WEEKLY INDOCHINA REPORT

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP91T01172R000300200002-6
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 31
• Document Creation Date: December 21, 2016
• Document Release Date: September 7, 2007
• Sequence Number: 2
• Publication Date: June 23, 1954
• Content Type: REPORT

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TOP SECRET
Itotan:ont Mo. ---- --------------
N? Change In Class. 20
0 DoelassiAid
Class. Chanted To: TS S C
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Data: 6y:
State Dept. review completed
DIA review(s) completed.
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23 June 1954
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SUMMARY . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Page 3
INDOCHINA . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Page 8
Military
Political
GENEVA CONFERENCE . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Page 18
Direct Military Talks
Supervision and Guarantees of a Truce
Political Questions
Relations Between Communist Delegations
FREE WORLD POLICIES AND OPINIONS. . . . . . . Page 27
France
Great Britain
New Zealand
India
Burma
Thailand
Japan
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Indochina
Militar : The two sides maneuvered for position
and proobee each other's defenses militarily in Indo-
china as they were doing diplomatically at Geneva. No
decisive battles of either sort were fought in either
theater.
General Cogny told the American consul in Hanoi
that the Viet Minh battle corps was ready to move
against the French in the delta "at any time," and
that if he were the enemy commander he would have
attacked two weeks ago.
Cogny will make every effort to defend the whole
Hanoi-Haiphong complex but he "foresees the eventual-
ity" that he will be forced to retire to Haiphong, he
told the consul.
Meanwhile intensification of activity by Viet
Minh forces already in the delta is foreshadowed by
several reports.
Political
Vietnam premier-designate Ngo Dinh Diem, in his
first public statement, ascribed Vietnam's woes
chiefly to France's "stubborn" refusal to face up to
the necessity of granting his country full independence.
INDOCHINA REPORT 3
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American officials who conferred recently with
Diem in Paris were struck by his apparent lack of any
program except the assumption of greater responsibili-
ties by the United States.
A prominent Vietnamese army officer told American
embassy officials in Saigon that conditions in five
once-safe provinces in southern Vietnam have deteri-
orated so markedly within the past half year that
"all would be lost" within two or three months unless
remedial action were taken immediately.
Among the causes of the worsening situation, he
said, were poor pay, inadequate arms, corruption and
incompetence in the local government and the fact
that the Vietnamese army was "concerned much more
with the tailoring of uniforms and unearned decorations
than with its primary purpose of combating the Commu-
nist enemy."
North Vietnam?s poorest rice crop in nine years
will provoke an even more intensive struggle for the
harvest than in previous years but the army attache
anticipates that the Viet Minh will be able to obtain
its requirements.
The Viet Minh radio asserted that pedicab drivers
in Hanoi have been organized in a fifth column.
Geneva Conference
The Communists hinted that they might agree to
reasonable terms for a settlement, but they committed
themselves to nothing.
Chou En-lai was conciliatory in tone but evasive
in content in a speech on military questions and the
Viet Minh delegate was enticing in content but aggres-
sive in tone in a speech on political questions.
The nine participants in the Indochina talks
agreed to have representatives of the two commands
meet immediately to examine questions relating to
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cease-fires in Laos and Cambodia, beginning with the
question of the withdrawal of all foreign armed forces
and all foreign military personnel from the two coun-
tries.
The Communists seemed far from prepared to nego-
tiate a complete withdrawal of Viet Minh forces from
Laos and Cambodia, however. There are, moreover,
"indigenous resistance movements" in both countries
whose existence must be recognized, the Communists
asserted.
Free World Policies and Opinions
France: Estimates of Premier Mendes-France's
capabilities and intentions varied widely.
The premier himself told Under Secretary W.
.Bedell Smith that it was essential to end the Indo-
china war promptly. He added, however, that he
would not under any circumstances agree to a settle-
ment which constituted a surrender to the Viet Minh.
Once peace is made in Indochina, he will press
for ratification of EDC, Mendes-France said, and he
will not countenance changes in the treaty which
would be unacceptable to other signatories.
The Italian ambassador in Paris, on the other
hand, reported to Rome that Mendes-France would
scuttle EDC if he could thereby get an acceptable
Indochina settlement from the Communists. The only
hope for EDC is that "the Russians will make some of
their blessed blunders," the ambassador said.
Mendes-France was to meet Chinese Communist
foreign minister. Chou En-lai at Bern on 23 June.
Great Britain: Hope welled up once again in the
Britis reast.
Officials thought the new French government might
be able to negotiate an Indochina settlement and there
was a spate of optimism in the press.
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"
Foreign Secretary Eden told Ambassador Aldrich
he thinks complete American-British agreement on a
Southeast Asian defense system will be reached during
Eden's and Prime Minister Churchill's forthcoming
visit to Washington.
New Zealand: Prime Minister Holland said he
would c scuss Southeast Asian problems with Austral-
ian prime minister Menzies during Menzies' current
vacation in New Zealand.
Some leading newspapers accused the United
States of obduracy at Geneva. There was, however,
both press and public support for the American pro-
posal for collective action in Southeast Asia.
India: Prime Minister Nehru's position on
Indochina was as difficult to determine as that of
a man who has climbed a rope and disappeared.
Ambassador Allen was unable to obtain confirma-
tion of reports that India might recognize Cambodia,
and there were only surmises as to what Nehru might
say to Chou En-lai when the Chinese Communist
foreign minister visits New Delhi on his way home
from Geneva.
Burma: The Burmese took an increasingly grave
view o`he situation in Indochina and acted accord-
ingly.
Rangoon said it would be willing to serve on an
Indochina armistice commission composed of the five
Colombo powers and possibly even on a commission made
up of three Colombo powers and one European and one
Communist country.
The Burmese further adopted the Western powers'
view that the problems of Laos and Cambodia must be
separated from those of Vietnam; they undertook, if
the Geneva conference collapses, to support the Thai
request that a UN peace observation committee be
sent to Southeast Asia; and they announced that they
intended to introduce military conscription.
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Thailand: Premier Phibun reaffirmed Bangkok's
willingness to take part in a Pacific defense alliance
and to permit the establishment of American military
bases in Thailand.
Foreign troops sent to defend Thailand should not
be considered the agents of imperialism as they had
been in the past, Phibun said. "Anyway, Americans are
not foreigners," he said.
Japan: The press went on treating the Indochina
conflict aas one between the West and the Communists.
A large right-wing Tokyo daily argued that Asian
Communism was mostly a movement for racial independ-
ence and--as in China--for agrarian reform.
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Military
General Cogny told the American consul in Hanoi on
17 June, however, that the enemy battle corps in the delta
was ready to move against the French "at any time." While
he had no indications of a major attack within the next
"week or ten days," Cogny said if he were the Viet Minh
commander he would have attacked two weeks ago. He thought
the failure of the Viet Minh to launch an all-out assault
was probably due to political considerations.
Cogny has stated that if the Viet Minh battle corps
were committed, he would have to withdraw from the large
populated areas of Nam Dinh, Bui Chu and Son Tay because
his forces are unable to defend both Hanoi and these out-
lying points (see map, p. 9)o According to the American
consul in Hanoi, Cogny will make every effort to defend
the whole Hanoi-Haiphong complex, but the general "fore-
sees the eventuality" of being forced to retire to
Haiphong.
Whether or not the Viet Minh plans a major assault
soon by its battle corps, early intensification of activity
against the French by Viet Minh forces already in the
delta is foreshadowed by several reports.
According to the American army attache in Saigon,
the French report "indications" that the Viet Minh 320th
Division and other smaller units have been ordered to
prepare for unspecified action in the southern part
of the delta beginning 1 July. One regiment of the 304th
Division may also be involved. The French are undecided
whether this would be part of an attack on the entire
delta or only a limited campaign.
INDOCHINA REPORT 8 23 June 54
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French attacks on Viet Minh bases in the delta
continued, however, the heaviest being an amphibious
assault against Van Coc Island on the Red River north-
west of Hanoi. Press sources report that relatively
severe fighting occurred as French forces drove ashore;
no details are available from official sources.
A Reuters press story reports that on 16 June Viet
Minh forces occupied the important town of Viet Tri at
the western apex of the perimeter; French units had with-
drawn earlier, leaving the post to Vietnamese militia
as a "listening" point. Sabotage of the Hanoi-Haiphong
communications line continued;
it is open only two or three hours a day.
shot own two French fighters on 13 June
The weapons used
are believed to have been 37mm guns, which have never
been reported in this area before.
South Vietnam: Press accounts of 20 June report
that 500 Viet Minh prisoners escaped from a POW camp
at Mytho, southwest of Saigon, on 19 June. Several com-
panies of Communist regionals in the area were said to
have aided the escape. About 100 of the prisoners were
reported recaptured.
Laos: The American diplomatic representative in
Laos reports that the situation in north Laos will remain
static and will be favorable in the south if no more
French troops are withdrawn. He notes, however, that
the situation could change rapidly in the event the
Tonkin delta were lost. In that event he believes one.
division., could conquer Laos at least as far south as
Thakheka
INDOCHINA REPORT
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vow Nwi
FRENCH UNION FORCES
VIET MINH FORCES
FRENCH
ASSOCIATED
TOTAL
STRENGTH COMBAT
AREA
REGULARS
REGIONAL
TOTAL
STRENGTH
46 Inf Bns
13 Arty Bns
32 Inf Bns
4 Arty Bns
78 Inf Bus
17 Arty Bns
97,700
I
65 Inf Bus
29 Inf Bus
93 Inf Ens
70,000
27 Lt Bns
27 Lt Bns
6 Arty Bns
6 A
rty Bns
5 Inf Bns
2 Arty Bns
17 Inf Bns
I Arty Bn
22 Inf Bus
2 Arty Bns
25,400
II
7 Inf Bus
8 Id Bns
13 Inf Bns
9,100
6 Lt Bus
6 Lt Bns
0 Arty Bns
0 Arty Bus
4 Inf Bus
0 Arty Bns
7 Inf Bns
OArty Bns
ll Inf Bus
0 Arty Bns
11,200
III
3 Inf Bus
0 A
t
B
0 Inf Bus
3 Inf Bus
0 A
t
B
100
2
2 Lt Bns
2 Lt Bns
r
y
ns
r
y
ns
1
6 Inf Bns
20 Inf Bns
26 Inf Bns
1 Arty Bn
3 Arty Bns
17 Lt Ens
4 Arty Bus
17 Lt Bns
43,900
IV
15 Inf Bns
0 Arty Bns
3 Id Ens
18 Id Bns
12,600
8 Guard
8 Guard
0 Arty Bns
6 Inf Bns
13 Inf Bns
19 Inf Bns
0 Arty Bns
0 Arty Bns
0 Arty Ens
32,500
V
10 Inf Bns
2 Inf Bns
12 Id Bns
8,400
24 Lt Bns
24 Lt Bns
0 Arty Bns
0 Arty Bns
0 Id Bns
0
6 Inf Bns
0
6 Inf Bns
0
7
300
-i
0 Inf Bns
I Inf Bn
1 Inf Bn
1,000
Arty Bns
Arty Bns
Arty Bns
,
r 1
0 Arty Bus
0 Arty Bns
3 Lt Bus
3 Lt Bus
9 Inf Bns
1 Arty Bn
1 Inf Bn
0 Arty Bns
10 Inf Bns
1 Arty Bn
10,900
VII
2 Inf Ens
0 Inf Bns
2 Inf Bns
2
100
2 Lt Bns
2 Lt Bns
1 Arty Bn
1 Arty Bn
,
6 Inf Bns
0 Arty Bns
4 Inf Bns
0 Arty Bns
10 Inf Bns
0 Arty Bns
10,900
VIII
11 Inf Bus
4 Inf Bns
15 Id Bns
10,500
3 Lt Bus
3 Lt Bus
0 Arty Bns
0 Arty Bns
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