THE CONTINUING STRENGTH OF THE ITALIAN COMMUNIST PARTY

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP91T01172R000200300041-3
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 2
• Document Creation Date: December 12, 2016
• Document Release Date: December 5, 2001
• Sequence Number: 41
• Publication Date: May 28, 1953
• Content Type: SUMMARY

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. SECURITY INFORMATION
OCI NO. 3982 CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
Copy N0.67 OFFICE OF CURRENT INTELLIGENCE
28 May 1953
THE CONTINUING STRENGTH OF THE ITALIAN COMMUNIST PARTY
The 7 June national elections are generally expected to
show a slight loss for the Communist Party in comparison with
its 1948 vote. However, the allied Nenni Socialist Party
with which it is linked in a unity-of-action pact is expected to
make corresponding gains. In any event, these two parties
are likely once again to poll about one third of the total
popular vote, leaving the De Gasperi government with a very
slim popular majority.
Continued strength by the extreme left was indicated in
the 1951-52 local elections, when the Communists and Nenni
Socialists together. won almost 35 percent of the vote, an-
increase of. about four percent over their showing in 1948.
This gain is attributed largely to the Nenni Socialists. Com-
munist Party membership has fallen from about 2,000,000 in
1948 to 1,500,000 now, and several important Communist deputies
have left the party. Furthermore, the size of the Communist-
dominated labor confederation has been reduced from about
5,000,000 to 3,500,000 members, and the Communists have become
increasingly less able to pull support for political strikes.
Nevertheless, they have maintained. their prestige as-cham-
pions of labor by keeping the initiative in promoting success-
ful strikes on economic issues.
As they face the 1953 elections, the Communists are in
a position to draw the protest vote deriving from a.clima.te
of frustration based not only on economic problems such as
unemployment, low pay and inadequate land reform, but also
on political issues. The steady drift of the government to
the right since the 1948 elections, the unpopular new elec-
toral law, the proposed measures restricting labor and freedom
of press and assembly, and failure to crack down hard against
the old and new fascists have tended to reduce the govern.-
.ment's popularity among voters of the left and center. More-
over, many voters.feel that the government is increasingly
dominated by the right wing of the Christian Democratic party
and subject to the influence of Catholic Action chief Luigi
Gedda, who has called De Gasperi "too democratic."
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The Communists' already popular "peace" campaign also
stands to benefit from the recent conciliatory moves of the
Soviet Union and the increase in anti-American feeling which
has developed since 1948 as a. result of US tariff restric-
tions and Italy's political and physical relations with NATO.
Moreover, many voters fear that military preparations will
lead to war or at least to a. reduction of social reform meas-
ures.
So far, popular reaction to the electoral campaigns has
been generally apathetic. The Communists appear to have held
more rallies than the other parties, though generally without
a large attendance. Their posters are more numerous, and they
are waging a more vigorous door-to-door campaign than the
others. Because the Communists are already strong in the in-
dustrial north of Italy, they appear to be concentrating their
efforts in the more conservative south. In Sicily, Communist
meetings have been marked by a. lack of enthusiasm similar to
that which showed up at the rallies of other parties in the
area. Although in parts of southern Italy Communists en masse
have torn up party cards and joined the Christian Democrats,
there have been indications that these defectors nevertheless
intend to vote Communist.
The Communists' campaign is expected to be materially
aided by their front group, the National Democratic Alliance,
which is made up of fellow-travellers previously connected
with various non-Communist parties. This group stresses the
neutrality theme in an effort to wipe out the one or two
percent edge on which the center parties may depend for a
majority.
Because under the new electoral law even such a bare
margin of victory would ensure the winning bloc two-thirds of
the seats in the lower house, Communist strength is expected
to be reduced in the Chamber of Deputies. The law does not
affect the seats in the Senate, however, and there it is
possible that the Social-Communists may win enough strength
that, together with the extreme rightist parties, they will
be able to block government-sponsored legislation.
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