THE POLITICAL SITUATION IN HAITI

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP91T01172R000300040027-7
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 3
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: July 17, 2012
• Sequence Number: 27
• Publication Date: December 30, 1954
• Content Type: REPORT

Declassified and Approved For Release 2012/07/17: CIA-RDP91T01172R000300040027-7
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OCI No. 2716 CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
Copy No. Office of Current Intelligence
30 December 1954
SUBJECT: The Political Situation in Haiti
Introduction:
The regime of Haitian president Magloire, who was popu-
larly elected for a six-year term in October 1950, has long
since developed into what may be considered a military dicta-
torship. Although the regime is in financial difficulty-and
there are reports of some dissatisfaction in the army, Magloire
and his friends still appear firmly entrenched in power.
Magloire is constitutionally barred from running for the
presidency in 1956, but he has recently indicated an intention
to perpetuate himself as the real power in Haiti by making
arrangements to assume the title of general in chief of the
army at the end of his presidential term.
Political organization in Haiti
There are no true political parties in Haiti, and politi-
cal prominence is based on personal popularity or influence.
This fact is exemplified in the dearth of candidates reported
in December for the 9 January elections for the 37-man Chamber
of Deputies and for municipal posts.
The only known organized political opposition to the
regime is the workers' and Peasants' Movement. It comprises
the following of Deputy Daniel Fignole, reputed. to be a leftist.
rabble-rouser and a long-standing irritant to the government.
There has been no known. Communist activity since dissolution
of the "plebian" Haitian Communist Party in 1948 and of its
"intellectual" counterpart, the Popular Socialist Party and
certain front organizations in January 1951.
A small group of essentially moderate reformists, in which
Fignole was included, established the League for the Defense
of Public Liberties late in December 1953, but leaders of the
league were accused of inciting revolution and arrested within
two weeks. They had all been released by mid-April 1954 and
have apparently not renewed their activity.
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Magloire's rise to power
Magloire emerged as one of Haiti's strongest leaders in
1946, when as commandant of the palace guard he was largely
instrumental in overthrowing the president who had sought to
prolong his term. A military triumvirate composed of Magloire,
then a major, Colonel Franck Lavaud, and Major Antoine Levelt
ruled for a few months until the congress elected a new
civilian president. Like his deposed predecessor, the new ex-
ecutive attempted in May 1950 to prolong himself in power.
Lavaud, Levelt, and Magloire again assumed power. Popular
elections were held on 8 October 1950, when Magloire was elec-
ted president and the present Senate and Chamber of Deputies
were elected. A Constituent Assembly elected at the same
time drafted the present constitution, which became effective
on 28 November 1950.
Consolidation of military rule and personal influence
There is good reason to believe that the 1950 elections
were largely controlled by the triumvirate, though several
opponents of Magloire were elected. Reflecting Magloire's
domination,the constitution permitted military officers on
inactive status to hold elective office. Apparently none but
Magloire has done so. The constitution also provides for the
reorganization of the army to place the police force of the
capital under a separate military command. The rule of the
military and thus enhanced ,while the military establishment
was divided.
The principal military officers,all classmates of
Magloire, are considered personally loyal to him, Neither
Levelt, now army chief of staff, nor Woolley, commandant of
the palace guard, is believed politically ambitious. Colonel
Marcaisse Prosper, commandant of the Port-au-Prince police,
therefore usually figures in speculation on the presidential
succession as virtually the only known serious aspirant.
Prosper, however, who is a close business associate of Mag-
loire has consistently exercised his power in favor of the
regime, even during the president's three-week absence from
the country last summer. Part of Prosper's influence derives
from his role in the distribution of governmental graft. As
a reputed champion of "black" supremacy in Haiti, he may have
some support among elements opposed to Magloire's policy of
conciliating "black's"and"mulattos,'" traditional political
rivals.
SJ T'
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In any case, the police controlled by Prosper are not
considered sufficiently well armed to threaten Magloire as
long as he retains the support of the palace guard, Haiti's
only well-equipped and cohesive military unit.
Problems confronting the regime
While the opposition to Magloire is nebulous, criticism
of graft and corruption: is mounting. There have been re-
ports of dissatisfaction within the army since the 11 October
hurricane, the reported cause being the diminution of govern-
ment revenues due to the loss of export crops and the conse-
quent cut in the take of Magloire's supporters.
It is now clear that the country was beset by financial
difficulties even before the hurricane, is spite of an ex-
cellent export year. Originally financed by a surplus .
accumulated through years of rigidly conservative fiscal
management, Magloire's development program launched in 1951
resulted in a large overdraft at the National Bank by 1953.
Short-term loans from American banks and from American
and other foreign contractors working on the projects main-
tained operations through the summer of 1954, and these
loans were duly repaid out of taxes on coffee, Haiti's princi-
pal export. Haitian financial missions have been unsuccessful
in obtaining long-term financing, however, and even the
Artibonite Valley irrigation project, financed by the Export-
Import Bank, is not is danger of running out of funds.
Effect of economic problems on political situation
Haitian officials have become increasingly critical of
United States policies on hemisphere economic problems during
1954. The government is probably strongly tempted to make
the United States a scapegoat for internal difficulties.
Nevertheless it has recently expressed a desire to resume
negotiations for a long-pending treaty of friendship, commerce
and navigation, and Magloire hopes to sign such a treaty
during his visit to Washington in January. Negotiations for
a bilateral. military assistance pact, requested by Haite
earlier this. year, are also scheduled to begin on 10 January.
The traditionally friendly attitude of the Haitian government
towards the United States will evidently be reaffirmed before
Magloire's visit, primarily in the hope of gaining eventual
American fincial aid. Magloire appears to consider, however,
that his immediate political difficulties will be alleviated
merely by signing of the treaties.
Declassified and Approved For Release 2012/07/17: CIA-RDP91T01172R000300040027-7