IMPLICATIONS OF THE FRENCH UN DELEGATE S 25 SEPTEMBER SPEECH

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP91T01172R000200330018-6
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 2
• Document Creation Date: December 15, 2016
• Document Release Date: April 16, 2003
• Sequence Number: 18
• Publication Date: September 26, 1953
• Content Type: REPORT

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OCI No. 8461 CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
Copy No. OFFICE OF CURRENT INTELLIGENCE
26 September 1953
Implications of the French UY' Delegate's
25 September Speech
The French Foreign Ministry announcement that Maurice
Schumann's 25 September speech to the UN General Assembly
represents no departure in French policy is borne out by
fuller excerpts from the speech itself. In context, the
items played up by the press are not startling in the
light of earlier French requests for discussion of the
Indochina question at the Korean political conference; and
there is no intimation that France is not going to imple-
ment the Navarre plan in Indochina.
Schumann's remark probably should be considered more
in relation to the internal French political scene than to
international problems. If Laniel and Bidault are sincere
in their protestations to American officials that ratifi-
cation of the EDC treaty is to be pushed this year, Schu-
mann's speech could be an attempt to gain the broadest.
possible public and parliamentary support in France. The
hint of additional guarantees against German militarism
and the appeal for an over-all, settlement with the USSR,
coupled with a strong defense of European integration
tend to bear out this interpretation, though possibly
pointing to further delay in the government's efforts to
obtain EDC ratification. All Frenchmen can be expected
to respond to an appeal to end the Indochina war, con-
trol German resurgence, relax the cold war, and above all,
to applaud any move reasserting French claims to leader-
ship on the continent. The timing could be an effort to
counterbalance parliamentary preoccupation with the eco-
nomic issues facing the National Assembly when it re-
convenes on 6 October.
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On the international level, France may be trying to
reestablish confidence in its leadership in Europe by the
suggestion that it is considering its own version of the
Churchill and Adenauer proposals for a. Locarno type tion to the German problem. In view of ChancellorAdelu-
nauer's electoral victory and Germany's growing promi-
nence on the continent, the French may feel impelled to
take the diplomatic initiative. A bold diplomatic step
could also serve as a basis for bargaining with France's
allies.
Schumann's speech could serve a double purpose in
regard to the Orbit. It challenges Moscow to demon-
strate Soviet sincerity on European negotiations and
makes a similar challenge to both Moscow and Peiping
on Far Eastern questions, The speech could also be a
move to capitalize diplomatically on the Navarre plan
now rather than run the risk of having to negotiate
from a greatly weakened position if the plan fails. In
particular, France may be hoping that the Communists
see a parallel to the Korean situation in the present
status of American aid to Indochina,
In Indochina, however, any hint that the French
might negotiate a settlement of the Indochina war
tends to raise the fear among supporters of the Bao
Dai government that they will be sold out and in-
creases the difficulty that government faces in at-
tracting popular support. Schumann's specific refer-
ence to the governments of the Associated States, their
link with France and recognition by other powers will
nevertheless serve to minimize these adverse reactions.
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