SITUATION IN VIETNAM

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP91T01172R000300060003-1
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 2
• Document Creation Date: December 20, 2016
• Document Release Date: February 22, 2006
• Sequence Number: 3
• Publication Date: April 8, 1955
• Content Type: REPORT

lr i Ll ?L V ? ( V J i)G '~ ~'
y ,u ~AL `w8 April 1955
SITUATION IN VIETNAM
Since the initial clash between government forces and
troops of the Binh Xuyen gangster organization on 30 March
there have been no serious hostilities, but neither has there
been any indication of a willingness to compromise on the part
of either side. The government's assent to successive truce
periods proposed by French and American representatives has
been largely dictated by the blocking moves of the French army
rather than by a conciliatory disposition toward the Binh Xuyen
and toward the general problem of the sects.
Premier Diem continues to feel that the Binh Xuyen's
actions and in particular the continued tenure of Lai Van Sang,
a Binh Xuyen man, as Chief of the National Police are intoler-
able, and he would undoubtedly be willing to run the risks in-
volved in a determined attack on the Binh Xuyen but for French
opposition.
Diem's firm position has alarmed not only the sects but
even some of his supporters in the cabinet. Several of them
have tentatively submitted their resignations and Diem is de-
pending for advice almost exclusively on his immediate circle,
among which his brothers are the most prominent. Criticism
leveled against Diem has come from such highly respected
nationalists as Phan Huy Quat and Tran Van Do, the foreign
minister.
The French government has for some weeks been urging a
joint French-American demarche to Bao Dai on the ground that
Bao Dai alone is capable of solving the current crisis in
view of his hold over the sects. Ely, however, told Collins
on 7 April that the sects might prove unresponsive to Bao
Dai's suggestions.
Ely bases his objection to Diem largely on the ground
that Diem no longer has local support except that which Ely
and Collins have given him. Actually, the balance of forces
between Diem and the sects has not shifted against the govern-
ment. Two out of four Hoa Hao generals are at least nominally
aligned with the government. Both of the Cao Dai generals have
pledged their loyalty. The French claim this was no more than
a maneuver but American observers believe that at least they
will not fight against Diem. Diem's cabinet remains largely
intact except for the resignations of his defense minister
and the anti-government Hoa Hao representatives. Others, who
have tentatively resigned have not actually left-the cabinet.
General Collins has reported his conviction that Diem does
not have the capacity to achieve the necessary unity of purpose
and action from his people which is essential to prevent Vietnam ARMY review s f completed rom i~pg under rid ~ control
~. SI n T ,~z r nTT -' _
Approved For Release 2007/04/02: CIA-RDP91 T0117 ~O 0003-~
"TOP SE E
 Approved For Release 2007/04/02 : CIA-RDP91 T01 172R000300060003-1
joai snasst 10
class, 1-'
ha 62aagg ~'}+
Doti
Sla
Mt1s?s ~~~~ ~?~ ~- ~'~
p
pates
Approved For Release 2007/04/02 : CIA-RDP91 T01 172R000300060003-1