COMMENT ON EAST BERLIN UPRISING

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP91T01172R000200310031-3
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 5
• Document Creation Date: December 16, 2016
• Document Release Date: March 15, 2005
• Sequence Number: 31
• Publication Date: June 17, 1953
• Content Type: SUMMARY

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L INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
OF CURRENT INTELLIGENCE
17 June 1953
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The uprising of tens of thousands of East Berliners on
16 and 17 June, which had to be quelled by Soviet troops, is
an unprecedented demonstration of hostility to a Communist re-
gime. In West Germany, the uprising has increased demands for
German unification, but East German Premier Grotewohl says the
riots will make unity more difficult. The uprising will also
have serious consequences for the Soviet "peace campaign"
throughout the world.
The rioting apparently commenced with a small controlled
demonstration of some 5,000 people, about noon on 16 June,
against the recently decreed 10 percent increase in work norms.
It is likely, though unproved, that this was planned to enable
the government to yield on the question without losing face.
About 2 P.M., however, a cabinet minister addressing the
crowd was pushed aside by a worker who shouted, "What you have
declared here is of no interest.to us. We want to be free.
Our demonstration is not against norms .... This is a people's
revolt." The demonstration dispersed about an hour later with
threats of a general strike. American observers mingled freely
with the small remaining groups, in which party workers seemed
to be trying to argue down demonstrators complaining against
food shortages and lack of freedom. During the evening there
was sporadic violence.
At 8 P.M., Premier Grotewohl and Communist Party Chief
Ulbricht addressed a closed meeting of the Berlin party mem-
bers calling for a rallying of the people around the party and
promising "further far-reaching measures" to correct the past
mistakes.
At 4.30 A.M. on Wednesday, 17 June, a West Berlin Police
unit observed 12 Russian tanks approaching the US Sector border
in the area of Gross Zeithen. At 5 A.M. an advance unit of 20
Russian tanks was observed passing Adlershof in East Berlin in
the direction of the center of East Berlin.
By 8:30 A.M. there were 17,000 marchers in East Berlin.
Soviet soldiers wearing battle dress and in troop carriers were
located in various sections to reinforce the police, but at this
time there was no intervention on their part.
State Department review completed
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. In the course of the morning struggle, nearly 2,000 per-
sons came into the West sectors of Berlin, but remained quiet.
By 11 A.M. some of the 13erlin elevated railway traffic had been
halted; a complete cessation of both elevated railway and sub-
way traffic was subsequently reported.
Later, up to 30,000 demonstrators on the Potsdamer Platz
overturned kiosks and police shelters, and tore down Communist
flags and posters. Smoke columns were reportedly seen rising
from the East German government's main office building, and
Peoples' Police inside finally opened fire on the crowd, wound-
ing some. Fire hoses failed to disperse the crowd.
In the Lustgarten Square, where the demonstrators planned
to converge eventually, Soviet tanks took up stations and Ger-
man reinforcements from the Saxony area were called for. In-
creasing numbers of the Peoples' Police were reported defecting
to the West.
The West German Post Office reported that the East German
postal and telecommunications workers struck and that Peoples'
Police had taken over the communications. From noon on, the
demonstrators were reported to be uncontrollable; the violence
being accompanied by shouts of "Ivan go home."
Press estimates of the.size of the mobs vary from 50,000
to several hundred thousand.
Shortly after noon firing was audible to listeners in West
Berlin. One report stated that 15 Soviet medium tanks, 20
armored cars, and 30 truckloads of machinegunners had been con-
centrated on the 50,000-man mob storming the government head-
quarters. Tanks drove into the mob here. Both Soviet and East
German forces used small arms fire to scatter the mobs. Forty
persons were brought to one West Berlin hospital alone, suffer-
ing from bullet or club wounds.
At 2:20 P.M., the East Berlin radio announced a state of
emergency in the Soviet Sector, banned all demonstrations,
rallies, and gatherings of more than three persons, proclaimed
a curfew from 8 P.M. to 4 A.M., and declared violaters punish-
able according to martial law.
It is believed that the most serious local disturbances
had been brought under control when this announcement was made.
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All other broadcasts by the East German radio minimized
the uprising. At 4 A.M. on 17 June it referred blandly to an
SED meeting the previous evening at which Ulbricht had said that
the party should listen more carefully to the criticisms of the
working people, and Grotewohl had promised measures to increase
the standard of living. Forty-five minutes later it announced
in a similar brief, that Ulbricht had promised to increase the
supply of consumers goods.
At 6 A.M. the radio stated that the demonstrations of the
previous day had been only local, incited by provocateurs from
West Berlin. At 10:30 it announced that the majority of the
workers in Berlin had resumed work. At 1:35 P.M. a Grotewohl
statement announced that the 28 May decree for the raising of
work norms by June 30 had been abolished.
Shortly after, at 2:20 P.M., came the broadcast declar-
ing a state of emergency and 15 minutes later the entire East
German network went on the air again with the appeal that provo-
cations and grave disturbances in the Democratic sector of
Berlin would only make the establishment of German unity more
difficult. The government asked the population to help restore
order and create conditions for normal and peaceful work; and
also to apprehend the provocateurs and turn them over to the
police.
At 5:33 P.M., in ostensible capitulation to the demands
of the workers, the radio announced that "the decisions of the
Politburo of the SED and of the government assure the prompt
fulfillment of your justified demands." The regular program
was interrupted about an hour later for a similar appeal to the
people to maintain order. Western provocateurs were again
blamed for the disturbances.
Actually, the only known formal encouragement from West
Germans came at 5 A.M. on 17 June, when the leader of the West
Berlin German Trade Union Federation, using the facilities of
the American Radio in Berlin, requested the East Berlin popula-
tion to support the day's demonstrations. He stated that he
could not give them instruction;, but only advice. He spoke of
the justification of their demands for tolerable work norms,
prompt payment of wages, and a reduced cost of living.
Latest press reports state that the entire Soviet Zone
railroad network is on strike, and that rioting and strikes
have broken out also in Dresden, Halle, Chemnitz, Zwickau,
and a large number of other industrial centers.
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The rioting, coming hard on the heels of the East German
government's 9 June campaign of conciliation, has left the
regime in a dilemma.
To quiet popular clamor Deputy Premier Ulbricht has al-
ready ordered an increase of consumer goods production. Steps
will probably be taken also to improve working conditions and
adjust wages.
But the regime was defeated in its effort to bow grace-
fully to the demands of workers, and instead has given the ap-
pearance of weakness. This could encourage the populace to
even greater resistance. Hence the government, for its own
security, may have to reverse that part of its 9 June program
calling for freer movement of the populace. Severe reprisals
have already been ordered for the "provocateurs," and this
move runs directly contrary to the "peace offensive."
Finally, the dependence of the regime on Soviet armed
force has been clearly demonstrated at the very time it was
trying to speak with authority for all of Germany.
In West Germany, the riots have sparked a strong surge
of national solidarity with the East German people and a wave
of contempt and distrust for the East German regime.
Initially, the riots have increased public pressure for
something to be done about unity. The Secretariat of the West
German Trade Unions quickly charged that the separation of
Germany was the main reason for the present unrest. It called
for immediate four-power talks on unification. American offi-
cials in Berlin, reporting on_the first day's rioting, said
that the US must avoid creating any impresi?ion of hanging back
on unity discussions.
Nevertheless, if the Soviets had hoped'to undercut
Adenauer in the September elections with a few additional
conciliatory gestures, they will now have to do much more.
Because the East Berlin mobs shouted not for wage concessions
but for free-elections, West German attention will now more
than ever be focused on what guarantees the Soviets would
offer of free all-German elections.
Grotewohl's statement that the riots will make unity
more difficult suggests that the Soviets may not be willing
to move ahead on unity.
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The USSR is likely to continue its conciliatory diplo-
matic approaches elsewhere, however. Their effectiveness
will not be completely nullified by the Berlin events, although
these will have a world-wide adverse effect on Communist propa-
ganda in support of the "peace campaign."
It is unlikely that the overt resistance manifested in
Berlin will spread to the other Satellites. If a liberaliza-
tion policy similar to that instituted in East Germany had
been planned for the other Satellites, it will certainly be
reviewed. Thus far there has been no evidence of such a policy
in Eastern Europe.
The riots are likely to result in a purge in the newly-
installed Soviet hierarchy in Germany. The repercussions of
this could affect the delicate power-balance in the Kremlin.
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