THE UNSETTLED PROBLEMS IN THE FAR EAST*

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP91T01172R000200330023-0
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 4
• Document Creation Date: December 15, 2016
• Document Release Date: April 16, 2003
• Sequence Number: 23
• Publication Date: November 19, 1953
• Content Type: REPORT

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THE UNSETTLED PROBLEMS IN THE FAR EAST*
Even if the Communists agree to sit down for substantive
discussions on outstanding Far Eastern problems, the evidence
at hand offers little prospect of a solution. These problems
include a Korean settlement, the Indochina war, and the fate of
Formosa.
In the negotiations at Panmunjom, the Communists have shown
no willingness to compromise on their stand calling for a round-
table conference of the belligerents and certain "Asian neutrals,"
including the USSR. Many UN members favor this concept, and the
Communists are trying to split the United States from its allies
or force an eventual accommodation to their position. A round-
table conference with the "neutral" participation demanded by
the Communists would place them in a better tactical spot to ex-
ploit Western differences than would a two-sided meeting.
Despite the recent concession on procedural matters at
Panmunjom, the Communists may continue to block substantive dis-
cussions in the hope that further delays will promote friction
among South Korea, India, and the United States, and incite the
unrepatriated prisoners to violence.
Whether the Communists actually intend to have a conference
on Korea must be viewed in the light of the Soviet regime's cur-
rent global strategy, The Soviet response to recent non-Communist
overtures for negotiations has not been encouraging. Soviet prop-
aganda no longer stresses the possibility of a negotiated settle-
ment but is concentrating on the charge that the Western powers
do not really desire an easing of international tension and that
Western maneuvering is creating impossible conditions for negoti-
ations or making their prospects almost hopeless.
If a Korean conference does take place, agreement on one of
the two main questions -- the withdrawal of foreign troops -- may
be reached. Withdrawal of Western forces from the Far East
* Nation-al-'Intel igence Estimate, NIE 98, "Communist Courses
of Action in Asia," is in the course of preparation.
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has been a major objective of the Communists since World War II.
They may estimate that North Korea's superiority in the air and
in tank and artillery strength, as well as its more favorable
logistical position and the presence of Chinese and Soviet
forces across the Yalu, would protect their military interests
if both sides withdrew.
On the other important question -- Korean unification --
there seems to be little hope of reconciling President Rhee's
stand with the probable Communist position. Continued division
and a long period of armed truce seem much more likely.
Rhee insists that unification should not result in the dis-
solution of his government, which, as he continually points out,
is the only Korean government recognized by the United Nations.
He will not accept a trusteeship arrangement, regarding it as a
form of "collective colonialism," nor does he want a neutrali-
zation scheme if it involves disarmament.
Rhee's plan for unification is to hold free elections in
the north, under UN auspices, to fill the 100 vacant seats in
the South Korean National Assembly which he has held open for
this purpose. He is confident that if free elections were
held, an all-Korean legislature would result which would be
almost entirely devoid of Communists.
The Communists for their part have been consistent in their
plans for unification. In the Soviet-American joint Korean Com-
mission meetings in 1946 and 1947, and in proposals just prior
to the invasion in 1950, the pattern has been the same. They
then called for the establishment of a provisional government
composed of representatives of both sides, with the broad par-
ticipation of "democratic" organizations, to formulate plans
for an election. This formula, always opposed by the West in
Korea as in Germany, may well again be put forward by the
Communists.
Their recent emphasis on troop withdrawal as the "main
task of the conference" suggests that they may demand its com-
pletion as a prerequisite to any discussion on unification.
There are a number of indications, moreover, that the Commu-
nists are not seriously planning for unification, Last August,
they replaced with Soviet-Koreans virtually the entire South
Korean Communist element in the North Korean government and
party., thus eliminating the only group in the north which had
connections and some support in the south.
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The Soviet one billion ruble aid program also suggests
that,the USSR is planning to continue its control over North
Korea. The aid is directed primarily at the rehabilitation
of heavy industry which serves Soviet and Manchurian rather
than Korean needs. The visit of a delegation of leading North
Korean officials to Peiping on 12 November, following a trip
to Pyongyang by Chinese dignitaries, suggests that China also
intends to make long-range commitments.
On the war in Indochina, there has been a good deal of
inconsistency in Communist statements and propaganda on the
prospect for a negotiated settlement. Moscow's reply to
President Eisenhower's speech of 16 April stated that such
"liberation" movements in Southeast Asia, as those in Indochina
and Malaya, were not subject to negotiation. In September,
however, Chou En-lai told a Western diplomat that China wished
to discuss Indochina in the Korean political conference. Soviet
and Chinese Communist propaganda has been similarly contradictory,
on the one hand, holding out the prospect of a negotiated settle-
ment in what appears to be an effort to exploit public pressures
in France; and on the other hand, stressing to the Viet Minh the
necessity of continuing the struggle, Ho Chi-minh denies the
possibility of a negotiated settlement.
Of the three alternatives open to the Communists in Indo-
china, an all-out offensive with large-scale Chinese participa-
tion, negotiations toward a settlement, or a continued war of
attrition, the last would appear for the foreseeable future to
be the most likely choice. No Communist movement in the Far
East has yet been willing to negotiate while winning, and the
Viet Minh still has the initiative. Moreover, the war in Indo-
china does not affect the success of Soviet global strategy or
the security of Soviet territory. Unlike the Korean war, it is
geographically remote from the Soviet Union and it has not been
"internationalized" by UN participation. At the moment the
advantages to the Communists of continuing the war seem to out-
weigh those of ending it,
The French on the other hand would prefer not to face the
expense in money and men required for a long war aimed at
annihilation of the Viet Minh. They are hoping that negotia-
tions will be possible, either at the Korean political confer-
ence or at a five-power conference including Communist China,
Recent public statements by Premier Laniel and other French
officials, as well as French press comment, have encouraged the
public to believe that the $385,000,000 American aid program
and the Navarre plan are intended to improve France's negotia-
ting position rather than to achieve military victory.
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Laniel has indicated his willingness to accept a Viet
Minh offer of talks.* Until such time as a military defeat
of the Viet Minh or American armed intervention is imminent,
however, it is probable that the Communists have no serious
intention of negotiating for peace in Indochina.
As for the status of Formosa, Communist plans for a
military operation against the island were frustrated by the
American neutralization declaration of June 1950. Following
its intervention in Korea, Peiping stated that its eventual
control of Formosa would be one of the prerequisites for ending
the Korean war. During the truce talks, Peiping relegated the
question to the postarmistice political conference, and an
"et cetera" in the armistice agreement will enable the Commu-
nists to bring up this question, among others, at the conference.
The 1C nations which fought on the UN side have agreed in-
formally that substantive progress at the conference must be
made on Korean questions before any Chinese issues can be
discussed. Should the Communists take a conciliatory line in
the conference, proposals to resolve the status of Formosa
may be welcomed or even initiated by some Western nations to
resolve- the problem by neutralization, by trusteeship, or
by outright cession to Communist China.
The Communists, at best, might be willing to go along
with a neutralization or trusteeship formula under the auspices
of the UN, provided Formosa is eventually restored to China as
called for in the Cairo and Potsdam agreements.
* or coming a ional Intelligence Estimate, NIE 63/1,
"Probable Developments in French Policy in Relation to U.S.
Interests," will deal with this subject in more detail.
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