ISSUES OF THE KOREAN POST-ARMISTICE POLITICAL CONFERENCE

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP91T01172R000300110001-3
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 25
• Document Creation Date: December 21, 2016
• Document Release Date: August 3, 2006
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: April 17, 1999
• Content Type: REPORT

Approved For Release 2007/10/23: CIA-RDP91T01172R000300110001-3
'TOP SECRET
25X1 Docwmen o. ------------ OOV
No Change In Class.
[J Declassified
Class. Changed To: TS S
Auitha HR 70.2 25X1
Date: 2-Q-d{.__ Byz July 1953
Copy Noe
Working draft
ISSUES OF THE KOREAN POST-ARMISTICE
POLITICAL CONFERENCE
State Dept. review completed "
Office of Current Intelligence
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
TOP SECRET
Approved For Release 2007/10/23: CIA-RDP91T01172R000300110001-3
 Approved For Release 2007/10/23: CIA-RDP91TO1172R000300110001-3
- JIJc.,1CGl VW
COMMUNIST, UNITED NATIONS, AND SOUTH KOREAN VIEWS ON
THE ISSUES OF. THE KOREAN POSTARMISTICE POLITICAL CONFERENCE
1. Participants
2. Role of the United Nations
3. Scope of the political conference
4. Withdrawal of foreign troops
5. The unification of Korea
6. The.prisoner of war issue
7. Other issues
Document No. _---~1
--
No Change In Class. ---------'--
Declassified
Class. Changed To; TS S C
.
Auth.: W 7912
Data: ------1978 By:
SECRET
Approved For Release 2007/10/23: CIA-RDP91TO1172R000300110001-3
 Approved For Release 2007/10/23: CIA-RDP91TO1172R000300110001-3
)I LHP 1 *4s
ISSUES OF THE KOREN POSTARMISTICE
POLITICAL CONFERENCE
1. Participants
A. Communist position
The Soviet resolution of 3 December 1952, supported by
Chou En-lai on 14 December 1952, called for 11-state participa-
tion comprising the United States, the United Kingdom, the
Soviet Union, France, Communist China, North and South Korea,
Czechoslovakia, India, Burma, and Switzerland. Decisions were
to be reached by a two-thirds vote, giving the Communist nations
a veto power over conference decisions.
Earlier at Panmunjom on 6 February 1952, the Communists
suggested five participants from Communist China and North Korea
and five from the "UN members concerned." Later they agreed to
South Korea's inclusion on the UN side.
In general, the Communists seem to desire a multipartite
Far Eastern conference with the participation of the Soviet Union.
As early as January 1951 Chou called for a conference of the Big
Four, Communist China, and India, but at that time he did not
make any recommendations on voting procedure.
SECRET
Approved For Release 2007/10/23: CIA-RDP91TO1172R000300110001-3
 25X1 Approved For Release 2007/10/23: CIA-RDP91TO1172R000300110001-3 25X1
Approved For Release 2007/10/23: CIA-RDP91TO1172R000300110001-3
 Approved For Release 2007/10/23: CIA-RDP91TO1172R000300110001-3
3E(MCC1 AW
25X1
1. Participants
President Rhee will undoubtedly insist upon South Korean
participation in view of his repeated demands for full ROK par-
ticipation in any international conference which discusses Korean
issues. While he might conceivably agree to an invitation-to
North Korea as a quid pro quo for his own, he will violently ob-
ject to the participation o Communist China, one of the aggres-
sors in Korea. He may demand the exclusion of India, whom he
regards as pro-Communist, and the leading western European na-
tions who, he believes, have influenced the US away from a hard
policy in Korea and toward one of "appeasement" of the Communists.
It goes without saying that Rhee would like to exclude any
Communist nation on grounds that political negotiation with them
is fruitless, and may take an intransigent attitude toward the
conference from the beginning if Communist nations are invited
to participate. On the other hand, his pledge not to obstruct
the armistice for 90 days may cause him to accept whatever na-
tions the UN invites to the conference.
SECRET
Approved For Release 2007/10/23: CIA-RDP91TO1172R000300110001-3
 Approved For Release 2007/10/23: CIA-RDP91T01172R000300110001-3
JL'UKE1 VW
2. Role of the UN
A. Communist position
While the Communists' view of the UN role is not clear, they
may seek to limit UN efforts to expressions of support for a po-
litical conference called outside the UN. This probability stems
from the fact that, although the Communists joined in support of
the 18 April Brazilian resolution, they later rejected at Panmun-
jom a UN proposal that final disposition of the prisoner issue be
referred to the General Assembly on the ground that the UN was
one of the belligerents in the Korean ware
Although the Communists have often used the UN as a propa-
ganda sounding board on other issues, and the Soviet Union has
twice shown a willingness to give the UN some role in reaching a
Korean settlement, they have sought primarily to limit.the UN's
effectiveness regarding Korea, The Soviet Union denounced the
UN "intervention" in Korea from the beginning, has boycotted UN
commissions set up to unify and rehabilitate Korea, and has charged
the UN with being an instrument of US aggression. On the two oc-
casions when the Soviet Union seemed willing to grant the UN some
voice on Korean matters, one of which called for a Security Coun-
cil settlement with Chinese Communist participation, and the other
providing for a commission to supervise all-Korean elections, they
added other stipulations which would have insured Communist domi-
nation of the peninsula.
It is not known whether the Soviet Union will press for Chi-
nese Communist membership at the reconvened General Assembly'ses-
sion (see item 3 below), but they may seek a hearing for both
Communist China and North Korea at the session.
A Soviet UN spokesman has indicated that Moscow will not
press for a Security Council meeting now that a truce has been
signed.
SECRET
Approved For Release 2007/10/23: CIA-RDP91T01172R000300110001-3
 Approved For Release 2007/10/23: CIA-RDP91T01172R000300110001-3
2, Role of the UN
On 18 April the UN General Assembly unanimously adopted the
Brazilian resolution calling, among other things, for reconven-
ing the General Assembly after the signing of a truce, Assembly
President Pearson has set 17 August as the date for reconvening
the General Assembly.
Views on the Assembly's possible role when it reconvenes
vary between a belief that the Assembly should merely fix the
mechanical details of the conference, while staying as aloof as
possible from substantive matters, and sentiment for the UN to
directly influence the conference by ensuring the adoption of as
broad agenda as possible.
The US believes that the sole business of the Assembly is to
make appropriate arrangements for UN participation in the politi-
cal conference. Secretary Dulles has said that it would be "to-
tally inappropriate" for the Assembly to hear the Chinese Commu-
nists or the North Koreans and that the US will vote against any
such proposal. This would be proper in view of the 7th Assembly's
25 October resolution deferring the question of Chinese Communist
admission to the UN during the current Assembly session, However,
because of the peculiar wording of article 60 of the draft armis-
tice agreement, some UN members may press the Assembly to inter-
pret the word "et cetera" to cover Chinese Communist admission and
other issues. (See item 3 below)
Regarding a possible Security Council meeting after a truce,
which the US favors, views appear divided between members who be-
lieve that a UN report on the conclusion of an armistice should
be placed on the Council's agenda and noted, and those believing
it sufficient merely to circulate a report to that effect. There-
upon, if no members asks for a Council meeting, it would merely be
assumed that the Council had taken note of the truce.
SECRET
Approved For Release 2007/10/23: CIA-RDP91T01172R000300110001-3
 Approved For Release 2007/10/23: CIA-RDP91TO1172R000300110001-3
20 Role of the UN
Co South Korean views
South Korea is not a member of the UN and hence cannot in-
fluence the international organization's possible role in a Korean
settlement directly. Further, if the US view prevails, and the
Assembly's role is limited to arranging for the UN's participation
in the political conference, the South Korean government should
have few objections. Rhee would, however, be expected to oppose
Assembly efforts to fix a broad Far Eastern agenda since his only
concern is the future of Korea. In case a wider agenda were adopted,
he would doubtless remind the UN that he has agreed not to obstruct
an armistice for 90 days and that the UN's involvement with extran-
eous issues would make even more doubtful successful negotiations
in such a limited period as three months. He has noted that the UN
efforts to solve Korea's problems and to effect economic rehabili-
tation in the past have been largely unsuccessful and that it was
a UN decision in 1945 which first resulted in Korea's division.
Rhee deeply distrusts many UN members as he demonstrated dur-
ing the Rhee-Robertson talks when he insisted that the US promise
to aid him immediately and without consulting other UN members in
case of a renewed attack against South Korea. He earlier told US
officials that some day the American people would learn whether
South Korea or America's allies in the UN were the real friends of
anti-Communism. His anti-UN attitudes may be further strengthened
when he discovers that the UN decided not to publish the joint
policy declaration coincidentally with the truce signing, largely
because of British arguments that Rhee, not the Communists, was
most likely to break the armistice.
At the same time, Rhee banks heavily on the fact that the UN
has repeatedly designated the Republic of Korea as the only law-
ful government in Korea and may hesitate to take any action which
would jeopardize continued UN backing of the Republic.
SECRET
Approved For Release 2007/10/23: CIA-RDP91TO1172R000300110001-3
 Approved For Release 2007/10/23: CIA-RDP91TO1172R000300110001-3
JMC'KL1
3. Scope of the Political Conference
A. Communist position
In view of their earlier insistence that Chinese Communist
membership in the UN and the status of Formosa should be in-
cluded on the conference agenda, the Communists almost certainly
will raise these issues at the conference itself. (Their atti-
tudes on specific conference issues, including POW's, unifi-
cation, and troop withdrawals, are discussed separately below.)
Communist attitudes on the agenda will undoubtedly be tem-
pered by the conference opening by such circumstances as Rhee's
interim truce behavior, the treatment accorded to neutral super-
visory personnel, UN assurances to SouthKorea in case of re-
newed aggression, the status of UN economic pressures on Commu-
nist China, and US assurances to Rhee, especially regarding a
mutual defense pact.
In view of the known Communist objections to limiting the
agenda to Korean issues, the following Communist indications
seem significant:
(1) On 1 April Soviet Foreign Minister Molotov declared,
in supporting Chou's truce proposal, that the UN could "naturally"
do more toward securing a Korean peace if it comprised "lawful"
Chinese and Korean representatives.
(2) Since the Vienna World Peace Congress of December 1952,
the Communists have revived demands for Chinese Communist member-
ship in the UN.
. (3) A Pravda editorial of 25 April noted that in his 16
April address, President Eisenhower had failed to mention Commu-
nist China's "lawful territorial rights, including the Island of
Taiwan."
(4) A Pravda article of 11 April denounced any suggestion
that the Indochina problem be linked to a Korean truce, and sub-
sequent Soviet statements have declared that, since the Indochina
problem is of "local nationalist origin," it is not subject to
international negotiation.
It is not clear, however, whether the Communists will link
any of these references directly to a Korean settlement.
Earlier, before the truce talks began, the Soviet Union var-
ied in its linkage of Korean issues to other postarmistice.prob-
lems. On 17 July 1950 Stalin told Nehru that Communist China's
admission to the UN was necessary for a Korean settlement, but
Moscow's 4 August 1950 Security Council resolution simply called
for a Communist Chinese-North Korean hearing by the UN. Except
for Soviet sponsorship of Wu Hsiu-chan's resolution of 28 Novem-
ber 1950, calling for US "withdrawals" from Taiwan and Korea,"
the Soviet Union has always treated the Korean and Chinese
issues separately.
SECRET
Approved For Release 2007/10/23: CIA-RDP91TO1172R000300110001-3
 Approved For Release 2007/10/23: CIA-RDP91TO1172R000300110001-3
to JCC,ICI21 '
3, Scope of the Political Conference
Article 60 of the draft armistice agreement provides that
the political conference should "settle through negotiation the
question of the withdrawal of foreign forces from Korea, the
peaceful settlement of the Korean question, etc." The "et cetera"
was inserted after the UN had refused at Panmunjom to include in
the conference agenda such specific subjects as Chinese Communist
admission to the UN and the permanent status of Formosa.
To date the UN views of the scope of the conference are
clouded by the inability of the Big Three to hold the Bermuda con-
ference, the lack of clarity about Communist attitudes toward the
conference, and Rhee's antitruce attitudes. Broadly, however, the
Western Big Three desire that Korean issues take precedence over
any others, if need be, to the exclusion of collateral matters.
Secretary Dulles has, however, mentioned linking the Indo-
china problem with a Korean settlement. He told the.recent for-
eign ministers meeting that the US hopes to maintain economic
controls against mainland China and to negotiate withdrawal of
foreign troops and Korean unification, while not allowing the
Communists to use the conference for propaganda purposes. The US
has also taken the lead in securing the signature of all the na-
tions fighting in Korea to a joint policy declaration designed to
restrain further Communist aggression in Korea. The US also in-
tends to adhere to its present position regarding Chinese Commu-
nist membership in the UN,
The UK, after subscribing to the idea of a limited agenda,
is coming increasingly to favor a wider latitude in the negotia-
tions, but only after substantial progress has been made toward
Korean political settlements The UK is more cautious than the
US toward Southeast Asia questions, and would relegate Indo-
chinese dsscussions to after the Korean issue is disposed of,
The British acquiesced in French efforts to expand the
joint policy declaration, but have secured a US promise not to
publish this declaration now. Salisbury told the foreign minis-
ters' meeting, on both the questions of Chinese economic con-
trols and UN membership, that the existing arrangements should
prevail for a while subject to later review in the light of
Communist policies.
The French hope that a Korean settlement may also cover
Indochina, agree "in principle" on steel and iron embargoes to
China, and have secured approval of all the nations fighting in
Korea to an addendum to the Greater Sanctions Statement covering
aggression elsewhere in Asia.
Other UN nations have not signified their intentions on the
agenda but some, notably India, will doubtless press for Chinese
Communist entry into the UN, settlement of the Formosa question,
discussion of "colonial" issues, and a broad Far Eastern settle-
ment calculated to reduce East-West tensions.
SECRET
Approved For Release 2007/10/23: CIA-RDP91TO1172R000300110001-3
 Approved For Release 2007/10/23: CIA-RDP91TO1172R000300110001-3
3. Scope of the Political Conference
A. Communist position (Continued)
The Chinese Communists, however, after initially separat-
ing the two issues, have connected them since the Chinese
Communist intervention. This was true of the 28 November 1950
resolution, noted above, and to Chou's 22 December 1950 linkage
of Chinese Communist UN membership with the withdrawal of all
foreign forces from Korea. Moreover, he stated twice in 1951
that the postarmistice political conference should discuss
"other problems concerning the Far East."
Since that time, the Chinese Communists have dropped their
references to these issues and have made a cease-fire contingent
upon UN acceptance of political commitments.
SECRET
Approved For Release 2007/10/23: CIA-RDP91TO1172R000300110001-3
 Approved For Release 2007/10/23: CIA-RDP91TO1172R000300110001-3
ltwlI JMI'If1 I - NO
4. Withdrawal of foreign troops
A. Communist position
The latest Communist position was expressed in the
Polish General Assembly resolution of 17 October 1952 which
called for the "withdrawal from Korea of foreign troops,
among them also the Chinese volunteer units, within a
period of two to three months . . . . TI
This has been virtually a standard Communist demand since
the Korean hostilities began. Before the Chinese Communist
intervention, such demands applied, of course, to UN troops
with the presumption that the North Korean army should be allowed
to win the war. However, Communist resolutions before that
of October 1952 stated that the Chinese Communists also
would depart. While General Nam I1 stated on 11 July 1951
that all foreign troops should withdraw "within the shortest
possible time," the only other Communist reference to a time
period was contained in a Soviet General Assembly resolution
of 8 November 1951, providing for withdrawal 90 days after a
cease-fire.
Peiping publicly stated in 1951 that some Chinese Communist
troops would remain in Korea after a truce to assist in North
Korean "economic reconstruction," and suggested the same thing
as late as 27 July 1953.
SECRET
Approved For Release 2007/10/23: CIA-RDP91TO1172R000300110001-3
 Approved For Release 2007/10/23: CIA-RDP91TO1172R000300110001-3
140W M L'It11
I%W
3. Scope of the Political Conference
C. South Korean views
Rhee's only interest, as indicated in his talks with Robert-
son, is to secure the withdrawal of Chinese Communist forces from
Korea and the unification of the entire peninsula under South
Korean domination. Previously he had additionally requested that
the UN disarm North Korean troops and prevent any aid to the North
Korean regime by a third power.
Rhee would oppose any decision which was not based upon full
South Korean representation or which he believed impaired his gov-
ernment's sovereignty. While he might not oppose the discussion
of other issues, especially if he became convinced that this was
a necessary prerequisite to obtaining his chief objectives, he
would insist on the disposal of Korean issues first and appears
convinced that even they cannot, be settled within a 90-day period.
SECRET
Approved For Release 2007/10/23: CIA-RDP91TO1172R000300110001-3
 Approved For Release 2007/10/23: CIA-RDP91TO1172R000300110001-3
Approved For Release 2007/10/23: CIA-RDP91TO1172R000300110001-3
 Approved For Release 2007/10/23: CIA-RDP91TO1172R000300110001-3
4. Withdrawal of foreign troops
C. South Korean views
This, together with unification, is a prime South Korean
political objective and because of its intimate relationship
with the South Korean security angle, it has formed part of
every demand which Rhee has made since the truce talks began.
Rhee believes that polite discussion with the Communists,
on the basis of past experience, will be protracted and without
results, but he agreed in the conversations with Robertson to
"hold in abeyance" his demand for the withdrawal of Chinese
Communist troops "pending an effort to secure" this objective
at the political conference. In his final note to Robertson
he stated that he had given up on insisting that the Chinese
be removed prior to a truce in order to cooperate with the US,
but that it had. been "agreed" that South Korean and US repre-
sentatives would withdraw from the conference ""90 days after
its commencement." In saying this, he did not add the conditions
for withdrawal which the US insisted upon during the Rhee-
Robertson conversations. He further conditioned this ambiguous
agreement upon US assurances of immediate and automatic military
aid in case of a renewed external attack and moral and material
support in case South Korea sought to eject invaders by itself --
assurances concerning which he still may not be entirely satisfied.
Presumably, Rhee's stand on this issue will have been clari-
fied by the high-level US-South Korean talks which are to be
held between now and the conference.
He might conceivably oppose the withdrawal of UN troops by
force if he felt that this withdrawal were being undertaken
before provisions for Korean unification had been implemented.
This would, however, seem unlikely for three months at least,
in view of his announced pledge not to obstruct a truce for that
period. On the other hand, he might welcome the simultaneous
withdrawal of both UN and Chinese Communist troops if he believed
that this would result in a settlement of Korean issues by the
Koreans alone.
SECRET
Approved For Release 2007/10/23: CIA-RDP91TO1172R000300110001-3
 Approved For Release 2007/10/23: CIA-RDP91T01172R000300110001-3
J t'KL l low
5. The Unification of Korea
A. Communist position
On 9 June the Peiping' People's Daily criticized President
Eisenhower's proposal for a US-Sou orean mutual defense pact,
which it said would "run counter to the object of the political
conference to bring about peaceful unification of Korea." It
pointed out that both the Chinese Communists and the USSR be-
lieved that unification must be achieved by the Koreans them-
selves, but did not make explicit the machinery by which unifica-
tion was to be achieved.
Previous Communist proposals for unification have all sought
to ensure Communist domination of Korea. At various times during
the war the Communists have proposed that the UN simply withdraw,
although at the 1952 Assembly, the USSR added some references
to supervisory machinery.
The only Communist resolution which has mentioned detailed
unification plans was submitted in October 1950. At that time
the USSR and four satellites called for the election of a
National Assembly organized and conducted by a joint commission
from North and South Korea formed at a joint meeting of the
respective legislatures. This joint assembly would elect an
interim government at elections supervised by a UN commission
"necessarily" including Korea's "neighbors." This would obviously
have ensured Communist control of both the joint assembly and
the interim government.
Communist attitudes on the unification question, it must be
recalled, are basically conditioned by the fact that both China
and the USSR recognize only the North Korean regime and do not
accord recognition to the Rhee government,. Between the truce
and the conference, and during the conference itself, these
attitudes will be conditioned further by Rhee's actions and by
the ability of the UN Command to implement the assurances given
to the Communists recently at Panmunjom.
Moscow may be expected continuously to play up fears that
no unification plan will succeed so long as Rhee remains at
the head of the South Korean government, and may stimulate
sentiment among UN members for the disarmament of the South
Korean army and/or UN repudiation of Rhee as necessary prior
steps to unification. The Communists will undoubtedly seek to
relate a Korean settlement to the broader issues of German uni-
fication, withdrawal of US forces from European countries, ex-
pansion of East-West trade, UN admission of Communist China,
and abandonment of US support for Chiang.
SECRET
Approved For Release 2007/10/23: CIA-RDP91T01172R000300110001-3
 Approved For Release 2007/10/23: CIA-RDP91TO1172R000300110001-3
VIEW NE (,'1t L' 1 %W )
On 27 June 1950 the UN Security Council by a 7-1-2 vote
(USSR absent) recommended that the member states "furnish such
assistance to (South) Korea as may be necessary to repel the
armed attack and to restore international peace and security
in the area," On 7 October the General Assembly recommended
that "all appropriate steps be taken to insure condtions of
stability throughout Korea," and invited both North and South
Korea to "cooperate" in the work of rehabilitation. This resolu-
tion also asserted that the UN objective continued to be, as it
had been since 1947, "the establishment of a unified, independent,
and democratic" Korea. On 1 February 1951 the Assembly reaffirmed
that the UN policy was "to bring about a cessation of hostil-
ities o 0 o and the achievement of UN objectives in Korea by
peaceful means."
In the recent Rhee-Robertson conversations, the US stated
that the political conference should seek "promptly and vigorously"
to obtain the "common objective" of a unified Korea and pledged
that if, after 90 days the conference was being exploited by
the Communists to "infiltrate, propagandize, or otherwise em-
barass" South Korea, the US would be prepared to withdraw, along
with South Korea, and consult about future courses of action.
Judging from press reports and a recent US State Department
query of UN attitudes, most members believe that the UN has
accomplished its original goal, namely, the repelling of aggres-
sion and that while the UN remains committed to unification, it
is not obligated to achieve this purpose by the use of force.
The UN members were not consulted regarding a possible 90-day
time limit and, at the political conference,, may press the US
to abandon any such restriction on the ground that even the
settlement of purely Korean issues will take a much longer period
to solve.
Some UN members, notably India if it is invited, may seek
US abandonment of its previous assurances to Rhee, notably the
promised mutual security pact which India regards as the real
stumbling block to profitable negotiations. There may be some
sentiment for the US to withdraw its personal support from
Rhee or to disarm the South Korean army if this seems to be the
necessary price to pay for peaceful settlement of the unification
question.
It seems almost certain that some formula looking toward all-
Korean elections will be put forth as the first step toward
accomplishing unification. If such a solution proves infeasible,
some UN members may propose a UN trusteeship for Korea, and
perhaps of Formosa as well. It is not yet clear whether,
if unification cannot be accomplished short of it, all UN dele-
gates will remain firm in the view that the present South Korean
government is the only legitimate one authorized to govern the
entire peninsula.
'?,C. 'ET
Approved For Release 2007/10/23: CIA-RDP91TO1172R000300110001-3
 Approved For Release 2007/10/23: CIA-RDP91TO1172R000300110001-3
JLL1CL1
C. South Korean views
As was noted with regard to withdrawal, Rhee has agreed
to hold off on his demand for unification pending an effort by
the conference to secure unification by political negotiation.
His stipulations regarding a time limit on these discussions
and US assurances, which were noted in item 4 above, also
apply to this issue. Hence the same ambiguities noted there,
plus the possibilities of unilateral South Korean action after
90 days of discussions, must be taken into account on unification.
Rhee will insist that any unification formula insure South
Korean domination of the entire peninsula. He has repeatedly
pointed to the fact that the UN recognizes his government as
the only legitimate one for all of Korea and will oppose any
suggestions which he deems to impair South Korean sovereignty.
He is fearful that a formula for all-Korean elections may be
adopted which would call for dissolution of the present South
Korean government, and after President Eisenhower's 16 April
call for "free elections in a united Korea," sought immediate
clarification that this did not envisage such dissolution.
Rhee may prove particularly troublesome on the unification
issue if and when the UN seeks to implement unification on
whatever terms are eventually fixed. His adamant opposition
to the entry of neutral nations repatriation personnel and
indications of his growing worry over NNSC personnel coming
to South Korea make it difficult to imagine his agreeing with
alacrity to UN personnel entering South Korea to enforce uni-
fication on other than his terms.
SECRET
Approved For Release 2007/10/23: CIA-RDP91TO1172R000300110001-3
 Approved For Release 2007/10/23: CIA-RDP91TO1172R000300110001-3
V4 M C1CL1 __1 Vft#
6. The prisoner of war issue
A. Communist position
The Communists will undoubtedly seek, in the political
conference, the return to their control of the maximum number
of POW's possible, although their limited access to the POW's
and the restricted time limit which the 8 June agreement im-
poses on them for "explanations" have apparently removed the
basis for their earlier confidence that they would get most
of the POW's to return.
Having been assured by General Harrison that no more POW's
will be released, the Communists have taken a conciliatory line
on other aspects of the POW issue. Rather than persisting in
the demand that the 27,000 released North Korean exprisoners
be recovered before a truce, they now state that,'if the UN
Command cannot recover them after a truce is signed, they
"reserve the right" to submit the question to the political
conference. Similarly, while noting that the Rhee-Robertson
agreement to allow POW's who remain anti-Communist to remain
in South Korea or go wherever they choose is contrary to the
8 June POW agreement, they "reserve the right" to ask for
implementation of the 8 June agreement.
The Communists could seek to force the repatriation of
all remaining prisoners and may seek to limit the neutral
nations to which POW's might be sent to the five nations
serving on the NNRC, but the UN retains the power to block
either of these demands. The Communists may, however, use
the ambiguities in the 8 June agreement to block settlement
of this or other issues unfavorable to them, to foster con-
flict between the US and South Korea, or to stimulate differences
among delegates on the UN side.
SECRET
Approved For Release 2007/10/23: CIA-RDP91TO1172R000300110001-3
 Approved For Release 2007/10/23: C
IA
-RDP91TO1172R000300110001-3
/(
/~
3EUKL1
6. The prisoner of war issue
The principal points of the 8 June POW agreement are:
(1) Exchange within two months of a truce all POW's
willing to be repatriated;
(2) Transfer to the five-nation repatriation commission,
also within two months, of all POW's unwilling to be repatriated;
(3) The period of access for "explanations" to the
POW's to be 90 days;
(4) The ratio of "explaining representatives" to be
7 per 1000 POW's; hours of access to be fixed by the commission;
(5) The fate of POW's who remain unwilling to return,
after 90 days in neutral custody, to be submitted to the political
conference;
(6) If the political conference cannot agree on their
fate within 30 days, the POW's shall be changed from POW status
to civilian status;
(7) Thereafter, ex-POW's who choose to go to neutral
nations shall be assisted by the repatriation commission until
its subsequent dissolution.
The US agreed in the Rhee-Robertson talks to move non-
Communist POW's now in UN custody to the demilitarized zone and
turn them over to the NNRC for questioning in the presence, among
others, of UN and South Korean representatives. Korean POW's
who desire to do so may return to South Korea. Other non-
Communist POW's, following explanations, are to be released in
accordance with the. terms of reference and are free thereafter
to proceed to any destination of their own choosing.
Other UN members have not made clear their position on
ultimate disposition of the POW's, although except for Nationalist
China, most have expressed approval of the 8 June agreement.
Most states probably are not particularly concerned with the
fate of the Communist prisoners or, as a matter of fact, with
the non-Communist POW's either, except that the return of large
numbers heretofore opposing repatriation to Communist control
would reduce UN prestige and support the Communist argument
that such POW's opposed repatriation because of UN "coercion."
One of the most difficult issues will be that of interpreting
the terms of the 8 June agreement, particularly the "neutral
nations" to which unwilling POW's are to be sent. The agree-
ment as a whole contains sufficient ambiguities to make pro-
tracted negotiation likely, especially in view of the 30-day
time limit under which the political conference must work to
settle the POW issue. The UN collectively probably has not
made up its mind on the interpretation of specific articles,
but will almost certainly oppose any Communist attempt to limit
the term "neutral nations" to the five members of the neutral
custodial commission.
SECRET
Approved For Release 2007/10/23: CIA-RDP91TO1172R000300110001-3
 Approved For Release 2007/10/23: CIA-RDP91TO1172R000300110001-3
/" JI LKL1
6. The prisoner of war issue
B. UN views (continued)
UN attitudes might be seriously affected, to the detriment
of the US, if the Communists were to allow relatively free
NNRC access to North Korea while the UN, in line with Rhee's
demands, must prevent such personnel from entering South Korean
territory.
SECRET
Approved For Release 2007/10/23: CIA-RDP91TO1172R000300110001-3
 Approved For Release 2007/10/23: CIA-RDP91T01172R000300110001-3
4) 1t1;1
6. The prisoner of war issue
Rhee agreed, in his talks with Robertson, to subject non-
Communist POW's to three months of "explanation" as required
by the 8 June POW agreement. He then demanded that, at the
expiration of three months, all remaining unrepatriated Korean
POW's who desired to remain in South Korea be released south
of the neutral zone. He also demanded that all Chinese POW's
who refused to return to Communist control be transported to
Formosa "according to their will." The variance between his
demand for 90 days of explanations followed by release, and
the 8 June agreement calling for a further 30-day period of
discussion of the POW issue by the political conference, was
not clarified by the Rhee-Robertson talks, nor was that regarding
the ultimate sending of Chinese POW's to Formosa.
Rhee retains the capability of releasing additional POW's,
although this might be interpreted as violating his pledge not
to obstruct An armistice. Here again, however, he is protected
by the fact that he has reserved his "sovereign right" to
prevent any measure or action which he regards as detrimental
to his national survival.
SECRET
Approved For Release 2007/10/23: CIA-RDP91T01172R000300110001-3
 Approved For Release 2007/10/23: CIA-RDP91TO1172R000300110001-3
7. Other issues
A. Communist position
The Polish resolution of 17 October 1952 called for
the withdrawal of foreign troops "and" peaceful settlement
of the Korean question, without making clear the Communist-
desired relations between the two. Hence it is not certain
whether the Communists will be inflexible on the wording of
the draft armistice agreement which calls for withdrawal
before a political settlement.
The Communists have, throughout the war, consistently
followed a three-point formula on Korea: (a) a cease-fire;
(b) withdrawal; and (c) a political settlement by the Koreans
themselves. While this would raise the presumption that they
would demand withdrawal prior to settlement, the Communists
have not specifically expressed the matter this way since
early 1951. The Soviet resolution of 2 October 1950 called
for the UN immediately to withdraw its troops, whereupon
conditions would be established for Korean settlement of
internal affairs.
At the beginning of their intervention, the Chinese
Communists made withdrawal a condition both of a cease-fire
and a political settlement.
The Communists may be expected, as their recent propa-
ganda does, to credit the Soviet peace offensive and Korean-
Chinese sincerity and military might with forcing the UN to
sue for an armistice. They will undoubtedly leave the door
open for rationalizing future Communist military action on
a self-defense pretext by continually voicing fears of Rhee's
future aggressive actions and the effects of a US-South Korean
mutual defense pact. The build-up of this theme suggests a
possible Communist insistence in the political conference that
South Korea be branded as the original aggressor.
SECRET
Approved For Release 2007/10/23: CIA-RDP91TO1172R000300110001-3
 Approved For Release 2007/10/23: CIA-RDP91TO1172R000300110001-3
low 3PIUKrIJ *0
7. Other issues
B. UN views
The UN has taken no stand on the specific relation of
withdrawal to other issues, although the peaceful unification
of Korea remains the chief UN objective. Presumably, the UN
would not desire to remove its forces until Korea's ultimate
status has been decided upon, but it might conceivably accept,
or be forced to accept, withdrawal as a condition for nego-
tiating the broader political settlement. Also, the UN may be
pressed by some of its own members to release forces currently
under UN operatipnal control and to return them to their home
juiisdictions, particularly if, as seems likely, protracted
negotiations are necessary to reach a settlement in Korea.
While many UN members might be willing, as the Communists
have proposed, to leave the determination of Korea's permanent
status to Koreans, most doubtless appreciate that this would
likely play into the hands of the Communists or result in an
aggressive move by South Korea, and hence would not result in
the real achievement of UN objectives in Korea.
While the attitudes of the Communists and South Korea will
doubtless be the determining factor, the most probable UN posi-
tion will be that some of the foreign forces from each side be
withdrawn fairly soon after a truce as an earnest of good faith,
and to proceed to the negotiation of a settlement, leaving some
troops in Korea both to deter future Communist aggressive ac-
tions and to guard against Rhee's threat to renew the fighting
after 90 days. Should considerable progress be registered at
the political conference, and perhaps some formula agreed upon
for Korea-wide elections, the UN would probably then agree to
the removal of its remaining forces.
SECRET
Approved For Release 2007/10/23: CIA-RDP91TO1172R000300110001-3
 Approved For Release 2007/10/23: CIA-RDP91TO1172R000300110001-3
JL1 U1[.C l -1 *AW
7. Other issues
Co South Korean views
Rhee will undoubtedly demand that the political conference
take up first the question of withdrawal prior to discussing
Korea's eventual status. This is of prime interest to him since
he believes that the presence of a million Chinese Communists
troops forty miles from Seoul imposes an intolerable barrier to
South Korea's security. Moreover, the withdrawal of Chinese
Communist troops would, he believes, make it more feasible for
him to secure his objective of unification by unilateral action.
More important in assessing Rhee's position regarding the
political conference are the numerous open and covert means which
he has to impair, block, or undermine the effectiveness of the
political conference. Conceding that he has agreed not to ob-
struct an armistice for 90 days after the commencement of the
postarmistice political conference, he retains the capability
of doing any of the following if he believes unification and
withdrawal are being sacrificed to other issues:
(1) withdrawing South Korean forces from the UNC;
(2) attacking incoming NNSC personnel;
(3) releasing additional POW's;
(4) engaging in independent military action which he
believes might force the US to come to his aid;
(5) withdrawing Korean supply and dock workers from
UN employment;
(6) drafting Koreans employed by UN agencies;
(7) crippling UN intelligence operations and in-
stallations;
(8) seizing UN supply and ammunition dumps;
(9) replacing key government personnel who oppose his
antiarmistice stand;
(10) developing further the potentialities of the internal
security organization which carried out the mid-
June POW release;
(11) seeking some kind of a post-90 day understanding for
assistance from Nationalist China;
(12) building of a militia or national guard, reported to
have begun under leadership of ex-defense minister
Shin Tae-yung, which would give him a private army
outside the control of the professional military
hierarchy.
SECRET
Approved For Release 2007/10/23: CIA-RDP91TO1172R000300110001-3