INDOCHINA REPORT

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP91T01172R000300210001-6
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 45
• Document Creation Date: December 21, 2016
• Sequence Number: 1
• Content Type: REPORT

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III
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
OFFICE OF CURRENT INTELLIGENCE
State Dept. review
completed
COPY NO.
DATE '4 August 1954
OCI No. 8955
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FINAL DECLARATION OF THE NINE PARTICIPANTS
IN THE GENEVA CONFERENCE . . . . . . . . . . . ... 6
CEASE-FIRE IN VIETNAM . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
I Arts. 1- 9 Provisional Military Demarcation
Line and Demilitarized Zone . . 10
II Arts. 10-15 Principles and Procedure Governing
Implementation of Agreement . . 12
III Arts. 16-20 Ban on Introduction of Fresh Troops,
Military Personnel, Arms and
Munitions, Military Bases . . . 19
IV Art. 21 Prisoners of War and Civilian Internees 22
V Arts. 22-47 Miscellaneous . . . . . . . . . . . 29
Annex . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29
CEASE-FIRE IN LAOS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30
I Arts. 1- 5 Cease-fire and Evacuation of*Foreign
Armed Forces and Foreign Military
Personnel . . . . . . . . . . 30
II Arts. 6-10 Prohibition of Introduction of Fresh
Troops, Military Personnel, Arma-
ments and Munitions . . . . . . . . 32
III Arts. 11-15 Disengagement of Forces, Assembly
Areas, Concentration Areas. . . . . 33
IV Art. 16 Prisoners of War and Civilian Internees 35
V Arts. 17-23 Miscellaneous . . . . . . . . . . . . 36
VI Arts. 24-39 Joint Commission and International
Commission . . . . . . . . . . . 36
VII Arts. 40-41 Effective Dates and Signatures. . . . 36
CEASE-FIRE IN CAMBODIA . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 37
I Arts. 1- 3 Principles and Conditions Governing
Execution of the Cease-fire . . . . 37
II Art.. 4 Procedure for Withdrawal of Foreign
Armed Forces and Foreign Military
Personnel from Territory of Cambodia 39
III Arts. 5- 9 Other Questions . . . . . . . 39
IV Arts. 10-33 Joint Commission and International
Commission . . . . . . . . . . . . 40
FINAL DECLARATIONS BY THE LAOTIAN, CAMBODIAN, FRENCH
AND AMERICAN DELEGATIONS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 42
4 Aug 54 INDOCHINA REPORT
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The Geneva conference concluded on 21 July with a
13-point Conference Declaration, issued in the name of
the nine participating powers, but qualified by a uni-
lateral declaration by the United States delegation.
These were accompanied by a detailed 47-article
agreement on cessation of hostilities in Vietnam
signed by representatives of the Viet Minh and French
commanders. In addition the Cambodian and Laotian
representatives signed slightly shorter cease-fire
agreements with the Viet Minh representative.
The Vietnamese delegates were unsuccessful in
trying to have their views incorporated in the final
declaration and they did not sign the Vietnamese
cease-fire agreement, a fact which raises the prob-
ability of future difficulties.
In essence, the declarations and agreements ended
the primarily military phase of the hostilities in
Indochina, and set a month--July 1956--in which
"free" elections will be held throughout Vietnam to
establish a unified government for that state.
In the meantime the country will be divided at
approximately the 17th parallel, French troops will
be withdrawn from the north and Viet Minh troops from
the south, and until the military regroupment has
taken place, Vietnamese will supposedly be permitted
to move to the zone of their choice.
The agreements, however, are filled with many
ambiguities--some of which are pointed out in the
following comments--to which both sides may raise
objections when it comes time to put certain pro-
visions into effect,
The successful application of the cease-fire-
which contains practically no enforcement provisions--
will in the end depend on the desire and intention of
the participating parties to make it work.
4 Aug 54
INDOCHINA REPORT
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The division at the 17th parallel may, in the
process, become permanent, placing Vietnam in the
same status as Germany, Austria, and Korea. As
likely is the possibility the Viet Minh will take
over all of Vietnam before the scheduled elections
in 1956--through ineptness on the part of the govern-
ment of south Vietnam, through subversion, through
elections, or even through further guerrilla warfare.
Although the Indochina settlement is less favor-
able than the French and the West generally had hoped
for, it is probably better than the French could have
obtained from the Viet Minh alone. There is good
reason to believe the Viet Minh was induced by its
acknowledged mentors, the Soviet Union and Communist
China, to accept a relatively modest settlement at
this time.
This type of settlement, in'the Communist view,
will encourage the West to believe in the possibility
of negotiated settlements of other outstanding con-
flicts and will thus tend'to discourage military
preparedness.
This report is a preliminary analysis by the
Office of Current Intelligence of the documents
resulting from the Geneva conference--the final
declarations and the three cease-fire agreements.
4 Aug 54
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H I- N A
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no T in Camhnirli.
S ~?, ART 407232
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FINAL DECLARATION OF THE NINE
PARTICIPANTS IN THE GENEVA CONFERENCE
General Observations
This document, although issued in the name of all
the participants, does not preclude any member from
dissenting from it. Vietnam has refused to acknowledge
the validity of the entire declaration and the American
statement pointedly omitted endorsing Paragraph 13,
regarding further consultations among the participating
powers.
The Declaration
PARAGRAPH 1: The conference "takes note" of the
cease- re agreements and the organization of inter-
national supervision.
Comment: The expression "takes note" represents
a mi o victory for the West, as the Communists
sought a phrase expressing approval of the agree-
ments by all nine participants.
PARAGRAPHS 2 and 3: The conference is convinced
that t Se cease- ire agreements and the present declara-
tion will permit the three countries to live in peace,
independence, and sovereignty. The conference takes
note of the intent of Laos and Cambodia (see their
declarations) to permit all citizens to take their
place in the national community, in particular through
the holding of general elections by secret ballot in
1955 as provided for in their respective constitutions.
Comment: During the course of the conference, the
Communists sought military and political control
over about half of Laos and a promise of important
jobs for Communists in Cambodia, but they settled
for de facto control of two northern provinces of
Laos and the agreement on elections in both coun-
tries--which had been scheduled in any case. The
Laotians and Cambodians, for their part, hoped it
would not be necessary to reach any political
agreement with the Communists.
4 Aug 54 INDOCHINA REPORT
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SICRL 1
PARAGRAPHS 4 and 5: The conference takes note
of provisions in the tree cease-fire agreements and
in the declarations of Laos and Cambodia restricting
the introduction of military aid and personnel into
those countries an the establishment of foreign
bases and military alliances.
Comment: The clause limiting the freedom of the
Indochina states to introduce foreign troops and
arms or to enter military alliances represents
in general a Communist victory in the negotia-
tions, although some concessions were granted
Laos and Cambodia.
PARAGRAPH 6: The conference affirms that the
truce -'l ne n Vietnam should not be interpreted as
constituting a political or territorial boundary.
Comment: All the participants in the conference
were well aware that this demarcation line in
fact partitions Vietnam, at least until the
elections scheduled for July 1956, but most were
anxious to gloss over this concept, owing to its
unpopularity in Vietnam.
PARAGRAPH 7: The conference delcares that
general elections will take place in Vietnam in July
1956 under the control'of an international commission
composed of the states which are members of the inter-
national commission for supervision of the cease-fire
agreements. Consultations are to take place on this
subject between competent representative authorities
of the two zones after 20 July 1955.
Comment: Although Vietnam has refused to
acs cpt" the terms of the Geneva settlement,
it apparently does not intend to repudiate
the decision to hold elections in 1956. The
date set for the elections represents a Western
victory, as the Communists sought elections
within six months. It is not specified in the
Geneva documentation what form these elections
will take or whether a parliament, a constituent
assembly, or a chief executive will be elected.
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JJ3UflGf
The ambiguity as to the "competent authority" in
the southern zone is characteristic of the entire
Geneva documentation.
PARAGRAPH 8: The conference calls for protection
,of indiv3 uc ua~nd property and the right of everyone
in Vietnam to ecl a where he will live.
Comment: The Communists may discourage any move-
ment rom north to south.
PARAGRAPH 9: The conference affirms that the
competent authorities in Vietnam, Laos, and Cambodia
must not permit individual or collective reprisals
against anyone who took sides during the war, or
against such persons' families.
Comment: There are certain to be reprisals,
particularly by the Communists.
PARAGRAPH 10: The conference takes note of the
declaration of the French government that it is ready
to withdraw its troops from the territory of Cambodia,
Laos an etnam, at the request of the governments
concerned an within a period which shall be fixed by
agreement between the parties except in the cases.
where, by agreement between the two parties, a certain
number of French troops shall remain at specified
points and for a specified time.
Comment: The use of the term "Vietnam" in this
paragraph and elsewhere in the Geneva documenta-
tion is ambiguous, since it could refer either
to the Associated State of Vietnam or to the
Democratic Republic of Vietnam or to both.
This ambiguity may prove troublesome in connec-
tion with the French pledge to withdraw its
troops from Vietnam at the request of "the
government concerned."
The reference to French troops remaining at
specified points applies to the Laos cease-fire
agreement,.but no time limit is specified.
4 Aug 54
INDOCHINA REPORT
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PARAGRAPH 11: The conference takes note of the
French declaration that it will respect the independ-
ence and sovereignty, unity and territorial integrity
of Cambodia, Laos-and Vietnam. (No comment.)
PARAGRAPH 12: Each member of the conference
undertakes to respect the sovereignty, independ.-
ence, unity, and territorial integrity of the three
states, and to refrain from interference in their
internal affairs.
Comment: The Cambodian government informed the
con erence that it would respect the territorial
integrity of Vietnam, subject to certain reser-
vations concerning adjustment of the border
between the two countries, this border having
been fixed by a unilateral act of France.
PARAGRAPH 13: The members of the conference
agree to consu t one another on any quest on w ieh
may be referred to them by the International Super-
visory Commission in order to study such measures
as may prove necessary to ensure that the agreements
on the cessation of hostilities in Cambodia, Laos,
and Vietnam are respected.
Comment: This represents a minor victory for
the W t, as the Communists had sought to commit
the nine participants. in the talks to "collective
measures" in taking action on questions referred
to them by the International Commission.
4 Aug 54 INDOCHINA REPORT
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CEASE-FIRE IN VIETNAM
General Observations
The cease-fire in Vietnam, like those for Laos and
Cambodia, provides for an International Supervisory
Commission (ISC) composed of representatives of India,
Poland, and Canada, and for the establishment of a Joint
Commission made up of representatives of the high commands
of the two parties to the agreement. The functions of
these bodies are discussed below. In Vietnam, in addi-
tion, there is a body known as the Trung Gia Military
Commission. This commission, which is already in ex-
istence, fulfills on an interim basis the functions
which are t? be assumed by the Joint Commission.
Provisions of the Agreement
ARTICLE 1: Provides for a provisional military
demarcation line at approximately the 17th parallel
(see map, p.11), for the regrouping of forces north and
south of the line, and for a demilitarized zone of a
width not more than five kilometers on either side.
Comment: Forces to be regrouped south of the
line are "the forces of the French Union." Prob-
lems may arise in the event a change occurs in
the relationship between Vietnam and the French
Union while the agreement is being carried out.
For example, France might agree to the withdrawal
of Vietnam from the French Union and the transfer
of military authority from French to Vietnamese
hands.
The military demarcation line is described as
"provisional." The implication of the Geneva
settlement appears to be that the line will cease
to exist following the holding of general elections
in July 1956.
4 Aug 54 INDOCHINA REPORT
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/ Luang Prabang
Pursal
o~ G
CAC 61 ~ik
HAN
Sam Neu. erg'
.Si- Reap
7 7Battarn4yng ~x {1, M 4 0 D
KRS RONG'J Kam t
~ ro
7 Feb. 1955
(200 Days)
/Bac Kan
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uen
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ompong Cham
Troop
Withdrawals
South
Vietnam
Approx.
106,000
E - SOUTH-, VJETNAM \ v M
"`"TI AUG 1954
Troop
Withdrawals
N; a-m; g North
m
AMA
a ~~ . I+'fc3hc~',
Than Thiet
10 Oct. 1954
(80 Days)
A Point of Entry
? International Supervisory
Commission Team
-??- International boundary
National capital
,~- Selected railroad
Selected road
h
Inh i,hCEASE-FIRE-NORTH c..Y AM
'&H. CEASE-FIRE - CE1 `7'RA %IETNAM
DEMARCATION LINE
Quang Tri ' .............
.
2nd Installment
30 Oct. 1954
(100 Days)
Qui Nhon
18_May 1955
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ARTICLE 2: Opposing forces will regroup north and
souther truce line within 300 days, counting from
22 July, i.e., 18 May 1955. (No comment)
ARTICLE 3: Navigation rights for both parties on
Ben Ha River-section of truce line. (No comment)
ARTICLE 4: Viet Minh forces will evacuate all
islands south of truce line and French Union forces will
evacuate all forces from all coastal islands north of
the line.
Comment: No specific time limit is given for these
evacuations, although presumably they will have
to take place before 18 May 1955. It is not clear
why the article is worded so that the Viet Minh
will evacuate all islands below the line whereas
the French area evacuate only the coastal is-
lands above the line, unless it is intended that
the French retain islands such as Nightingale,
midway between Hainan and Tonkin. In any case,
the islands near Indochina are not significant
and it is unlikely that major difficulties will
result from the provisions of this article.
ARTICLE 5: Withdrawal of all militarY;; forces, supplies
and equipment from the demilitarized zone will be com-
pleted within 20 days of the present agreement's entry
into force, i.e., by 11 August 1954. (No comment)
ARTICLES 6-9: Ban on movement of persons or
materiel across truce line or into demilitarized zone
except as authorized by Joint Commission. Civil admin-
istration is responsibility of the two commanders in
chief. The Joint Commission and International Com-
mission to have free access to zone. (No comment)
ARTICLE 10: The respective commanders "shall order
and enforce t ~e complete cessation of all hostilities
in Vietnam by all armed forces under their control ....
Comment: On enforcement powers of commanders, see
Articles 22, 28, and 29.
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ARTICLE 11: Cease-fire to take effect in north
Vietnam on 27 July, in central Vietnam on 1 August, in
south Vietnam on 11 August. No large-scale military
action permitted after 27 July.
Comment: The two commands have agreed that
' a arge-scale" will refer to regiment or larger
in north Vietnam and to battalion or larger
in central and south Vietnam. (cf. cease-fire
dates for Laos, 6 August, and Cambodia, 7 August.)
ARTICLE 12: Withdrawal of troops from opposing
side's assembly areas.
Comment: This provision appears to be markedly
a vantageous to the French. One of the greatest
shortcomings of the French military effort in
Tonkin has always been the high success of the
Viet Minh in operating behind French lines. If
the Viet Minh forces now in the French assembly
area (Hanoi-Haiphong area) are moved out, the
French position will be clearly improved.
The Viet Minh assembly areas will not be similarly
affected since there are few if any French troops
in these areas.
ARTICLE 13: Air corridors to be established for
French civil and military transport aircraft between
French assembly area in Tonkin and the Laotian frontier
and southern Vietnam. (No comment)
ARTICLE 14: Political and administrative measures
in the two regrouping zones.
A. The conduct of civil administration
in each of the regrouping zones shall be in the hands
of the "party" which is to be regrouped there (e.g., -the
Viet Minh north of the truce line) between the time when
regrouping has been completed and the holding of general
elections to unify Vietnam.
?Comment: This is the only reference in the cease-
fire to the general elections stipulated
in the joint declaration of the Geneva conference.
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The effect of this article is clear so far as Viet
Minh administration in Tonkin is concerned. A
problem arises as to the "party" in the south. No-
where in any of the Geneva documentation does the
Viet Minh recognize the existence of a civil author-
ity in any part of Vietnam other than the Viet
Minh itself. The effect of the ambiguous term
"party" is therefore to defer such recognition..
B. Civil administration will remain in the hands
of the present authority pending the regroupment. Ade-
quate notice shall be given by the withdrawing party of
its plans to permit assumption of authority by the other
side. The length of such notice shall be determined by
the Trung Gia military commission. Transfer of civil
authority in Hanoi and Haiphong to the Viet Minh shall
coincide with the military withdrawals (80 days and 300
days respectively).
Comment: Same problems as in (A) above. The re-
uc ance"of the Vietnamese civil authorities"to'
abandon any part of Tonkin will incline them to
prolong the transfer of powers.
C. Parties will undertake no reprisals against
political enemies.
Comment: There will certainly be reprisals,
particularly by the Communists.
D. From the date of entry into force of the present
agreement (22 July) until the movement of troops is com-
pleted, any civilians who so desire may transfer from
one zone to the other.
Comment: Physical difficulties as well as Commu-
nist obstruction may well prevent the movement
from the north to the south of all those persons
who wish to make the move.
Aside from the delta, the area around Dong Hoi,
just north of the truce line on the coast, con-
tains many thousands of persons who have already
fled the Viet Minh, and who may find further
flight blocked by the truce line and lack of
shipping.
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Estimates of the number of persons who may chose
to move from the north to the south have run as
high as several millions.
No appreciable movement of persons from the south
to the north is anticipated.
ARTICLE 15: This article lays down the principles
by which the opposing forces and their equipment and
supplies will be disengaged, withdrawn and transferred.
A. The withdrawals and transfers of the military
forces, equipment and supplies of the two parties shall
be completed within 300 days (18 May 1955).
Comment: Presumably this long period was agreed
on in view of the great dispersion of forces of
both sides throughout Indochina and because of
the great quantity of equipment and supplies to
be moved by the French from Tonkin. If the Viet
Minh had been able to attain a much shorter period,
by necessity the French would have had to abandon
large amounts of valuable arms and war materiel in
Tonkin. The 300-day period will permit extensive
preparations to be made by both sides to solidify
subversive and intelligence organizations in the
areas from which they are withdrawing. It is to
be expected that the Viet Minh will use the with-
drawal period to organize agitators and sympa-
thizers, armed and unarmed, for future use in the
south zone.
B. Within both territories successive withdrawals
shall be made by sectors, portions of sectors or prov-
inces. Transfers from one regrouping zone to another
shall be made in successive monthly installments pro-
portionate to the number of troops to be transferred.
Comment: This provision is to establish orderly
and complete withdrawal procedures and to ensure
that the withdrawals will proceed on schedule.
According to this provision about 10,000 Viet
Minh troops should be withdrawn per month from
the south and about 25,000 French and Vietnamese
troops should leave the Tonkin delta.
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M t'KC 1
r-'
C. The two parties shall undertake to carry out
all troop withdrawals and transfers in accordance with
the aims of the present agreement, shall permit no
hostile act and shall take no step whatsoever which
might hamper such withdrawals and transfers. They shall
assist one another as far as this is possible.
Comment: This provision is the key to the success
of the -entire agreement. If complete good faith
by both sides is not shown at the outset of the
withdrawals, the chances for a successful re-
groupment and a final end to the fighting will be
proportionately reduced.
D. Parties shall permit no injury to persons or
property.
E. The Joint Commission and the International
Commission shall ensure that steps are taken to safe-
guard the forces in the course of withdrawal and transfer.
Comment: This is a blanket provision to establish
the broad responsibilities of the two commissions.
Their specific duties are spelled out in subsequent
articles.
F. This paragraph contains broad instructions to
the Trung Gia and Joint Commissions under which the
disengagement, withdrawal and transfer of the opposing
forces ire to take place. These commissions shall "by
common agreement" determine the exact procedures to
be followed.
1. Within 15 days of the effective cease-
fire date the combatants are to disengage, the with-
drawing forces are to concentrate in the provisional
assembly areas, and the opposing forces will temporarily
evacuate these assembly areas. No troops shall be
stationed less than 1,500 meters from the lines delim-
iting the provisional assembly areas.
Comment: Good faith is the key to this provision.
Here, specifically, the Viet Minh has ample
opportunity to disband many of its units in the
south without concentrating them in the provisional
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assembly areas. According to the provision,
forces in north Vietnam will be concentrated
in the assembly areas by 11 August, in cen-
tral Vietnam by 16 August, and in south
Vietnam by 26 August. Advantages accruing
to the Viet Minh by these time differences
could be substantial if it did not begin to
concentrate until the deadlines approach.
In the meantime, the French would have
abandoned much of their defense works in
Tonkin and would be greatly weakened in the
event of renewed hostilities.
2. Withdrawals will be made in accordance
with the following timetable
For French forces from:
(see map, p.
18)
Hanoi perimeter
80
days
(by
10
October
1954)
Hai Duong perimeter
100
days
(by
30
October
1954)
Haiphong perimeter
300
days
(by
18
May
1955)
For Viet Minh forces from:
(see map, p. 11)
Ham Tan sector 80 days
Central Vietnam
(1st installment) 80 days
plaine des Joncs
sector 100 days
Central Vietnam
(2nd installment) 100 days
Pointe Ca Mau sector 200 days
Central Vietnam
(last installment) 300 days
(by 10 October 1954)
(by 10 October 1954)
(by 30 October 1954)
(by 30 October 1954)
(by 7 February 1955)
(by 18 May 1955)
Comment: Besides establishing a schedule, this
section is aimed at ensuring that the withdrawing
forces of neither side will be placed in a posi-
tion of relatively greater hazard than those of
the other at any stage during the withdrawals.
Thus, by the time the French evacuate the Hai
Duong perimeter, Viet Minh forces will remain
only in central Vietnam and Ca Mau, etc.
4 Aug 54
INDOCHINA REPORT
page 17
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ARTICLE 16: The introduction of any troop
reinforcements and additional military personnel into
Vietnam is prohibited after 22 July 1954. The rota-
tion of units and groups of personnel are provided for
under the following conditions:
A. Forces of the French Union north of the line
cannot be rotated, except that 50 officers and men
during each month may be permitted in on temporary
duty or on return from leave.
B. Units rotated elsewhere shall not be larger
than a battalion or its equivalent in air or sea forces.
C. Rotation shall be conducted on a man-for-man
basis, but for not more than 15,000 men in any quarter.
D. Rotation units and personnel shall enter and
leave Vietnam only through specific entry points enum-
erated in Article 20.
E. Each party shall notify the Joint Commission
and the International Commission at least two days in
advance of any arrivals or departures of units or per-
sonnel. Daily reports shall be submitted to both
commissions on such arrivals and departures.
F. The International Commission, through its
teams, shall supervise and inspect the rotation of
units and personnel at the points of entry.
Comment: These provisions are directed primarily
-at preventing the strengthening of French forces.
It is unlikely, although, remotely possible', that
the Viet Minh will rotate units from north of the
line to the south. Aside'from several battalions
of Viet Minh,troops training in China, no Viet
Minh forces are known to be outside Indochina.
A marked difference between the Vietnam agreement
and those for Laos and Cambodia is that it does
not provide for the withdrawal of foreign troops.
The withdrawal of French troops from the southern
part of Vietnam is referred to in Article 10 of
the Final Declaration of the Geneva Conference.
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The Viet Minh will probably contend that the
term "Vietnam" as used in the Final Declaration
refers to the Democratic Republic of Vietnam.
This contention will be strengthened by the
failure of the cease-fire agreement to make any
reference to the Associated State of Vietnam.
The lack of a provision for the withdrawal of
foreign military personnel might be construed
as permitting the Viet Minh to retain any Chinese
advisers now with the Viet Minh.
The ban on the introduction of additional military
personnel appears to preclude any expansion of
the American MAAG mission, which in turn pre-
cludes any large-scale American training program
in Vietnam.
ARTICLE 17: Complements Article 16 in that any
increase in the materiel strength of the opposing forces
after 22 July 1954 is prohibited. Specifically pro-
hibited are "all types of arms, munitions and other
war materiel, such as combat aircraft, naval craft,
pieces of ordnance, jet engines and jet weapons and
armored vehicles." On a piece-for-piece basis, how-
ever, war materiel, arms and munitions expended after
the cessation of hostilities may be replaced except
for those of the French forces north of the line.
Arriving equipment must pass through the points of en-
try and be reported to and checked by the International
Commission.
Comment: A possible weakness in this provision
si that only two points of entry are established
for the China-Tonkin border--Lao Kay and Lang Son?
even through there are provisions for mobile in-
spection teams to have access to Other areas along
the border. The Viet Minh could easily hinder
the movement of mobile teams while the Chinese
continue to ship in war materiel through Cao Bang,
Thanh Thuy, Ban Leng and even Mon Cay. The nature
of the terrain and vegetation in these areas of
Tonkin is such that large supplies could be easily
hidden.
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This provision is more restrictive for the Viet
Minh than for the French, since it precludes
the establishment by the Viet Minh of armored,
naval, and air forces.
ARTICLE 18: Ban on the establishment of new
military bases.
Comment: Friction is likely to arise over the
distinction between the establishment of a new
base and the expansion of an existing base. The
concentration of all French Union forces in
southern Vietnam will obviously require some sort
of expansion of existing bases. The same problem
will be evident when the Viet Minh assumes control
in areas of Tonkin where it has heretofore had
no bases.
The term "base" is ambiguous. For example, it is
uncertain whether it would apply to the establish-
ment of a new training center for the Vietnamese
army.
ARTICLE 19: Ban on the establishment of military
bases under t e control of a foreign state. "The two
parties shall ensure that the zones assigned to them
do not adhere to any military alliance....
Comment: The effect of this provision for the
West is to limit the freedom of action of the
United States to make any arrangement for assuming
control of an existing French Union base.
A problem will arise regarding military alliances
in the event that Vietnam, denying that it is a
"party" to the agreement, seeks such an alliance.
Such an occurence would oblige the French high
command to "ensure" that the Vietnam government
made no such alliance.
The ban on military alliances in the Vietnam cease-
fire is much stricter than comparable provisions
in the Laos and Cambodia agreements.
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The Viet Minh is technically already a violator
of this provision since it adheres to an "alliance"
with the Pathet Lao and Khmer governments.
ARTICLE 20: Fixes the points of entry in the north
as: Lao Kay, Lang Son, Tien Yen, Haiphong, Vinh, Dong
Hoi and Muong Sen; and in the south. Tourane, Qui Nhon,
Nha Trang, Ba Ngoi, Saigon, Cap St. Jacques, and Tan
Chau (see map, p.11 ).
Comment: Both sides could circumvent the restric-
ons placed on increases in their armed strength
by shipping materials through other points. Any
intent not to live up to the agreement would be-
come evident through unwillingness to allow the
mobile teams of the International Commission to
visit other potential entry points.
ARTICLE 21: All prisoners of war and civilian
internees o be "liberated" within 30 days after the
effective cease-fire date in each sector (see Article
11) and surrendered to the appropriate authorities of
the other party, who shall give them all assistance
in proceeding to the zone of their choice.
Comment: The implication is that there shall be
no right on' the part of prisoners to refuse to
be turned over to the other party.
ARTICLE 22: The commanders of the forces of the
two parties shall ensure that persons under their re-
spective commands who violate any of the provisions of
the present agreement are suitably punished.
Comment: This is the only provision in the whole
of the-Geneva documentation for sanctions against
violations. It is, moreover, restricted to persons
under the respective commands. Vietnamese officials
whom the Viet Minh might charge with violations
could presumably argue that they are not "under"
-the French commando
ARTICLE 23: 'Graves-registration personnel of each
party may enter the territory of the other according
to terms to be agreed on between the respective
commanders. (Nb comment)
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SL(1WL1 Now,
ARTICLE 24: Provides for respect by each party
of territory o the other. "Territory" includes waters
and air space. No blockade shall be undertaken. (No
comment)
ARTICLES 25 and 26: Parties guarantee to protect,
assist, and share cos s of joint bodies and International
Commission. (No comment)
ARTICLE 27: "The signatories of the present agree-
ment and eir successors in their functions shall be
responsible for ensuring the observance and enforce-
ment of the terms and provisions thereof." The com-
manders shall ensure full compliance within their re-
spective zones with all the provisions of the present
agreement by "all elements" and military personnel
under their command.
Comment: Trouble may arise when and if the Viet-
namese succeed to the functions of the French
command.
As in the case of Article 22 above, the Vietnamese
might contend that they are not under the French
command.
This article and the two which follow bring out
the distinction between the functions of the two
commands, on the one hand, and the International
Commission, on the other.
ARTICLES 28 and 29: "Responsibility for the exe-
cution of the agreement on the cessation of hostilities
shall-rest with-the parties."
"An International Commission shall ensure the
control and supervision of this execution."
Comment: These articles make clear that enforce-
menroof the agreement is dependent on the good
faith of the parties. The French word "controle"
connotes a supervisory function rather than an
enforcement power..'
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ARTICLES 30-33: Establish a French-Viet Minh
Joint Commission and define its functions.
The Joint Commission is to be set up in Vietnam
and will be composed of an equal number of representa-
tives of the commanders of the two parties. The presi-
dent of each delegation shall be a general. The Joint
Commission shall set up joint teams of an equal number
of officers from each side. The parties shall deter-
mine where the joint teams will operate on the demarca-
tion line.
The function of the Joint Commission is to "ensure
the execution of" the following provisions of the agree-
ment on the cessation of hostilities. (a) a simultaneous
and general cease-fire in Vietnam for all regular and
irregular forces of the two parties, (b) a regroupment
of the armed forces of the two parties, and (c) observ-
ance of the demarcation lines between the zones of re-
groupment and of the demilitarized sectors.
The Joint Commission shall help the parties to
execute the said provisions, shall ensure liaison be-
tween them for the purpose of preparing and carrying
out plans for the application of these provisions, and
shall endeavor to solve such disputed questions as may
arise between the parties in the course of executing
these provisions, (No comment)
ARTICLE 34: Provides for the establishment of the
International Commission to "control and supervise"
the application of the provisions of the agreement and
describe its functions and powers. The commission shall
be composed of representatives of Canada, India and
Poland, with the Indian member presiding. (No comment)
ARTICLE 35: Provides for fixed and mobile inspec-
tion exams and-defines their rights. The fixed teams
are to be located at the entry points specified in
Article 20, The points of location of these teams may
be changed at the request of the Joint Commission, one
of the parties, or the International Commission itself
upon agreement with the command of the party concerned,
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Comment: The ability of one of the parties to
c aTi nge the location of the fixed teams is a
safeguard to ensure that the best possible coverage
of incoming personnel and materiel is attained.
The zones of action of the mobile teams are defined
as "the regions bordering the land and sea frontiers
of Vietnam, the demarcation lines between the regrouping
zones, and the demilitarized zones." Within the limits
of these zones the mobile teams "shall have the right
to move freely and shall receive from the local civil
and military authorities all facilities they may require
for the fulfillment of their tasks,. .they shall have at
their disposal such modern means of transport, observa-
tion and communication as they may require."
Comment: Apparently the phrase "modern means of
transport" was inserted to ensure that mobile
teams would be able to cover remote areas by air-
craft. Because great stretches of the Vietnam-
China border between Lang Son and Lao Kay are
almost inaccessible by motor vehicle, the Inter-
national Commission's mobile teams will have to
use aircraft if they are to operate efficiently.
Unwillingness of the Viet Minh to permit this
type of coverage therefore probably would show
bad faith with respect to the receipt of unauthor-
ized materiel or personnel.
Local civil and military authorities are required
to assist the mobile teams by "provision of personnel,
placing at their disposal documents needed for super-
vision, summoning witnesses necessary for holding in-
quiries, ensuring the security and freedom of movement
of the inspection teams, etc.
Article 35 specifies that if the command of the
party concerned agrees, the mobile teams may carry
Out other movements within the limits of the tasks
given them by the present agreement.
Comment: If the commander of one party did not
agree to allow the mobile teams to inspect the
areas a short distance from the demilitarized
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zone, there would be no method by which the Inter-
national Commission could ascertain whether one side
was preparing to violate the agreement and attack
the other. Similarly, the International Commission
apparently is not empowered to observe whether new
bases are being constructed in areas where the
fixed and mobile teams are not allowed, Presumably
the Viet Minh could construct an air base in central
Tonkin, receive aircraft flown from China, and pro-
hibit the International Commission from inspecting
the area.
ARTICLE 36, The International Commission's respon-
sibilities in the field of control, observation, inspec-
tion and investigation of the application of the cease-
fire provisions are to: (a) control the movement of the
armed forces of the two parties under the regroupment
plan, (b) supervise the demarcation lines between t e
zones of regroupment, and also the demilitarized zones,
(c) control the operations of releasing prisoners of
war and civilian internees, and (d) supervise at ports
and airfields as well as along all frontiers of Vietnam
the execution of the provisions of the agreement on the
cease-fire, regulating the introduction into the country
of armed forces, military personnel and of all kinds of
arms, munitions and war materiel.
Comment: Note that the parties are free to make
movements not under the regroupment plan, and thus
are free to move their forces anywhere they wish
within their own territories. A build-up for an
offensive either across the demarcation line or
against the withdrawing forces in the assembly
areas could be undertaken with the commander
vetoing an inspection by the International Com-
mission. Note also that there is no provision
for the policing of the provisional assembly
areas; the International Commission therefore
will have no means of ensuring that the opposing
forces remain 1,500 meters from the line, that
the remaining forces temporarily evacuate the
assembly areas of the withdrawing forces, or that
neither side is preparing for a resumption of
hostilities in the interior of the assembly areas,
except in the areas near the frontiers of Vietnam
which may be accessible to the mobile inspection
teams.
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ARTICLE 37: Directs the International Commission
to undertake tie necessary investigations both docu-
mentary and on the ground "as soon as possible," on its
own initiative, at the request of the Joint Commission,
or at the request of one of the parties. (No comment)
ARTICLE 38: Directs the inspection teams to submit
to the Intern a ional Commission the results of their
supervision, their investigations and their observations.
They shall also draw up special reports on their own
initiative or when directed by the International Com-
mission. If the members of a team disagree, the con-
clusion of each member shall be submitted to the commission.
ARTICLE 39: Provides that if any inspection team
is unable to settle an incident or considers that there
is a violation or a threat of a serious violation, the
International Commission shall be informed.
Comment: Articles 38 and 39 prevent the conclusions
of two-members of an inspection team from obstruc-
ting a minority report by the other member and
allow the minority member to have his viewpoint
considered by the International Commission.
The International Commission studies the reports
and conclusions of the inspection teams and informs
the parties of the measures which "should be taken"
for the settlement of the incident, ending of the viola-
tion or removal of the threat of violation.
Comment: The phrase "should be taken" points up
the fact that the International Commission can
only recommend.
ARTICLE 40: Provides that when the Joint Commission
cannot agree on the interpretation to be gi ev some
provision or on the appraisal of a fact, the International
Commission shall be informed of the disputed ques ion.
The International Commission shall send its recommenda-
tions directly to the parties and shall notify the Joint
Commission.
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%W %i
ARTICLE 41-43: Recommendations of the International
Commission are by majority vote, except when dealing with
questions concerning amendments and "decisions" concerning
violations, or threats of violation, "which might lead to
a resumption of hostilities"--in which case decisions
must be unanimous.
In the event that one of the parties refuses to put
into effect a recommendation of the International Com-
mission, the parties concerned or the commission itself
shall inform the members of the Geneva conference. If
there is no unanimity regarding an alleged violation,
the commission will submit a majority report and one or
more minority reports to the Geneva conference powers.
Comment: The effect of these provisions is to carry
a dispute between the two parties on the spot to the
same parties at Geneva. There is no neutral en-
forcement agency.
ARTICLE 44: The International Commission shall be
set up at the of the cessation of hostilities in
Indochina.
Comment: The theoretical date for the complete
cessation of hostilities in Indochina is 11
August at the latest. A question arises whether
the International Commission will be set up in
the event firing does not actually cease.
ARTICLE 45: The International Commission in
Vietnam shall ct in close co-operation with the Inter-
national Commission in Laos and Cambodia. A body com-
prising equal numbers of representatives of each of
the powers will be set up to co-ordinate the activities
of the three commissions. (No comment)
ARTICLE 46: The International Commission may
reduce its activities by unanimous decision. (No
comment)
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SKG.KL' 1
ARTICLE 47
Effective date of agreement -- 22 July, 1954
(signed)
For the Commander in Chief For the Commander in Chief
of the Peoples Army of of the French Union Forces
Vietnam in Indochina
Ta Quang Buy}, Vice Minister brigadier General Delteil
of Defense
ANNEX
Provides details on delineation of truce line,
demilitarized zone, and provisional assembly areas
(see map, p. 11 ).
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J'I CK1 I
General Observations
The similarity between many of the articles of
the Vietnam and Laos agreements obviates article-by-
article discussion.
Articles 3, 5, 7, 13, 15, 17-25, and 27-41 will
be omitted.
The major difference between the two agreements
is indicated by the title of the first chapter of the
Laos agreement--The Evacuation of Foreign Armed
Forces. Whereas the Vietnam agreement provides for
the military division of the country between the
French Union and Viet Minh commands, the Laos agree-
ment would banish all French and Viet Minh-Pathet Lao
forces except for small contingents, as noted in
Articles 6, 8, and 14.
Provisions of the Agreement
ARTICLE 1: The commanders of the armed forces
of the parties shall enforce the cease-fire.
Comment: Some question might arise as to the
d e~y of the Communist commander in Laos.
The agreement itself is signed by the Vice
Minister of Defense of the Democratic Republic
of Vietnam. Pathet Lao is not a signatory.
The Viet Minh forces in Laos are described in
the agreement as "Vietnamese people's volun-
teers" and are to be withdrawn. No reference
is made to a Pathet Lao high command.
ARTICLE 2: Cease-fire to take effect on 6
August. (cf. Vietnam cease-fire, 11 August and
.Cambodian cease-fire, 7 August.)
ARTICLE 3: Omitted.
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PHNOM PENH
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INDOCHINA
22 JULY 1954
AGREEMENTS'
ENTRY INTO FORCE
Completion of
Troop Withdrawals
~....... French Base
A Point of Entry
International bound ry
National capital
~- Seleetrd railroad
Selected road
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N"K 1%W
ARTICLE 4: The withdrawals and transfer of
military forces, supplies and equipment will be
effected in accordance with the following principles:
A. The withdrawals and transfers of the military
forces, supplies and equipment of the two parties
shall be completed within a period of 120 days from
the day on which the armistice agreement enters into
force.
Comment: Thus the military regroupment shall be
completed by 20 November 1954, assuming good
faith on both sides and no unexpected incidents.
The two parties undertake to communicate their
transfer plans to each other, for information, within
25 days of the entry into force of the present agree-
ment, i.e. by 16 August.
Comment: Presumably this will be done through
the rung Gia Commission or the Joint Commission;
this is a matter of good faith and might or might
not be lived up to, depending on Viet Minh plans
for retaining troops in Laos.
B. The withdrawals of the Vietnamese peoples
volunteers from Laos to Vietnam shall be effected by
provinces. The position of those volunteers who were
settled in Laos before the hostilities will form the
subject of a special convention.
Comment: The special convention will presumably
be negotiated at a later date. This problem is
virtually insoluble in view of the fact that
many Vietnamese who have been bona fide residents
of Laos over the past several years or decades
have also been strong Viet Minh supporters.
ARTICLE 5: Omitted.
ARTICLE 6: Ban on introduction of military per-
sonnel, but Drench may leave not more than 1,500
officers and noncoms for training of Laotian army.
(No comment.)
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JL (_,W E 1 ,,W
ARTICLE 7: Ban on the establishment of new
military bases. (No comment.)
ARTICLE 8: High command of the French forces
shall maintain in Laos personnel not to exceed 3,500
for the maintenance of two French military establish-
ments, one at Seno and the other in the Mekong valley,
either in the Vientiane area or downstream from
Vientiane. (No comment.)
ARTICLE 9: Ban on introduction of arms, "with
the exception of a specified quantity of armaments in
categories specified as necessary for the defense of
Laos."
Comment: There is a conspicuous omission in the
failure of the agreement to determine how these
specifications will be made.
ARTICLE 10: This article establishes Luang
Prabang, Xieng Khouang, Vientiane, Seno, Pakse, Savan-
nakhet and Tchepone as the only points of entry for
the armaments specified as legal under Article 9 (see
map, p.31 ). Note that no point of entry is specified
in the two provinces of Phong Saly and Sam Neua, which
the Pathet Lao forces will occupy. Fixed inspection
teams of the International Commission will be stationed
at Phong Saly in Phong Saly Province and at Sop Hoa in
Sam Neua Province, with the aim of protecting against
the shipment of war materiel to the Communist side.
(No comment.)
ARTICLE 11: This article provides that the armed
forces of both sides be disengaged, concentrated and
moved to their provisional assembly areas within a
period not exceeding 15 days after the cease-fire,
i.e., 21 August 1954. (No comment.)
ARTICLE 12: The joint commission shall fix the
site and areas: (a) of the five provisional assembly
areas for the reception of the Viet Minh forces, (b)
of the five provisional assembly areas for the recep-
tion of French forces in Laos, (c) of the 12 provis-
ional assembly areas, one to each province, for the
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reception of the fighting units of "Pathet Lao." The
forces of the Laotian National Army shall remain in
their present positions during the entire duration of
the operations of separation and transfer of foreign
forces and fighting units of "Pathet Lao."
Comment: Note that in the Vietnam agreement the
provisional sional assembly areas were carefully
described whereas in this case the Joint Com-
mission will define these areas. Conceivably
the opposing sides will not reach agreement on
this point within the time limit described in
Article 11, particularly if there is any inten-
tion not to live up to the spirit of the cease-
fire agreement.
The fixing of an assembly area in each of the
12 Laotian provinces for the "Pathet Lao"
forces is a great exaggeration of their
strength and effectiveness. It is estimated
that the "Pathet Lao" army totals only some
2,500 troops, most of which are located near
the border with Tonkin and all of which are
poorly armed. The creation of assembly areas
in each of the provinces may actually result in
their expanding into areas in which they have
not effectively operated. The Communists may
therefore use this provision to utilize the
three months between assembly and withdrawal
for propagandizing and pressuring the popula-
tions in each assembly area.
Conceivably Viet Minh troops could be used to
bolster the size of the "Pathet Lao" forces to
improve the Communist chances of influencing
the populations of the assembly areas. Note
that the International Commission has no direct
supervision over the assembly areas. As in the
case of Vietnam, the mobile teams are authorized
to operate only in the "regions bordering the
land frontiers of Laos."
The Laotian government's concept of its relation-
ship with the"Pathet Lao government'is stated
more fully in the Laotian declaration at the
Geneva conference.
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ShUR 1
ARTICLE 13: Omitted.
ARTICLE 14: Provides that within 120 days of
entry into force of the agreement (19 November 1954)
the fighting units of "Pathet Lao" will move from the
provi:sionar assembly areas' into the provinces of Phong
Saly and Sam Neua, "except for any military personnel
who wish to be demobilized where they are." The
"Pathet Lao" units will remain there "pending a
political settlement" and will be free to move
between the provinces of Phong Saly and Sam Neua
in a corridor along the Tonkin frontier.
Comment: This article gives the Communists
very great advantages. No demobilization of
"Pathet Lao" forces in Phong Saly and Sam Neua
is specified. Because of the remoteness of the
areas, the lack of Laotian government control
over them at this time, and because of the pro-
visions in the cease-fire agreements preventing
Laotian or French forces from moving to estab-
lish control over these provinces and the cor-
ridor connecting them, the "Pathet Lao" forces,
possibly aided by the Viet Minh, undoubtedly
will take over de facto control of Phong Saly
Province, Sam Neua Province, and the corridor
connecting them. Thus, "Pathet Lao" forces
will have access to China and will seal off
the Laotian-Tonkin border to access by the
Laotian government. With this firm base to
build on, the "Pathet Lao" could.,,greatly
increase its influence in Laos.
The declaration of the Laos government at
Geneva affirmed that government's right to
administer the two provinces. The conference
"took note" of this declaration.
ARTICLE 15: Omitted.
ARTICLE 16: Liberation and "repatriation" of
prisoners of war and civilian internees.
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Comment: The provisions are similar to those of
the V etnam cease-fire. Probably not more than
a few thousand persons will be affected.
However, "liberation" applies to "all prisoners
of war and civilian internees of Laotian and
other nationalities," whereas "repatriation"
applies only to "foreign prisoners of war," who
shall be surrendered to the "appropriate
authorities of the other party."
Thus, prisoners and civilian internees of the
Laotian and Pathet Lao armies will merely be
liberated, whereas French and Viet Minh
prisoners will be forcibly "repatriated."
ARTICLES 17-25: Omitted.
ARTICLE 26: Deals with the rights and defines
the areas of operation of the fixed and mobile
inspection teams of the international commission.
The fixed teams shall be located at Pakse, Seno,
Tchepone, Vientiane, Xieng Khouang, Phong Saly and
Sop Hoa (see map, p. 31) .
Comment: Note that all but two of these points
are in territory occupied by the Laotian govern-
ment or the French. The other two, Phong Saly
and Sop Hoa, are in territory occupied by the
"Pathet Lao."
The zones of action of the mobile teams are
described as in the "regions bordering the land
frontiers of Laos." The rights of these teams
to gather information are identical with those
described for the mobile teams in Vietnam.
As in the agreement on Vietnam, the Inter-
national Commission for Laos cannot determine,
without the consent of the commander concerned,
what is happening in areas not at points of
entry or in the frontier regions.
ARTICLES 27-41: Omitted.
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General Observations
The Cambodian truce agreement differs from that
of Vietnam principally in that it does not exclude
the entry of arms and military personnel nor the
conclusion by Cambodia of military alliances with
foreign countries. It also differs from the Vietnam
agreement in providing for the withdrawal of all
foreign military personnel. In this connection, it
contains no exceptions of the sort incorporated into
the Laos agreement.
Articles 3, 9-11, and 13-33 are identical with
articles in the Laos and Vietnam agreements, and are
omitted in the following analysis.
Provisions of the Agreement
ARTICLE 1: The commanders of the armed forces
of the two parties shall enforce the cease-fire.
Comment: As in the case of Laos, there is some
uncertainty as to the identity of the commander
on the Communist side. The agreement is signed
on behalf of the commander in chief of the "Khmer
Resistance Forces" and the "Vietnamese military
units" (i.e., Viet Minh) by the Viet Minh vice
minister of defense.
The commander in the case of the Cambodians is
the commander in chief of the Cambodian Royal-
Army rather than the commander of French Union
forces.
ARTICLE 2: Cease-fire to take effect on 7
August. (cf. 6 August in the case of Laos, and 11
August in the case of Vietnam.)
ARTICLE 3: Omitted.
4 Aug 54 INDOCHINA REPORT. Page 37
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SECRET
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INDOCHINA
Tri
22 JULY 1954 an
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Mu ng KhoKeen M kd h ~J ? - e -
Sa nnakhet Mvong Phil/k
AGREEMENTS' HUE
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ENTRY INTO FORCE TOURANE
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present V M locations SreP ok o Song Ca.
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POINTE OE CA MAV
no entry restrictions in Cambodia 105 110
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ARTICLE 4: Withdrawal of foreign armed forces
and foreign military personnel.
A. Withdrawal applies to armed forces and mili-
tary combatant personnel of the French Union.
Comment: The Cambodian government elsewhere
see Cambodian Declaration, p.43 ) reserves the
right to maintain foreign military personnel
necessary to its defense. Strict application
of the above article would therefore involve
retention of French military personnel, if any,
in some status other than as French Union mili-
tary personnel.
B. and C. Withdrawal applies to Viet Minh
forces proper and to "all the foreign elements (or
Cambodians, not natives of Cambodia) in the military
formations of any kind or holding supervisory func-?
tions in all political or military, administrative,
economic, or social bodies, having worked in liaison
with the Vietnam military units." Withdrawal to be
completed within 90 days after date of entry into
force of agreement, i.e., by 21 October.
Comment: "Vietnam" in this context refers to
Viet Dinh units. The phrase "Cambodians, not
native of Cambodia" refers to the presence
within Viet Minh ranks of Cambodians recruited
from among the large Cambodian population of
Cochinchina.
ARTICLES 5 and 6:
Khmer resistance forces
will
be demobilized on t e
spot within
30
days. The
status
of these persons will
be decided
in
the light of
the
Cambodian declaration at the Geneva conference that
it intended to integrate all citizens, without dis-
crimination, into the national community, all having
the right to participate as electors or candidates in
the general elections provided for by the Cambodian
constitution.
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JCCK1 1 4W
Comment: The Cambodia settlement goes further
than the Laos settlement in affirming the
jurisdiction of the government over all citizens
and throughout the entire country.
ARTICLE 7: Qualified limitation on Cambodian
right o enter military alliances and to solicit
foreign aid. (This article is a quotation from the
Cambodian Geneva conference declaration, q.v. p.43
ARTICLE 8: Liberation and repatriation of
civilian internees and prisoners of war.
Comment: The wording is the same as in the Laos
agreement, except that the 30-day time limit
specified in the Laos agreement for liberation
of prisoners does not appear in the Cambodian
agreement, the implication being that prisoners
in Cambodia will be liberated at once.
Like the Laos agreement, the Cambodian agreement
differs from that of Vietnam in limiting forcible
repatriation to "foreign" prisoners.
ARTICLES 9-11: Omitted.
ARTICLE 12: This article deals with the rights
and zones of action of the fixed and mobile inspection
teams of the International Commission. In these
respects it is similar to the comparable articles
covering Vietnam and Laos, with several exceptions:
Fixed teams are to'be located at Phnom Penh,
Kompong Cham, Kratie, Svay Rieng, and Kampot, The
zones of action of the mobile teams shall be the
regions bordering on the land and sea frontiers of
Cambodia. Outside these zones of action the mobile
teams may, with the agreement of the Cambodian com-
mander, move about as required by the tasks assigned
to them under the present agreement.
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Comment: Because the Cambodian agreement
prohibits any zone of Communist control, the
inspection teams cannot be hampered by the
refusal of a Communist commander to let them
report on an area removed from the land and sea
frontiers of Cambodia and the ports of entry.
ARTICLES 13-33: Omitted.
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SLC't(L 1
Summary of the Declaration: The Royal Government
of Laos resolves to take the necessary measures to
integrate all citizens without discrimination into the
national community in accordance with the constitution
of the Kingdom. It affirms that all Laotian citizens
may freely participate as electors or candidates in
general elections by secret ballot.
The Laos government will provide, during the inter-
val between the cessation of hostilities and the
general elections, for a "special representation" in
the royal administration of the provinces of Phong
Saly and Sam Neua on behalf of "Laotian nationals who
did not support the royal forces during hostilities."
Laos will never pursue or permit its territory
to be used in furtherance of aggressive policies.
It will not join in any military alliance not in
conformity with the UN Charter or the cease-fire
agreement, nor, unless its security is threatened,
will it permit the establishment of foreign bases
in Laos.
During the period between the cessation of hos-
tilities in Vietnam and the final settlement of the
political problems in Vietnam, Laos will not request
foreign aid, in personnel or materiel, except for the
purpose of its effective territorial defense and to
the extent defined by the cease-fire agreement.
Comment: The royal government makes clear that
it regards itself as the de jure authority
throughout Laos, notwithstanding the assignment
of regrouping zones to the Pathet Lao forces.
The restrictions on foreign participation in
Laos' defense are so qualified as to give this
government a basis for requesting foreign aid
whenever it felt its security to be threatened,
although the Communists would be expected to
contest such action.
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DECLARATION BY THE ROYAL GOVERNMENT OF CAMBODIA
The Cambodian declaration is identical with the
Laotian declaration, except that no "special repre-
sentation" is envisaged for Cambodian dissidents
allied with the Viet Minh, and that it omits the
phrase "...and to the extent defined by the cease-
fire agreement" in connection with foreign military
aid.
Comment: These differences reflect the stronger
position of Cambodia, as compared with Laos, vis-
a-vis the Viet Minh. There are no regrouping
areas for dissidents in Cambodia, nor is there
any provision in the cease-fire agreement relat-
ing to French military bases.
DECLARATION OF THE FRENCH GOVERNMENT
This declaration consists of two paragraphs which
correspond with Paragraphs 10 and 11 (p.8 ) of the
Final Declaration of the Conference.
DECLARATION BY THE AMERICAN DELEGATION
Summary of the Declaration: The American dele-
gate stated that the United Stakes, not being prepared
to join in a declaration by the conference such as was
submitted, would make the following unilateral declara-
tion of its position:
The United States takes note of the three cease-
fire agreements and of paragraphs 1-12 inclusive of
the Final Declaration of the Conference. With regard
to these, it declares that (1) it will refrain from
the threat of force or the use of force to disturb
them, in conformity with Article 4 of the UN Charter,
and (2) it would view any renewal of aggression in
violation of. these agreements with grave concern and
as seriously threatening international peace and
security.
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4fl
With regard to elections in Vietnam, the
consistent position of the United States government
is, in the case of nations divided against their
will, to continue to seek to achieve unity through
free elections, supervised by the United Nations, to
ensure that they are conducted fairly.
With respect to the statement made by Vietnam,*
the United States reiterates its traditional position
that peoples are entitled to determine their own
future and that it will not join in an arrangement
which would hinder this.
Comment: In declining to "take note" of the
13th paragraph of the Final Declaration, the
American delegation avoided committing the
United States to consult with the other Geneva
powers on matters which might be referred to
them by the International Commission,
In advocating elections supervised by the
United Nations, the American delegate avoided
endorsing the procedure established by the
conference; that is, supervision of elections
by an international commission composed of
representatives of India, Poland, and Canada.
* The Vietnamese delegation at Geneva sent a note to
the United States delegation on 20 July that, in
general, dissented from the agreements. The text of
the note was also released to the press and con-
cluded: "The State of Vietnam cannot accept to see
taken from it not only a vital part of its territory
and of its population but, beyond that, the right of
a sovereign and independent state to organize its
defense in the manner it believes to be most in
conformity with its national interests."
* * *
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