Khrushchev's part in the battle of Stalin-
grad, as a member of the Stalingrad military
council, wts played up as it had been on previous
occasions. Incidentally, the name of Malenkov, who
had been sent by the State Defense Committee to
Stalingrad, was also ignored.
1/ There has been some build-up of Khru$hchev's
role as a political officer in the last war. In the
past it had been customary to give the State Defense
Committee credit for victory, listing its contribution
ahead of the work of the political generals. The
first variation in the official order of precedence
was noted in March 1954; TRUD, on the anniversary of
Stalin's death, stated that the Central Committee,
without mentioning the State Defense Committee, send
Comrades Bulganin, Zhdanov, Shcherbakov, Khrushchev,
and others to direct military work. The same four
were named in December 1954. This may have been an
attempt to undermine the prestige of Malenkov, who
was a member of the State Defense Committee, while
Khrushchev was not. On 2 February 1955, on the 12th
anniversary of the victory of Stalingrad, a Pravda
article ignored all military heroes; besides to n,
only Khrushchev was singled out and personally
associated with victory.
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F. Probable Appearance of Military Groupings:
It has been speculated that Khrushchev may
be attempting to fractionalize the loyalties of the
military by building up his own clique among the pro-
fessional class, in contrast to those who might be
called Zhukov's followers.1 The background of
officers promoted in rank or position since the fall
of Malenkov has therefore been examined for evidence
on the following points: (1) past association with
Khrushchev or Konev; (2) evidence of more than usual
Party activity; (3) indications of Ukrainian ties.
Of the eleven officers promoted to the
rank of Marshal on 11 March 1955, evidence would
indicate that three possibly have loyalties to
Khrushchev and Konev; there is a slight possibility
that two more owe such allegiance. Of the remaining
five, it is impossible to advance an opinion re-
garding four of them, but the fifth has strong war-
time ties to Zhukov. No generalization as to
allegiance can be made in regard to the officer
nrcvneted at the same time to Army General.
nevertheless, 25X1A
The limitations of attempting to line up
followers by the :above-mentioned criteria are rec-
ognized;
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the fact that some of these officers
1/ It is impossible to isolate Zhukov's
followers on the basis of association. During
the last war he came in contact either directly
or indirectly with every prominent officer and,
during his period of eclipse after the war, his
influence would not have been felt in the assign-
ment or promotion of officers. The allegiance
that he commands would date primarily from the
wartime and post-Stalin periods.
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were promoted in place of men of equal or greater
qualifications, suggest that some political in-
fluence was exerted on their behalf. There was
observed a rather close interrelationship of war-
time ties among those promoted.
Promoted officers who are considered
possibly to favor Khrushchev and Konev are:
-- K. S. Moskalenko, Marshal of SU,
Commander of Moscow Military District and Commander
of Moscow Garrison;
-- A. A. Grechko, Marshal of SU,
Commander, Soviet Forces in Germany;
-- S. S. Varentsov, Marshal of
Artillery, probably Chief of Main Artillery
Directorate.
Promoted officers whose careers indicate a
slight possibility of allegiance to Khrushchev and
Konev are:
-- A. I. Yeremenko, Marshal of SU,
Commander, North Caucasus Military District;
-- I. K. Bagramyan, Marshal of SU,
position unknown.
Promoted officers whose allegiance, if any,
cannot be determined:
-- V. I. Chuikov, Marshal of SU, Kiev
Military District.
-- S. S. Biryuzov,, Marshal of SU,
position unknown, possibly PVO chief.
-- P. F. Zhigarev, Chief Marshal of
Aviation, Commander in Chief of Military Air Force;
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-- S. I. Rudenko, Marshal of Aviation,
Chief of Staff of Military Air Force;
-- V. A. Sudets, Marshal of Aviation,
position unknown.
Promoted officer with major wartime ties to
-- V. I. Kazakov, Marshal of Artillery,
Deputy Commander in Chief of Main Directorate of
Artillery Troops.
Bonev's 25X1A
subordinates during and after the war have risen,
possibly through his influence. These officers
include:
-- A. S. Zheltov, Colonel General,
Chief, Chief Political Directorate;
-- G. K. Malandin, Army General, Chief
of Staff, Ground Troops, and Deputy Chief,of General
Staff.
-- A. S. Zhadov, Colonel General,
formerly Commander in Chief, Central Group of Forces;
now possibly a deputy to Konev.
V. V. Kurasov, Army general, Com-
mandant, Voroshilov Military Academy.
Of those high officers who have advanced
in position since 11 March 1955, the advancements of
Konev and Marshal V. D. Sokolovsky are the most
significant. Konev's rise has been discussed.
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The Soviet press revealed in April 1955
that Sokolovsky is now a first deputy Minister of
Defense and Chief of the General Staff of the
Army and Navy. Sokolovsky, a brilliant staff
officer and army commander, was Konev's chief of
staff in the drive across Poland; he was relieved
before the Frankfurt/Berlin breakthrough, apparently
to be Zhukov's staff co-ordinator for the Berlin
operation. He replaced Zhukov in 1946 as commander
of the Soviet Forces in Germany and as chairman,
Soviet Element, Allied Control Council, Berlin.
Western officers in Berlin found him intelligent,
hard, and skillful in carrying out Soviet policy,
in which he was a convinced believer. It was under
his direction that the Soviets instituted the Berlin
blockade.
He became first deputy Minister of the Armed
Forces for General Affairs in March 1949, which
position he retained after the separation of the
Armed Forces Ministry into the War and Navy
Ministries. In 1953, he was identified as chief
of the General Staff and a deputy minister of war.
An apparent favorite of Stalin, he was
elected a full member of the Central Committee,
CPSU, in October 1952. It is impossible to ally
him to any military or political grouping.
Of the six new military district commanders
in the western USSR, four have major wartime ties to
Zhukov; this is also true of the officer who has
been recently named chairman of the central committee
of DOSAAF (All-Union Society for Cooperation with
the Army, Aviation, and the Navy), the Soviet para-
and civil defense organization. 25X1A
Newly assigned
officers with probable major Zhukov associations
include:
-- A. V. Gorbatov, Colonel General,
Commander, Baltic Military District;
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-- I. I. Fedyuninski, Colonel General,
Commander, Transcaucasus Military District;
-- A. I. Radzievski, Colonel General,
Commander, Odessa Military District;
-- V. Ya. Kolpakchi, Colonel General,
Commander, Northern Military District;
-- P. A. Belov, Colonel General,
Chairman, Central Committee, DOSAAF.
In attempting to outline the possibilities
of groupings or cliques within the military establish-
ments, two other recent developments must be taken
into account. The first, already discussed, is the
singling out by certain military leaders in the
spring of 1955 of the select grouping of Party leaders
who allegedly contributed most to winning World War
II. Konev, Bagramyan and Zheltov were chief among
the military leaders who chose or were chosen to
perform this service for Khrushchev and Bulganin.
Second, a curious public airing of military
doctrinal problems apparently came to a head in
March, April and May 1955, during which period im-
portant military leaders made statements regarding
the significance of surprise attack and nuclear
weapons in modern war. The question of the impact
of surprise in war goes back to Stalin's assertion
following the early German victories in 1941 that
surprise was not one of those factors which deter-
mine the final outcome of war. Some re-examination
of this theory has been evident since the year of
Stalin's death, but it now appears that an entire
reworking of the theory has occurred and has been
brought to light in recent Soviet publications.
The full implications of this re-examination are not
clear, particularly since it has been interwoven
with vigilance propaganda, assertions of Soviet
nuclear strength, and the debate over the conse-
quences of atomic war touched off by Malenkov in
1954.
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In public statements, different military
leaders have exhibited a variety of approaches to
the problems of surprise attack and nuclear warfare.
In 1954, Vasilevsky and Bulganin called for heightened
vigilance and preparedness to use all weapons in case
of surprise attack, but it was not until after Mal-
enkov's demotion that the first hints were issued
that atomic surprise, because of its decisiveness,
might be a valid general principle of modern war.
Sokolovsky wrote on 23 February 1955 that the ag-
gressor must be deprived of the element of, surprise
and that one must "not allow oneself to be caught
unawares." On 24 March, -Marshal' of Tank- Troops
Rotmistrov publicly called for a re-examination of
Soviet military science, declaring that "in certain
circumstances a surprise assault using atomic and
hydrogen weapons may be one of the decisive con-
citions of success, not only in the initial period
of a war but in its entire course.
The possible results of such a war have
been alluded to by several military leaders. Zhukov
and Vasilevsky have publicly warned of the heavy
losses in life and property that would be visited
upon both sides. In contrast to this relatively
realistic appreciation, Konev and Lt. Gen. Shatilov
(deputy head of the Chief Political Directorate
under Zheltov) have avoided indicating the mutually
destructive power of nuclear weapons, the latter
warning the West to "remember well that atomic
weapons as well as suddenness of action are double-
edged weapons." Bagramyan stressed Soviet invinci-
bility by repeating Molotov's 8 February 1955 claim
of Soviet superiority over the US in hydrogen
weapons and called for the Soviet armed forces to
"nip in the bud every striving of the aggressors to
carry out a surprise attack on our Soviet mother-
land."
Although little has been said publicly on
the subject since May, the problem was left without
any clear resolution in Soviet military circles of
the question of whether or not atomic war implies
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mutual destruction. For the purposes of this paper.,
however, it must suffice to point out that different
military leaders have since 1954 publicly adopted
quite divergent views on a key question.
G. Conclusions Regarding Control of the Military
and Military Group ngs:
In summary, the traditional Party and secu-
rity controls apparently remain as effective as in the
past, with a note of subtlety and latitude appearing
in the method of Party control. Defense Minister
Zhukov is well under Party control, but as insurance
against too much influence or independence on his part,
two developments have appeared; (1) The build-up of
Konev, possibly a counterweight; and (2) the possible
appearance of a military grouping whose first loyal-
ties might be to other than Zhukov. It is not to be
inferred that the military leadership is divided into
pro-Konev and pro-Zhukov camps; there are undoubtedly
many independents who command loyalties of their own.
But it does appear that groupings do exist within
the top military hierarchy, arising from factors in-
cluding patronage within the military establishment,
associations with and support for political leaders,
and divergent views on strategic questions. Konev
figures in one way or another in much of the material
on these groupings, probably in part because of his
recent prominence and because of the greater diffi-
culty in identifying Zhukov's associations. At the
present time, the most that could be said of such
groupings is that they would detract somewhat from
Zhukov's pre-eminence. The suggestion is strong,
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however, that in continuing future study of the polit-
ical- position of the top Soviet military hierarchy,
Konev and his associates must be watched closely as
potential key figures in political intrigue.
V. Probable Influence of Military on Soviet Policy:
At present the military enjoy their greatest
prestige since the war; their influence has grown
with each crisis since the death of Stalin. Never-
theless, it not to be implied that the military are
playing a decisive political role, for as before
mentioned no representative of the professional
officer class is on the major policy-making bodies
of the USSR.
The influence of the military remains indirect
rather than direct, but the prestige of the military
in the USSR has become such that indirect influence
can be more easily exerted than before. Their
favored position indicates that military leaders
are no longer viewed with the suspicion and distrust
that was their postwar lot under Stalin.
The influence of the military must be exercised
from within the Soviet ruling group, rather than from
the outside. The political control apparatus in
the armed forces would seem to prevent the military
from adopting an independent position on a question
and then successfully seeking support for their
viewpoint outside Party circles.
It is probable that the greatest influence of
the military leadership is exerted in the personal
relationships between military personalities and
members of the Soviet political leadership, and
only those officers whose loyalty to the regime and
leadership were beyond question would be in a
position to exercise this privilege.
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