(Sanitized) REVIEW OF THE SITUATION IN INDOCHINA

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP91T01172R000200300015-2
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 4
• Document Creation Date: December 12, 2016
• Document Release Date: March 19, 2001
• Sequence Number: 15
• Publication Date: May 12, 1953
• Content Type: REPORT

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OCI NO. 3702
COPY NO. g7
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
OFFICE OF CURRENT INTELLIGENCE
12 May 1953
THE SITUATION IN INDOCHINA
Military Situation
The long term trend in Indochina since 1945 has been one of
military deterioration accelerated by the following factors:
1. The fall of the frontier forts in 1950;
2. The Hoa Binh fiasco in 1951-52;
3. The loss of the Thai country in 1952;
4. The present campaign in Laos, which
indicated a French inability to prevent
Viet Minh expansion despite advance
French notice, superiority in fire
power, air power, and over-all man-
power;
5. Viet Minh capability to attack success-
fully any part of the Tonkin Delta,
proved by such incidents as the destruc-
tion in part of the Kien An ammunition
dumps, the capture of a Vietnamese army
training class at Nam Dinh, and the in-
filtration of the southern part of the
Delta under the watch of a large French
task force;
6. The failure of three French operations
on the Annam coast under optimum con-
ditions.
The French are actually glutted with US aid materiel; and
in fact are forced to keep a large amount in dead storage and
unable to maintain the materiel properly in use because of a
lack of maintenance personnel. Much of the heavy equipment is
unadaptable to the terrain, and misuse of the equipment by the
French has been observed.
State Dept. declassification & release instructions on file
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There is an absence of any serious attempt to put Vietnam
on a war footing. Much of the Vietnamese National Army consists
of units transferred from French Union forces and does not
represent any actual increase in the National Army. Only a.
small percentage of commando battalions will be combat ready
by the end of 1953. A mobilization program to relieve. these
problems is almost non-existent because of the lack of political
concessions needed to motivate the nationals. The following
factors contribute to the Vietnamese lethargy and French stub-
borness: French national pride, an unwillingness of the entrenched
bureaucracy and the vested business interests to disturb the
status quo, the continued fence sitting of a large portion of
the Vietnamese which stems from a combination of lack of confi-
dence in their own ability and the motives of the government and
the French military, plus a fear of a Viet Minh or Chinese Commu-
nist victory.
Comment: Ample evidence has been received over a long
perio -to to support the conclusion of a steady deterioration of
t1e military situation in Indochina.
The French have been particularly inefficient in their
utilization of aircraft provided by the US. In this connection,
the American military attache at Saigon protested against the
recent proposal to send six C-119's to Ind
hi
oc
na saying the
, French had a sufficient number of C-47's for the supply of
garrisons in Laos and that C-119's were unsuitable for the
operations envisioned.
There have been several reports recently that this year's
program for the expansion of the Vietnamese army is lagging
badly. In addition to the factors cited above, it is believed
by many observers that the French are delaying from fear that
a strong native army would force them to relinquish their
present controls.
Political Situation
Some progress toward a limited autonomy of the Associated
States has been made, but developments along this line are far
too slow considering the urgency of the situation, and are
further handicapped by the effect of military defeats. The
few French political concessions have been involuntary, tardy
and graceless, which deprives the French of any benefits they
might have derived if the concessions had been made under
other conditions.
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SECURITY INFORMATION
The Vietnam Government is weak and in a sense there is no
contact with the population. The government is incapable of
mobilization of human and natural resources. It has only
tenuous contact with organized political parties enjoying
political support, and these parties at best give the govern-
ment a limited support; at the worst they support the Viet
Minh as an instrument of national liberation.
Comment: The political picture described above accurately
reflects e majority of reports received from Indochina over
the past several years.
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