REPORTED DECLINE IN US PRESTIGE ABROAD
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Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST):
CIA-RDP91T01172R000300120001-6
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S
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Document Creation Date:
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Publication Date:
September 11, 1953
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REPORT
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CONFIDENTIAL
11 September 1953
THIS DOCUMENT IS FOR THE?EYES OF THE RECIPIENT
ONLY. IT MUST NOT BE FURTHER DISSEMINATED IN
WHOLE OR IN PART.
State Dept. review completed
THIS MATERIAL CONTAINS INFORMATION AFFECTING THE NATIONAL
DEFENSE OF THE UNITED STATES WITHIN THE MEANING OF THE
ESPIONAGE LAWS, TITLE 18, USC, SECS. 793 AND 794, THE
TRANSMISSION OR REVELATION OF WHICH IN ANY MANNER TO AN
UNAUTHORIZED PERSON IS PROHIBITED BY LAW.
------------
ChanCe n. Class.
L-j
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Auth..i IO.2
Date, IV
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REPORTED DECLINE IN US PRESTIGE ABROAD
w
This report is an attempt to present a synthesis of opinion
held in certain foreign countries respecting the United States.
It is based on reports largely prepared by American officials
and intelligence officers in various foreign countries, pursuant
to request. It has been assembled by intelligence officers whose
duty it was to reproduce not what they themselves thought but what
they had received from observers on the spot in foreign lands.
To have tempered these views in order to make them more palatable
here would have been false to the purpose of the entire exercise.
At the same time, those who have compiled this synthesis are
conscious of the fact that it might prove misleading if it were
accepted as representing a settled, long range opinion of certain
countries toward the United States and its policy. Inevitably,
American contacts are disproportionately with educated, articu-
late sectors of the population, and one must guard against
attributing to an entire populace sentiments expressed by this
relatively small group.
Nothing is more fleeting or inconstant than the feeling of
one country towards another. The American people have a very
particular yearning to be loved and even possibly to be flat-
tered by other peoples. We feel that we have been generous in
our policy and with our money and that we have sought no unfair
political, territorial, or other advantages. Therefore we tend
to be shocked when we find that we are not universally admired
and even that in certain areas there is growing hostility. It
is well to remember that history does not show many precedents
of lasting love and affection between nations. It also shows
that the more powerful a nation becomes the less popular it is.
The most that a nation can aspire to and should aspire to in
international relations is healthy respect.
In the present case the attitude of certain countries
toward the United States is influenced by factors such as
these: A debtor never loves a creditor and those who receive
bounty rarely feel lasting gratitude to the giver; states which
quickly assume commanding positions in the world are viewed
with jealousy and suspicion by those who lately exercised
great power and who by force of circumstances have lost it;
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the devastation and disillusionment of war, bring to victor and
vanquished alike, psychopathic conditions, which superimposed on
economic and social stress and strain, tend to exaggerate inter-
nation friction. This is particularly true in Western Europe
today.
Countless historical precedents could be cited which throw
light upon the present international feeling toward the United
States. Harold Nicolson in his recent work on the Life and
Reign of King George the Fifth describes the attitude toward
Britain at the close of the 19th Century which as he states
"had rendered England the richest and most powerful country in
the world." Then came the Boer war with initial reverses for
British policy. This produced in London a black cloud of
depression shot with flashes of bewildered rage. Even more
perplexing to the British was the wave of gloating animosity
which suddenly swept across the continent of Europe. (King
George V, His Life and Reign, Harold Nicolson, Constable,
Page 58-59.) One more recent precedent might be cited:
Woodrow Wilson visited Europe in triumph after the Armistice
in 1918. He was deified in the countries of Western Europe
by victors and vanquished alike. When he refused to accede
to all the claims of the victors or to satisfy all the hopes
of the vanquished, he became the most hated man in Europe.
Italy, early in 1919, had given him a reception such as no man,
Italian or foreigner, had ever before received. A few months
later when he rejected Italian claims to Fiume his face, encased
in a German helmet, was imprinted on toilet paper and circulated
in millions and millions of copies from the north to the south
of Italy. Such is the stability of "affection" among nations.
In appending this foreword to the factual intelligence
report which follows, it should be emphasized that it would be
false to draw the conclusion that there is anything durable or
fundamentally wrong in the relationships between the United
States and other countries. The outcome of the recent elections
in Germany, in which alignment with the United States-led coa-
lition was a major issue, is reassuring in this regard. We
are, however, passing through a phase in which an attitude
of hostility is being shown us here and there and this must be
reckoned as a factor in the accomplishment of our policy objec-
tives. Naturally it is an element that we should seek to
eliminate in order to facilitate the carrying out of that
policy.
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The reported decline in American prestige abroad is
considered separately in each of the general regions of the
globe. Attitudes toward the United States are influenced by
diverse factors in the different areas, many of them directly
opposite in impact, so that no significant common trend can be
deduced. Therefore, the problem will be dealt with separately
in each of the following arbitrary groupings of the free world:
I. Europe and Canada
II. Far East and Western Pacific
III. Near East and South Asia
IV. Latin America
Under each, an attempt will be made to show the variations in
American prestige from its first decline after World War II,
pointing out especially the low point and the trends during
the past six months.
Part V is a tabulation of the favorable and unfavorable
references to the United States for the past six months in the
radio broadcasts normally monitored from non-Communist countries.
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I. EUROPE AND CANADA
(detailed report as Tab A)
The high point of US prestige in Western Europe and
Canada during the cold war era is difficult to identify but
can probably be fixed between the lifting of the Berlin
Blockade in the spring of 1949 and the apparent crushing of
North Korea's aggression in mid-September 1950. Western
Europe's general response to the decision to defend South
Korea was one of relief and admiration for American leadership.
The military defeats of July and August at the hands of a
third rate power raised apprehensions as to American military
ability, but the Inchon landings restored European respect for
our power.
Almost simultaneously, however, doubts arose in European
minds as to the wisdom of American leadership. The decision
in September 1950 to seek German rearmament shocked many
former victims of the Nazis in the countries they had overrun.
Our insistence on exploiting the Korean victory with an advance
to the Yalu River seemed to many of our allies provocative.
The subsequent intervention of the Chinese and their defeat
of a first rate Western army spread gloom in Europe. Even
stronger apprehensions were evoked, however, by rumors that
Washington was seriously contemplating the use of the atom
bomb and the expansion of the war in order to extricate itself
from the local difficulty. Many Europeans came to feel for the
first time that their gravest danger lay in the possibility of
America's recklessly touching off a new war. British Prime
Minister Attlee's sudden visit to President Truman in December
1950 was one measure of the depth of this fear.
The first six months of 1951 saw a genuine recovery of
European confidence in America. Though the Korean war news
was not followed with the same close attention in Europe as
it received in the United States, the Eighth Army's recovery
and decisive defensive victories against heavy Chinese attacks
in April and May had their effect on public opinion. The
23 June Soviet initiative for a truce further rehabilitated
US military prestige, General Eisenhower's mission to establish
SHAPE succeeded in shaking off much of Europe's lethargy,
Whether by the summer of 1951 our stock had again reached its
1950 high is debatable; probably it had at least regained a
comparatively high plateau.
The 1952 presidential campaign had an impact on US
prestige in Europe that was definitely adverse. With all
their liking for Eisenhower as a man and as a military leader
in war or peace, many Europeans distrusted the Republican
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party among other things for the past isolationist tendencies
of certain of its leaders. By election day they clearly
favored Stevenson, The attacks on the respective candidates
contributed to the European distrust,
Thus by inauguration day the Eisenhower administration
was viewed in Europe with an attitude of watchful scepticism
that has persisted throughout the past eight months. Relatively
minor incidents which seemed to confirm previously expressed
fears have consequently loomed larger to many Europeans than
substantial evidence that the new administration is pursuing
broad policies that they consider far-sighted and in accord
with their essential interests. For example:
The selection as ambassador to the USSR of an ex-
perienced career officer, rather than a political figure,
was confused in European minds by the attempts of a
relatively few Senators to block his confirmation.
The reaffirmation of American support for NATO and
the EDC was in part' eclipsed by Europeans' resentment
at the Secretary of State's call for a speeding up of EDC
ratification.
The achievement of a truce in Korea was partially lost
sight of in the European disapproval of our apparent con-
doning of President Rhee's irresponsible actions.
The impact of the President's generally acclaimed
16 April speech was to some extent lost in the almost
simultaneous reaction of mingled ridicule and dismay
provoked by the Cohn-Schine investigations of US inform-
mation centers in Europe and the subsequent "book burnings."
Our prestige in Europe in this period was necessarily af-
fected by certain external factors. Chief among these was
Stalin's death in February and the ensuing Soviet "peace of-
fensive," which for most Europeans made the need to rely on
American power seem much less urgent. An additional factor
was the way European economic trends combined with the tapering
off of American aid, Further deterioration in the French and
Italian economies led those nations in part to see their
difficulties as resulting from America's policies, On the
other hand, in Britain the achievement of a new recovery high
tended to produce a renewed assertiveness in foreign policy.
In summary, the decline in US prestige began approximately
three years ago, and accelerated during the last part of 1952,
eft W) WIT, A
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and in certain countries is currently at or near a postwar
low.
The past six months have in most countries seen no gen-
eral improvement; relatively high prestige in West Germany
and the Netherlands has been roughly counterbalanced by a
further ebbing of respect for American policies in France
and Italy. Except in the latter two countries, however, there
is less evidence of actual decline than of an increasingly
sceptical attitude. On the whole, the situation seems such
that a few ill-considered American actions--or even inaction
with respect to certain problems--could stimulate a further
and accelerated fall.
Major Causes:
It is impossible to separate these into neat compart-
ments. Each impinges on the other. Nevertheless, the follow-
ing salient features may be identified.
(1) Declining fear of the Soviet Union
The fact that the USSR did not attack Western
Europe when it was much weaker than today, the varied "peace"
gestures of Stalin's successors, and the European nations'
own desire to escape the burdens of armament have for many
articulate Europeans added up to the conclusion that there
is now little danger from the East. The 1947 guerrilla war
in Greece, the 1948 coup in Czechoslovakia and the 1950 in-
vasion of South Korea have found no comparable counterpart in
the past three years: hence it is argued that the Kremlin
has learned its lesson and will concentrate for some time on
ameliorating conditions within the Orbit. Thus when American
leaders stress the continuance and growth of the Soviet threat,
they are regarded as doing so from ulterior motives, and even
charged with insincerity on the ground that we would not be
reducing our own arms budget if we really believed in the
Soviet threat ourselves.
Another and familiar line of European reasoning,
though inconsistent with the above, nevertheless induces the
same tendency toward defense cutbacks. This view holds that
if the American contention is right and the USSR is indeed
building a powerful military machine to achieve world domination,
this force will be far too potent for Europeans to cope with
alone and will be defeated only after a protracted struggle
in which Western European civilization will be destroyed no
matter what defensive measures the free countries take.
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Whatever the line of reasoning may be, there is
a very strong desire in Europe to settle the cold war by negoti-
ation, and this is transmuted by wishful thinking into the con-
viction that such a settlement is in fact attainable in the
relatively near future. In immediate practical terms, this
European conviction has removed much of the sense of urgency
and willingness to sacrifice which marked the early NATO build-
up. As regards American prestige, it means that Washington,
by continuing to insist that the West demand some prior evidence
of Moscow's peaceful intentions, now draws condemnation as a
major obstacle to peace.
(2) Distrust of American Leadership
Many Europeans who profess to follow international
developments believe that the United States has not had suffi-
cient experience in foreign affairs to offer wise and farsighted
leadership. This opinion arises in the capitals of states which
have been important European powers for centuries and global
powers for many decades. In Britain, the return of Churchill
and the Conservatives has strengthened the nostalgia for the
time when Britain was the leading global power, and hypersensi-
tivity to playing the role of a junior partner manifests itself
in reflections on American inexperience.
Throughout Europe we are often charged with im-
patience and impetuosity, with an "all-or-nothing" approach
in the East-West conflict, and with intending to press the
present struggle to a conclusion entailing humiliation of or
annihilation of the Soviet Union, The smaller countries like
Denmark and Switzerland, which in the past have managed to
survive under the shadows of vastly greater powers, are es-
pecially prone to regard the American approach as dangerous
and greatly lacking in historical perspective. Such mis-
givings are evidenced particularly in the strong reactions to
any intimations that we might embark on a course designed to
"liberate" the satellites.
To many Europeans we also appear unfair in our
ready criticism of the colonial policies of some European na-
tions. We seem to them too reluctant to give credit to the
French and Dutch for their positive accomplishments in im-
proving conditions in French North Africa and the Netherlands
East Indies, Others see us as so anxious to have the European
defense and political communities established that we forget
the strides already taken in forming the Coal and Steel Com-
munity.
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(3) "McCarthyism"
Whether or not European reaction to Senator
McCarthy is fundamentally the most active cause of the current
distrust of American leadership, in many European minds"Mc-
Carthyism" is used to justify much of their dislike and dis-
trust of the United States.
Rightly or wrongly, many articulate Europeans
point to the possibility that the McCarthy philosophy may be-
come dominant in the United States, They profess to see a
powerful and prosperous country with a negligible Communist
Party showing signs of acute alarm over the dangers of internal
subversion, and they conclude that this country is either un-
sure of itself or has no genuine attachment to some of the
fundamental values of a democratic society. Recallinc; that in
1928, barely four years before becoming Chancellor of Germany,
Hitler and his Nazis polled only three percent of thu German
vote, these European observers note that more than one-third
of the US electorate have a favorable view of McCarthy, and
that one-fifth hold this opinion intensely. They speculate on
what might happen if America should suffer a disaster in
foreign affairs coupled with a depression akin to Germany's
in 1930-31.
Besides this fear of the potentialities of
"McCarthyism" is the widespread European view that the senator's
methods are abusive, These Europeans not only object on grounds
of principle to his efforts to destroy his opponents' individual
integrity but also hold in high esteem many of McCarthy's tar-
gets, whom they directly associate with the development of the
most constructive postwar American policies,
Since to many Europeans McCarthy is a symbol en-
tirely incompatible with their image of President Eisenhower,
they profess to be particularly bewildered at the apparent
deferential treatment McCarthy has received from the administra-
tion. They consider that no European party entrusted with
executive leadership would tolerate. such an open challenge to
its top direction. These Europeans see McCarthy as, on the
contrary, exercising an increasing influence over American for-
eign policy. They note his attacks on foreign trade with China,
his influence over State Department personnel policy, and par-
ticularly his success during the spring in apparently forcing
a shake-up of the whole overseas information program,
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(4) Economic Policies
Certain aspects of our international economic
policies have also been pointed out as being harmful to our
standing in most of Europe as well as in Canada. Europeans
have been heavily sold on a policy of "trade not aid," many
of them realizing that in any case American willingness to
provide subsidies is drying up. Many seriously question our
sincerity, however, when we fail to lower our own trade
barriers and at the same time oppose their trading with the
Soviet Orbit. Canada has already threatened retaliation
against new American trade restrictions.
In Europe there are frequent indications of
resentment against the Battle Act and our positions taken in
COCOM, despite the efforts of American representatives to mini-
mize friction on these questions. American policy is seen as
forcing European countries to curtail its traditional trade
with areas now within the Orbit, while relatively little has
been accomplished to help them fina alternative markets in the
free world. Consequently, our extremist critics in Europe
charge that European economic shortcomings can be laid at the
door of the United States. Even in more responsible circles
of European opinion there is a conviction that as a great
creditor nation the United States must move nearly all the way
to a policy of free trade. They believe that restrictions on
East-West trade have hurt the free world far more than was
necessary to avoid significant assistance to the Soviet mili-
tary build-up.
(5) Miscellaneous lesser factors
Suspected American interference in domestic
politics.
Labor's failure to achieve the higher standard
of living expected from the Marshall Plan.
Rigid American immigration laws.
Statements by Congressmen and private citizens
which Europeans consider to be offensive to them.
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II. FAR EAST AND WESTERN PACIFIC
(Detailed Report as Tab B)
The great mass of oriental peoples have little or no
understanding of international issues and thus their attitudes
towards the United States are either formulated by their leaders
or are nebulous. The government-inspired demonstrations of the
South Korean populace during various allegedly unpopular phases
of the Korean armistice negotiations are a case in point.
It is difficult to characterize the status of US prestige
in the orient in any generalization because, lacking the homo-
geneity of western European nations, there is less uniformity
of attitude towards the United States in the Far East and Western
Pacific than in the West. In Indonesia in 1948 and 1949 our
prestige was at its postwar high thanks to US support for the
Indonesian struggle for independence. The Chinese Nationalists
in 1949, however, credited America with much responsibility for
the Communists' mainland victory and American prestige was at
its lowest ebb since World War II. Our prestige in these two
countries is now reversed.
The white man's prestige in the Far East suffered a nearly
total eclipse at the beginning of World War II as a result of
the Pearl Harbor fiasco, and the fall of Singapore, Bataan and
Corregidor in rapid succession. America's impressive military
victory in the war and our contribution to the Atlantic Charter
and the formation of the UN brought US prestige to unprecedented
heights in the months following the war. American prestige has
declined since the Japanese defeat but the ebbing has not been
uniform. Generally speaking, however, the prestige of the
United States with the non-Communist leaders in Japan, South
Korea, Formosa, the Philippines and Thailand, while subject to
fluctuations, is still high. Comparatively in Burma, Indonesia
and Indochina, however, it has deteriorated and is now low.
The loss of mainland China to the Chinese Communists saw
our prestige at its lowest since World War II. The Korean
"police action" has been a period of ups and downs. There was
a great rise in prestige with the Inchon landing and a sharp
fall with the retreat from the Yalu. The war in Korea has seen
the reputation of the United States on the rise in Formosa while
the peoples of the Philippines and Thailand have taken pride in
the accomplishments of their troops in Korea fighting in a
common cause with the forces of the United States.
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In summary, American prestige reached its nadir in the orient
in 1949 with the fall of mainland China to the Chinese Communists.
The Korean war has been a period of successive rises and declines.
There has been no over-all change in US prestige during the
past six months, although there has been some recent recession
over the question of India's participation at the Korean
political conference.
Major Causes:
The following salient causes may be identified.
(1) Economic Problems
American economic and medical aid programs, the
results of which can be clearly seen, have made deep
and favorable impressions on the public and intelligent-
sia of several countries. American financial aid, which
has often been squandered by corrupt governments or mis-
applied by impractical local American administrators,
has sometimes been more than wasteful and has resulted
in varying degrees of disrespect. A number of govern-
ments have sought American economic aid as a means of
maintaining the position of the politicians in power.
Frequently the popular protests over failure to receive
aid in the amounts desired is more indicative of
politician-inspired pressure on the US to raise the
ante rather than genuine public dissatisfaction.
United States trade policy has been a source of
worry for Japan and the Philippines. High tariffs
against Japanese exports combined with pressure not
to trade with Communist China leaves the Japanese
frustrated. The Philippines are growing alarmed
over the prospect of gradual loss of the preferential
tariffs on their sugar.
(2) Colonialism and Race
Close American relations in Western Europe with
the United Kingdom, France and the Netherlands as well
as our former relationship with the Philippines leaves
the US open to charges of colonialism whenever we have
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failed to support a Far Eastern nation in its
nationalistic aspirations. Suspicion of American
"imperialism" is the single most adverse influence
on American prestige.
All orientals are acutely sensitive to any
hint of racial discrimination. Asians bitterly
resent any American policy that states or implies
a "Europe First" preference because of racial
affinity. They see a contemptuous quality in the
suggestion that we will retain Asians to fight our
battles in the Far East.
(3) Distrust of American Leadership
The attitudes of the non-Communist oriental
countries towards Communism are so divergent as to
make a satisfactory middle ground impossible of
attainment. South Korea and Formosa feel that the
US fails to appreciate sufficiently the dangers of
Communism and that we are not instituting severe
enough anti-Communist action. The Japanese view
themselves as understanding the Chinese mind better
than Americans do and they have attempted to advance
themselves as political middlemen. The neutralist-
minded nations in Southeast Asia view our actions as
designed to lure them into our camp and frequently
our actions are seen as provocative towards the
Communist orbit.
Many native leaders are naive about the threat
of Communism and American prestige would be greatly
enhanced if these men were persuaded to see Communism
in its true light. President Sukarno of Indonesia,
who is typical, has publicly announced that a Commu-
nist government in his country would be fully accept-
able to him if it attained power by legal means.
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III. NEAR EAST AND SOUTH ASIA
(detailed report as Tab C)
American prestige in the Near East and South Asia since
1947 has varied widely in the different parts of the area. In
Greece and Turkey it has been high for many years, and since
1947, when the United States filled the vacuum created by Brit-
ain's contraction of its sphere of influence in the Mediterranean,
it has continued on the same high plane. In Egypt and Lebanon,
American prestige has improved somewhat from the all-time low it
reached in 1948 after the close of the Palestine War and the es-
tablishment of the state of Israel, but the United States has yet
to prove itself in the area.
In South Asia, American prestige has registered a fairly
steady decline in government circles since 1947 when India became
independent, though among the peasant classes it has risen some-
what in the past two years as the effects of economic assistance
and'emergency food aid have become evident.
The historical friendship between Greece and the United
States and the post-World War II economic and military aid given
by this country have combined to keep American prestige at a high
level. Similarly in Turkey, Turkish recognition of the cultural
and educational contribution being made by American institutions
there has contributed to the friendly attitude taken toward the
United States. The considerable quantity of economic and mili-
tary aid given Turkey since World War II has also helped.
Occasional slight decreases in American prestige in both Greece
and Turkey have not in recent years materially altered the basic
good will felt toward the United States.
In Egypt and Lebanon, the situation has been different.
Prior to and following the establishment of the state of Israel
and the ensuing Palestine War of 1948, in which the Israelis
soundly defeated the Arab armies, American prestige reached an
extreme low throughout the Arab world. Since that time, Ameri-
can support for Israel has continuously irritated Egypt, Lebanon,
and the other Arab nations. American diplomatic actions and
promises of economic assistance to the Arabs have only slightly
increased the prestige of the United States in the area.
In 1947, American prestige in South Asia was high. The
Indian people, newly freed from British domination, regarded the
United States as the world's mightiest nation as well as its
greatest democracy, and they hoped to emulate its example. Since
then, however, American prestige has declined almost steadily,
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especially in government circles, rising only temporarily when
American and Indian views on world issues happened to coincide,
or when spectacular American economic assistance has been forth-
coming.
During 1953, friction between India and the United States
has again become pronounced. The February announcement that the
US Seventh Fleet would no longer protect the Chinese mainland
from Nationalistic attack, American efforts to keep India out of
the Korean political conference, the United States' opposition
to admitting Communist China into the UN, and its reiterated
stand against inscribing the North African issue on the Security
Council agenda are all cases in point.
Major causes:
The basic causes for periodic declines in American
prestige in the Near East and South Asia are:
(1) Nationalist sensitivity
The intense national pride and independence which has
developed in most of the Near East and South Asia since World
War II has created an ardent drive for recognition, a sensitivity
to criticism or advice, an antagonism toward color bars, and a
fear of political and economic domination that have created
constant friction with the United States.
(2) Neutralism
National sm has also led to a desire to remain apart
from big-power politics and from participation in either the
Eastern or Western blocs. This feeling of neutralism is best ex-
emplified in India, where Prime Minister Nehru's concept of an
Asian "Third Force" or "neutral" bloc has become well known.
Constant American efforts to draw Near Eastern nations closer to
the West have produced antagonism. American failure to recognize
India as the leader of a "Third Force" also rankles Nehru.
(3) American backing of Western powers
Concurrently with disappointment over the United States
failure to encourage nationalist movements in Indochina, Iran,
Egypt, and Morocco, the Near East feels that the United States is
tied to British and French apron strings and that it does not
dare to make its own independent policies. This feeling is akin
to that which considers the United States more interested in big-
power politics than in the welfare of Near Eastern peoples.
(4) Dislike of American materialism
The feeling that the United States is politically self-
ish is accompanied within the area by the concept that it is
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economically selfish. Regardless of the amount of aid granted
to various Near Eastern countries to date, the view is expressed
that the United States favors Europe over the more needy under-
developed regions of Asia and there is constant criticism of
American failure to provide economic and military aid in the
quantities desired. It is also felt that the United States is
not the altruistic democracy it claims to be. Suspicious of
"something for nothing," Near Easterners and South Asians feel
that some hidden motive must lie behind American offers of aid.
(5) Inconsistency of American policy
Apparent inconsistency in American policy on various
occasions creates uncertainty in Asian minds as to American mo-
tives and intentions. American alacrity in springing to the
defense of South Korea, for instance, is contrasted with its un-
willingness to support Iran, Egypt, and Morocco against
"colonial" powers whose intentions are deemed oppressive, if not
actually aggressive. In India, particularly, American
"aggressiveness" in advancing to the Yalu River in Korea and the
statement that the Seventh Fleet would no longer protect the
Chinese mainland from Nationalist attack were contrasted with
statements that the United States desired peace.
(6) American fear of Communism
Many Near Easterners, and especially South Asians, have
been unable to understand the sense of urgency displayed by the
United States in its war on Communism. To them, Communism is not
a danger, and Soviet imperialism is an empty phrase. The Islamic
religion is seen as a strong barrier against any Communist threat.
Consequently, American efforts to point out the dangers of Commu-
nism have been rebuffed or minimized. The "threat to turn to the
USSR," if the United States does not supply desired political or
economic support, has also been used by Near Easterners who recog-
nize its usefulness in exploiting American concern.
(7) Religiously-inspired national rivalries
National antagonisms based on religious differences,
such as the Moslem-Jewish friction between the Arab states and
Israel and the Hindu-Moslem rivalry between India and Pakistan,
also lead to occasional bad relations with the United States.
Any apparent display of favoritism toward one side is invariably
severely criticized by the other.
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IV. LATIN AMERICA
(detailed report as Tab D)
For several generations "the Colossus of the North"
and "dollar diplomacy" have been favority subjects of at-
tack by Latin American nationalists, who have nevertheless
grudgingly admitted their respect for the United States.
Our prestige and popularity in Latin America probably reached
their peak on the eve of the Allied victory in World War II,
when representatives of the American republics gathered in
Mexico City for the Chapultepec Conference in February and
March 1945. Our success at this inter-American Conference on
the Problems of War and Peace, however, was somewhat tempered
when Assistant Secretary of State Clayton strongly insinuated
that after the war Latin America should forsake its industri-
alization aims and make every effort to expand and improve its
agriculture and extractive industries.
In Latin America our prestige, in the sense of respect
for the strength, material wealth, technical development and
democratic institutions of the United States, has remained at
a relatively constant high level during recent years. It
has, however, varied among different socio-economic groups
and from country to country, probably being lowest in southern
South America and highest in the Caribbean area. United States'
popularity, on the other hand, has fluctuated according to the
favorable or unfavorable reception in the various countries
of Washington's policies with respect to the individual re-
publics.
Our postwar policies of rebuilding a sound Europe gave
rise to American charges that the United States, friendly to-
ward them only during the war years, was again neglecting them.
Latin Americans felt that they should at least have received
a larger share of aid. This feeling of irritation increased
almost to a point of disrespect for the United States on the
part of many Latin American delegates to the Ninth Inter-
American Conference in Bogota, Colombia, in April 1948, when
Secretary of State Marshall explained the logic of first re-
building Western Europe in order to strengthen the free world.
American popularity and prestige in Latin America was probably
at its lowest ebb at that time.
The promptness with which the United States opposed Com-
munist aggression in Korea in June 1950 greatly increased our
standing with the Latin American governments. The people of
Latin America, however, never felt the urgency of fighting in
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Korea. The Truman administration was increasingly attacked
for calling on the Latin Americans to give up, albeit momen-
tarily, their industrialization programs in order to increase
the production of those raw materials necessary for winning
the Korean war. Many Latin Americans felt that Roosevelt's
Good Neighbor policy had now been abandoned.
The election of President Eisenhower last November
brought a halt to the decline of our prestige and popularity
in Latin America. Since January of this year, the Latin
Americans have adopted a "wait and see" attitude toward the
developing Latin American policy of the Eisenhower adminis-
tration. They were generally encouraged by Assistant Secretary
of State Cabot's trip through Mexico, Central America and the
republics in the Caribbean and even more by Dr. Milton Eisen-
hower's visit to the ten South American capitals. Argentina
in particular hailed the latter's trip as the turning point in
its relations with us. All apparently expect his visit to
result in concrete offers of economic assistance and loans.
In summary, American prestige was at its peak during World
War II. The decline began shortly after the end of the war
and probably reached its lowest ebb in the spring of 1948. Our
prestige again reached a relatively high point at the time
of the meeting of the foreign ministers of the American repub-
lics in Washington early in 1951, but then decreased once more.
The Eisenhower election last November brought at least
a'momentary halt in the decline of US prestige and popularity
in Latin America. During the last six months, American
prestige has risen in some of the countries, notably Argentina.
All are adopting a "wait and see" attitude. A very few ill-
considered actions or statements on our part could again pre-
cipitate a slump. Failure to act favorably on certain Latin
American problems--notably those of American loans and raw
material purchases--may also stimulate a. decline. Conversely,
a relatively small increase in economic and military aid to
Latin America could bring about a sharp increase of our pres-
tige and popularity in the area.
Major Causes:
It is impossible to separate these into neat compart-
ments. Each impinges on the other. Nevertheless, the fol-
lowing salient features may be identified:
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(1) Latin American feeling of being neglected
Since the, United States has become preoccupied with
problems of the cold war, the Latin American nations have come
more and more to feel that they are simply being taken for
granted. They believe strongly that their strategic impor-
tance and their close association with the United States en-
title them to at least equal consideration with the European
and Asian nations which are receiving the bulk of American
Economic and military aid.
(2) Growth of nationalism
An increase in their national consciousness in recent
years has made the Latin Americans vulnerable to the propa-
ganda of ultranationalist menorities and of small groups of
Communists. Politically, this has resulted in an oversensi-
tivity to any appearance of infringement by the United States
on their sovereign rights and a tendency to blame us for many
of their own difficulties.
Economically, this growing nationalism has resulted
in renewed efforts to free their economies from dependence on
those of the highly industrialized countries. "Economic colo-
nialism," in their view, holds them to an unfair trade relation-
ship with the United States and other great industrial countries
which, they claim, impose price ceilings on raw materials im-
ported from Latin America while doing little to control the ex-
port prices of manufactured goods needed by the Latin Americas.
The strength of this desire for economic independence
is seen in such measures as protective tariffs, exchange
restrictions, and government-sponsored industrialization.
Sentiment is also growing, particularly in Guatemala, Chile
and Bolivia, for the expropriation and nationalization of
foreign owned enterprises, which in manv countries are mainly
owned by US citizens, and for more control over the form and
scope of foreign investments.
(3) US demands on Latin America in the East-West struggle
Latin Americans fear that the United States has been
demanding too much from them in the East-West struggle. Their
initial enthusiasm for our decision to intervene in Korea soon
gave way to an attitude of caution, while Communist and Peron-
ist propaganda exploited the fear of global war and stressed
the theme that Latin America had nothing to gain and much to
lose from involvement in world conflict. As a result, only
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Colombia contributed troops to the UN action in Korea, and
Latin American implementation of the pledge to increase pro-
duction of strategic materials was not as effective as the
emergency warranted. Further evidence of the neutralist
pressures in those countries is seen in the long delay of
some South American legislatures, notably in Brazil and
Uruguay, in ratifying military agreements with the United
States.
(4) High tariff sentiment in the US
Latin American nations have indicated concern over
the recent growth of high tariff sentiment in the United
States; our prestige in the hemisphere is endangered whenever
a bill is introduced in Congress which would restrict imports
of important Latin American commodities. The Venezuelans,
for example, strongly opposed the so-called Simpson Bill
which would have restricted imports of petroleum. Latin
Americans also fear that the Korean truce may result in a
general recession in the US which would be disastrous to
their ill-balanced economies.
(5) Miscellaneous lesser factors
Offensive statements about Latin America and its
internal affairs by Congressmen or private citizens.
US press attacks on chiefs of Latin American states
and other high government officials.
Poaching in Latin American territorial waters,
notably in Mexico, Ecuador and Peru, by American-owned fishing
vessels,
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V. FOREIGN RADIO BROADCAST SUMMARY
Some hint of how our policies appear to non-Communist
nations abroad is discernible in a tabulation of references
in the radio broadcasts The
Sample is, however, too haphazard for firm or precise
results.
References to the United States
in non-Communist Broadcasts, all countries
Mom March to September
Eisenhower State-
ments, especially
16 April speech
U.S. Aid or Inter-
vention abroad
Dulles Statements,
especially tour
with Stassen
Food offer to East
Germany
Rosenberg Case
Senator McCarthy and
Committee Activities
Taft's "Go-it-alone"
speech
U.S. Trade Policies
Favorable
Unfavorable
I1-'"r"T
I . I I I I I I I I i I
%D N co Kt co
H H
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United Kingdom
American prestige has suffered a moderate decline in
Great Britain over the past two years, and this trend has
accelerated since the inauguration of President Eisenhower
in January.
The British nation is particularly sensitive to its re-
linquishment of world leadership to the United States. The
.British do not believe that their own decline in power and
prestige has lessened their understanding of world affairs,
and fundamentally doubt that the United States is learning
fast enough the proper role of leader. They see Washington
more divided than ever on the general approach to interna-
tional problems, unwilling to take the economic steps a credi-
tor country should in international affairs and in particular
failing to understand the need for flexibility in its diplo-
macy.
In several important respects American policies have
been deemed ill-conceived. Differences over the conduct of
the Korean war and Washington's pressure upon the Chinese Com-
munists has An l -Ameri an
relations.
Renewed criticism was aroused by each hint that the
United States might extend the Korean fighting or conversely
that Washington was not bending every effort to bring the
fighting there to an end. Official circles generally sympa-
thized with the American approach and tried to explain it,
but the underlying doubts about the maturity of Washington's
leadership remained. American insistence on the two-sided
Korean political conference, with India excluded, was con-
sidered particularly shortsighted, causing almost universal
condemnation of the Washington position.
Regarding the Middle East, both public and officialdom
have been sensitive toward any signs that the United States
might not be giving full support to Britain in its diffi-
culties with Iran and Egypt. Additional elements of impor-
tance have included the focusing of public annoyance at
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American trade practices by the widely publicized rejection
of the British bid on the Chief Joseph Dam project and the
British public's distinct preference for Governor Stevenson
over General Eisenhower during the presidential campaign--
which still survives in expressions of doubt as to the
desirability of a general's occupying the White House.
The varied activities of Senator McCarthy have been
pointed out as having markedly harmful effects on the prestige
of the Eisenhower administration. The press made a great deal
of his efforts to defeat the Bohlen nomination. It initially
played up Cohn and Schine's travels about Europe as a subject
for amusement, but soon turned to their more serious aspects
as highlighted by the "book burning" issue. Conservative as
well as Labor papers were indignant over McCarthy's personal
attack on Attlee in May. British officials were directly af-
fected by the Senator's strictures on the United Kingdom's
trade with China. Many British have professed to be particu-
larly disturbed at his apparent immunity from control by the
leader of his own party, in matters which they considered as
clearly affecting the foreign policy and standing of the United
States government, and welcomed signs in mid-summer that the
president might be moving to deal with the situation.
The problem of a decline in American prestige assumes
greater proportions in France than in any other continental
European country. During the past year, and more especially
during the past six months, Frenchmen's sense of frustration
over their country's own difficulties has been reflected in
part in a profession of spreading distrust of Washington's
leadership and increased criticisms of what the US stands for
as a country.
An influential urban minority composed largely of intel-
lectuals has been bitterly critical of the effects of Holly-
wood and Coca-Cola in Europe and has waged a vociferous
campaign against America's "lapse" from democratic traditions.
Such elements eagerly grasp at the USSR's "peace" feelers,
and internal political trends have intensified a demand that
France follow,a new course in foreign affairs, which would
diverge considerably from a number of key American policies.
Basically, moreover, French views on all major foreign issues
are distorted by their excessive concern over Germany's
economic resurgence. Now for the first time since World War II
there is danger of a real cleavage between the United States
and France on fundamental issues.
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According to a poll conducted in mid-1950, the French
were least disposed of all the major Western European
peoples to trust United States leadership, praise American
cultural standards, or credit this country with continuing
progress toward democratic goals. Commencing in the summer
of 1952, events in France and the United States combined to
intensify these attitudes. Demands in the American election
campaign for a shift to a policy of liberation in the cold
war badly frightened the French, who dread a drive to restore
Germany's pre-war frontiers or any other tipping of the scales
toward total war. At the same time organized opposition to
the proposed EDC treaty was beginning to emerge in France,
and the widespread skepticism and disapproval were reflected
in Premier Pinay's procrastination on the issue. By October,
Foreign Minister Robert Schuman's pro-US position was being
rapidly discredited as out of step with the growing sentiment
for nationalistic stands on EDC and Tunisia.
The critical French financial situation of early 1953,
the resulting prolonged cabinet crisis of mid-year, and the
increasing temptation to abandon the Indochina War greatly
strengthened the hand of those nationalistic political and
press elements seeking to discredit the "Schuman" policies,
portray the United States as basically hostile to French
interests, and thus promote French independence from American
influence, Even though a more nationalistic left-center
government under a leader such as Mendes-France is not likely
to be formed in the near future, the evident support for such
a coalition is sufficient to exert considerable influence on
the R,
,sent government.
These domestic factors reducing French respect for
American leadership were accompanied by the many unfavorable
reactions to the new Washington administration's policies and
to "McCarthyism," The emphasis on deep economies in the United
States budget struck a special terror in the French, for whom
this was a further indication that they might be left alone
sooner than expected to cope with German economic ascendancy.
Senator McCarthy's methods evoked much criticism in French in-
tellectual circles. Already this allegedly has contributed to
the discrediting of the French government's own anti-Communist
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campaign, which has now been broken off. There are those
who say that the French people as a whole would far sooner
tolerate Communism in France in its present form and to the
extent under which it has hitherto been brought under control
than to have it eradicated thanks to the importation of
McCarthy's methods and tactics. Certain of these seem to re-
gard Senator McCarthy as only a symbol of a deep-seated
American trend. The intellectual leadership reads, even
though it may disapprove of, the Paris newspaper Le Monde,
whose strong nationalism has frequently resulted In expressions
of anti-American and neutralistic sentiments. "McCarthyism
would not disappear with McCarthy; it has become one of the
main currents of American public opinion," and "McCarthyism is
only an atrophied expression of the sentiment which carried
President Eisenhower to the White House," Le Monde has declared.
There is evidence that America's bridgehead among labor and
youth groups have been weakened, and the rising doubts in
scientific circles that intellectual freedom can be maintained
in America promote Communist efforts to disrupt the valuable
liaison between American and European scientists.
Thus, granted a continuation of France's economic diffi-
culties and further relaxation of cold war tensions, the stage
is set in France for an additional decline of United States
prestige. Despite the French nation's deep respect for
America's dynamism, this situation tends toward serious clashes
with Paris over major cold war policies as American aid de-
clines.
Italy
After France, Italy would appear to call for the great-
est attention in any effort to reverse the decline of
American.prestige. This decline began as early as 1948, when
the revival of Italian national aspirations and the continua-
tion of heavy economic burdens resulted in a growing volume
of attacks against American leadership of the West. American
prestige reached perhaps its lowest point after this year's
June national elections in which the US-oriented De Gasperi
government suffered serious defeats from both the extreme
left and, but to a lesser extent, the extreme right.
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The June election results point up one of the major
reasons fir the deterioration of American prestige in Italy.
A large part of the Italian public appears to feel that the
De Gasperi government was gradually turning to the right in
the face of an increasing popular trend to the left, and
that this is partially a result of United States influence.
Many Italians say that the De Gasperi government was en-
couraged by Washington to ignore the demands of the moderate
left for sweeping social reform as a counter to Communism and
that they fear that the United States is even now exerting
pressure on the Christian Democrats to ignore the "popular
mandate" for giving elements of the left a voice in the govern-
ment.
Although many Italians admire American economic self-
sufficiency and technical know-how, some are distrustful of
the stability of the American temperament particularly in re-
gard to Communism and the Soviet Union. These find the
American attitude toward Communism hectic and exaggerated,
and the Italian press registers alarm over the influence of
McCarthyism on American policies. Many Italians fear that
the United States is willing to engage the USSR in a preven-
tive war in which Italy would be destroyed, and consequently
they view the presence of US forces on Italian soil as un-
necessarily provocative and as a sign of Italy's satellite
status. The presence of a former general in the White House
is regarded by some as a further indication that the United
States may become aggressive. Meanwhile, numbers of Italians
have little faith in NATO's present military strength and are
critical of their subordinate status in that organization.
Similarly, Italy's failure to gain admission to the UN
seems to be charged less to Soviet intransigence than to
American lack of insistence in pushing Italy's cause.
Long-standing grievances have been American tariff re-
strictions on Italian products such as fats, oils, and hatters!
fur, and low US immigration quotas for Italian nationals.
More recently, Italians have resented the McCarran Act and
the effects on their economy of the Battle Act and the US-
sponsored COCOM restrictions on East-West trade.
The strong neutralist sentiment in Italy has been con-
sistently and skillfully exploited by the large Communist Party
and its ally, the Italian Socialist Party led by Pietro Nenni.
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Both have taken effective advantage of the recent change
in Soviet international tactics to discredit American
foreign policy in the popular mind.
Particularly within the past few months American pres-
tige has been seriously impaired by the growing suspicion
that Yugoslav military cooperation is being purchased at
the expense of Italian interests in Trieste and elsewhere.
The Italian press was sharply critical of Secretary Dulles'
recent statement that the united States was willing to re-
consider alternative solutions to the 1948 tripartite
declaration calling for the return of the entire Free Terri-
tory of Trieste to Italy. Italians are also sensitive to
American criticism that their economic policies are to blame
for the failure of American economic aid to produce the
expected results. Ambassador Luce's pre-election statement
that a "totalitarian victory" would have "grave consequences"
for cooperation between Italy and the United States is stated
by some important observers as having been a factor in the
failure of De Gasperi's center bloc to win a majority of the
popular vote.
We s~t- Germany
the
Germans focus attention on America's overwhelming industrial
and military potential; for them, traditionally, power is the
essence of prestige. Hence, American prestige in Germany
has undergone no appreciable deterioration and will probably
continue at its high level for a long time to come. Chancel-
lor Adenauer's overwhelming electoral victory on 6 September
was, in part, a reflection of America's current standing.
Criticisms of American policy methods, and dissatis-
faction with our policy shortcomings, are almost as rife in
Germany as, for example, in France. But whereas the French
are likely to be preoccupied with the implications of
Washington's actions for the larger question of America's
moral leadership, the Germans tend to judge the United States'
role in terms of specific results. By the same token, a clear-
cut failure of our policies could impair America's prestige.
with the Germans.
German.critieismS: of American polio which can bear.
watching. include the,to.ndencie.s to regret the. excitability
of Americans, . to resent American :"preferential treatment of
France, and to attack certain occupation practices. The
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extension of Senator McCarthy's activities to Germany gave
rise to a considerable volume of adverse publicity which
played down Congress' constitutional rights and the facts
pointing to Communist conspiracy. Various German elements,
particularly rightist newspapers, have hinted strongly that
"McCarthyism" cancels the Americans' right to criticize the
Nazi regime. Many well-educated Germans, however, profess to
believe that "McCarthyism" is only temporary, and that the
more serious longterm threat to respect for American officials
abroad arises from the publicity given to the deep conflicts
between the Executive departments and Congress.
The decline of American prestige in Austria has been
more gradual than in France and Italy and may be traced back
to 1947 or 1948, when hope for an early end of the occupation
or of dependence on American "charity" began to fade. With
the progressive decline of Communist influence within Western
Europe Austrians have discounted the Soviet threat from. with-
out and have displayed a growing conviction that they could
criticize American positions without necessarily playing into
Communist hands. This attitude was reinforced as they came
to realize that any basic improvementain the Austrian situa-
tion depended on Soviet concessions rather than on the United
States' good will.
Foreign Minister Gruber has taken unilateral actions in
quest of a state treaty and has had a tendency to disparage
the local staff of American officials. The Austrians have
shown that they do not accept American officials in Vienna as
really representing present Washington policy, in view of the
change of administration. The Cohn and Shine investigations
caused many criticisms. Furthermore, Austrians frequently
reveal their sensitivity to blows suffered by American policy
at the hands of other major Western powers, as for example
by British attacks on America's Far Eastern policy and by
French procrastination on EDC.
American prestige in Sweden has apparently suffered a
slight decline in the past year, continuing a general though
irregular postwar trend.
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Committed to a policy of neutrality, and hence less
involved with American foreign policies than most European
countries, Sweden is most directly infl-uenced by indications
of American determination to seek a peaceful settlement of
disputes. Accordingly, the Swedes, who were disturbed early
in the Korean war that American military leaders might act
contrary to Washington's intentions, have in the past year
been similarly alarmed at occasional signs to them that Repub-
lican leadership is divided over continuing a conciliatory ap-
proach on East-West issues. Many Swedes initially saw dangerous
implications in many Republican administration statements about
pursuing a more dynamic program and liberating enslaved people.
In the past six months, Swedish leaders of opinion have indicated
that they have been reassured by the achievement of the truce in
Korea and the positive approach of president Eisenhower's 16 April
speech.
Detracting from this generally higher regard for American
actions in the foreign field is a, continued decline in many
Swedes' esteem for the moral stature of the United States. The
varied aspects of "McCarthyism" have caused most criticism.
Criticism has also been directed against the rigid provisions
in immigration laws and the limiting of the shipment of anti-
biotics to China, the execution of the Rosenbergs, and, as
always, discrimination against Negroes. In addition, some Swedes
have deprecated an increasingly propagandistic tone in official
statements, and signs of interference in the internal affairs
of other countries
In general, Swedish opinion, which frequently follows the
British approach to international affairs, professes to see
the United States as not yet sufficiently sure of itself to
act maturely as leader of the free world.
Belgium
American prestige declined somewhat in Belgium during the
first few weeks after the Republican administration took office
in Washington and reached its low point by the end of March,
though even then not falling far, below the general level
maintained during the period 1946-50.
With their high living standards and advanced technolo-
gical development, the Belgians are proud of their close
approach to American standards and are predisposed toward
approving United. States leadership. This economic prosperity,
plus their historic insecurity, however, make them wary of any
threats to international stability. Hence they have been
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-,~
highly sensitive to any indications that the new Washington
administration might be tending to "go it alone" or follow inflexi-
ble lines in international problems. Such apprehension has been
increased by the publicity given by the leftist press in parti-
cular to a "reactionary" trend in the United States, as exempli-
fied by such developments as "McCarthyism," the McCarran Immi-
gration Act, and the Rosenberg case.
American prestige in The Netherlands has reached its highest
point of the post-liberation period in the past six months,
principally as a result of gratitude for the United States'
response in the flood disaster of February 1953. In addition,
the Dutch are believed to be aware that their steady economic
gains are made possible by the American aid program.
Dutch supersensitivity on two points, however, tends to
diminish deep confidence in American leadership. The loss of
their Far Eastern possessions has' ?made them unusually quick
to see themselves slighted by the big powers and regarded as
merely a minor European state.
The second point of sensitivity is on East-West trade
controls, where the Dutch are prone to complain that the United
States puts less pressure on the British than on them and that
the United Kingdom will benefit from any increase of restric-
tions on Dutch exports to the Orbit. Dutch dissatisfaction
with the control program is heightened as a result of the rapid
over-all expansion of their trade with the USSR, which in 1952
reached a level 15 times that of 1950.
There has been a decrease in United States prestige in
Switzerland since the summer of 1952, but it has not been so
deep or far-reaching as in France or Italy. This decline has
been reflected in a more critical attitude toward American
policies, rather than outright rejection of them.
The Swiss press disagrees with those who attribute America's
decline in influence to reductions of foreign aid, and instead
blames the inconstancy of Washington's foreign policy since the
1952 election campaign, together with a lack of leadership and
foresight. As an example of the latter, South Korean President
Rhee's coup in releasing the war prisoners is cited.
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Many Swiss, moreover, now profess to feel that Senator McCarthy
represents a dominant'.. element within the Republican Party and
hence within the present administration.
US prestige seems not to have suffered appreciably from
Swiss criticism of American policies, and the working relation-
ships between the two governments have not been affected. Bern
did present Washington with a note, however, requesting that
we desist from undertaking security investigations of American
nationals employed in UN agencies in Geneva.
is conditioned by their view
Basically, the Spaniards' attitude toward the United States
Spain
United States prestige in Spain has not declined and has
remained substantially unchanged during the past twelve months.
A major recent factor in this situation has been the highly
favorable reactions to the visits of the United States Sixth
Fleet to Spanish ports. On the other hand, there has been
some disappointment over the long delay in the base negotiations
and over President Eisenhower's failure to exercise the dominant
leadership which the Spaniards expected as the result of asso-
ciating his role in their minds with that of General Franco.
contrasting sharply with the United States, w
ey regard as the Western world's main present hope.
Am Canada
American prestige has apparently suffered a small to
moderate decline in Canada during the past year, particularly
since January. Canadians, fully conscious of their natural
close association.with the United States, are all the more
sensitive about retaining their national identity and about
Ottawa's diplomatic support being taken for granted in Wash-
inton.
. During the past year they have been increasingly sharp
critics of the course of American international leadership.
Considering themselves a bridge between Britain and the United
States, many Canadians have taken particular alarm at the
apparent rise in Anglo-American friction.Though oftdh in postwar
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years adopting an American rather than a British stand on
such questions as the recognition of Communist China, Canada in
the past twelve months has taken the British side on virtually
all divisive issues.
Many Canadians have criticized Washington as being in-
sufficiently imaginative and flexible in its search for peace-
ful solutions of East-West problems. American conduct of the
Korean war and truce negotiations frequently caused uneasiness.
The American opposition to the seating of India at the post-
armistice political conference,a proposal co-sponsored by
Canada, evoked sharp criticism even in normally friendly
papers. Other issues which have disturbed people in Britain
have agitated Canadians to a somewhat lesser degree.
A special consideration in recent months has been a
Canadian fear that the Republican administration is moving
toward increasingly restrictive trade policies to the detri-
ment of cross-border trade on which Canada's prosperity largely
depends. Continued inaction on the St. Lawrence seaway project
also tends to lower American standing.
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II. FAR EAST AND WESTERN PACIFIC
Japan
American prestige in Japan reached a peak in 1947
and since that time has experienced declines and upsurges.
Although the US enjoys less prestige today than in 1947, the
decline, while noticeable, has not been serious; rather,
it represents a readjustment from the high point following
the military victory in World War II and the subsequent be-
nevolent occupation policies. There has been no concomitant
transfer of prestige to another power. A majority of the
Japanese people look to the United States for protection and
aid.
American prestige competes with growing Japanese nation-
alism, which is sensitive to any infringement of Japan's
sovereignty or interference in affairs which the nation
considers its own responsibility. Nationalistic sen-
timent has been responsible for the popular concept that
Japan is an unequal partner in the Japan-United States re-
lationship. The Japanese resent any "big brother" attitude,
any statements that the United States regards Japan as a
source of manpower for defense against the USSR, and any im-
plication that the United States is formulating a defense plan
for the Japanese to implement.
The necessity to subordinate the occupation's original
democratic reforms and pacificism to the demands of security
against communism has tended to alienate the intelligentsia,
who wield an influence in information media that is dispropor-
tionate to their numbers. Nationalistic sentiment creates a
belief that existing Japanese-American treaty relations were
negotiated under occupation coercion and represent a continua-
tion of that type of control and subserviency. To the sensi-
tive Japanese, the exercise of criminal jurisdiction by
the American forces represents a grant of extraterritoriality
and implies that the United States is unwilling to accord Japan
a status equal to that of our other allies. In addition, con-
tinued use of facilities that were prominent landmarks of
the occupation tends to'emphasize that the peace treaty did
not remove all vestiges of foreign control.
The presence of large numbers of American troops engen-
ders cultural conflict. American behavior patterns which
differ from those of the Japanese in many social relation-
ships and the obvious difference in standards of living
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arouse Japanese resentment and create suspicion that Amer-
icans consider the Japanese inferior.
United States trade policy probably is the crucial
economic issue involved in declining American prestige.
Japan sees in the US decision to refrain from major tariff
negotiations a block to Japanese accession to the General
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, which prevents Japan from
gaining an enlarged market among the free nations. Con-
currently, the Japanese feel the United States is also block-
ing trade with China which many businessmen feel offers the
only alternative hope for achieving a self-sustaining
economy.
Japanese trade circles have been alarmed by US moves
to increase the tariff on imports of Japanese tuna and
silk scarves. Despite the favorable effects of the long-
standing "most favored nation" treatment of Japan by the
United States and the reciprocity provisions of the recently
ratified commercial treaty, the Japanese tend to doubt the
sincerity of American "free trade" pronouncements.
The Japanese have some reservations regarding American
qualifications for dealing with orientals. This general
attitude has been indicated in Japanese proposals for Jap-
anese-British-American talks on Far East problems, approaches
on participation in the Korean political conference, and
intimations that Japanese businessmen might develop trade with
Communist China to the advantage of the free world.
The impact of American base requirements on Japan's
limited resources naturally produces local irritations which
are exploited by leftist elements. However, such conflicts
do not represent any irreconcilable issues, despite the
loud public clamor.
Although American prestige currently appears to be at
its lowest ebb, the level does not appear to be serious. The
recent promise to return part of the Ryukyu Islands may mark
an upward turn in Japanese esteem for the United States.
During the past six months there has been a significant
increase in the overt expression of anti-American sentiment
in Japan. Much of this arises from Communist and other left-
wing exploitation of local opposition to American military
bases. In June adverse reporting and comment on the American
security forces reached a post-occupation high, bases being
the major target.
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A newspaper opinion poll in June showed that 35 per-
cent of the respondents favored a pro-American policy for
Japan, a decline of 20 percent from the previous year.
At the same time 47 percent desired an early departure of
American forces while only 27 percent wished them to remain.
Public opinion in South Korea normally lies dormant
and takes form only when purposefully stimulated from above.
It currently tends to follow the lead established by Presi-
dent Rhee, who maintains close supervision over all sources of
information and does not permit opposing viewpoints to arise.
American prestige in South Korea thus rises and falls in
direct relation to the president's attitude toward American
policy at any particular time.
While US prestige has dropped in recent months because
of what has been interpreted as American unwillingness to
inflict a complete defeat on the Communists, the extent of
this decline is not serious. The public demonstrations
against the cease-fire were staged by the government and lacked
real enthusiasm. They showed no popular resentment toward
the US and resulted in no violence against Americans. More-
over, despite the divergent attitudes toward the armistice,
the overwhelmingly pro-US sentiment among the South Korean
leaders is still basically unaltered.
The loss of China to the Communists marked the first
noticeable decline in American prestige in Korea since World
War II. It rose to new heights following the American in-
tervention in 1950 and following the Inchon landing, but
declined again with the start of the truce talks in mid-1951.
President Rhee, and thus most Koreans, interpret America's
willingness to conclude a truce on the 38th Parallel as a sur-
render to the Western European nations which have influenced
the US toward a-policy of appeasement of the Communists. While
the truce and the loss of China to the Communists are the only
adverse developments which have significantly affected Ameri-
can prestige in Korea, there have been a number of irritants
in US-Korean relations which have made inroads on the reservoir
of good will built up toward America over the years. These
include:
(a) American responsibility for the Japanese surrender
arrangements which led to the division of Korea;
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(b) The statement of Secretary Acheson in the spring
of 1950, defining the American outer defense as excluding
Korea. Many Koreans believe this statement brought on the
war;
(c) Failure of the US to provide South Korea with
heavy equipment prior to the attack by the North Koreans;
(d) Friction between US occupation personnel and
Koreans, and discontent over many rigid occupation policies;
(e) American policy in the early years of NATO empha-
sizing Western Europe as the key to successful defense
against Soviet attack, and as better able to utilize American
aid than Asia;
(f) Failure of the US to make prompt settlement for the
money advanced to the UN forces in 1951 and 1952;
(g) American emphasis on the.reconstruction of Japan
and the procurement in Japan of items necessary for the
Korean war;
(h) President Eisenhower's campaign suggestion for re-
placing US troops by Asians. A public opinion poll taken in
Pusan by the government during the Eisenhower visit, pro-
bably not completely reliable, showed that 83 percent were
opposed to replacing US with Korean troops;
(i) Alleged failure of the US to consult in advance
with South Korea on decisions taken at Panmunjom.
American prestige reached its lowest ebb in June and
July 1953, following the 25 May proposal to the Communists
which reversed the earlier stand that the anti-Communist
Korean prisoners must be released in South Korea. In these
months Rhee publicly accused the US of following appease-
ment policies, of bad faith in our commitments to South
Korea, and openly questioned our motives.
American prestige has recovered somewhat since July
by the strong stand taken against India's participation in
the Korean political conference, by insistence that the USSR
participate on the side of the Communists, and by reassurances
against future Communist aggression as demonstrated by the
proposed US-South Korean Security Treaty. A measure of good
will has also been recovered by US promises of military and
economic aid, by Secretary Dulles' consultations with President
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Rhee, and by our consideration of South Korea's views on
reconstruction plannitig.
Rhee has been influenced by
Foreign Minister Pyun and Provost Marshal General Won, and
his past tactics in dealing with the US have consistently
been to increase his demands once a concession was granted.
Since the establishment of the Chinese National Govern-
ment on Formosa in late 1949, American prestige with the most
important groups on the island has varied appreciably, being
primarily affected by the progress of the UN military effort
in Korea and American policies regarding Communist China and
Formosa. During the current year American prestige on For-
mosa has been enhanced.
American prestige among the Chinese Nationalists was
low during and immediately after the Nationalist retreat
from the mainland, when Formosa itself was threatened. It
increased sharply in June 1950 after the United States had
taken the lead in resisting Communist aggression in Korea
and had committed the 7th Fleet to the defense of Formosa.
It steadily improved further with UN successes in Korea
during the next several months, but declined with UN re-
verses following the Chinese Communist intervention in late
1950. It remained fairly stable during the period from the
beginning of the truce talks to late 1952, at which time it
began to rise in the light of indications of increased
American support for the Nationalist cause. American prestige
with the Nationalists has fluctuated during 1953, but it is
now rising and appears to be at its highest point in several
years.
The three principal groups on Formosa to be considered
are the Chinese Nationalist leadership and the pro-Nationalist
majority of the 2,000,000 Chinese who came with it from the
mainland; the much smaller group of anti-Communist Chinese who
are opposed to the current Nationalist leadership; and the
8,000,000 native Formosans, who are generally anti-Communist
and anti-Nationalist. American prestige has been affected by
different considerations for each of these groups.
Nationalist leaders and the bulk of their followers
believe that the United States failed t.osee'the. dangers pre-
sented by the Chinese Communists after World War II, failed to
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support the Nationalists on a sufficient scale in those years,
failed to accord the Nationalist leadership sufficient respect
as an ally, and failed and still fails to adopt a sufficiently
aggressive policy toward Communist China. These beliefs are
outweighed, however, by Nationalist recognition that the
United States is the leader of the free world, that Nationalist
China is heavily dependent on the United States for its continued
existence, and that Nationalist prospects for returning to the
mainland depend completely on the United States. For these
reasons American prestige has remained high despite Nationalist
disappointment with American policies toward China in recent
years.
The anti-Communist group which is opposed to the Nationalist
leadership tends to blame the United States for not having had
greater successes in reforming Chiang Kai-shek's government, for
providing Chiang with support without adequate guarantees as to
its use, and for failing to support an anti-Communist and anti-
Nationalist "third force." Like the Nationalists, however, this
group recognizes American leadership of the free world, believes
that American leaders are in sympathy with many of its views, and
is aware that its position would be much worse than it is if
American influence were removed from Formosa.
The native Formosans, most of whom would reportedly prefer
Japanese to Chinese rule, tend to blame the United States in
part for permitting the Nationalists to take over the island
after World War II, for Nationalist misrule Qf Formosa at that
time, and for the small Formosan share in the island's govern-
ment now. On the other hand, they recognize the American
contribution to the defense and economy of the island and give
the United States much of the credit for the great improvement
in Formosa's government in the past three years.
During 1953, American prestige with the Nationalist leader-
ship, the most important of these groups, has had both declines
and rises. The declines have been due to such matters as Korean
truce issues, rumors of a contemplated UN trusteeship over
Formosa, and the American effort to evacuate Li Mi's forces from
Burma. The rises have followed the change of mission of the
7th Fleet in early February, a growing Nationalist belief in
increasing American sympathy with Nationalist objectives, such
developments as the appointment of a pro-Nationalist US ambas-
sador, an acceleration of American military aid to For
the arrival of jet aircraft,
American-statements regarding China's
seethe UN, the status of Formosa, and sanctions against
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Communist China, and other verbal and material indications that
American policy involves increased support of a more aggressive
Nationalist policy.
The Philippines
American prestige in the Philippines is probably as high as
anywhere in the Far East, although some disillusionment among .
Filipino intellectuals has been reported with regard to American
policy toward China and the long Korean stalemate and subsequent
armistice. The occasional bitter attacks on US policies by some
elements have usually been motivated by domestic politics or a
desire to assert Philippine independence and affinity with Asian
interests and is not symptomatic of growing ill will toward the
United States.
Criticisms of complex and allegedly poorly administered US
programs, such as the disposal of war surplus property and
settlement of war claims, have been more than offset by a
steady improvement in Philippine security and progress in
economic recovery and stability, accomplished with American
advice and assistance. Filipinos in general continue to show
enthusiasm for United States techniques, institutions and
civilization. Moreover, most Filipinos have always recognized
their dependence on US military strength and leadership in the
Pacific area.
United States prestige in the Philippines, however, will
be severely tested by the success or failure of the democratic
processes in the coming Philippine elections. If the Quirino
administration retains power through fraud and violence, the
United States will undoubtedly bear much of the blame. An
honest election, however, will enhance American prestige.
In Thailand, where the.stigma of colonialism has not been
a major influence, American prestige has remained high since
the end of World War II. Thai friendliness was greatly in-
creased this past spring when the American military aid program
was accelerated
While the Thai occasionally show irritation over relatively
minor incidents, it is unlikely that the esteem with which
the United States is widely held will decrease within the
foreseeable future.
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The great majority of the Thai people are farmers and
have little interest in international politics. They are,
however, gradually becoming'aware of the results of the various
American aid programs.
The small, politically articulate segment of the popula-
tion, concentrated largely in Bangkok, is also-favorably
disposed toward the United States. Po?itical opposition
groups tend to resent the increase of the ruling military
junta's power through American aid, but there is little
evidence that this.sentiment reflects a basically anti-
American bias.
The Phibun regime has always aligned itself closely with
the United States and has almost invariably supported American
foreign policy. Although this orientation undoubtedly contains
a substantial measure of opportunism, there is evidence that
important leaders are developing a genuine friendship for the
United States and are increasingly aware that Thailand's sur-
'vival can best be assured by a strongly pro-US policy. There
is occasional irritation. over specific American acts, as in
the case of the recent decision not to support the foreign
minister for the UN General Assembly presidency and in what the
Thai feel is failure to consult them on matters of Southeast
Asia defense. These irritations, however, are not deep-seated.
The increasing Thai tendency to look to Washington for
the solution to all problems is potentially embarrassing.
Such a tendency increases Thai vulnerability to Communist
propaganda blaming the United States for the world's economic
problems and could assume serious proportions should the
current downward trend in the price of Thailand's chief ex-
ports have a significantly adverse effect.
Despite their apparent feeling of dependence on the
United States, the Thai are a proud people who resent criticism
and condescens=ion. They especially resent magazine and news-
paper articles depicting Thailand in comic opera terms.
Indonesia
American prestige in Indonesia was high in 1948 and 1949
when the United States supported Indonesia's struggle for
independence. It decreased, however, immediately after in-
dependence was achieved in December 1949. Indonesia adopted
a defensive attitude toward the United States, fearing that
the price of American help would mean inclusion in the Western
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bloc which would be inconsistent with its "independent" foreign
policy.
American prestige reached its low ebb in February 1952 when
the cabinet fell over the issue of commitments for US assistance,
in which it was charged that the aid agreement violated their
sovereignty. Concurrently, a sudden decrease in the price of
rubber, Indonesia's principal export, was blamed on the United
States.
US prestige rose slightly in January 1953, as manifested by
an Indonesian acceptance of a revised agreement for American
economic and technical assistance. The Indonesians viewed this
development as a diplomatic victory and good will toward the US
was enhanced. During the past six months, there has been no
perceptible change in US-Indonesian relations despite the
installation of a Communist-influenced cabinet on 1 August.
Many articulate Indonesians' attitude toward the United
States is conditioned by fear of foreign encroachment and they
regard the United States as a powerful nation which would, if it
could, draw Indonesia into its own power bloc. The deep con-
sciousness of newly-won independence makes the majority of
politically conscious Indonesians suspicious of US motives and
susceptible to allegations of US imperialistic intentions. On
the other hand, those Indonesians who are friendly toward the
US have been concerned that national expressions of friendship
toward America would bring reprisals from both internal and
foreign Communists.
The recent establishment of a Communist-influenced govern-
ment may force non-Communist elements into a position of open
opposition to the Soviet bloc. The strategy of the new govern-
ment, however, appears to be one of outwardly following a
.moderate course in order to avoid vigorous opposition while at
the same time pursuing a policy of quiet infiltration of its
supporters throughout the government, the army, and the police.
Such a development portends a dangerous change in Indonesia's
attitude toward the United States.
Throughout the period of independence, American prestige
has suffered somewhat from the criticism of the Dutch who
hold a few advisory positions in the Indonesian government,
and from the extension of Washington politics to Indonesia
as shown in the rivalry among US agencies in Indonesia. This
rivalry has not only damaged the US position but has permitted
the Indonesians to play one agency off against another.
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A minor factor contributing to decreased US prestige
is the behavior of various American businessmen and government
employees. The unethical standards of certain of the former
and the social isolation of the latter are primarily respon-
sible in this respect.
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III NEAR EAST AND SOUTH ASIA
Egypt
A general decline in American prestige'in Egypt dates
from the Palestine War of 1948 and US support for the estab
lishment of Israel. While the effects of the United States'
close identity with Israel continue, American influence in
Egypt has increased since the military regime assumed power
in July 1952.
The young, inexperienced rulers of Egypt soon realized
that the future of their regime depended on obtaining exten-
sive foreign economic and military assistance, which the Unit-
ed States alone could supply. Reliance on the United States
for advice and the hope of support, both moral and material,
have been important factors in increasing the American influ-
ence among the Egyptian leaders.
The populace and press, however, have remained generally
critical of the United States, particularly when it is iden-
tified with British and French interests or when it lends
support to Israel. The press and official spokesmen, speak-
ing for popular consumption, have attacked the United States
for its failure to "make" Britain accept Egyptian terms in
the Suez dispute; for support of France in the Moroccan
question; and for disproportionate aid to Israel.
American prestige in Egypt, which reached its lowest
ebb immediately following the Palestine affair in 1948-49,
has generally increased during the past six months, despite
incidental rebuffs. The time is approaching, however, when
the Egyptian regime may insist on positive evidence of the
United States' professed interest. The military leaders wish
to build up their armed forces and look to the United States
for military assistance. Should they feel that American mili-
tary and economic aid is not adequate, these leaders may
turn from the United States, and American prestige would suf-
fer a severe setback.
The Current favorable attitude of the military regime
toward the United States affords an opportunity to extend
American influence in Egypt and indirectly throughout the
Near East.
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Lebanon
American prestige, which suffered a .serious setback in
Lebanon and the other Arab states during the period immedi-
ately preceding and following the establishment of Israel
in 1948, has improved to some extent in recent years. This
improvement became particularly noticeable after the advent
of the new administration in Washington, with its declared
policy of treating the Arab nations on a par with Israel.
American influence, however, is not yet close to the high
level it enjoyed in the World War II era before the United
States became involved with the Palestine issue or subsequently
with the Iranian, Egyptian, and Moroccan questions.
Lebanese elation over the Eisenhower election has dimin-
ished in recent weeks as a result of disillusionment over
American failure to implement what the Lebanese had hoped
would be a new pro-Arab policy. In particular, the Lebanese
have expressed suspicions over the American stand on the in-
ternationalization of Jerusalem, and they oppose US backing
of France bia the'Moroccan issue. Criticism of the United
States has long been evident in the neutralist and leftist
press as well as in the Arab refugee camps, but many govern-
ment officials, and even such pro-West leaders as Charles
Malik, have periodically opposed American policies in the
Near East.
Lebanon's small size and geographic position in the
Arab world pave often forced the government to follow the
anti-Wester line of the larger Arab states or of the Arab
League, even When the Lebanese, some 50 percent of whom
are Christians, have privately favored a pro-Western policy.
General Arab misunderstanding has also caused the Lebanese
to become impatient with the American long-term aid programs.
Greece
There has been a slight but significant drop in Ameri-
can prestige in Greece during the past year. Greek officials
have privately criticized decreased American aid without con-
current cuts in Greek defense expenditures.
The previous Liberal-EPEK government asserted that the
reduction in American aid made it necessary to put into effect
some unpopular economic and financial restrictions, thus
blaming the United States for the measures. The Papagos gov-
ernment has not resorted to these tactics and has presented
unpalatable reforms as necessary if Greece is to become more
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self-sufficient. As Greece recovers some stability, officials
are reluctant to accept detailed American guidance, a situa-
tion caused in part by Papagos' assertions that Greece must
stand on its own feet.
In addition, there appears to be some feeling in Greek
government and intellectual circles that Senator McCarthy
is attacking traditional American liberties, that he is in-
hibiting the pursuit of announced policies, and that he may
force a return to American isolationism?
In the press, most of the criticism of the United States
is related to domestic political issues. Pro-government
papers usually follow the line that continued American aid
indicates American support for Papagos; anti-government papers
take the view that his failure to get more aid indicates his
inability to govern Greece successfully, It is probable that
occasional articles, more or less critical of American policy
toward Greece, have been planted by individuals now in the
government in an effort to persuade the United States to
change some aspects of its Greek policies.
The degree to which the press is pro--American depends
on the political beliefs of the editor or ownerand on ex-
pediency. Newspapers speaking for the Communist-dominated
EDA party are consistently critical of the United States.
The more sensational newspapers occasionally print articles
setting forth American criticism of the Greek government or
the royal family.
On the whole, the Greek public opinion is overwhelmingly
pro-American. Long association of the people with United
States--particularly through immigrant contacts, private re-
mittances to Greece, and more recent American governmental
economic and financial aid--has raised the prestige of the
United States to a high level.
Some provincial criticism has resulted from the feeling
that the United States has permitted too much American aid
to go to the cities and from the belief that the administra-
tion of this aid has been placed in incompetent, dishonest
Greek hands. Certain elements of the population such as
the tobacco workers have been displeased by American failure
to aid Greece to sell its large tobacco surplus. This Greek
failure to sell its tobacco has produced genuine hardship
and provided fertile ground for Communist exploitation.
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An additional factor affecting American prestige and
reflecting adversely on the United States comes from errors
in judgment made by individual Americans. They show an
ignorance of Greek sensitivities and, by attempting to des-
cribe all phases of American life, often do so in an un-
balanced manner.
The cumulative effect of all these factors has resulted
in a slight decrease in American prestige, especially on the
official level where the reduction in aid produces the most
reaction. There is no indication that this decline will
affect internal Greek policies except to produce reluctance
among officials to accept detailed American guidance. The
Greek government, however, will continue to support the
United States on all major international issues.
Turkey
American prestige in Turkey is being sustained at a
high level. There has been no significant variation for
many months, and there is apparently complete accord on all
matters of substance. There is currently no important body
of anti-American opinion in Turkey nor any indication of an
incipient neutralist attitude.
There is no evidence in either official or popular
circles to suggest a probable future decline in American
prestige in Turkey. Spokesmen for both the government and
its opposition, Turkish press editorials, and radio comment
reflect the high degree of.prestige accorded the United
States and its representatives in Turkey and approval of
basic American foreign policy. Government representatives
have displayed a cordial attitude and have stated their de-
sire to cooperate fully. In the opening debate before the
Grand National Assembly on the budget for 1953-54, leaders
of both parties reaffirmed their solidarity on issues of
foreign policy.
President Eisenhower's foreign policy address on 16
April was well received by the majority of the Istanbul and
Ankara newspapers where editorial reaction was generally
favorable. Public and press reaction to Secretary Dulles'
visit to Turkey was highly satisfactory, reflecting Turkey's
solidarity with the United States on all major issues.
Turkey shows a genuine interest in the United States
and appreciates the economic and military assistance which
it has furnished. There has, however, been some minor criti-
cism of ECA information methods as too blatant and spectacular.
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One reason for the basically favorable Turkish attitude
toward the United States is the fact that the Turks do not
regard themselves as the recipients of American largesse.
They feel that they are making a more than equal contribu-
tion to the American-Turkish "alliance," and hence do not
harbor the resentful attitude which sometimes develops in
a debtor country toward a major creditor. Turkey acknowl-
edges the indispensability of American aid and its heavy de-
pendence on American military guidance.
An adverse effect on public opinion of the inevitable
decline in military and economic aid to Turkey is a poten-
tial source of friction. As long as aid persists, American
prestige can be expected to ramain high. Once the flow of
arms and money is cut off, a reaction will undoubtedly set in
which will be reflected primarily in the press and among the
political leaders. It is not expected, however, to disturb
the esteem in which the public holds the United States.
The primary American objective in Turkey is to retain
the conviction among the people that the United States is
the center of the free world which will remain constant, and
that their'adherence to this'fr.ee world will benefit Turkey.
American prestige in India, which was probably at its
highest point in 1947 when India became an independent nation,
had declined materially by about 1950 and since then has
fluctuated within relatively narrow limits. It is currently
experiencing a setback, caused primarily by American opposi-
tion to India's views on the Korean question and by the with-
drawal of Ambassador Bowles from New Delhi.
During World War II, the United States had proved itself
to be the world's mightiest single nation,industrially and
militarily. Indians were impressed and hoped, with American
encouragement, to emulate its example. The dimunition in
American prestige resulted from strains imposed by Indian
nationalist attitudes and aims, hesitant. and apparently in-
consitent American policies, and divergent views on world
problems. These frictions have only occasionally been less-
ened by forthright expressions of American opinions or by
an acquiesence to Indian desires.
Possibly the most important factor adversely affecting
American prestige has been Indian nationalism, developing
out of the country's recent. experience as a dependent of
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Britain. This has taken the form of an exaggerated sense of
pride and independence, an over-emphasis on equality with
other nations, a sensitivity to color bars, extreme dislike
of criticism and advice, and an intense urge for world recog-
nition.
In foreign relations this nationalism has become mani-
fest in Prime Minister Nehru's concept of an Asian "Third
Force" or neutral bloc under Indian leadership, as well as
in his insistence that India remain aloof from both the
East and West. It was also obvious in India's desire to
sign a separate peace treaty with Japan. The belief that
American policy has refused to recognize and support emerg-
ing Asian nationalist movements such as those in Communist
China,. Indochina and Iran has created ill-will, especially
on the part of Nehru and the press. The failure of the United
States to recognize India as the spokesman of non-Communist
Asia, as illustrated by its opposition to Indian participa-
tion in the political conference on Korea, has produced
additional bitterness. Finally, Indian rivalry with Paki-
stan caused violent outcries in Indian government and press
circles when, early in 1953, Pakistan indicated an interest
in ,a Middle East defense organization. Indian antagonism
was aimed at the United States, one of the prime movers in
this matter.
Nehru's personal dislike of materialism, as well as
his feeling that Americans have little culture, has made
him hesitant to accept American aid or advice. In this he
is supported by other Hindu nationalist leaders, who seek
a return to ancient glory along strictly Indian lines. The
oriental suspicion of "something for nothing" originally
made all Indians hesitate to accept American assistance.
Having once determined the true nature of such aid, however,
many Indians became critical of American failure to produce
it in greater quantity. By 1950, frustrated by their own
inability to achieve desired economic advances, many govern-
ment officials and some segments of the press had turned
against the United States. They accused it of not sharing
its wealth adequately among the needy nations of the world.
Nevertheless, American economic assistance and the granting
of emergency food aid in 1951 have been effective in main-
taining or temporarily increasing American prestige, partic-
ularly among the Indian people.
American actions interpreted as inconsistency in policy
or a departure from announced moral principles add to Indian
disrespect. The alacrity of the United States in springing
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to the defense of South Korea, where American security
interests were obviously at stake, as opposed to its unwill-
ingness to support the peoples of Morocco against what the
Indians consider to be French aggressive action is a case
in point. America's failure to come to the aid of colonial
peoples is attributed to a fear of offending its traditional
allies. The United States' success in keeping India out of
the political conference on Korea and its efforts to keep
Communist China out of the UN are also taken as evidence that
it is interested primarily in power politics.
Basically divergent views held by India and the United
States on world problems constantly cause friction between
the two countries. Prime Minister Nehru, who is primarily
responsible for India's policy of neutrality, thoroughly
dislikes continuous American attempts to swing his. allegiance
to the Western bloc. He, like many other Indian leaders, be-
lieves t#at the United States is dominated by an almost
hysterical fear of Communism rather than a reasoned opposi-
tion to Soviet imperialism. Many Indians hold the United
States equally guilty with the USSR for the present state of
world tension, and they cannot understand American failure
to respond to Soviet "peace" propaganda backed up, as in
recent months, by apparently tangible demonstrations of peace-
ful intent.
Prime Minister Nehru, who claims to desire world peace
despite his somewhat aggresive activities in South Asia,
expresses fear that US aggressiveness or overconfidence will
lead to World War III. The advance to the Yalu River in
North Korea, the February 1953 announcement that the US
Seventh Fleet would no longer protect the Chinese mainland
from Nationalist attacks, and American insistence on demon-
strations of Communist good faith before concluding an armis-
tice in Korea have all been cited by Nehru as reasons to lose
patience with the, United States,
On the economic level, many Indian officials have con-
cluded that the United States overemphasizes aid to Europe
as opposed to the less developed countries of Asia, and is
motivated less by humanitarian principles than by a desire
to aid its allies,
Some American actions temporarily raised American pres-
tige in India. The personal interest taken by former Ambassa-
dor Bowles and by some American visitors and students in
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Indian history, aspirations, and activities serves constantly
to maintain friendly relations on both government and popular
levels. The ambassador;'s recognition of the Indian viewpoint,
even when differences with the United States existed, demon-
strated to the Indians a basic frankness and honesty of
approach. The present American support for Madam Pandit's
candidacy for presidency of the Eighth UN General Assembly
will undoubtedly create good will among the Indian people,
though its timing may lead the government and press to con-
clude it is an antidote for opposition to Indian participa-
tion in the Korean conference.
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Brazil
American prestige in Brazil has declined to some ex-
tent since its peak period during the last years of World
War II, but there has been no marked decrease during the
past year. The armistice in Korea has had little effect
on American prestige. Senator McCarthy's activities have
attracted comparatively little attention.
Washington's policies on economic assistance to Brazil,
rather than on larger East-West issues, have been the main
determinants of Americ&'s standing in the country. The
Brazilians have felt that as the United States' best Latin
American ally during World War II they should have received
more economic help from the US after the war. Relations prob-
ably reached their lowest ebb in June 1953 when the US was
severely criticized for taking steps to close the Joint
Brazil-US Economic Development Commission. Although the Com-
mission was merely going out of existence on schedule, many
Brazilians seized on the closing as symbolic of lack of
American interest in lending financial aid to Brazil.
In Brazil prestige of the United States as a world
power has suffered no important change during the past year.
Press attitudes remain generally unchanged, and the absence
of any strong anti-Communist line is probably due basically
to the fact that Brazil feels that the US can deal with the
USSR and that Communism is therefore no menace to Brazil.
Even in this most internationally-minded of the Latin Ameri-
can countries, Communists and ultranationalists were able
through their propaganda to prevent the dispatch of Brazil-
ian troops to Korea, in spite of urgent pleas from Washington.
Two basic causes of anti-US feeling in Brazil do, how-
ever, continue to be successfully exploited by the Communist
press which consists of at least 25 regular publications.
These two causes are envy of wealth of the United States and
dislike of its reputed racial discrimination, which offends
Brazilians with their century-long tradition of racial tol-
erance.
Favorable influences on US-Brazilian relations in re-
cent months have been the granting of the $300,000,000 loan
by the Export-Import Bank to reduce Brazil's commercial back-
log, the visit in July of several US naval vessels to Brazilian
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ports and the visit of Dr. Milton Eisenhower.
Argentina
American prestige in Argentina which has been low for
many years, has improved during the past year, and expecially
since the visit of Dr. Milton Eisenhower in July. It has
never been as high there as in other Latin American countries.
Buenos Aires official attitude. toward the United States has
been adversely affected by the comparative absence of im-
portant trade relations and by fifty years of rivalry for
leadership in the hemisphere.
Improvement in the United States' standing in Argentina
commenced shortly after the death in July 1952 of Senora de
Peron, who reportedly had been the strongest proponent of a
sharply anti-American policy. After her death, anti-American
propaganda tapered off and finally disappeared in January 1953
reappearing briefly in early May when Peron was convinced by
anti-US elements among his advisers that the United States
was behind the Buenos Aires bombing incident of 15 April.
During the last six months, American prestige has risen
markedly, expecially in government circles. Peron apparently
decided during the latter half of 1952 that he had more to
gain through friendship with the United States than through
anti-Americanism. Also, with the change of administration
in the United States, Argentina was able to use the face-
saving device of saying that its quarrels had been with the
Truman administration, not with the United States as a whole.
Thus the government prepared the public for the at-
tutude of sympathetic expectancy adopted six months ago and
of official friendliness adopted in July and characterized
by the new press line, "Welcome Dr. Eisenhower. The Argen-
tines Wipe the Slate Clean." Dr. Eisenhower's recent state-
ment that the United States should in no way interfere in
Latin America's internal affairs was quoted in the controlled
press of Argentina as indicative of a more sympathetic under-
standing by the American administration and inevitably leading
to improved relations between the two countries.
Chile
Chile's copper problem has been a major factor in the
decline in US prestige and popularity since 1950. Both
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governments have been intimately involved in the problem since
two American companies control Chile's largest copper mines
and the US has been the major importer of the metal, which
is the leading source of Chile's revenue. Chileans have long
resented "exploitation" of their resources, and they took
particular exception to the 1951 US-Chilean copper agreement
by which the US was able to buy 80 percent of the large
companies' production at a low price at a time when Chile
could sell copper at high prices to non-US buyers.
American popularity in Chile declined rapidly in the two-
year period of campaigning prior to the election of Presi-
dent Ibanez in September 1952 and reached a low point im-
mediately prior to his election. The immediate cause was
political opportunism which anticipated the presidential elec-
tion, and criticism of the unpopular pro-American administra-
tion of Gonzalez Videla was tailored to include the United
States itself.
Public dissatisfaction, aroused by the inability of the
Gonzalez administration to cppe with serious inflation, pro-
vided fertile ground for the proposal of extremist solutions
to Chile's problems by the supporters of Ibanez and the Com-
munists, who were allowed almost complete freedom of activity.
To a large extent the US was blamed for Chile's economic prob-
lems, and demands were made for a denunciation of the US mil-
itary assistance agreement, and for nationalization of American
copper companies in Chile.
American popularity in Chile appears to have recovered
partly since the inauguration of-Ibanez in November of 1952.
The relatively friendly attitude of his government toward the
US, in sharp contrast to the campaign, has been largely re-
sponsible for the recovery. If a solution of Chile's current
copper problem is worked out with US assistance, there should
be further recovery of US prestige.
Most Chileans are basically pro-American today, and
identify themselves with the US causes in the East-West con-
flict even though they reject the idea of participation in
any possible war. They admire the American democratic process
and industrial achievements. The apparent lowering of US
prestige and popularity in Chile probably results from the
Chilean desire for economic independence, the unsettled nature
of the country today, and the acceptance of extremist propa-
ganda. Other such factors include certain working class re-
sentments at the large US-owned copper companies, and a con-
tinued tendency for Chilean intellectuals to look to Europe
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for their cultural standards.
Also, Chileans see themselves as one of the most advanced
nations of South America. Increasingly as a result of severe
economic pressures, they therefore feel entitled to large-
scale US financial assistance. Chileans do not understand
why American aid to Europe and Asia appears to take precedence
over assistance to them. What is interpreted as US disinterest
in Chile's problems has caused some Chileans to begin to dis-
trust American motives. This feeling may in effect be causing
permanent damage to US prestige in Chile.
Peru
American prestige with the ruling Peruvian upper class
has generally remained on the high level it reached during
World War II when it became clear that the US was on the win-
ning side. It declined somewhat in 1952 as a result of a
proposed tariff increase on tuna, and more recently because
of proposed tariff increases on lead and zinc. To date, how-
ever, technical assistance grants, Export-Import Bank loans,
and other forms of material aid have served to balance tempo-
rary displeasure in Peruvian official circles.
Among the Peruvian people generally, however, there has
been a slow decline in American prestige and pro-US sentiment.
The people do not have a feeling of unity with their govern-
ment or with the upper class which dominates the government.
Therefore cooperation with the autocratic Peruvian govern-
ment has caused US reputation as a democracy to suffer among
the Peruvian lower classes. Prestige of the United States
as a world power is of far less importance to the Peruvian
people than to government circles.
Anti-US propaganda in Peru has come from Communist, Peron-
ist, European, and American Popular Revolutionary Alliance
(APRA) sources. Until less than a year ago, Communist propa-
ganda was given a free hand and even financial aid by the
government on the condition that., the Communist line be fol-
lowed only on international affairs and that in domestic mat-
ters the Peruvian government would be supported. Peronist
anti-US propaganda also had some, although much less, effect
up to the cessation of its anti-US line in the summer of 1952.
The propaganda of APRA, the only mass supported political party
in Peruvian history, took a pro-US line during World War II,
but its origins in Yankee-phobia have shown some tendency to
i-e?-emerge since the war.
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In the Republic of Panama, United States prestige has
probably remained constantly high over the past years, despite
periodic irritations over specific issues. The great majority
of Panamanians look to the United States for leadership in
international affairs and for economic and technical aid, and
they attempt to emulate United States political institutions.
Most Panamanians are genuinely proud of the close association
of their country with the United States.
Panama, however, has been affected by the post-war
nationalistic trend particularly prevalent among politically
weak and economically under-developed countries. While this
has probably not yet significantly affected the Panamanians'
basic respect for the United States, it has made them quick to
attack, sometimes violently and irresponsibly, any US policy
which they feel adversely affects the sovereign rights or
economic well-being of their country.
In late 1947, efforts by the United States to reach an
agreement with Panama on continued occupancy of defense bases
on Panamanian territory became a violent political issue, and
antagonism against the United States ran high. The Panamanian
National Assembly rejected the proposed agreement when demon-
strators successfully intimidated the deputies. In spite of
the serious harm done to Panama's economy by the immediate
United States withdrawal from the bases, few Panamanians have
been consistently critical of the radical and ultranationalistic
groups who were basically responsible for the situation. On
the contrary, the United States is often made responsible
for the current economic depression in Panama through alleged
violations of the Canal Zone Treaty.
Feeling against the United States again became strong
during March and April 1953. Newly-elected President Jose
Antonio Remon, who had always shown a firm friendship for the
United States, initiated a campaign for revision of the United
States-Panama treaty which regulates relations between the
Panama Canal Zone and the Republic of Panama. Alleged US
violations of the treaty were given considerable space in
the Panamanian press, and the United States attacked for al-
lowing commercial activities in the Canal Zone to compete
with Panamanian business and discriminating against Panamanians
in the Zone.
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After World War II, US prestige began its decline from
the peak reached in the era of the Roosevelt Good Neighbor
policy, and finally hit a relatively low point prior to the
Mexican presidential election of July 1952. The election-
eering at that time again brought to the surface the historic
undercurrents of anti-Americanism in Mexico as well as the
varied irritations over cattle imports, migrant labor and
shrimp fishing caused by the proximity of the two countries.
Aside from memories of past conflicts, a major cause for
the decline in US prestige in Mexico since World War II has
been resentment over the comparative lack of financial as-
sistance to Latin America, as compared with large-scale US aid
to other areas. Many Mexicans who had been particularly im-
pressed by Roosevelt's interest in Latin America feel that with
his death the Good Neighbor policy had ended. Mexican dis-
illusionment with the US was quickly exploited by Communists
and ultranationalists, who called for radical solutions to US-
Mexican problems.
The anti-Americanism of the Mexican presidential election
period appears to have been tempered by the election of Presi-
dent Eisenhower. The coming 19 October meeting of Eisenhower
with President Ruiz Cortines to inaugurate the Falcon dam,
built through Mexican-US cooperative effort, has caused the
Mexican press to express hope that this meeting may be a signi-
ficant step in the development of a favorable US policy toward
Mexico. Similarly, the visit of US Assistant Secretary of
State Cabot last spring, the defeat of the protectionist Simp-
son bill in the US Congress, and the trip of Dr. Milton Eisen-
hower to South America were viewed with encouragement by
Mexican public opinion.
PET L
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