POINTS OF INTEREST BETWEEN THE UN COMMAND AND THE COMMINISTS

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP91T01172R000200310006-1
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: R
• Document Page Count: 3
• Document Creation Date: December 15, 2016
• Document Release Date: June 15, 2004
• Sequence Number: 6
• Publication Date: June 4, 1953
• Content Type: SUMMARY

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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
OFFICE OF CURRENT INTELLIGENCE
4 June 1953
Since April 1952 the prisoner-of-war issue has been the sole
remaining obstacle to a Korean armistice. The UN Command and the
Communists had reached agreement by that time on all other major
points, most often by a Communist concession, often by a compro-
mise, and occasionally by a UN concession.
Before the talks began on 10 July 1951, the Communists made
in effect two important concessions. They had previously in-
sisted on an immediate cease-fire and on discussion of all out-
standing Far Eastern questions in any Korean truce talks. Fol-
lowing Malik's speech of 23 June making a bid for truce talks,
the Communists failed to put forward these demands.
From 10 July to the Communist break-off of the talks on 23
August 1951, the Communists were inflexible in demanding the 38th
Parallel as the cease-fire line. When the talks were resumed on
25 October, they abandoned this position and accepted the UN's
line of contact for demarcation.
Agreement was then quickly reached on the mechanics of a
cease-fire: the time of a cease-fire, withdrawal of troops from
the neutral zone, and so on, with the UN making a minor conces-
sion in giving up five islands north of the 38th Parallel. On
the question of supervising a truce, the UN made a major conces-
sion in dropping its insistence on a unified supervising author-
ity while accepting a Communist proposal that neutral observer
teams inspect rear areas and the, UN-Communist commission inspect
only the demilitarized zone.
During December 1951 the Communists abandoned their position
that the UN must agree in advance to a blanket prisoners exchange
before lists of prisoners could be exchanged. The Communist
attitude stiffened in January 1952 when the UN's insistence on
the principle of voluntary repatriation became known, and to
date the Communists have not accepted this principle, although
they have left room in all of their proposals for an eventual
compromise in fact.
25X1
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During February 1952 the Communists made concessions on minor
issues such as replacement of troops and equipment during the
armistice, the number of ports of entry that observer teams
would inspect, the method and time and place of prisoner exchange,
and other points on which the. essential UN position was maintained.
Agreement was reached in mid-February for a post-armistice politi-
cal conference on Korean issues. This conference would discuss
the permanent status of Korea, the withdrawal of foreign troops,.
"et cetera" -- the last expression being a compromise between the
Communist desire to discuss, and the UN's refusal to commit itself
to discuss, the status of Formosa and China's seat in the UN.
The most important provisions of the draft armistice agree-
ment are:
(1) a military demarcation line shall be fixed as indicated
by an attached map (43 miles north of the 38th Parallel on east
coast, 28 miles north of the 38th Parallel in central Korea, and
16 miles south of the 38th Parallel on the west coast), and both
sides shall withdraw two kilometers from this line so as to
establish a demilitarized zone (this may have expired);
(2) hostilities will cease within 12 hours of the signing
of the armistice agreement; armed forces will be withdrawn from
the demilitarized zone within 72 hours and no armed forces will
be sent into, or armed action taken against, the zone; within
five days, all armed forces of either side will be withdrawn
from the rear and territorial waters of the other side and from
coastal islands formerly controlled by the other side; there will
be no reinforcement of military personnel, although limited ro-
tation is permitted; there will be no increase in the level of
materiel;
(3) a mixed armistice commission will be established, with
five members appointed by each side, to supervise implementation
of the armistice agreement and deal with alleged violations in
the demilitarized zone; a neutral nations supervisory commission
will be established, composed of representatives of non-combatant
nations, which will supervise the activity of neutral nations
inspection teams investigating violations throughout Korea;
(4) all prisoners of war held by either side shall be re-
leased and repatriated "as soon as possible" in conformity with
lists which have been exchanged and checked (this provision has
been interpreted by the UN as consistent with the principle of
voluntary repatriation and by the Communists as specifying
total repatriation, voluntary or involuntary);
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(5) the military commanders of both sides will recommend to
their governments that, within three months of the signing of a
truce, a "political conference of a higher level be held . . .
to settle through negotiations the questions of the withdrawal
of all foreign forces from Korea, the peaceful settlement of
the Korean question, et cetera."
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