COMMENT ON SOVIET NOTE OF 16 AUGUST REGARDING GERMANY

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP91T01172R000200330010-4
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 3
• Document Creation Date: December 15, 2016
• Document Release Date: April 16, 2003
• Sequence Number: 10
• Publication Date: August 18, 1953
• Content Type: REPORT

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OCI No. Q9? q CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
Copy No, 9 OFFICE OF CURRENT INTELLIGENCE
16 AUGUST 1953
COMMENT ON SOVIET NOTE OF 16 AUGUST REGARDING GERMANY
The Soviet note of 16 August reveals no basic change in
the Kremlin's policy toward Germany, and appears to be prin-
cipally aimed at the German electorate. It proposes to call
a four power discussion on a German peace treaty within six
months, with the participation of representatives of East and
West Germany. While not advancing the Soviet position, the
note follows the line that may have been expected in reply to
the Western proposal of 15 July for a foreign ministers con-
ference. It appears, then, that the 4 August Soviet reply was
principally an effort to get the USSR on record as favoring a
broad agenda conference for easing international tension, and
the inclusion of Communist China in such a conference. With
that disposed of, the USSR apparently is willing to address it-
self specifically to the German problem in a manner more de-
signed to upset Chancellor Adenauer's chance for reelection
in September.
As a basis for discussion, the Soviet Union re-submits
its draft treaty of March 1952 which included provisions for
the withdrawal of occupation troops, a guarantee that Germany
not enter into any military alliances, territorial boundaries
based on the Potsdam agreement, no limitation on the develop-
ment of German trade or economy, and permission for Germany
to have its own army.
Again the USSR does not compromise on the crucial issue
of free all-German elections as a prior condition to peace
treaty discussions. Rather, the establishment of a provisional
German government is proposed as a second step, and the ques-
tion of elections regarded as only one of the chief tasks of
that government. The note attacks the Western proposal for
free elections as an attempt to foist upon Germany "all sorts
of foreign 'investigators", and to treat Germany as "some sort
of colony 'without rights". To avoid supervision of elections,
the Kremlin proposes that measures be taken by the four powers
for carrying out free all-German elections "with the exclusion
of any pressure whatsoever on the part of foreign powers in the
carrying out of these elections". Having originally agreed to
a four power electoral commission in its April 1952 note on
Germany, the Kremlin's latest proposal, while ostensibly pro-
posing free elections, actually represgnts a backward step.
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The detailed proposal for a provisional all-German govern-
ment undoubtedly is designed to appeal to German sentiment. In
addition to preparing for free elections, this government would
decide upon such questions as the representation of Germany in
the preparation of a peace treaty and in international organiza-
tions, the inadmissability of involvement of Germany in military
alliances, the expansion of East-West German trade, the free
movement of peoples and goods across zonal boundaries,
and the development of economic and cultural ties between East
and West Germany.
The USSR recognizes that the establishment of a provision-
al government may prove difficult, and to insure continued con-
trol of its zone, suggests that for a certain period of time
the provisional government be established while retaining the
governments of the German Democratic Republic and the-German
Federal Republic. The note's emphasis on the provisional
government's role in establishing East-West German contacts,
indicates Soviet anticipation of a divided Germany for an in-
definite time o
As an additional gesture to the Germans, the Kremlin pro-
poses the elimination of both reparation payments and German
indebtedness for occupation costs. In both respects, however,
the Soviet Government is vulnerable to Western arguments, The
USSR has extracted exorbitant reparations in contrast to the
West, and its proposal for a limitation of occupation costs dis-
plays a lack of faith in its coincident proposal for withdrawal
of troops within one year of the conclusion of a peace treaty.
Possibly in an-effort to bolster the Soviet position by
giving the impression of its readiness to negotiate, Foreign
Minister Molotov has already invited an East German delegation
to Moscow to discuss "important questions dealing with the en-
tire German problem"
In West Germany, the note will intensify speculation on the
prospects for unity, and each warring political party will en-
deavor to use the note to support its election campaign propa-
ganda. The note, however, will probably have little influence
on swaying any sizeable group of voters to switch their support
in the 6 September elections. Its chief effect will likely be
to increase the necessity for an Allied reply prior to the
elections --- a development which Chancellor Adenauer had hoped
to avoid believing that any Allied terms for four power talks
might weaken his position.
The Soviet proposal for the formation of a provisional All-
German government, composed of representatives,fZom the Federal
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Republic and the German Democratic Republic, was foreshadowed'
by a speech of Max'Reimann, West German Communist Party chief,
on 17 June in Bonn, and a formal resolution by the East German
Council of Ministers on 15 July, advocating the same proposal'.
Reimann's speech received no acknowledgement whatever in Bonn,
and the East German Council?s resolution was officially ig-
nored by both the Bonn coalition parties and the Social Demo-
cratic Party. Spokesmen for the government parties emphatically
declared that the government could have no relations with Com-
munist puppets, and the Social Democrats passed a party resolu-
tion in a similar vein.
For the West German populace, the touchstone of Soviet in-
tentions on unification is a willingness to yield control of
its zone and to grant truly free elections under international
supervision, but the present note casts even greater doubts that
the Soviet Union will accede to this.
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