THE OVERTHROW OF THE MAYER GOVERNMENT

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP91T01172R000200300032-3
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 3
• Document Creation Date: December 12, 2016
• Document Release Date: December 5, 2001
• Sequence Number: 32
• Publication Date: May 22, 1953
• Content Type: REPORT

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SECURITY INFORMATION
OCI No. 3973
Copy No. I
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
OFFICE OF CURRENT INTELLIGENCE
22 May 1953
THE OVERTHROW OF THE MAYER GOVERNMENT
Premier Mayer fell on 21 May because an absolute major-
ity of the 624 National Assembly delegates, including the
Gaullists on whom he had depended for support, refused to
accept his aggressive program to relieve the government's
grave financial difficulties. He demanded extensive econo-
mies, increased revenues and constitutional reforms, as well
as broad decree powers which the Assembly had refused in the
past.
Mayer's position became critical last March just before
his trip to Washington, when he was forced to appeal to the
National Assembly for an emergency advance from the Bank of
France. Although the Assembly voted the advance by a narrow
margin, many of former Premier Pinay's supporters were ali-
enated when Pinay was blamed for the government's financial
difficulties, and Mayer's efforts to appease these elements
cost him some Popular Republican and Gaullist support. His
subsequent insistence on a realistic program distasteful to
both center and rightist elements precipitated the crisis.
Mayer's overthrow is a blow to American policy objec-
tives in Western Europe. While a later government will prob-
ably be given at least some of the special financial powers
demanded by Mayer, this is not likely in the immediate future;
hence a further Increase in inflationary pressures as well as
new cuts in defense expenditures can be expected.
Mayer, morever, had committed himself more openly than
his predecessor to EDC ratification; the next government can
be expected to sidestep this issue in return for maximum
support on domestic problems. Since General DeGaulle's with-
drawal from active politics leaves his following free to en-
ter a government, a center-right coalition without Robert
Schuman's Popular Republicans has now for the first time be-
come a clear possibility. The policy of European integration
will not be abandoned, however, inasmuch as such a coalition
would depend on support from Rene Pleven's small war-time re-
sistance group.
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SECURITY INFORMATION
Former Premier Pinay has regained much prestige in re-
cent weeks and will be a prominent contender for the premier-
ship. Since he also is likely to insist on a stern financial
program, however, he may be unable to obtain sufficient Assem-
bly support at this time. Should the crisis be prolonged, a
"national union" government of all non-Communist parties un-
der a more flexible leader such as former Premier Queuille
would be the ultimate resort.
Contrary to press reports, the French Constitution does
not permit the executive to dissolve Parliament now, since
it is necessary to have at least two governments overthrown
by an absolute majority of the National Assembly deputies
within an 18 month period before a special election can oc-
cur. The deputies, disliking the prospect of a new election,
are most unlikely to precipitate one by overthrowing the
next government.
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