SOVIET ORBIT DEVELOPMENTS JANUARY - NOVEMBER 1954

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP91T01172R000300230001-4
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 51
• Document Creation Date: December 21, 2016
• Sequence Number: 1
• Content Type: STUDY

23 December 1954
Copy No , 25X1
State Dept. review
completed
SOVIET ORBIT DEVELOPMENTS
JANUARY -NOVEMBER 1954
~~a~nnrf ~~? --------------
,M? ~iaM~ In Olga.
DNIAaiA~1
~Clasa. ~.C~anCer Tic TS S C
Aatlr:r HR 7Q-2
e~t~r ~~ ~~ Sy;
Office of Current me ige
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
roP sECR.~T
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This study is a working paper prepared by the
Soviet Staff, OCI, FOR INTERNAL DISSEMINATION ONLY.
It represents an effort to identify and assess the
character of the major trends in recent Soviet Orbit
affairs, It is designed solely to assist Soviet Staff
analysts in developing,.a common appreciation of the
background against which to view current intelligence
in the Soviet field.
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SOVIET OREIT DEVELOPMENTS (January-November 154)
Page
Introduction ................................. ii
Review of Soviet Foreign Policy .............. 2
Sino-Soviet Relations ........................ 13
Political and Social Developments
within the Soviet Union ...................... 1$
The Soviet Economy ........................... 24
Soviet Military Developments ................. 30
Eastern Europe ............................... 35
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The following analysis of the USSR's mayor foreign,
internal and ?rbit policies during the past year, together
with recent expressions of the prevailing. mood of the top
Soviet leadership, suggests a general orientation of Soviet
thinking and action around the recognition that general
war fought with nuclear weapons would involve unacceptable
military and political risks fir the Soviet Union, that
Stalinist pressures had driven the non-Communist world to
unite and rearm, and that Stalin's policies had resulted in
Serious weaknesses in certain sectors of the Soviet economy
which are vital for the further over-all development of
Soviet power. Soviet policy planning in all mayor fields
appears to rest on these fundamental strategic premises.
Malenkgv referred last March to .the possibility of the
"destruction of world civiliazation" in a general war, not
dust the collapse of capitalism, and the prominent Soviet
economist Varga recently declared that "peaceful competition"
between Communism and capitalism must not be allowed to
develop into World War III, which would threaten the
destruction of the human race. At the Moscow reception
commemorating the October revolut~.on, Malenkov stressed to
Ambassador Bohlen the USSR's "serious and sincere" des~lre
for "peace and normal-and good relations with all countries."
While such declarations probably contain a goodly amount
of hyperbole, they nonetheless afford.a.n insight into the
general mood and cast of thought of the Kremlin leaders.
The outward manifestation of this basic trend in
strategic thinking is evident in Soviet foreign policy,
which reflects-the abandonment of outright military
pressures and heavy-handed methods of expanding the areas
of Soviet influence and control in favor of a return to
the more traditional methods of diplomatic maneuver among
nations and political infiltration through local Communist
organizations within non-Communist countries. The_Soviet
leaders are trying to ensure that there will be what they
call a "prolonged period of peaceful coexistence" with the
Western world during which the danger of general war would
not be great and Western apprehensions regarding Soviet
expansionist inclinations could be allayed.
In terms of policy planning, Soviet leaders seem to be
preoccupied with long-range consolidation and strengthening
of the Communist bloc within its present frontiers rather
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than the extension of this empire by military action or
outright attempts by foreign Communist parties to seize
governmental power. This Soviet outlook appears to apply
to both the Eastern European and Far Eastern areas of
Communist control. As long as the present Soviet strategy
continues, the USSR can be expected to use its influence
and bargaining power in order to .deter other Communist
states, particularly China, from initiating any action
that-could not be localized or .that appeared clearly
to involve substantial risk of general war. In the Soviet
View, cumulative Communist power will eventually turn the
balance of world power against the West and open up new
opportunities for outward thrusts from present frontiers.
The top leadership seems to be going through a period
of relative stability, even though there are occasional
signs of differences of view over execution of policies.
The principle of collective leadership has been strictly
enforced throughout the party hierarchy, and the Kremlin
is making a major effort to strengthen and invigorate
the Soviet political system by moving to limit "bureau-
cratic" leada~rship and encourage honest, efficient, and
imaginative direction on all levels. While the new leaders
have displayed a more flexible app~?oach to problems of
domestic and foreign policy than did Stalin, Marxist-
Leninist ideology still has an important and is some
cases determining influence on th?ir actions and thoughts.
Current domestic economic policy has deeply committed
the Soviet regime to expanding production by introducing
new incentives measures to raise labor productivity. The
-1954 budget revealed a leveling-off of military expenditures
and a renewed emphasis on long-range economic developement
and investment, combined with vigorous measures to carry
out the program for increased agricultural and consumers'
goods production. The new emphasis on boosting agricultural
output and light industrial production and the leveling-
off of military expenditures are economic policies that
probably would not have been adopted if the Soviet planners
anticipated an imminent increase in international tensions.
Moscow's military planning is similarly oriented
toward the long haul. The budget allocation this year for
maintenance and equipment of the armed forces, although
about ten billion rubles below the amount allocated in 1953,
appears adequate to maintain the military establishment at
its present strength. Moreover, since it is likely that
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the 1953 defense allocations were underspent and even fell
slightly below the 1952 level, the smaller budget allowance
for 1954 probably does not represent a sign ifica.nt~reduction
from actual 1953 outlays.
The emphasis in military planning is on the steady
strengthening of military capabilities, in particular the
improvement of weapons, rather than on the mobilization of
forces. In general, military policy in the last year has been
characterized by a stabilization of announced expenditures,
personnel strengths and disposition of forces. The scope
of the current naval construction programs, however, indicates
an intensive strengthening effort.
The past year has witnessed changes in Soviet-Satellite
control relationships which likewise point to long-term
stabilization and consolidation. Satellite leaders apparently
are committed to continuing their "new course" policies aimed
at increased consumer benefits until 1960, and Moscow has
been moving toward greater relaxatio~a of_direct control and
toward granting the captive states at least the appearances of
greater autonomy. The Soviet leaders would hardly have
adopted this course if they were contemplating any need
to execute a drastic tightening of the means of control
to support expansionist plans or to resist a Western challenge.
It has been the task of Soviet diplomacy during the
past year to bring about the atmosphere and conditions in
international relations essential for the execution of
these long-range internal and Orbit programs.
The foremost objective of Soviet foreign policy during
this period was to prevent the incorporation of a rearmed
West Germany in the Atlantic alliance. Soviet diplomacy
during the first eight months of the year was therefore
chiefly preoccupied with the effort to defeat the EDC.
At the same time Moscow undertook parallel measures to
improve its relations with those countries immediately
adjacent to the Orbit and to reduce the dangers of Soviet
involvement in a general war-by easing world tensions.
These measures were accelerated of ter the London and Paris
agreements, which represented a major setb~.ck for Soviet
diplomacy. The Soviet leaders have now turned their
attention to preparing their position to meet the situation
of ter the agreements take effect. This was the background
of the Orbit security conference in Moscow at the end of
November called to lay the groundwork for an eastern security
system to counterbalance the augmented power of NATO.
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A REVIEW OF SOVIET FOREIGN POLICY--JANUARY-NOVEMBER 1954
The opening of the Berlin-conference on 25 January 1954
marked the end of the. preparatory stage and the beginning of
the action stage of the Malenkov regime's drive to shatter '
the Western coalition. The pattern of Soviet foreign policy,
particularly as it was revealed by Molotov's actions at-the
Berlin and Geneva conferences and in Soviet moves to block
ratification of the London-Paris accords, indicates a belief
on the part of the Soviet leaders that the crucial decisions
in .the present phase of the East-West struggle will be made in
Europe and that Germany remains the center of the conflict.
The corollary of this emphasis on European problems in the
period under review was the subordination of Soviet-Communist
.interests and objectives on the most active Asian front--
Indochina--to the demands of European policy. These demands
governed Molotov's tactics at the Berlin conference and re-
sulted in Communist willingness at the Geneva conference to
sacrifice immediate military gains in Indochina to-bring about
a cessation of hostilities.?
Objectives and tactics
The immediate objective of Soviet foreign policy during
the period was to prevent the strengthening of the Western al-
liance by the integration of a rearmed West Germany; the
longer-range objective was to isolate the United States from
its major allies and, in this way, to disrupt the whole struc-
ture of Western defense. In pursuit of these objectives, the
Soviet leaders concentrated their campaign on what they ap-
parently regarded as the most vulnerable points in the West's
position: (1) the overwhelming desire in France for an end
to the Indochina war; (2) Western European, particularly French,
fears of a rearmed Germany; (3) the f-act that the West's de-
fense structure and German policy were predicated on the in-
definite continuation of the division of Germany; and (4) wide-
spread fears, particularly in Western Europe, of a general war
fought with nuclear weapons.
One of the Communists' primary propaganda methods for
capitaliza.ng on tY~ese vulnerabilities was to emphasize "peace -
ful coexistence." Moscow encouraged non-Communist nations to
believe twat continued strengthening of alliances around the
Soviet Orbit was not necessary, that courses of action at
variance with American policies would enhance national interests,
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that small powers adjacent to the Soviet Orbit would be per-
mitted to maintain their independence, and that Satellite
states were being allowed to emerge from under Moscow's
domination. Soviet strategy also ,suggested the actual mean-
ixng of "'peaceful coexistence" for the USSR, that is, the
avoidance of a general war and of .irretrievable involvement in
explosive local situations, .accompanied by a refusal to re-
treat from the present frontiers of the Soviet Orbit... Malenkov
and other top leaders spoke increasingly frankly during this
period of the threat to world civilization of a war fought
with nuclear weapons.
Exploitation of French weaknesses
Moscow obviously proceeded on the assumption that France
was the weakest link in the Atlantic alliance and the most vul-
nerable on the question of German rearmament. The USSR, there-
fore, launched an offensive to induce France to break with
American policy on German rearmament and integration, and
eventually to detach France from the Atlantic alliance.
The USSR's policy aimed to make France serve a~ the main
instrument of Soviet attempts to erect an insurmountable barrier
to West German rearmament and integration, The Soviet leaders
were compelled to follow this Bourse of action because they
were both unwilling and unable to grant the concessions that
would be necessary to block German rearmament and integration
by serious negotiations with the three Western powers,
Molotov displayed no intention of seriously negotiating
settlements for either Germany or Austria at Berlin, His
principal tactic was to evade concrete discussion of the de-
tails of a German settlement by using the conference as a
forum for addressi~ag appeals and sounding warnings to the
French ~.nd West German people, His plan of attack focuses
on the two most vulnerable points in the West's position at
Berlin; France's fear of a rearmed Germany and its over-
whelming desire for an end to the Indochina war. He made sub-
stantial concessions to reach an agreement to convene the
Geneva conference, apparently on the assumption that the very
fact of the agreement to discuss Indochina would deter the
French from ratifying EDC in the interval.
Molotov's Berlin proposal for a European collective se-
curity system was intended to provide French and other op-
ponents of German rearmament with an alternative to EDC. This
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I
proposal tacitly wrote off any settlement of the German prob-
lem for an indefinite period, thus confirming the division of
Germany.
After the Berlin conference, the leaders of the Soviet bloc
pressed the course ,of events toward an early showdown on Indo-
china and EDC. As the Geneva conference approached, the Com-
munists intensified their pressure on Paris by increasing prop-
aganda to stir up anti-French feeling in North Africa, by
launching,on 15 March, the first phase of the Viet Minh`s
final. assault on the fortress of lien Bien Phu, and by sending
Viet Minh forces into Cambodia for the first time on 1 April. .
This growing pressure appears to have been aimed at bringing
about the replacement of the Laniel government by a regime
willing to end the war at almost any price, and, even more im-
portant, to introduce a major rearientation in French policy
in Europe. The fall of the Laniel government on 12 June marked
the climax and success of this drive,
This objective governed the tactics of the Communist dele-
gations at Geneva during the first month of talks on Indochina.
They attempted to discredit Bidault`s conduct of the negotia-
tions and to turn the French public against the government`s
Indochina policy. They adopted an unyielding attitude and made
no essential change in their basic position on Indochina, which
was deliberately made unacceptable to Bidault. Meanwhile, the
Viet Minh forces pressed their final assault on Dien Bien Phu.
and the outpost fell on 7 May, Molotov appeared confident that
the fall of the fortress, together with the growing Viet Minh
strength in the Tonkin delta and the continued intransigence
of the Communist negotiators at Geneva, would eventually gener-
ate enough pressure to sweep Laniel and Bidault from power.
The climax of the Communists" pressure tactics was care-
fully timed to coincide with the crucial debate on Laniel`s
Indochina policy in the French assembly in early June. The
government`s only chance for survival rested on Bidault`s
bringing b~.ck from Geneva some prospect for an Indochina cease-
fire,- Molotov timed his 8 June speech to shatter this hope,
The terms he proposed were virtually the same as the maximum
terms first advanced in early May. ThP effectiveness of this
maneuver was indicated when Bidault dryly remarked during the
assembly debate on 10 June that '"Molotov was an extra interpellator
in this debate." Gn 12 June, although the vote against Laniel
fell short of an absolute majority, the premier was forced to
submit his resignation.
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This was followed by an abrupt shift in Communist tactics
at Geneva. When it became apparent that Mendes-France was
ready to make his bid for investiture, the Communists intro-
duced concessions intended to strengthen his bid. On the
following day, 17 June, the assembly confirmed Mendes-France
as premier, with the Communist deputies casting their first
vote in support of a French government since 1947.
The Soviet reaction underscored the great significance
Moscow attached to these events and its hope that the emergence
of Mendes-France would lead to a radical shift in France's
European policy. The Soviet leaders appeared to see in the
fall of the right-center government of Laniel and Bidault a
turning point in postwar European politics which would open to
Soviet diplomacy a growing field for maneuver.
With Mendes-France's 20 July deadline putting the issue
squarely up to the Communist delegates at Geneva, Molotov and
his allies agreed in last-mixaute negotiations to a number of
concessions which made possible the conclusion on 21 July of
three Indochina cease-fire agreements as well as a declaration
of political principles,
Post-Geneva efforts against EDC
Following the conferenc?, Commun~.st propaganda used the
Geneva aMcords to show the feasibility of negotiations and co-
e~istence with the Soviet bloc, With an eye to the forthcoming
French assembly debate Qn EDC, Moscow sent notes on 24 July
to the Big Three in which it proposed calling within the "next
few months" a European conference to consider Molotov's offer
of a European security pact. These notes were followed by a
call on 4 August far four-power talks on Germany.
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Following the French assembly's rejection of the EDC treaty
on 30 August,the Soviet Foreign Ministry on 9 September issued
a statement which hailed this as a "profoundly patriotic act,"
reiterated the USSR's desire for a "strong and independent
France," and argued that France would be reduced to the role of
a second-rate power if Germany were allowed to rearm, This
statement made it clear that the Soviet government would con-
tinue to rely, at least for the present, on France as the grin-
cipal means of blocking West German rearmament. Moscow, however,
tempered its satisfaction over the demise of EDC with a warning
that the task of preventing West German remilitarization was
far from completed.
The Soviet leaders may well have expected that the defeat
of EDC would be followed by months of confusion and recrimination
within the Western world. They appeared to believe that they
could rely on public pressure in Western Europe to force changes
in official policies regardixig Germany and could stimulate this
pressure simply by continuing verbal support of a four-power con-
ference on Germany, a European collective security system, and
settlement of the armaments problem.
The London-Paris accords
The Soviet government was apparently surprised by the prompt
and far-reaching agreements achieved at the nine-power London
conference (28 September to 3 October). The USSR probably hoped
that Vyshinsky's carefully timed disarmament proposals in the
United Nations on 30 September would disrupt the conference.
That these proposals were addressed primarily to France was
evident in Molotov's action in giving an advance copy of the
plan to the French ambassador the day before Vyshinsky's speech.
The Soviet foreign minister's accompanying remark that "account
must be taken of the German problem" was an obvious hint that
disarmament talks would provide a convenient pretext for post-
poning final agreement to rearm Germany.
The Soviet leaders reacted promptly and dramatically
to the London agreements. Two days after the end of the
nonference, Molotov flew to Berlin to deliver a speech at
the celebration of the fifth anniversary of the founding
of the German Democratic republic. He followed this with a
weeklong tour cif East Germany. These unprecedented gestures
emphatically reaffirmed Moscow's continuing support of the
East German regime in the face of Western decisions to rearm
S~'est Germany and bring it into NATO. Molotov's speech
warned the West Germans that they faced a fateful choice.
"If West Germany is incorporated in aggressive military
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alignments,'" he declared, '"the German nation will remain
partitioned for a long time to come,"'
In this speech, Molotov also tried to give the impression
of greater flexibility on German questions by stating that
.the USSR was ready to discuss "both the problems brought up
earlier by the participants at the Berlin conference as-well "
as any new proposals which may be made on the problem of free,
all-German elections."
The relative caution of Molotov's attacks on the London
agreements probably reflected a recognition that the .chances
of sabotaging them were considerably less than in the case of
EDC. Moscow failed to advance any new substantive proposals
in the crucial period between the London and Paris conferences
which might have upset the London decisions and forestalled
final agreement at Paris on 23 October. This display of
Soviet inaction furthermore was impressive evidence of the
immobility and sterility of Soviet policy toward Germany.
On 23 October, a few hours of ter the protocols had been
signed in Paris, Moscow made a belated and ill-timed effort
to counter the Paris conference by sending a note to the
Western powers proposing a four-power conference in November.
The main purpose of this note appears to have been to attempt
once more to create the impression that the Soviet attitude
on German questions would be different from what it was at
the Berlin conference if the London -Paris agreements were
not put into effect.
The Orbit security conference
Moscow reacted to the Paris accords by addressing a
proposal on 13 November to all the European countries with
which it has diplomatic relations and to the United States
and China calling for a conference on European collective se-
curity to be held in Paris or Moscow on 29 November.
Following the West's prompt rejection of this proposal,
Molotov offered in a Pravda "interview"' on 20 November to
postpone the European s=ec city conference if the West would
delay ratification of the Paris agreements, This move was
apparently intended to provide additional justification for
convoking-the Orbit security conference in Moscow.
The USSR's underlying purpose in convening the Orbit
security conference in Moscow on 29 November was to prepare
to-meet the situation following ratification. In opening
the conference, Molotov warned that if the Western powers
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ratify and implement the Faris agreements, the Soviet bloc
will be ?icompelled to take effective measures for self -defense,
for the prevention of attack?? ~,nd suggested that the partici-
pating states ??carry out ~oimt measures in organizing the
armed forces and their command.?9 The second principal theme
of this meeting was reflected in Molotov's statement that
the conference ??would be a,n important stage in establishing
a system of collective security.?? Premier Grotewohl of East
Germany warned that if a West German army were formed, East
Germany would be obliged to ?1create national armed forces,?'
lout this statement was not included in the final declaration.
The deela~ration issued on 2 December was cast in vague and
general terms, apparently in order to permit the Soviet govern-
ment relative freedom of action.
The failure of the Moscow conference to produce any new
proposals on Germany, Austr~.a, or European security which
might have created difficulties in the ratification process
in Paris e,nd Bonn strengthens the conclusion that the
conference was staged primarily to dramatize the Soviet thesis
that the West will bear the entire responsibility fox the
consequences of rearming West Germ~.ny and to lay the ground -
work for the creation of ~.n Eastern security system, inm
eluding an East German ~,ra~y, to counterbalance the build-up
of Wes t German mi li t~,t~y power ,
Policy toward Germany
Following the Bea?lian conference, Moscow moved quickly
to enhance the prestige and ostensible freedom of the East.
German government in order to promote it as a partner in a11-
German and international ~aegotia.tions and to generate West
German frustration w~,th Adenauer's delay in gaining full
sovereignty.of the Federal Republic. At the same time, the
Soviet leade~?s, by repe~.tedly insisting that the in?
tegr~,tion of West Germany in 'the Western alliance will seal
t&~e permanent division of Ge~?many, have tried to encourage
the emergence of ~. government in Bonn favorably disposed
to comoperate with the USSR.
Policy t?ward Britain and Europe
Soviet policy toward Britain continued to rest an the
assumption that there ~.re irreconcile.ble conflicts of interest
between the tTnited States ~,n~ Britain which eventually will
le~.d to a serious cleavage. During the first part of the
Geneve, conference, Molotov adopted an attitude considerably
more cordial toward the united Kingdom than toward France
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or the United States. Soviet propaganda stressed the
reasonable attitude of the United Kingdom in contrast to
that of the United States and of France under Laniel and,
at the end of May, praised the efforts of British diplomacy.
More recently, Soviet moves toward Britain were directed at
strengthening opposition to the government's policy on
German rearmament. Left-wing Labor opinion was apparently
singled out as the most promising field for exploitation.
The USSR directed an intensified campaign of con-
ciliation toward the Scandinavian countries in which the
most significant moves included Soviet naval visits to
Stockholm and Helsinki in July, the awarding of the Order
of Lenin to President Paasikivi on the tenth anniversary
of the Soviet-Finnish armistice in September, better treat-
ment of Swedish and Danish fishermen in the Baltic, and a
growing exchange of commercial, trade union and cultural
delegations.
Soviet bloc relations with Yugoslavia have improved
steadily since the summer of 1953, largely because of
Soviet initiative. There has been a decided relaxation of
pressure on the Tito regime. Apparently no serious attempt
has been made to entice Belgrade back into the Orbit, al-
though some maneuvers were apparently designed to arouse
Western suspicions of the Belgrade regime. This effort
seems to have the purpose of arresting the growth of
Yugoslav-Western co-operation and plans for Balkan defense,
and of demonstrating Moscow's desire to reduce tensions
and to recognize the independence of small powers adjacent
to the Orbit.
Policy toward the Middle East
Soviet actions in the Middle East were aimed at pre-
venting or at least retarding an American-sponsored regional
defense arrangement. Two sharply worded notes to Turkey and
Pakistan showed Moscow's displeasure over the incipient
Turkish-Pakistani military agreement. Despite these efforts,
Soviet diplomacy in the Middle East suffered two reverses
during July. The USSR. was unable to prevent Egyptian
acquiescence in an agreement for the return of British .forces
to the Suez base in the event of an attack on any of the Arab
League states or Turkey by a "third power." It also failed
to obtain assurances that Iran would not participate in the
Turkish-Pakistani military pact.
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By late autumn, there were increasing signs that the
Soviet leaders had decided to adopt a different a roach
toward Turke and Iran in particular.
ese ge ures were accompan e y a ser es o unu u y
friendly broadcasts stressing the "historical ties" between
Turkey and the USSR and the mutual benefits which would
result from close cultural and economic ties. On 2 December,
Moscow siwhich~hadelongwdisturbedsSovietglranian~relationscial
disputes
The Malenkov regime's attitude toward India seems
governed primarily by a desire to encourage India's aspira-
tions to play a moderating and mediatory role between the
two power blocs. Malenkov's special tribute to Nehru in
March was a good example of the play Soviet leositionato
been making far Indian sympathy with their opp
American policy in the Middle East, Southeast Asia, and the
F~;r East. Moscow made much of the Chou-Nehru "Five Principles"
as a key to relations between Communist and non-Communist
states,- Nehru was invited to visit the USSR, and Moscow
showed a growing interest in e~cpanding technical assistance
activities in India.
Policy toward the Far East
The Soviet leaders also undertook some important moves
to gain greater inf luence in Indonesia. The first Sovie t
ambassador, who arrived in Djakarta in September, has-been
l rou s o
i
ca
encouraging Indonesian cultural and techn
sit the USSR.
Soviet policy toward .Tapan indicated that the Soviet
leaders anticipate changes in Japanese policy in the direction
of an economic and political accommodation with the Orbit.
Moscow's and Peiping's actions during 1954 suggest that they
do not believe there are sufficient advantages to be gained
3.n the immediate future to justify meeting Japanese con-
ditions-for a resumption of normal diplomatic relations.
'1'~~.e Communist states are, instead, biding their time in the
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conviction that Japan's pro-Western policy-.most eventually.
fail. as a consequence of the logic off,economic and political
factors and. the rise of nationalisms
serious cleavage on world or Asian policy with the possible.
exception of differences over lines of action regarding
Formosa. In general, Moscow portrayed Peiping as the dynamic
"junior partner'.' in the Communist bloc, the Far Eastern leader
of the Communist movement and a-model for revolutions in
colonial and semicolonial Asian countries, and a rightful
participant in-major international deliberations.
Moscow's military policy on Asian .issues was reflected
~n Khrushchev's speech in Peiping and also emerged in a
major provision of the 11 October-communique covering the
scheduled withdrawal of Soviet troops from Port Arthur and
the return of-the installations there to China without com-
pensation by 31 May 1955. While this: provision is in part
a recognition of China's growing military capabilities, it
is also closely related to Moscow's desire to avoid involve-
merit in any. dangerous situation-created by any reckless
actians on.the part of Peiping and Moscow's reluctance to
extend any autom~;tic 'mi li ta,ry ~ ~commi tanents to China. :This
caution was also evident in Khrushchev's Peiping speech which
carefully avoided anything resembling a Soviet commitment of
support far China's claims to Formosa, promising only the
support of the Soviet "people" (not government). He made no
mention of the Sino-Soviet alliance in relation to Formosa,
and Malenkov, Molotov, and Voroshilov pointedly ignored the
Chinese ambassador's toast at the Chinese reception in Moscow
to China's determination to liberate Formosa. Since that
time, the most militant Soviet statement on-this issue has
.been a repetition of a Chinese assertion that the "Chinese
people" are strong enough to "liberate" Formosa.
Molotov's statement to a Japanese paper on 11 ,September
m~.de clean.. once again that the price 'f'ar any real concessions
was severance of Japan's ties-with the United States, This.
positaon was well summarized-in the 11 October joint Sino-
Soviet statement which demanded that foreign troops sh,~~.ild be
evacuated from Japan and .that Japan.should be allowed