COMMUNIST POSITON IN THE KOREAN TRUCE TALKS

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP91T01172R000200320013-2
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 2
• Document Creation Date: December 15, 2016
• Document Release Date: April 9, 2003
• Sequence Number: 13
• Publication Date: July 13, 1953
• Content Type: SUMMARY

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OCI NO. 4517 CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
COPY NO. 39 OFFICE OF CURRENT INTELLIGENCE
13 July 1953
COMMUNIST POSITION IN THE KOREAN TRUCE TALKS
Peiping Radio on 12 July denounced in detail the joint Rhee-
Robertson statement of the same date. The lengthy commentary,
attributed to a Chinese correspondent at Panmunjom, asserted that
"Rhee still gives no assurance that his government and army will
observe the Korean armistice agreement" and that Rhee and Robertson
in fact agreed on American support of Rhee in a military operation
against North Korea.
The broadcast quotes Rhee's reported remark to a Scripps-
Howard correspondent, following the release of the joint statement,
that he "would not accept an armistice" but had merely agreed not
to obstruct one for 90 days. It concludes that the American-South
Korean "understanding" is to "allow Rhee a free hand to undermine
the truce after 90 days."
Further, the commentary notes the lack of reference to the
released prisoners in the joint statement, and objects to the
agreement to release in South Korea those Korean prisoners who
continue to resist repatriation after Communist "explanations"
to them.
Finally, the correspondent cites South Korean officials as
believing that the prospective American-South Korean security
pact will mean American support of Rhee in a northward drive, and
interprets other American-South Korean agreements noted in the
joint statement as additional evidence of an American intention
to build up South Korean forces for such an operation,
Although the Communists-still appear to desire a Korean
truce, this broadcast and others from Peiping Radio in the past
three days suggest that they will not sign a truce unless given
stronger assurances that the UN Command will attempt to imple-
ment a truce whether or not the terms are acceptable to Rhee.
Specifically, the propaganda suggests that the Communists will
demand in the current meetings at Panmunjom that the UN Command
(1) make a serious effort to recover the released prisoners,
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(2) ensure against further releases, (3) adhere to the 8 June
agreement on the disposition of prisoners unwilling to be re-
patriated, (4) ensure that South Korean forces will observe a
cease-fire and withdraw from the demilitarized zone, and (5)
guarantee the safety of neutral nations personnel supervising a
truce and handling the prisoners, Indian troops guarding the
prisoners, and Communist "explanations" personnel.
The Communists are also expected to demand assurances in
the Panmunjom meetings or through other channels, that the United
States is not committed to resume hostilities if no early agree-
ment is reached on the major agenda questions in the political
conference, and that the United States will not support Rhee in
a South Korean military operation against North Korea at the end
of 90 days or thereafter.
It is still not clear whether the Communists desire a truce
to be peacefully implemented or would prefer an American-South
Korean conflict on its implementation. The Communists could be
expected in either case to insist, as they have insisted, on
assurances regarding implementation. A reliable indication of
their preference may be provided shortly in their position on
the prisoner issue. Persistence in demanding recovery of all
of the released prisoners would indicate a preference for an
American-South Korean conflict.
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