THE CURRENT SITUATION IN CUBA

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP91T01172R000300040010-5
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 17
• Document Creation Date: December 20, 2016
• Document Release Date: July 27, 2006
• Sequence Number: 10
• Publication Date: November 23, 1954
• Content Type: REPORT

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OCI No. 0343 CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
Copy No.
24 OFFICE OF CURRENT INTELLIGENCE
23 November 1954
SUEJECT: The Current Situation in Cuba
Conclusions:
1. The 1 November election may be said to have pre-
s.:ed the Cuban people with a second fait accompli--the
first being the 10 March 1952 coup by which General Batista
seized power. Since the election does not represent a true
solution to the Cuban problem, political difficulties can
be expected to continue.
2. The mass of the Cuban people has remained indif-
ferent to the results of the election. What active re-
sentment has existed is being overcome by the actual hold-
ing of elections and the promised restoration of democratic
processes. Most Cubans appear relieved that the "political
crisis" is over and that revolutionary tension has diminished.
3. President Batista has replaced with a comparatively
honest and orderly government, the former corrupt Prio regime.
His political strategy continues to be aimed at insuring.the
continuation of his regime in power and gaining wider public
acceptance of it. The election has succeeded, to a moderate
degree, in attaining the objectives for which it was de=
signed. Batista continues to broaden and develop the poli-
tical forces supporting him. He is making significant moves
to increase his popularity which appears to be growing.
4. The principal political opposition groups remain
fragmented into antagonistic sectors which do not constitute
effective political forces. Attempts to form a united front
opposition so far have failed. The Grau forces are losing
some of their political strength, the Prio group continues
its revolutionary activities, while the Ortodoxo name, unless
revived by inspiring leadership, may lose its identity in
other political ranks. A new party may emerge as the legal
opposition minority party which will participate in the
"new" Batista government.
State Dept. review completed
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Now that the elections are over, the possibility
of a successful revolutionary coup appears more remote than
ever.
6. President Batista has not yet gained the full
confidence and support of the people, although the election
and imminent restoration of democratic institutions consti-
tute a strong influence for stability. By thus consolidating
his position he has rendered the possibility of a "palace
revolution" more remote. The regime, however, continues to
be a military dictatorship dependent on the loyalty and sup-
port of the armed forces whose strength is considered capable
of thwarting any revolutionary action. Presistent rumors
of a counterrevolutionary coup continue to produce an un-
settling effect. The regime's principal weakness is the
concentration of power in Batista.
7. Economic stability of the country has never been
seriously threatened although economic difficulties have been
experienced. Contraction from the 1951-1952 sugar boom pe-
riod has ceased with the return to a normal level of opera-
tion. The country can look forward to a period of moderate
economic well-being.
8. Organized labor has been going through a difficult
period, largely because it has failed to receive the finan-
cial and political support it was accustomed to get from
the previous government. It, however, can be expected to
continue to cooperate with the regime in return for future
concessions.
9. Batista continues to dominate the armed forces
over which he has tightened control. It is considered un-
likely that the military will make any move that might
jeopardize their current priviliged position. The armed
forces are considered superior in combat effectiveness to
any force which might be mustered by enemies of the regime;
and they are fully loyal to Batista.
10. The Cuban Communist Party--with an estimated
strength of 50,000 of which some 25,000 are militants---
remains the strongest and most influential in the Caribbean
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area. Its greatest influence and activity continues to be
in the labor movement. Its strength in youth, women's and
students groups is almost as great. Communist strength and
influence in education remains significant and may be grow-
ing. A comparatively'reeent development is increased in.-
filtration into radio, television, and press. Communists
are having some success in infiltrating other parties. They
continue to possess capabilities for sabotage, espionage,
and limited guerilla warfare. They can be expected to ex-
ploit any antiregime outbreaks. However, they lack the
potentiality, by themselves, to create serious and widespredl
disturbances.
The party's outlawing and continued repression have
caused it to lose some strength. Efforts to register a new
front party have failed as have attempts to form a united
opposition front with other groups. Communist publications
have been suppressed. Communists have very little, if any,
influence in the army, navy, and police.
The Batista regime probably will soft-pedal the Com-
munist issue whenever political expediency so dictates.
11. Cuba's relations with other Caribbean govern-
ments will continue to be cordial with the possible excep-
tion of Costa Rica. The Batista regime can be expected to
maintain close relations with the United States and a firm
pro-Western anti-Communist stand.
1 November 1954 Election
The 1 November 1954 election, marked by conc.-tlderable
abstentionism, was one of the quietest in Cuban history.
Returns compiled by the military authorities at Camp Colum-
bia, army headquarters in the suburbs of Havana, show an
overwhelming majority for General Batista who has received
1,244,813 votes to 181,399 for Ramon Grau San Martin. This
indicates that about 50 percent of the qualified electorate,
some 2.9 million, have voted-- Batista obtaining about 90
percent of the votes cast. Dr. Rafael Guas Inclan, head of
the Liberal Party, has been elected to the vice
pre.
Justo Luis del Pozo, mayor of Havana since the 10Marchn19522
coup, has been elected by a wide margin to continue in his
post--the most important in the country after the presidency.
Official results, which are expected to be announced shortly
by the Superior Electoral Tribunal, probably will not show
figures at great variance from the above.
iAGMT
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The abstenionism which took place was largely that
occasioned by the participation of only small'sectors
of the greater Autentico and Ortodoxo parties, Grau has
stated publicly that not more than 10 percent of the elec-
torate actually voted and has charged that the election re-
turns are completely fraudulent and incorrect and have been
altered to give an impression of electoral participation not
consonant with reality. The true results presumably lie
closer to the government's released figures. The government
coalition numbered a reported 1,663,663 affiliates while the
opposition totaled 215,385. Many coalition supporters proba-
bly turned out, fearing the loss of their government jobs
if they did not vote, since this is one of the penalties for
not voting.
Grau's eleventh-hour dramatic withdrawal, his appeal
to his Autentico Party followers to boycott the elections,
and his later threat to expel from the party any Autentico
who might be elected to office and accepted it, apparently
have not received wide acceptance within Autentico ranks.
A number of his adherents disregarded his appeal and continued
to run for office or, it they were voters, voted for their
own party choices. As a result, 18 senators (minority re-
presentation guaranteed by law) and 27 representatives from
the Autentico ranks won seats in the new congress. The ma-
jority of these reportedly have already quit the Autentico
ranks and have expressed their intention to accept their
posts.
Despite the expected participation of the elected
Autentico senators and representatives in the new government,
the election, a virtually uncontested affair in which the
opposition played no effective role, may be said to have been
one in name only. The Cuban people have been presented with
a second fait accompli--the first being the 10 March 1952
coup by which Batista seized power. Although on the face
of things the regime has received a legal mandate to continue
in office for another four years, political difficulties can
be expected to continue since the election does not represent
a true solution to the Cuban problem.
Public Reaction to the Election
The mass of the Cuban people has remained indifferent
to the results of the elections. The Cubans, more apathetic
than disaffected with the regime, have resented almost solely
the fact that Batista's coup interrupted the "constitutional
rhythm" of their government. The holding of elections and
the imminent restoration of constitutional processes is
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doing much toward overcoming this feeling. The majority
of Cubans, who heard countless rumors about a revolutionary
attempt on election day, are reported to be relieved that
the "political crisis"i.s now over and that revolutionary
tension has diminished.
Electoral Process Timetable
With the holding of elections, the electoral process
remains unimpeded and the country can look forward to the
restoration of democratic institutions as promised by the
Batista regime.
Article 14 of the current electoral code, Law Decree
1215 of 26 November 1953, sets the dates on which elected
officials are to take office. On 3 January 1955, municipal
aldermen and mayors will take office. On 15 January,pro?
vincial governors will assume their posts. On 28 January,
federal senators and representatives are to take office.
The new congress will be formed and both the present Council
of Ministers (cabinet) and the Consultative Council (adiisory
body) will cease to exist. The president and vice president
will take office on 24 February and presumably the m.ew cabi-
net will be named then. On that date, the current "Consti-
tutional Statutes" will cease to govern and the 1940 Consti-
tution will be restored in its entirety.
Should these events take place as scheduled, although
there will be present largely the form and not the substance
of democratic government, there will be established a facade
of legality which is likely 'to be accepted by a majority of
Cubans, according to all reports.
Batista's Political Strategy
Ever since his coup, Batista has replaced with a coffi_
paratively honest and orderly government the former Prio
administration which was characterized by excessive graft
and corruption, unpunished political gangsterism and repeated
labor strikes. There is evidence to indicate that Batista
will continue to keep throttled to a moderate pace the usual
activities connected with graft, corruption and the spoils
system
Batista's actual holding of elections, as promised, has
succeeded to a moderately successful degree in attaining the
objectives for which it was originally designed: 1) to give
some democratic semblance to his government, 2) to gain
wider public appeal, and 3) to obtain a legal mandate from
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the people for a new four year term.
Batista continues to develop his flexible coalition of
four parties which serve to broaden and maintain his politi-
cal support. The Progressive Action Party (PAP) and the
Radical Union Party (UR) lie in the cuter and somewhat left
of center respectively in orientation and are composed princi-
pally of his followers. The Liberal and Democratic parties,
which are splinter groups from the old-line rightist parties
of the same name have provided Batista with the benefit of
their names. Thus Batista is offering Cubans parties to
meet every view.
Batista has made and is making significant moves to in-
crease his popularity: repeal of onerous public order laws,
amnesty for many political prisoners, an ever expanding pub-
lic works program, an economic and social development pro-
gram, and certain concessions to labor. There is evidence
that his support among lower class groups is growing and
that he is also drawing some conservative groups into his
camp through moderate policies.
Batista has some substantial achievements to his credit:
new roads, an aqueduct system, agricultural and industrial
aid and other improvements, undertaken in the face of fall-
ing sugar prices--a situation effectively counteracted by
his firm sugar policy.
He broke Cuba's relations with the USSR and has out-
lawed the Communist party. He has kept the political op-
position divided and has suppressed successfully to date
all attempts against the regime.
These and other moves appear to be making progress
toward the restoration of the people's confidence in him-
a condition which, next to the support of the military,
Batista deems important to the continuation of his regime.
Political opposition
The numerically strongest opposition force, the Cuban
Revolutionary Party (Autentico), continues to be divided
into antagonistic sectors headed by Grau and ex-president
Carlos Prio Socarras.
Grau's "collaborationist" group with some 194,297
affiliates, was the only Autentico Party sector to parti-
cipate in the recent elections. Grau, through his
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chameleon-like electoral behavior, blatant political
opportunism and dictatorial party command apparently has
been and is alienating many of his adherents. Present
indications are that he, together with his diminishing
followers, probably will not continue to play as prominent
a role in Cuban politics as during the past two years.
The principal leadership of the militant sector of the
Autentico Party, the Prio sector,, is currently entrusted to
Manuel Antonio Varona since Prio is in voluntary exile.
Varona actually heads what may be termed the less overtly
militant faction of this sector. The action group of this
tor on the other hand is led by an able, brilliant and
aggressive revolutionist Aureliano Sanchez Aranan
The Cuban People's Party (Ortodoxo), originally a lead-
ing party comprised of elements ranging from far right to
far left, has failed to recover from the staggering blow it
received by the death of its charismatic leader, Eduardo
Chibas.. Its disintegration into a group of quarreling
factions, produced by the March 1952 coup, continues. Its
participation in the 1 November election was virtually nomi-
nal. Each of the four principal sectors of this party bears
its leader's name.
The Roberto Agramonte sector has the largest following;
personifies passive resistance to Batista and represents the
Chibas ideal of political independence and isolation. Some
of its members in the future may join the Authentic ranks
which wish to compose the legal minority representation in
the Batista government. Others may transfer to militant
groups be they Autentico or Ortodoxo.
,The Emilio Ochoa sector represents the most militant
Orthodox faction. It is comprised of elements who 1) con-
sider violence the best or only means of ousting Batista,
2) believe that the Ortodoxos can be effective only through
collaboration with other parties and 3) feel that Agramonte
is unattractive politically and can never effectively rally
the opposition about him. Although Ortodoxo Party president
at the time of the coup, Ochoa since then has declined
siderably in prestige.
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The Jose Pardo Llada sector is a splinter group of
the Ochoa sector. Pardo returned not too long ago from
voluntary exile in Mexico since the coup. His followers
are opposed to association with the Prio revolutionary ele-
ments and were last reported exploring the possibilities of
joining the Agramonte ranks. The future course of this
group is not clear.
The Carlos Marquez Sterling sector (for want of a,
better name) was originally the group of Federico Fernandez
Casas who, by registering the party name, made it legally
possible for the Ortodoxos to participate in the elections.
l~;xikandez turned over the presidency of this group to Marquez
who resigned in March 1954 following his failure to reconcile
opposing factions within the greater Orthodox party. This
sector ran candidates in only three provinces during the
recent elections. Raul Chibas, brother of Eduardo Chibas,
has been active in its ranks although he has refused the
presidency of the group. Although this sector may be said
to be currently ineffective politically, it may serve as
the future rallying point for Ortodoxo who wish to consti-
tute a legal opposition to the Batista government.
Recent information points to the possible emergence of
a new party composed of successful Autentico candidates, who
won seats in the new congress, and their followers. These
leaders have started to break away from the Grau and Prio
Authentic ranks and have stated that they intend to take
their legislative seats and establish themselves as a legal..
opposition minority party participating fully in government
activities. Batista has told the,American charge that nine
minority senators--who belong to this group--are not antag-,
onistic toward him personally and would vote with the govern-
ment when convenient to them. This party, when established,
probably will draw its strength from the ranks of both the
-Authentic and Orthodox parties. The administration is
likely to give its approbation to the appearance of this
new party although it will probably keep close surveillance
over its activities in order to prevent it from growing into
too strong a political force.
In summary, the principal opposition groups remain frag-
mented into antagonistic sectors which do not constitute ef-
fective political forces. Attempts at unification for par-
ticipation in the 1 November elections as a united front of
opposition to Batista failed miserably. The Grau forces are
losing some of their political strength, the Prio group con-
tinues its revolutionary activities while the Orthodox name,
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unless revived by some challenging and inspiring leader,
may gradually lose its identity in the ranks of other poli-
tical groups. A new party may emerge as the legal opposi-
tion minority party which will participate fully in the "new"
Batista government.
Revolutionary apposition
Militant groups opposed to the government now
include many Autentico party members, some Ortodoxo party,
members, many students (traditionally rebellious and pro-
rexorm), members of youth groups, some disaffected military
elements, discontented labor elements, political gangsters 25X1
and some professional revolutionaries.
The Cuban people, to date, have given no
Indication of preferring to attempt a solution by force.
While having no particular liking for Batista, they still
possess unpleasant memories of the former corrupt Prio and
Grau regimes.
Many reported "D-days" have come and no attack has ever
materialized. The long-heralded island-wide counterrevolu-
tionary coup on election day under Prio and Carlos Hevia did 25X1
not come off. Neither did plans to cry "fraud" over Batista's
victory succeed in inciting all opposition groups to rise in
open rebellion as was widely reported.
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Viewed against this background and in the light of
recent developments--such as the holding of elections and
the imminent restoration of democratic processes--the like-
lihood of a successful counterrevolutionary coup appears
more remote as time goes on and certainly more difficult to
justify. Nevertheless the possibility of one--especially
one involving the assassination of Batista and his key of-
ficials--cannot be excluded. properly.
Stability of the government
From all indications, Batista has not yet gained the
full confidence and support of the Cuban people although
his, popularity appears to be increasing. The actual hold-
ing of elections and promised early restoration of the Consti-
tution of 1940 is constituting a strong influence for peace
and stability.
By continuing to maintain, firmer than ever, the reins
of government in his hands, Batista has consolidated his own
position and made the likelihood of a "palace revolution"
even more remote.
The regime continues, however, to be in essence a mili-
tary dictatorship with its power to govern dependent on the
continued loyalty and support of the armed forces. The threat
of a countercoup by opposition forces continues to produce
an unsettling effect over the entire country. 25X1
25X1
However, the Cuban government and armed forces are "tied
together" by one individual--Batista. This constitutes the
regime's principal weakness. Should Batista be alive and
in full control, of the government at the time of an internal
revolt or armed invasion or both, then the armed forces, as
a whole loyal, would most likely be able to repel any such
action. Should Batista be assassinated as a prelude to an
attempted revolution or otherwise incapacitated from personal
control of the government, a chaotic situation probably would
exist for a period during which antagonistic factions within
the armed forces would be fighting for supremacy. Out of
this would evolve probably a military junta which would de-
clare martial. law and a state of siege and would bring some
semblance of law and order. Under these circumstances the
likelihood of success of the Prio or any other revolutionary
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force would be enhanced--if not to seize control at least
to receive some recognition, perhaps even participation,
in the new ruling order.
The economic stability of the country has never been
seriously threatened since the coup, although economic dif-
ficulties have been experienced.
General contraction from the 1951-1952 sugar boom has
virtually ceased with the country's return to what is con-
sidered a normal level of operation. Major factors contri-
buting to this are: 1) the relative stabilization of sugar
production, 2) the growing development of the rice industry,
3) the boom in private construction, 4) the government's ex-
panding public works program, 5) expanding mining activities,
and 6) the psychological uplift provided by the holding of
elections and the promised reestablishment of normal. politi-
cal institutions.
Negative significant factors in the economic picture
include: 1) continuing sizeable unemployment, 2) continuing
budgetary difficulties, and 3) the "wait and see" policy of
the regime until after the elections with regard to labor
and other matters.
With reduction in government expenditures together
with strong efforts to increase revenues, and with implementa-
tion of the new economic and social development plan, the
country can look forward, with reasonable assurance, to a
period of moderate economic well-being.
The main difficulty of organized labor in Cuba. currently
is that it is not receiving financial and political support
from the government upon which it has been dependent histori-
cally. That the movement has succeeded remarkably in remain-
ing united despite strong political and personal pressures
from many directions is due largely to the general recogni-
tion that its strength lies in its unity. The greatest co-
hesive force, perhaps, is the leadership of Eusebio Mujal,
Secretary General of the anti-Communist Confederation of
Cuban Workers (CTC), which represents the major portion of
organized labor.
The advent of Batista to power brought no serious labor
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reaction primarily because of the strong authority exercised
by Batista and the army and secondarily by the almost com-
plete absence of public support. During the past two years,
the CTC has made no important moves without the prior ap-
proval of the regime. Labor's comparatively passive attitude
also has been due in part to the general economic contraction
during the past two years which has placed labor at a disad-
vantage. Furthermore, labor appears to be becoming more con-
scious of the damage to its interests arising from labor abuses.
However, the situation has not been static. Labor has been
going through a difficult period. During the pre-election
Period labor became quite restive and there were indications
tnat the CTC might become obstructive to the regime. Mujal's
belated coming out for Batista in the latter part of October
was done under voluntary leave from his official position in
order to, as was stated, "keep the CTC neutral in politics."
Not being a candidate he did not have to take leave under
CTC rules in order to engage in political activities. Mujal
in the past has stressed frequently the need of keeping the
CTC friendly terms with the government of the day. The move,
from a vote-getting standpoint, was not looked upon by the
regime with too friendly an eye and did little to promote
more cordial relations between Batista and Mujal. Despite
rumors that Mujal would be replaced during the immediate post-
election period by a leader more amenable to the regime, it is
believed that Mujal has the support in, and command over, the
labor movement of a kind that Batista would be very reluctant
to lose. It is believed that regardless of leadership, labor
will continue to cooperate with the regime in return for fu-
ture concessions. Labor in Cuba generally has followed who-
ever has been in power, and currently no critical problem
is.expected to arise from this sector of the national life.
Armed Forces
Batista continues to dominate the armed forces. The
interdependence of their fortunes with his is mutually recog-
nized and it is considered unlikely that the military would
make any move that might jeopardize its current privileged
position.
Since the coup Batista has done much to improve the eco-
nomic and social status of the armed forces, particularly
the enlisted personnel in which his major strength lies,
Considered solely from the view point of individual self-
interest, the majority of non-commissioned officers and en-
listed men are not likely to become disloyal.. The officers,
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who are powerless without the enlisted support, are ex-
pected to continue loyal since they received their present 25X1
positions largely through their proven loyalty to Batista.
There persists a certain amount of resentment by the
people against the brutal and high-handed methods of the mili-
tary and police.
strengthened his position within his own following.
Batista's proven intention of not relinquishing power
and his winning of the presidential election appear to have
Apart from the crucial, aspect of loyalty, the relative
combat effectiveness of the armed forces is considered supe-
rior to any military force which conceivably might be mustered
currently by the Prio revolutionary forces.
The Cuban armed forces, ever since the day of the coup,
have been in a semi-alert status to guard against the element
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of surprise. Current army strength is estimated at 20,000.
The strength of the navy, which,possesse nb major combat
vessels, is 5,505, exclusive of 218 in the naval air arm,
which has 26 aircraft. The air force, with some 56 air-
craft, has a personnel strength of 680.
Communism
At one time perhaps the largest Communist party in
Latin America with an estimated membership of 158,000 in 1948,
the Partido Socialista Popular (PSP) registered only 56,000
affiliates in 1950. The party is now illegal and the num-
oer of affiliates is not known. It is estimated that the
party nowpossesses some 25,000 militants. It is however
the strongest and most influential Communist party in the
Caribbean area. Its leadership, virtually unchanged since
the coup, remains united, well-organized and aggressive. The
PSP has received organizational and operational directives
from the Soviet orbit and a number of its members have had 25X1
training behind the Iron Curtain. Cuban Communist delegations
at various Communist international conferences have alwa s
been appreciable,
The PSP maintains close relations with other Communist
parties in Latin America and has assisted in training other
Caribbean Communist parties.
The PSP's greatest influence and activity is in the
labor movement. Communists maintain their own Confederation
of Cuban Workers (CTC) under the very able Lazaro Pena.. It
controls some 40 out of 2000 local syndicates. Communists
hold positions in key industries and their strength is
greatest in the important tobacco, port and maritime, trans-
portation and sugar trade unions. Activities connected with
the infiltration of non-Communist labor unions have been
stepped up ever since the coup, particularly among dock and
tobacco workers and bus operators and their influence in
non-Communist unions, although difficult to guage in extent,
may be said to have increased.
Communist strength in youth, women's, and student groups
is almost as great as that in the labor movement. Prominent
organizations in these groups include Junentud Socia.lista
(Socialist Youth) and the Federacion Democratica de Mujeres
Cubanas (Democratic Federation of Cuban Women) both closely
allied with the PSP.
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Communist strength and influence in education remains
significant and may be growing, particularly within the ranks
of teachers and professors. It has been estimated that some
25 percent (difficult to evaluate) of the teachers are Com-
munists and that their influence extends from the primary
grades through the university level.
A comparatively recent development is the increased
infiltration into radio, television, and the press.
Communists are having some success in infiltrating
other parties, particularly those supporting Batista, and
siavl. specifically the labor blocs of those parties. Em-
ploying various subterfuges, such as pretending to be ex-
pellees of the party, a number have succeeded in penetrating
government ministries particularly that of Labor and, to
a lesser extent, Education. Several thousand are govern-
ment employees although holding very minor positions.
Communists continue to possess capabilities for acts
of sabotage, espionage activities, and perhaps limited
guerrilla warfare. They can be expected to exploit any
antiregime outbreak and probably would attempt to convert
such into anti-US demonstrations at which they might have
some initial success, since this would be consonant with
one of their principal party aims--maintenance of a constant
anti-US campaign. It must be noted, however, that the Com-
munists, per se, lack the potentiality for creating serious
widespread disturbances.
On the negative side, the party's outlawing and sub-
sequent government repression have caused it to lose some
strength. The comparative weakening of its position in
labor has produced some loss of revenue which has engendered
a series of difficulties for the party and some dissension
within its lower ranks. The PSP has not been permitted
to register and reorganize as a national political party
under the terms of the current electoral code. Communists
efforts to register a new front party have failed. Efforts
at unification with opposition parties in formation of a 25X1
"united opposition front's have failed conspiciously as did
those connected with the advocation of the "negative vote"
against Batista as a result of Grau's withdrawal.
as very itt e, any influence in le army e P
national , navy and
police.
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l5-
 s
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Critics of the regime had ong
contended that much Batista's anti-Communist action was
due entirely to his desire to impress the United States
thereby gaining its support. The government's passage in
June of strong measures directed against Communist indi-
viduals helped to combat the rising criticism that Batista 25X1
only "talked" a big anti-Communist line. However, these 25X1
measures have not been strictly implemented and their ef-
ic;acy is seriously open to question.
Present indications are that Batista feels that his
surveillance authorities have the situation completely in
hand and that he does not regard the Communist potential
as a strong factor which might work toward his overthrow.
It is estimated that during his new period of office,
Batista, as have both he and other high Cuban officials
done in the past, probably will soft-pedal the Communist
issue whenever political expediency so dictates.
Foreign Relations
Cuba's relations with other Caribbean governments,
which were not too good under the former Prio regime, have
greatly improved under the Batista government. This has 25X1
been due largely to the present trend in Caribbean countries 25X1
toward rightist regimes of which Costa Rica is the sole ex-
ception. F_ I
I Batista currently is on
his International good behavior and probably will not meddle
in the internal affairs of other neighboring governments.
His election assures continuation of Cuba's friendly rela-
tions with other Caribbean countries and the promotion of
peace in that area.
The regime can be expected to continue to maintain close
cordial relations with the United States and a firm pro-West-
ern anti-Communist stand.
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