POSSIBLE CHANGES IN THE EAST GERMAN REGIME

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP91T01172R000200310043-0
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 2
• Document Creation Date: December 15, 2016
• Document Release Date: June 15, 2004
• Sequence Number: 43
• Publication Date: June 22, 1953
• Content Type: REPORT

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OCI No. 4500 CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
Copy No, OFFICE OF CURRENT INTELLIGENCE
22 June 1953
POSSIBLE CHANGES IN THE EAST GERMAN REGIME
The possibility of drastic changes in the East German
government has been emphasized by the necessity to abandon
German civil administration and assert Soviet military control
as a result of the recent disturbances and by press criticisms
of the regime for previous repressive measures. The extensive
breakdown of civil administration during last week?s rioting
in Berlin and the Soviet Zone has revealed the inadequacy of
the government at its various levels and the general unre-
liability of the German police forces, In view of these de-
ficiencies, and the requirements of the Soviet conciliation
program, there appears to be a strong need for transferring
the authority currently vested in the Grotewohl government to
another more palatable to the East German population and the
West.
Since the beginning of the conciliation program there has
been in East Germany a noticeable journalistic neglect of
Ulbricht, heretofore the principal custodian of indigenous
power in the German Democratic Republic. During the demonstra_
tions popular antipathy toward Ulbricht and Minister President
Grotewohl was obvious, and these two dignitaries refused to
appear before the demonstrators. Unconfirmed reports have
stated that the new Russian high commissioner, Semeonov, brought
with him orders to remove Ulbricht, who in the past was the
proponent of harshness and speed in the implementation of
communization in East Germany. The change from Ulbricht?s
program to one of conciliation, and the discredit which the
riots of the past week brought upon him, presage his downfall
and replacement by someone more likely to command the respect
of the populace and to be acceptable to the West Germans as a
part
i
ner
n the event of future talks on unity.
25X1
It has been suggested that Hermann Kastner of the Liberal
Democratic Party, one-time deputy minister president who has
been kept in the background for the past three years, will re-
place Grotewohl and head a new "non-communist" government.
The association of his name with that of Otto Nuschke,.CDU
leader, in connection with alleged recent conversations with
Semeonov gives rise to speculation that these men are to assume
control of the East German government.
25X
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25X1
There is no conclusive indication that the Soviets are
prepared to abandon their socialization program in East Germany,
but there is no doubt that they have introduced a period of
leniency which will bring material advantages to the population
and generally improve living conditions. It may be that the
Soviets are taking cognizance of the essentially bourgeois
character of the East German community and recognize that
communization cannot be applied here as intensely as was possi-
ble in the Soviet Union. Certainly they know that a communist
East Germany cannot be offered as a partner in German unifica-
tion.
Now the Soviets are faced with the dilemma of establish-
ing conditions in East Germany which appear to meet Western
conditions for unity negotiations and yet maintain the military
control that last week's disturbances have shown to be essential
to the security of their position. A show of military strength
would negate their conciliatory gestures, but relaxation of
control would be a dangerous thing in view of the willingness
of the East Germans to rebel if the opportunity presents it-
self.
Agitation for all-German talks would be aided by the
prior removal of Ulbricht and Grotewohl from their offices.
The appointment of the two bourgeois leaders, Kastner and
Nuschke, to head a new government would probably do much to
win West German sentiment for unity and yet leave dependable
Soviet puppets in the GDR. There is no need to suppose that
such a measure would be any more than a temporary maneuver to
exert maximum influence on the West German voters before they
go to the polls in early September. Having served its purpose,
the bourgeois regime could be dropped and a communist regime
reinstituted,
If, on the other hand, the Soviets feel that they must
now revert to a policy of repression in East Germany, they
must reckon with the failure of whatever they had hoped to
achieve with their program of conciliation.
The third alternative, of course, is to maintain the
status of the present regime, with some changes in its leader-
ship, as one that is cognizant of its past mistakes and is
now prepared to improve living and working conditions. The
granting of several economic concessions immediately after
the disturbances in Berlin suggests that this course is
being followed. This measure would in the long run soften
the rebellious attitudes currently prevalent in East Germany
and would permit the maintenance of a communist-led regime.
It would not, however, be as advantageous to the USSR in pro-
moting the unity program as a "bourgeois" government led by
such politicians as Kastner and Nuschkeo
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